THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEMETRIE LADON MAYFIELD, Defendant and Appellant. In re DEMETRIE LADON MAYFIELD on Habeas Corpus, 5 Cal. 4th 142

Opinion MOSK, J. Demetrie Ladon Mayfield awaits, at San Quentin Prison, execution of a judgment of death. A jury convicted him of two counts of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.) The jury found true the special circumstance alleged in each count: that defendant, in addition to one first degree murder, was convicted at trial of an additional murder in the first or second degree. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) At the conclusion of the penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to modify the verdict and entered judgment.

In the 24 hours following the killings, defendant was arrested for their commission. He confessed to them that day during an interrogation that was audiotaped. The next day he agreed to reenact the crimes. The reenactment was videotaped. Defendant’s taped description of the killings’ circumstances left no possibility of dispute at trial that he had shot and killed both victims and murdered the second of them. The only questions were whether the murder of the second victim was in the first or second degree, and whether the killing of the initial victim was murder or involuntary manslaughter.

The prosecution theorized that defendant had carried out two brutal executions. The defense contended that the first killing was an accident, hence involuntary manslaughter, and the second a rash impulse, hence second degree murder. The trial’s guilt and penalty phases together took 10 days. Facts A. Guilt Phase Facts. Early on the morning of February 3, 1983, police found the bodies of Ora Mae Pope and Edward Moreno in a shed adjoining the Pope residence. Both had just died from gunshot wounds. Within hours of the discovery, police arrested defendant at his home.

They also recovered a shotgun from the house of Patricia Harper, a friend of defendant. Defendant, a young man, had known Ora Mae Pope for about two years; her son Byron was a friend of defendant. But there was evidence that defendant was angry at the Pope family. Defendant had been arrested for the theft of the Popes’ 1968 Pontiac, and Byron Pope or his mother, or both, had decided to press charges against him. Defendant had been sentenced to a year in jail and was awaiting incarceration when he committed the killings.

The trial produced strong evidence that defendant had plotted the killing of Ora Mae Pope in order to exact revenge on one or both of the Popes, and that he had killed Edward Moreno because he witnessed Ms. Pope’s killing. There was evidence that before the crimes defendant told two witnesses he was going to kill Ora Mae Pope as revenge for the car-theft prosecution. The witnesses—defendant’s friend Glen Brooks, and defendant’s cousin Michael Taylor—denied having heard defendant say so. In turn, however, the prosecution introduced evidence of prior inconsistent statements (Evid.

Code, § 1235) in the form of taped telephone conversations. In one, Taylor told a detective that on the day of the killings defendant said he was going to kill Ms. Pope because of the car-theft charges. In the other, Brooks told the detective that he was present at Taylor’s house the day of the killings and had heard defendant say, “Man, I’m going to kill Home Boy’s mother.” In addition, Patricia Harper testified that defendant, just before the killings, had said something to the effect that Ms.

Pope and Edward Moreno were “going to get theirs.” Patricia Harper’s testimony established that the night of the killings defendant left her house and surreptitiously approached the nearby Pope residence. For a few minutes, apparently through the living room window, he spied and eavesdropped on Ora Mae Pope and Edward Moreno, who were sitting on the living room couch. When defendant returned to Harper’s house, he told her he was angry about what he had overheard.

As mentioned above, defendant gave a confession on February 3, 1983, which was audiotaped, and on February 4 he reenacted the killings and the events surrounding them on videotape. The tapes established that after the eavesdropping foray described in the previous paragraph, defendant obtained his 12-gauge shotgun, which he had previously sawed off, and went back to the Pope residence with two shells—all the ammunition he owned. With a screwdriver he removed the screen from a window in the Popes’ bedroom and pried open the window.

He crept through the bedroom into the living room, where he confronted Ora Mae Pope about the car-theft prosecution. Defendant aimed the loaded, cocked shotgun at her while the two discussed or argued about the car-theft charges. The gun discharged and killed her. Defendant then shot and killed Edward Moreno, seated on the same couch as Ms. Pope, because he was a witness to Ms. Pope’s killing. In his audiotaped confession, defendant gave two accounts of Ora Mae Pope’s death. While they were arguing or discussing the car-theft charges, Ms.

Pope leaned over to get a cigarette and defendant, with his finger on a hair trigger, accidentally discharged the gun; or she started to come at defendant from the couch and he shot her because he was scared or startled. Defendant dragged the two victims—Ms. Pope still showing signs of life, but Edward Moreno dead—to an outside storage shed. In a futile attempt to erase evidence of the shootings, he hosed blood off the pavement between the house and the shed, locked the house, and restored the rear window to its original condition.

He took the shotgun to Patricia Harper’s house, telling her he had shot the victims. “He said he did it,” she testified. “It slipped. He didn’t mean to. And then he had to. . . . He had to do the second one.” She also testified that defendant showed her the two spent shotgun shells, and that she permitted him to conceal the weapon on the premises.

Defendant then told Harper, in her words, that he was “going to go wait for Byron, too” and to “get Byron, too.” There was evidence that, carrying a towel-wrapped kitchen knife he had obtained from the Pope residence, defendant returned thereto to lie in wait for Byron Pope behind a nearby parked van. Pope testified that defendant approached him from the van and confronted him, the towel containing the knife wrapped around his arm. The two wrestled and defendant succeeded in forcing Pope to leave without entering the house. Defendant essentially confirmed this account in his taped statements.

After warding off Pope, defendant went home. Later that morning the police found him there. Defendant waived opening statement, did not testify, and did not present any witnesses. His defense consisted of the playing of the complete audio-taped confession—the prosecution had played only excerpts—and closing argument. At closing argument defendant’s counsel contended that the first killing was an accident and that the second was second degree murder.

He asserted that it was implausible defendant would have calculatedly lied to the police when he described the killing of Ora Mae Pope as an accident, but then forthrightly admitted he killed Edward Moreno to silence a witness. Defendant did not know the meaning of special circumstances or death eligibility; as far as he knew, when he was confessing to the police he was confessing to murder. In defendant’s mind, he threw himself completely on their mercy—in counsel’s words, he “put his neck in the noose . . . .” Therefore, counsel argued, the jury should accept that the first killing was an accident.

The defense acknowledged the existence of evidence of premeditation of that killing, but maintained that defendant had abandoned any intent to kill before his shotgun accidentally discharged. With regard to the killing of Edward Moreno, the defense conceded it was murder, either of the first or second degree, but contended that it was the latter because defendant had not had sufficient time to deliberate and form the specific intent to kill.

Defendant argued that if the jury agreed that Moreno’s death was murder but could not find it to be first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, it was legally bound to convict him of second degree murder. The prosecution emphasized its theory that neither version of defendant’s story that Ora Mae Pope’s killing was accidental was true: defendant had killed Ms. Pope purely for revenge. The prosecution also argued that the evidence showed the killing of Edward Moreno was deliberated and premeditated.

In answer to defendant’s claim that the shotgun had a hair trigger, at closing argument the prosecution invited the jury—which had access to the gun as a trial exhibit—to squeeze the trigger. B. Penalty Phase Facts. The prosecution introduced evidence of criminal activity involving the use or attempted use of force or violence (§ 190.3).

There was evidence that on October 9, 1982, defendant, angry at a former girlfriend who had broken up with him that day, fired a rifle round through her family’s living room window after saying to her, in effect, “If I can’t have you, can’t nobody have you.” There was also evidence that defendant had once or twice before threatened her by displaying to or pointing at her a gun, which may or may not have been functional. Another former girlfriend testified that on Halloween of 1982 defendant became angry with her and hit her in the face with his fist. Defendant’s sole penalty phase witness, Dr.

Craig Rath, a clinical psychologist, illuminated defendant’s background and character for the jury and offered other evidence in mitigation. Dr. Rath testified that defendant had “indicated considerable remorse [over the killings] in different ways at different times in [an] interview.” Defendant was moderately to severely depressed in jail, perhaps because of his actions; not all killers are. And Dr.

Rath was “personally stunned at the degree of rapport” that defendant had with at least five different jail guards—“they seemed to like him and he seemed to like them, [f] In addition to that, he appears to be in many ways a socialized person. He does respond to authority in many ways, follows rules more than he breaks them, and he would be, of the inmates I have seen, he would be among the easier to handle.” Through Dr. Rath’s testimony the defense introduced the evaluation of Dr.

Guy Hunt, a neurologist, that “the crime of which he is accused is out of character and can be explained only on the basis of definite cerebral impairment due to alcohol and drug abuse.” According to Dr. Rath, the killings were the culmination of a deterioration in defendant’s personality that had been occurring for some 18 months. Dr.

Rath described rather briefly defendant’s family structure and background, his relationship with the girlfriend into whose house defendant had allegedly fired, defendant’s history of drug abuse and the possible cognitive effects thereof, defendant’s work background, and defendant’s “long history” of health problems, including poorly controlled juvenile onset diabetes mellitus. Dr. Rath stated that defendant’s friend Patricia Harper did not believe at first that defendant had killed, because in her view “it seemed out of character for him” (the psychologist’s words). Dr.

Rath told the jury that defendant had an inadequate education and was “[i]n many ways” “dull” and basically “in the low average range of intelligence” as a result of an emotionally deprived childhood. Finally, counsel asked Dr. Rath to say whether he thought the crimes were out of character for defendant. Dr. Rath replied, “The jury has already decided what happened in their own minds, and I’m not going to tell them any different. The only thing I would point out to them is that in my opinion what occurred is qualitatively different than most of defendant’s behavior for most of his life.

And one thing that seems to collaborate with it is extensive drug usage. What is commonly seen with that usage is deterioration in reasoning, judgment, and lack of insight, and so on. And what happened, whether it was exactly deliberate, as you have decided, or what, does seem to be out of character compared to almost all of his previous history.” (Paragraphing omitted.) In rebuttal, the prosecution called another psychologist, Dr. William H. Soltz, who had interviewed defendant once on each of the two days following the killings. Dr.

Soltz concluded that defendant intended to kill and planned the crimes “very affirmatively.” Dr. Soltz also stated on the basis of the interviews that defendant “had a plan [to get Ora Mae Pope to drop the charges]. He executed it in getting in the house. He had a gun to scare them, and it got out of hand and he shot them both. He killed her. He shot her, and once he shot her, he knew he had to shoot the other person.” Dr. Soltz concluded that the killings were consistent with defendant’s past reactions to bad situations. Dr.

Soltz also testified that defendant told him he had had only one can of beer the day of the killings and his mind was clear for all practical purposes. Defendant’s behavioral problems had motivated his mother to have him tested as an adolescent, apparently at the Loma Linda University Medical Center; a few days after the killings defendant’s mother told Dr. Soltz that defendant was “a very dangerous child,” possibly because that was the evaluation Loma Linda had made of him. Defendant told Dr.

Soltz that he was arrested at age 21 for attempted robbery, and mentioned his arrest for the theft of the Popes’ automobile. (The jury was instructed not to consider that testimony as evidence that defendant did attempt the robbery or steal the car.) Defendant impeached Dr. Soltz by eliciting concessions on cross-examination. He got Dr. Soltz to admit grudgingly that in another case in which the psychologist testified against a defendant represented by defendant’s counsel, his mental evaluation was wrong. He could have administered other tests to defendant but chose not to do so.

Defendant’s lack of an outward showing of “acute” remorse did not mean he did not regret what he had done, and Dr. Soltz could not tell the jury that defendant was not “damn sorry”—counsel’s words—for what he had done. Dr. Soltz did not have access to many records that might have been helpful; the written material on which he relied consisted solely of police records. Discussion I. Jury Selection Issues A. Inclusion of Jurors Philosophically Favoring Death.

Defendant contends that the court erred in denying his challenges for cause of 13 prospective jurors who were biased in favor of the death penalty and who, in defendant’s opinion, could not fairly weigh the factors that might be presented in mitigation. Defendant concedes, however, that he did not exhaust his peremptory challenges. We have held that a defendant must exhaust the peremptory challenges available to him to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause in order to preserve the issue for appeal. (People v.

Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 904-905 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712].) Defendant fails to offer any justification for his failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges, and did not indicate any dissatisfaction with the jury when sworn. Thus any claim of error is procedurally barred. (Ibid.) B. Exclusion of Jurors Expressing Doubts About the Death Penalty. Next, defendant contends the court erred in excluding jurors who expressed doubts about the propriety of the death penalty. He calls our attention to the exclusion of two venirepersons.

Jurors must be excused if their views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties in accordance with the instructions and their oath. (People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 712-713 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729], quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852, 105 S.Ct. 844].) Our review of the record reveals no error in the exclusion of the two venirepersons. Both declared that they could not vote for death under any circumstances and thus could not follow their oath. Hence they were properly excluded. (People v.

Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1261-1262 [270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) C. Creation of Guilt-prone Jury by Exclusion of Jurors Opposed to Death. Finally, defendant contends the exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty created a jury improperly predisposed toward guilt. He acknowledges that we have held that those who would always vote against death yet profess impartiality with regard to guilt do not constitute a cognizable class whose exclusion offends the federal or state Constitutions. (People v.

Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 956-957 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214].) We have not changed our view, and decline to revisit the question. II. Guilt Phase Issues A. Validity of Miranda Waiver. As stated above, the day of defendant’s arrest the San Bernardino police interviewed him regarding the crimes. The interview was tape-recorded. Before giving his statement, the interviewing detective—possibly showing defendant the written text of the warning required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]-read the text to defendant.

The text was written in the first person—e.g., “Anything I say can and will be used as evidence against me in court.” Defendant then waived his Miranda rights, saying, as the written record reflects, “Yeah” and “Oh, I guess so” in response to questions about his willingness to waive them. In addition, the detective, aware that defendant was a diabetic, asked defendant at the beginning of the audiotaped interview whether he felt physically capable of being questioned. Defendant responded that he felt up to the task.

Because this issue will become important when we consider defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, we set forth defendant’s colloquy with his interrogator on this topic: Detective Anderson: “. . . My name is Dave Anderson. This is my partner, Steve Jarvis, and I need to talk to you about some few things. “But first I need to see how you’re doing. “You were out to the hospital, right? Did you see a doctor out there?” Mr. Mayfield: “Yeah.” Detective Anderson: “Did he give you like a prescription or something or some medication for your, for your stomach?” Mr.

Mayfield: “He didn’t give me my medicine yet, so I don’t know.” Detective Anderson: “Okay. How you feel? When was the last time you had your medicine?” Mr. Mayfield: “It was yesterday. I didn’t take it this morning. I’m supposed to take it every day.” Detective Anderson: “You’re supposed to take it every day?” Mr. Mayfield: “But I didn’t take it this morning.” Detective Anderson: “When was the last time you had it?” Mr. Mayfield: “Yesterday.” Detective Anderson: “About what time?” Mr. Mayfield: “8:00 [a.m.].” Detective Anderson: “Okay. How are you feeling right now?” Mr.

Mayfield: “[Unintelligible.] That’s all, no.” Detective Anderson: “Otherwise you’re . . . .” Mr. Mayfield: “Yeah.” Detective Anderson: “There’s no problem with you talking to us and stuff? You feel up to that?” Mr. Mayfield: “Yeah.” Before trial defendant sought a ruling on the tapes’ admissibility. He questioned the Miranda waiver’s validity, contending that the interviewing detective’s failure to explain his Miranda rights in the second person before questioning began made the warnings confusing and therefore his waiver was not knowingly and intelligently given.

Court and counsel listened to the audiotape, which contained the reading of the Miranda warnings. The court concluded that the use of “I” rather than “you” did not confuse defendant, and ruled that the tapes could be used as evidence notwithstanding the claim. The court wondered, however, whether the videotape was such powerful evidence that the standard Miranda warning did not suffice to warn defendant of the tape’s incriminating effect.

Defendant now contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress the audio and video versions of his confession and reenactment of the crimes because the audiotape was made involuntarily and therefore was inadmissible, and because the videotape was inadmissible as the poisoned fruit of the audiotape.

Three bases for the contention regarding the audiotape are offered on appeal: that the interviewers did not give defendant, a diabetic, insulin even though they knew he needed it; that they unlawfully induced or coerced him to make the incriminating statements; and that defendant’s waiver was invalid because grudgingly given. Defendant did not raise the medical ground at trial as a ground for excluding the audiotape and videotape as involuntary. Nor did he raise his present contentions that the audiotaped statement was involuntary because it was made as a result of an improper inducement (see People v.

McClary (1977) 20 Cal.3d 218, 228-229 [142 Cal.Rptr. 163, 571 P.2d 620]) and that he never waived his Miranda rights ab initio because his response was grudging at best and therefore involuntary. Because he did not raise them at trial, his claims of involuntariness on those grounds are not preserved for appeal. (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 519 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) Defendant also renews his contention that the Miranda waiver was invalid because the detective’s use of the first person rather than the second in reading defendant his rights was confusing. This claim is preserved for appeal.

We find it meritless, however. The interviewer told defendant, “I have to read you your Miranda warning rights. ... [f] I’m going to read them off of this waiver form here.” Then, after reading from the sheet of paper, the interviewer said, “You’re being charged with, with two counts of murder. Okay? [1] With those rights in mind, do you want to talk to me . . . ?” The trial court’s determination that the Miranda waiver was valid raises a predominantly legal question subject to independent review on appeal. (People v.

Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 649 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].) Under this standard and in light of the record quoted above, we do not conclude that the trial court erred. The use of the first person cannot have been confusing; it was obvious whose waiver was being sought. It is also plain that the interrogator’s preliminary and follow-up questions provided an adequate context to make clear to defendant that it was his rights he was waiving. Thus we conclude defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.

As for whether the use of a videotaped reenactment requires a more elaborate warning of the possibly incriminating effect than the standard recitation of the rights to remain silent and to counsel, we have discovered no authority for the proposition that the law requires a more elaborate warning than the Miranda formula. The Miranda rule assures that defendants knowingly waive specific constitutional rights. The degree of prejudice to defendant arising from that waiver is not a question of constitutional magnitude and is not a necessary basis for a knowing and intelligent waiver.

Finally, defendant’s contention that the videotape should have been suppressed as the poisonous fruit of the audiotape is not preserved for appeal, as he failed to raise that claim at trial. (People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 383 [85 Cal.Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961].) It obviously fails on the merits in any event, given our determination that the initial waiver was valid. B. Ability to Waive Counsel’s Presence at Arraignment. On February 7,1983, defendant was arraigned on charges of two counts of murder (§ 187). No special circumstances were alleged in the complaint.

Defendant waived his right to counsel at the arraignment. On February 22, 12 days after counsel for defendant was appointed, the complaint was amended to charge a special circumstance of multiple murder. Defendant waived his right to formal rearraignment. Defendant suggests his unwaivable right to counsel at arraignment in a capital case (§ 987, subd. (b)) was violated because the prosecution withheld the special circumstance allegations from the original complaint so as to avoid the mandatory provision of counsel at the original arraignment. Citing Hamilton v.

Alabama (1961) 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 [7 L.Ed.2d 114, 116-117, 82 S.Ct. 157], he also contends that the procedure violated the federal Constitution because it deprived him of counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings. If he had counsel, defendant maintains, he would have been able to consider pleading guilty to the two noncapital murder charges and thereby avoided his death sentence, and that he would have had an earlier opportunity to investigate a defense of lack of intent to kill because of intoxication or disease. We are not persuaded.

Defendant was not capitally charged when first arraigned; therefore subdivision (

b) of

section 987 did not apply. And defendant’s suggestion that the prosecutor acted so as to leave him without the benefit of counsel is purely speculative. Furthermore, it appears that defendant is claiming the pleadings should have conferred a sort of dual status on him, to his benefit in each case: that as a noncapital defendant he could have pleaded directly to the charges, but as a potentially capital defendant his right to counsel was not waivable. Defendant cannot claim the benefits of such a dual status; as we have just stated, he was not capitally charged when first arraigned.

We emphasize that the prosecution should never manipulate the pleadings to deny a defendant an unwaivable right to counsel. But the record is devoid of evidence of any such manipulation. Nor do we perceive what would be gained by any such attempt. If the prosecution proposes to refuse to negotiate a plea bargain it can do so whether or not a defendant is represented by counsel.

Defendant also claims that the harm resulting from the failure to appoint counsel was particularly severe because after his arraignment he was taken to another court and, without counsel, pleaded guilty to a battery against a former girlfriend. But the judgment of conviction itself was never used against him in this case. (See pt. III.F., post.) Therefore, no harm would have occurred even if error had. Nor do we find merit in defendant’s constitutional argument. Hamilton v.

Alabama, supra, 368 U.S. 52, is distinguishable: The petitioner there claimed he was denied counsel at arraignment, not that he should not have been permitted to waive counsel. Defendant makes no claim that his waiver was in any way involuntary, so no constitutional error appears. C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase and thus was deprived of a right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and a similar right under

article I,

section 15, of the California Constitution. The record, to which we are limited in considering defendant’s direct appeal (see People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 557-558 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171]), shows otherwise. Defendant contends that counsel was deficient in the following particulars: 1. He failed to invest the time necessary and the money available to prepare an adequate defense, and some of the specific inadequacies appear on the face of the record. 2. He failed to challenge the voluntariness of the audio- and videotapings of defendant’s confession to and reenactment of the killings. 3.

He told the jury that his client was guilty of the first or second degree murder of Edward Moreno, and thereby abandoned his client. 4. He failed to interview Patricia Harper, Michael Taylor, or Glen Brooks, all prosecution witnesses who had ties to and were sympathetic to defendant. 5. His playing of the entire audiotape of defendant’s confession was extraordinarily damaging to his client. 6. He failed to ask for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. 7. He failed to raise the issue of temporary insanity. 8. He failed to present an adequate closing argument. 9.

He failed to object to the prosecutor’s contention, at closing argument, that defendant had expressed no remorse over the killings, and to a statement that the jury could consider the manslaughter charge only if there was no evidence of murder. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance under either the federal or state Constitutions, a defendant must show (1) deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and (2) prejudice under a test of reasonable probability. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v.

Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) Defendant fails to do so. We turn first to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge adequately the admission of the audiotape and videotape. We will not address the question of deficient performance, for, as we explain, we discern no reasonable probability that the result would have varied had counsel raised the claim that the confessions were involuntary. We agree with defendant that the playing of the audiotape and videotape gave the prosecution very strong evidence of guilt.

Moreover, they tended to negate any claim that defendant was under the influence of drugs or affected by his diabetes at the time of the crimes. Nevertheless, defendant bears the burden of showing a reasonable probability that but for the asserted errors of counsel, the result would have been different. (People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218.) We conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the court would have granted a motion to suppress the taped evidence on grounds of involuntariness had counsel made such a motion.

The record on appeal strongly suggests that defendant was in possession of his faculties when the authorities recorded him on audiotape and videotape. His manner was rational, he assured the interrogator that he was well enough to proceed, and he showed no symptoms of confusion or illness. (See also pt. IV.D., post.) Nor does the bare record, including our own review of the audiotape and videotape, yield any clue that the authorities coerced a grudging Miranda waiver from defendant (see pt. II.A., ante), or obtained the evidence by, an improper inducement.

With regard to the first point, we do not perceive that physical coercion was being applied to defendant when he made his statements. Nor was the confession rendered involuntary as a matter of law because the police threatened to quit listening to defendant. The police were entitled to do so. Their remark, about a course of action they could legally follow, was not sufficiently coercive to make the subsequent statement involuntary. (See U.S. v.

Pelton (4th Cir. 1987) 835 F.2d 1067, 1072-1073.) With regard to the second, there was no inducement that might have made defendant’s statement involuntary as a matter of law: the police did not offer defendant anything. (See People v. McClary, supra, 20 Cal.3d 218, 228; cf. id. at p. 229.) We therefore reject defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal to the extent they dwell on counsel’s alleged failure to challenge the voluntariness of the statements contained in the tapes the jury heard or saw.

Nor do defendant’s other claims establish ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the appellate record. We cannot agree that counsel performed deficiently in failing to try to interview Patricia Harper, Michael Taylor, or Glen Brooks, in failing diligently to secure funds and spend time to develop the defense, or in playing the audiotaped confession.

The record does not illuminate the basis for the challenged acts or omissions, and therefore “ ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ the claim on appeal must be rejected.” (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212].) Neither premise of the foregoing rule was met; we therefore reject the claims. The same reasoning applies to the alleged failure to raise a defense of temporary insanity or to seek a voluntary manslaughter instruction; we therefore reject those claims as well.

We turn to defendant’s contentions that counsel’s closing argument amounted to the abandonment of his client because he conceded that Edward Moreno’s death was murder, and that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s contention at closing argument that defendant had expressed no remorse over the killings. Our review of the record does not persuade us that the closing argument amounted to an abandonment of defendant. To the extent defendant is arguing that it is necessarily incompetence for an attorney to concede his or her client’s guilt of murder, the law is otherwise. (People v.

Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149].) The record does not show that counsel ignored any express wish on defendant’s part to present an active defense with regard to that count. (Cf. People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 856-857 [258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270].) To the extent defendant is arguing it was an incompetent tactical choice, we disagree.

It was not unreasonable to seek to avoid the death penalty by seeking a conviction on one count of second degree murder and one count of involuntary manslaughter on a plausible theory, when the prosecution’s evidence put defendant at grave risk of two first degree murder convictions. As we have said before, candor may be the most effective tool available to counsel. (People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1060-1061 [5 Cal.Rptr .2d 230 [824 P.2d 1277] [counsel conceded that whoever shot one particular victim had the intent to kill]; People v.

Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 415 [276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]; People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 292-293.) Nor do we conclude that as a general matter closing argument was ineffective. It bears reemphasizing that the evidence against defendant was highly incriminating. Counsel attempted at length to convince the jury that at least the killing of Ora Mae Pope was an accident. He labored to persuade that Edward Moreno’s murder stemmed from a rash impulse rather than a calculated decision. Counsel “attempted] to make the best of a bad situation,” given his very limited options. (People v.

McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1187 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146]; see also People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 531-532 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 1011].) Finally, we treat defendant’s ninth claim—that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain aspects of the prosecutor’s closing argument— immediately below. As will appear, we are unpersuaded that prejudice could have resulted from any error; therefore, counsel was not legally ineffective. D. Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct. Defendant contends that the prosecutor twice committed misconduct at closing argument.

First, defendant argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to assert that no remorse was shown. Second, defendant maintains it was misconduct to imply to the jury that a conviction of involuntary manslaughter for Ora Mae Pope’s death was only possible if it could not return a verdict for second degree murder. We are not required to address such contentions on the merits because, as defendant acknowledges, the issue has been waived: counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s remarks and it appears that an admonition would have cured any potential harm. (People v.

Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) Nevertheless, we will do so in response to defendant’s claim that the failure to assign misconduct constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].) It will be recalled that a mainstay of the defense was a theory that defendant killed Ora Mae Pope by accident. The prosecutor reminded the jury of defendant’s contention, and urged its rejection.

The prosecutor argued that the evidence pointed away from any suggestion of an accident, including defendant’s own words as heard and seen on the tapes. In so doing, the prosecutor asked, “How about remorse? Has the defendant expressed remorse for this accident? What does he do after he kills Mrs. Pope that he says is an accident?” The prosecutor then interpreted defendant’s behavior on returning to Patricia Harper’s house after the killings. “And what are his last words to Pat Harper as he leaves the house? Is it, ‘My God, what have I done? What am I going to do?’ No.

His last words . . . were, ‘Now I’m going to get Byron, too.’ [1] There wasn’t any remorse. . . .” Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s words were a constitutionally impermissible comment on his failure to testify at trial. (Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 [14L.Ed.2d 106, 110, 85 S.Ct. 1229].) Not so. We review the comment to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would be misled about the inference to be drawn from defendant’s silence. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) No such conclusion is possible.

The remarks, viewed in context, cannot be seen as other than a fair comment on the state of the evidence that falls outside the purview of Griffin (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 446 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388]). If defendant’s shooting of Ora Mae Pope was an accident, then why, the prosecutor wondered rhetorically, did defendant behave as the evidence suggested he did after the event? The issue is very similar to that presented in People v.

Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585], There too, albeit at the penalty phase, the prosecutor commented on the defendant’s lack of remorse, saying he had not expressed any such sentiment after he killed. (Id. at p. 312.) We held that the prosecutor’s comment “was simply a reference to defendant’s callous behavior after the killing.” (Id. at p. 313.) In Breaux, of course, the prosecutor’s comment was addressed to the defendant’s character; here it was addressed to the type of homicide defendant committed. But the difference is insignificant.

We note, too, that the jury was instructed prophylactically not to consider defendant’s failure to testify. The prosecutor also told the jury that if he failed to prove the elements of murder, then it could still convict defendant of the lesser included crime of involuntary manslaughter. “But... we only get to that point if there is no evidence or no proof of first or second degree murder. If there is, then it’s the greater crime.” The comment, and similar comments the prosecutor made immediately after, were incorrect.

Obviously, if the prosecution did not provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed murder, the jury was required to acquit him thereof. (§ 1097.) But the court, after informing the jury that “we come to that part of the trial where you are instructed on the applicable law” and that “You must accept and follow the rules of law as I state them to you,” instructed the jury that if it was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed murder, it could then turn to the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter to determine whether the evidence sufficed to establish his guilt of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v.

Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1236-1237 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1].) The court’s instructions, not the prosecution’s argument, are determinative, for “We presume that jurors treat the court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.” (People v.

Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663, fn. 8.) Given the instructions provided here, we discern no reasonable likelihood (id. at p. 663) that the prosecutor’s statements would have misled the jury; therefore defendant fails to demonstrate any prejudice arising from the failure to object. E. Claims of Carlos and Another Intent-related Error. Defendant contends the jury was not properly instructed that a special circumstance finding requires a finding of intent to kill as required by Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862] (Carlos). We reject the claim.

Defendant admitted in the videotaped interview that he was solely responsible for the victims’ injuries. “As we held in People v. Anderson [(1987)] 43 Cal.3d [1104,] 1147 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], ‘The court must instruct on intent to kill as an element of the . . . special circumstance when there is evidence from which the jury could find [citation] that the defendant was an aider and abetter rather than the actual killer.’ Here, all the evidence showed that defendant . . . actually killed [his victims]. . . ; there was no evidence that he was an aider and abetter.

Accordingly, the court did not err in failing to instruct on intent.” (People v. Hamilton (1988) 46 Cal.3d 123, 142-143 [249 Cal.Rptr. 320, 756 P.2d 1348], fn. omitted.) People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306] applies retroactively to murders committed before the decision in Carlos. (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 840 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865].) The murders occurred in February 1983; Carlos was filed December 12 of that year. Therefore defendant’s claim lacks merit.

Defendant also contends that the court confused the jury to his detriment by giving an instruction that implied specific intent was required to prove murder of either the first or second degree. The court stated, “The crime of murder requires the specific intent to kill unlawfully.” The instruction, in defendant’s view, encouraged the jury to believe that what defendant calls his reckless act sufficed to establish an intent to kill and thereby removed the issue of intent from the jury’s consideration.

We do not agree with defendant’s contention, for we believe that the instruction could only have benefitted defendant. In our view the only reasonably likely

interpretation the jury could have made of it (People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663) is that murder of either the first or second degree requires the specific intent to kill. Thus any error would have been harmless. (See People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 57, fn. 26 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].) F. Failure to Caution Jury on Role of Note-taking. Defendant contends the court erred in failing to caution the jury to pay attention to the trial and not become overly absorbed in note-taking. (See People v.

Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724, 746-748 [205 Cal.Rptr. 810 [685 P.2d 1161].) We note that although the trial court invited the jurors to take notes, it reminded them simultaneously that they should “keep in mind what you hear during the presentation of the evidence.” Even if this brief comment did not suffice to warn the jurors that they should not let their note-taking distract them from the task of judging defendant, we have explained since Whitt that the trial court is not required to give such an instruction. (People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 578 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 822 P.2d 418].) III.

Penalty Phase Issues A. Importing Guilt Phase Instructions and Improper Argument. During the guilt phase the court instructed the jury that it should not be influenced by pity for defendant or prejudice against him, nor should it be swayed by mere sentiment or sympathy. The court also instructed the jury to reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences. At the penalty phase, the court told the jurors they could consider guilt phase instructions if they found them to be applicable. 1. Jury’s Entitlement to Consider Sympathy.

Defendant contends that the jury was improperly instructed, via the guilt phase instruction, that it could not consider sympathy for him in weighing his fate—an error that violated state law and his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

He maintains that the error was compounded by the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument that “as the judge indicated to you earlier in the original instructions that he gave you, any decision that you make [in] this case must be based on a conscientious and objective consideration of both the facts and the law, and you should not make your decision based on any sympathies or passions or prejudices or emotions, either for the defendant or against him.” We do not find it reasonably likely (People v.

Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 663) that the jurors were misled about the scope of their discretion in determining penalty. We thus reject the contention. We have reasoned that a jury will understand such an instruction does not foreclose compassionate evaluation of the mitigating evidence, but warns only against untethered emotion, bias, or outside pressure. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1225 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) The facts are similar to those we confronted in People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1 [252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249].

Malone’s jury also was told at the guilt phase not to consider sympathy in reaching a verdict, and then was told at the penalty phase to consider guilt phase instructions it found relevant. We held that, given the penalty trial’s focus on the defendant’s background and character, the jury would not have misunderstood that it could not consider sympathy in deciding punishment. (Id. at pp. 39-42.) We so conclude in this case. Sympathy was obviously at issue during the penalty trial.

The court instructed the jury that it could consider (1) whether the offenses were committed while defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, (2) whether the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law’s requirements was impaired by mental disease or defect or by intoxication, and (3) any other circumstances that might extenuate the crimes’ gravity, even though they might not be legal excuses for the crimes.

Indeed, in an abundance of caution the court instructed the jurors, in a significant and appropriate modification of former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (4th ed. 1979 bound vol.), that “If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstance [sic], you may impose a sentence of death.

However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.” (Italics added.) The instructions as a whole adequately signaled the jury that it could consider sympathy, a signal buttressed by the use of “may” in the modified instruction quoted immediately above—a device that further emphasized to the jurors the normative nature of the decision they were to make. To be sure, in People v.

Malone, supra, the prosecutor stated that the jury could consider sympathy (47 Cal.3d at p. 41); here the prosecutor incorrectly stated the opposite. The prosecutor’s comment, viewed in isolation, misstated the law and we cannot endorse it. We have held that each juror may assign whatever sympathetic value he or she will to each relevant factor, including those in mitigation. (People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541 [220 Cal.Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], revd. on other grounds sub nom. California v.

Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837].) But we have already explained that we presume the jury understands the court’s instructions to be statements of the law by a judge, and the prosecution’s argument to be an advocate’s attempt to persuade. (Pt. II.D., ante.) Moreover, the nature of the penalty trial itself vitiated the comment’s effect, for, as we have stated, the defense at the penalty phase was designed to elicit sympathy for defendant in light of his background and medical history. In fact the prosecutor’s argument, taken as a whole, did not urge the jury to disregard sympathy.

He reviewed the relevant statutory aggravating and mitigating factors seriatim. He argued that the circumstances of the crime should be considered in aggravation, as should be defendant’s relevant prior criminal activity. He argued there was no extreme mental or emotional disturbance, but did not say the absence thereof was a factor in aggravation. He conceded that the absence of prior felony convictions and defendant’s age were basically factors in mitigation, though the latter was not unequivocally so.

He said that defendant’s ability to appreciate the nature of his conduct and conform to the law’s requirements might have been impaired by mental difficulties—though the prosecutor disagreed that the evidence led to any such conclusion. And he acknowledged the “evidence of extenuation” of the gravity of the crimes presented by Dr. Rath, evidence showing “possibly some extenuating circumstances,” although he argued, to use his prefatory expression, that evidence of that factor “really is not present.” There was nothing inherently improper in the prosecutor’s approach. (See People v.

Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 152-154 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.), vacated and remanded sub nom. Bacigalupo v. California (1992) 506 U.S. _ [121 L.Ed.2d 5, 113 S.Ct. 32].) Moreover, each of the mitigating factors to which the prosecutor referred naturally touched on sympathy. And the prosecutor did not object when defense counsel stated at closing argument, “So you are not in a rigid situation. You don’t have to count up these factors and you don’t have to say, ‘Well, I would like to give him life; I have the power to do that.

But the law prevents me from doing it.’ [][] The law does not prevent you from doing it.” Given the record described above, we conclude that the proceedings did not mislead the jury about its role. We find no reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood they could not consider sympathy for defendant’s background, in particular his medical difficulties. 2. Instruction to Disregard the Consequences. A guilt phase instruction also told the jury to reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences. The instruction was not repeated at the penalty phase, nor should it have been. (See People v.

Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 43-44.) Defendant contends that the court’s instruction at the penalty phase to consider relevant prior instructions undermined an asserted duty on the jury’s part to consider the consequences of its action. We see no reasonable likelihood (People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 663) that the jury would conclude it should disregard the consequences of its decision. The court instructed the jury to “consider[] the arguments of counsel” in reaching a penalty verdict. Both parties reminded the jury of the gravity of its role.

The prosecutor stated, “Certainly we recognize that that kind of a decision is a very, very difficult decision for anybody to render. And obviously nothing I say or anyone says can make that decision any easier for you.” Defendant’s counsel argued, “We are talking about the life or death of a fellow human being . . . .” He reminded the jurors that “each of you, ladies and gentlemen, has the power of the gift of life in your hands . . . .” Moreover, the entire focus of the penalty trial was the consequence to defendant of his crimes. Given that focus, defendant’s claim fails to persuade. 3.

Effect of Guilt Phase Instructions on Malice and Intent. Defendant contends that the giving of instructions at the guilt phase on malice and intent might have led the jury to believe it could not consider mental disturbance at the penalty phase. This contention is unpersuasive. The jury was told at the penalty phase that it could consider in mitigation any extreme emotional or mental disturbances it found, and moreover was told to consider, if applicable, any other circumstance that might extenuate the crimes’ gravity.

Given the penalty defense’s focus on defendant’s medical and emotional problems, we are not persuaded there is any reasonable likelihood (People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663) that the jury would import these guilt phase instructions for the limiting purpose defendant suggests in light of the penalty phase instruction. B. Instructions’ Restrictive Effect on Considering Mitigating Evidence. Defendant contends that certain instructions unconstitutionally restricted the jury’s ability to consider mitigating evidence. 1. Extenuation of the Crimes’ Gravity.

As described above, the jury was told it could consider any other circumstance that might extenuate the crimes’ gravity, even though the circumstance would not provide a legal excuse for the crimes. Defendant contends the instruction unconstitutionally restricted the jury’s consideration of sympathetic aspects of defendant’s background and character. The United States Supreme Court has held otherwise, concluding that reasonable jurors would not understand the instruction to restrict consideration of sympathetic background evidence. (Boyde v.

California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 381-382 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329-330, 110 S.Ct. 1190].) Defendant argues that Boyde is distinguishable on its facts because, among other things, the prosecutor in that case acknowledged that the jury could consider defendant’s character (id. at pp. 385-386 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 332-333]), whereas in this case the prosecutor told the jury to disregard sympathy. We have already explained that the prosecutor’s comment was insignificant in the context of the other instructions and the penalty trial as a whole. (See pt.

III.A.l., ante.) Hence we are unpersuaded that the distinction is material: even in light of the prosecution’s comment there is no reasonable likelihood (People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663) that the jury misconstrued the instruction to preclude any consideration of sympathy for defendant. 2. Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance. Defendant contends that by giving an instruction that the jury could consider in mitigation any extreme mental or emotional disturbance the court misled the jury that it could not consider such disturbances if of lesser degree.

Defendant also notes that the court, after the trial had concluded, referred to the absence of any extreme disturbance in denying his motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)). We disagree that the jury was misled by the instruction’s wording. For reasons we gave in People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 803-804 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330], the instruction that the jury could consider any circumstance in addition to those specified that might extenuate the crimes’ gravity leads us to conclude there is no reasonable likelihood (People v.

Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663) that the jury misunderstood the degree of disturbance, if any, it could consider. (See also People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 163 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561].) With regard to defendant’s contention that the court’s posttrial comment showed an undue focus on extreme disturbances, we note that the court also found no circumstances whatever that might have extenuated the crimes’ gravity. We believe the court’s comment shows that it saw no disturbance of a lesser degree that might have amounted to such an extenuation. 3. Age As a Factor in Mitigation or Aggravation.

Finally, defendant contends the jury should have been instructed that age could be considered only in mitigation, and that equivocal prosecution comments on the topic buttressed the instructional error, thereby making his penalty trial unconstitutionally unreliable. We have repeatedly rejected similar claims (e.g., People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1253 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210]) and decline to alter our views. Moreover, the prosecutor conceded that age was a factor that could be considered in mitigation. (See pt. III.A.1., ante.) C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase.

Defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the penalty trial. He is not persuasive. At the penalty phase as at the guilt trial, defendant bears the burden of showing ineffective assistance. He must show (1) deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness, and (2) prejudice under a test of reasonable probability. (In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 602-603 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, 822 P.2d 435].) As we will explain here and in our discussion of the habeas corpus petition, counsel’s effort to present a penalty defense was unimpressive.

Nevertheless, we conclude it did not violate the state or federal constitutions. 1. Quality of Closing Argument. Defendant contends that his counsel’s closing argument (1) distanced counsel from his client by remarking on his status as appointed counsel, (2) failed to mention factors in mitigation or stress the need for factors in aggravation to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) in general was perfunctory. We do agree that it was perfunctory, but find no prejudice.

Counsel began his closing argument by stating, “We are talking about the life or death of a fellow human being and, for that reason, I may become emotional.” He continued, “I thought about what I would say to you ladies and gentlemen and I read a quote from Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court. ... [1] He said, ‘The role of the defense lawyer should be, above all, to function as the instrument and defender of the client’s autonomy and dignity in all phases of the criminal process.’ [f] He said, ‘The right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests of his client.’ [1] . . . ‘It’s this kind of service for which the Sixth Amendment makes provision and nowhere is this service deemed more honorable than in the case of an appointment to represent an accused too poor to hire a lawyer, even though the accused may be a member of an unpopular or hated group, or may be charged with an offense which is particularly abhorrent.’ [|] So, ladies and gentlemen, recalling those words of Justice Brennan, I want to tell you that I’m proud to stand before you and make no apologies for it whatsoever, both as a lawyer and as a man, to plead for the life of a fellow human being.” Counsel’s curious reference to his appointed status appears to be of limited rhetorical value.

Its point is obscure. But clear by contrast was counsel’s summation of his mention of his appointed status: he was not just obligated but rather was proud to stand before the jury and plead for defendant’s life. We do not believe counsel made his reference to his appointed status to distance himself from defendant. (See also People v.

Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 987-988 [244 Cal.Rptr. 905, 750 P.2d 794].) If defendant is asserting that the defense’s closing argument was inadequate in principle because briefly made, we cannot agree: brevity and eloquence are not necessarily inconsistent. (See pre-Strickland cases: Kinnell v. State of Kan. (D.Kan. 1981) 509 F.Supp. 1248, 1252, 1254 [seven-minute closing argument did not show incompetence of counsel; “[t]he closing argument. . . indicates preparation on the part of counsel and his development of the self-defense theory”]; State v.

Gutierrez (1980) 1 Hawaii App. 268 [618 P.2d 315, 317] [court trial; decision to spend five minutes on closing argument was tactical and the record as a whole did not reveal ineffective assistance of counsel].) Contrary to defendant’s claim, defense counsel did mention defendant’s lack of prior felony convictions, the possibility that he was mentally impaired, and his age as factors in mitigation.

Counsel told the jury that defendant would die in prison no matter what penalty the jury prescribed—“The issue is how and when.” He told the jury that if a single member decided the evidence in mitigation justified the lesser penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, the law would sustain the verdict. Anticipating the jury’s likely desire to punish defendant severely, counsel described the dreary life defendant was destined to spend behind bars if given the lesser penalty, and that defendant would forever have to contemplate the acts he had committed.

To be sure, counsel did not argue that factors in aggravation must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but such an argument would be mistaken except as regards evidence of unadjudicated crimes (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 842 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]), a factor that in this case defendant contends to be and the court itself regarded as relatively minor. Moreover, it is evident that this point was adequately covered by the instructions to the jury: the jury was told that it must be satisfied that defendant committed the criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt.

We leave aside any further discussion of deficiency, because the question of prejudice is not close. The crimes were egregious, and therefore the case in aggravation was strong. The jury had just heard Dr. Rath’s mitigating evidence and must have had it well in mind. We discern no reasonable probability that had counsel delivered a stronger closing argument the outcome would have differed. (In re Marquez, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 602-603.) 2. Failure to Present Additional Mitigating Evidence. Defendant contends counsel was ineffective in failing to present additional mitigating evidence.

The speculative character of this claim is illustrated by defendant’s assertion that “Even if the testimony of doctors, relatives or friends might have been trivial in isolation, their cumulative effect [might] have altered the verdict in appellant’s favor.” Because the record does not illuminate the reasons for counsel’s decisions with regard to the presentation of evidence, the claim is better raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as defendant indeed did. (People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936; see pt. IV.E., post.) On direct appeal we reject it.

Defendant also maintains that counsel chose the sole defense witness, Dr. Rath, heedless of the risk involved. In defendant’s view, Dr. Rath’s testimony elicited extensive cross-examination that introduced damaging evidence of other instances of misconduct and a rebuttal case that included evidence defendant had committed the crimes coldly, rationally, and without remorse. We discern no deficient performance in the introduction of Dr. Rath’s testimony. As we have described above, Dr.

Rath tried to portray defendant as a young man buffeted by the vicissitudes of a harsh life replete with physical, mental and environmental challenges—all proper items for the jury’s consideration under

section 190.3. On direct appeal we will not question counsel’s choice to introduce such testimony—it was proper under an objective standard of effective counsel in light of the grim portrait of defendant the crimes themselves had painted at the guilt phase. 3. Other Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Defendant asserts that counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to try to exclude the evidence of unadjudicated violent acts committed against defendant’s former girlfriends; (2) failing to interview the former girlfriends; (3) failing to try to set aside defendant’s subsequent plea of guilty to a charge of battery on one of the girlfriends; and (4) failing to object to the prosecution’s use of hearsay evidence to prove defendant’s prior violent conduct.

These are tactical choices presented to us on a silent record; they are better evaluated by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and on direct appeal we reject them. (People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 936.) Finally, defendant contends we should find prejudice on the basis of ineffective assistance if “any substantial error” occurred because of the dire consequences of an adverse outcome at the penalty phase. We disagree. We have held that the standard of review of a claim of ineffective assistance is generally the same (see pt.

III.C., ante) for either the guilt or penalty trials. (See also People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1080.) D. Double-charging the Multiple-murder Special Circumstance. Defendant argues that his sentence must be reversed because the state improperly alleged twice the special circumstance of having been convicted of multiple murder in the same proceeding. We do not normally review a charging decision unless there is a claim that invidious discrimination caused it. (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 971 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571].) No such claim is advanced here.

We agree that one of the special circumstance findings must be set aside (id. at p. 955; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 191 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781]), but do not agree that the error requires reversal of the judgment. The jury could not have been confused about the number of victims, nor was it urged to engage in a mechanical counting of aggravating factors. (See People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 357 [253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289].) Defendant insists, in supplemental briefing, that this error requires reversal of the judgment because the prosecution’s penalty phase case was weak.

We do not agree with the premise of that contention: the case in aggravation was not weak. E. Quality of Evidence of Unadjudicated Violent Acts. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant’s unadjudicated violent acts against two former girlfriends. Defendant did not oppose the introduction of the evidence in the trial court. He now maintains on numerous grounds that his sentence must be reversed as a result of the introduction of the evidence. Defendant concedes that he did not oppose the introduction of the evidence. His claim thus is procedurally barred. (People v.

Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We see little point in treating the issues on the merits notwithstanding defendant’s claim, ante,

part III.C.3., that his counsel’s failure to oppose the introduction of the evidence amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Cf. People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d 522, 567.) We do not believe defendant’s counsel would have succeeded in keeping from the jury the substance of the violent acts, even if he could have suppressed certain purportedly hearsay testimony regarding the incident involving the discharge of a firearm (see fn. 6, ante) as inadmissible under the Evidence Code.

There is no doubt the introduction of evidence of defendant’s conduct plainly showed “criminal activity . . . which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use force or violence . . . .” (§ 190.3.) Defendant also contends that the court’s failure to instruct that the jury could not consider the unadjudicated prior criminal activity unless it unanimously found that the prosecutor had proved each element of the aggravating offense beyond a reasonable doubt violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and similar state constitutional provisions.

We discern no such violation. In People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1273, we determined that neither state law, nor “the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment[, or] the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” required such an instruction. In light of Gordon, we reject defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process claim. The Sixth Amendment contention also fails to persuade; indeed, “we have never held that the United States Constitution requires such an instruction—neither, to our knowledge, has any other appellate court in a reported decision.” (People v.

Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754, 811.) And “We reject the [state constitutional claims] at the threshold as not properly raised: defendant perfunctorily asserts the claim without argument in support.” (People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 945, fn. 9 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676].) Nor, contrary to defendant’s urging, do we require that the jurors put in writing their findings regarding the alleged criminal acts. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 490 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610].) F. Relitigation of Facts of Prior Violent Act.

Defendant contends that his conviction of battery required the exclusion of evidence of his battery of one of his former girlfriends. First, defendant concedes that he did not attempt to substitute the record of the conviction for the testimony given at trial. His claim is thus procedurally barred. (People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 960.) In any event, we have rejected similar contentions many times, and decline to reconsider the issue now. (People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 730 [274 Cal.Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215].) G. Propriety of Prosecution Psychologist’s Rebuttal Testimony.

Defendant argues that the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Soltz, the prosecution psychologist, was improperly admitted because it was the product of an involuntary confession. We have concluded, however, that the audiotaped statement and videotaped reenactment were not provided involuntarily. (See pt. II.C., ante.) The contention thus fails for want of a valid premise. H. Propriety of Prosecution’s Evidence Regarding Aggravating Factors. 1. Propensity for Violence. Defendant contends that the prosecution, over his objection, introduced through Dr.

Soltz’s testimony character evidence that was inadmissible because it was general in nature and did not relate to any statutory aggravating factor. The record reveals no objection on that ground. Rather, the prosecution’s rebuttal witness, Dr. Soltz, stated that defendant had been arrested for attempted robbery. Defendant found this testimony “misleading” because the alleged crime was never offered as aggravating evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. In other words, the objection was to improper rebuttal testimony.

Defendant moved for a mistrial and to strike the evidence; both motions were denied, but the court admonished the jury not to treat Dr. Soltz’s statement as evidence that defendant had indeed attempted to commit a crime; rather, the jury could consider the statements only in evaluating the quality of the psychologist’s opinion regarding defendant. The court’s admonition was adequate. 2. Claim of Improper Rebuttal. Defendant also maintains that Dr. Soltz’s testimony was improper rebuttal insofar as it reflected on defendant’s character and his lack of remorse.

We treat the first contention on the merits, for as we have explained, defendant raised it at trial. Defendant’s penalty phase witness, Dr. Rath, testified that the murders were out of character. The implication was that defendant, though troubled, was not as violent as the crimes would suggest. The prosecution was entitled to try to undermine defendant’s claim of good character with expert testimony that the crimes were in character. (People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1071-1072; People v.

Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 237 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302].) We understand defendant to claim that by eliciting Dr. Soltz’s statement, the prosecutor unconstitutionally called attention to defendant’s failure to testify at trial. (Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 615 [14 L.Ed.2d 106,110].) Defendant, however, did not object on any ground to Dr. Soltz’s statement that defendant appeared to show no remorse, much less on the ground of Griffin. And we discern no reason to conclude that an objection and subsequent admonition by the court to the jury would not have cured any harm.

Therefore we will not consider on appeal defendant’s contentions that the testimony was improper rebuttal under state law and amounted to a violation of due process of law. (People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 446.) I. Prosecutorial Conduct Regarding Defendant’s Medical Test Results.

In his supplemental brief on direct appeal, defendant raises a new contention: that the prosecutor committed misconduct by implying throughout the trial that defendant’s blood and urine had tested negative for the presence of phencyclidine (PCP), when in fact a lab test discovered after trial reveals that defendant’s urine had not been tested for that drug. He maintains this court should consider the issue to avoid additional habeas corpus litigation. We decline to do so. Defendant does not contend he objected to any of the prosecutor’s purported references.

The claim is procedurally barred on direct appeal because it was not raised in the trial court. (People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754, 786, fn. 7.) J. Reduction of Death Sentence to Life Imprisonment Without Parole. Defendant contends that as a matter of law the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating, and that we should therefore reduce his sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We cannot agree.

Defendant seemingly overlooks that the law permits the jury to consider in aggravation the circumstances of the crimes of which he was convicted at the guilt phase (§ 190.3, factor (a)): two first degree murders. We have already rejected defendant’s premise that the prosecution’s penalty case was weak. (Pt. III.D., ante.) Hence we must reject this claim too. K. Constitutionality of 1978 Death Penalty Law. As have many other defendants, defendant contends the judgment of death must be reversed because the 1978 death penalty law is unconstitutional on six specific grounds.

As we summarized them in another case, the grounds are that the 1978 law “fails: (

i) to distinguish which penalty phase factors are aggravating and which are mitigating; (ii) to exclude ‘non-statutory unspecified aggravating factors’; (iii) to require written findings of the existence of the aggravating factors supporting the death penalty; (iv) to require proof of each aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; (

v) to require jury unanimity on the dispositive aggravating factors; and (vi) to require proportionality review by the appellate courts.” (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86, 214.) We have rejected claims made on the basis of those grounds. (Ibid.) Defendant also asserts that the 1978 death penalty is unconstitutional for failure to require the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the proper punishment. We have rejected this claim as well. (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 341 [826 P.2d 274, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276]; see also People v.

Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 691 [as a general matter at least, the 1978 death penalty law is facially valid under the federal and California constitutions].) In supplemental briefing, defendant argues that

section 190.3 is unconstitutional in light of Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 U.S. _ [117 L.Ed.2d 367, 112 S.Ct. 1130]. He also contends the jury was unconstitutionally instructed in the language of

section 190.3. He incorporates by reference the opening brief of Miguel Angel Bacigalupo on remand from the United States Supreme Court’s decision to vacate and remand our previous decision in that case. (Bacigalupo v. California, supra, 506 U.S._[121 L.Ed.2d 5, 113 S.Ct. 32].)

Section 190.3 sets forth the criteria the trier of fact is to consider in deciding whether a death-eligible defendant shall live or die. In this case, the penalty jury was instructed on all the statutorily prescribed criteria. But the penalty trial focused on the three most relevant considerations: the circumstances of the crimes, prior criminal activity, and, in mitigation, considerations of background and character, including the possibility of emotional disturbance arising from drug use, diabetes, and a hard life. In his letter brief and by his incorporation of the brief on remand in People v. Bacigalupo, supra, defendant contends in essence that, by its vagueness,

section 190.3 and the instructions based on that

section violate the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of guided discretion in determining sentence in a capital case. He contends that the following criteria fail to satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s requirements for what he terms a “rational and reliable capital sentencing”: the circumstances of the crime; the presence or absence of prior relevant criminal activity; whether the crime was committed under circumstances of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and his age at the time of the crimes. (See § 190.3, factors (a), (b), (d), (i).) We disagree. In People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118], we stated, with regard to factor (

i) of

section 190.3, “Finally, defendant cites Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 U.S___ - [117 L.Ed.2d 367, 377-383, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1135-1140] in support of his contention that the age factor set forth in the standard penalty phase instructions is vague, thereby inviting arbitrary and capricious sentencing results in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Reversal on this ground is subject to a harmless error analysis. (Id., at 503 U.S. pp____[117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 379, 382-383, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1137, 1140].) Even assuming the age factor to be unconstitutionally infirm as contended, on the record before us we find no prejudice.” (See also People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499 [15 Cal Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100]; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 594-595 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142] [discussing § 190.3, factors (a), (b), & (i)]; People v.

Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160].) The same conclusion applies to the four sentencing criteria to which defendant objects. On this record, we do not believe that prejudice could have resulted from any error in relying on

section 190.3 and reading the challenged instructions. Neither the argument nor the instructions could have focused the jury on any impermissible consideration under that section. The three most relevant considerations—the circumstances of the crimes, prior criminal activity, and, in mitigation, considerations of background and character—were set forth starkly for the jury’s consideration. And as we have already stated, the prosecutor essentially conceded that age was a mitigating factor. (See pt.

III.A.l., ante.) Defendant’s supplemental letter brief points to no evidence, argument or instruction possibly giving rise to the consideration in aggravation of an impermissible matter. Defendant also contends, in keeping with his previous contention, that we have interpreted the statutorily provided range of aggravating factors a juror may consider so broadly as to make the death penalty unconstitutional.

He argues in essence that in decisions discussing death eligibility for murder committed while lying in wait, and reviewing the jury’s discretion to consider age and victim-impact statements at the penalty phase, we have failed to adopt a narrowing construction of

section 190.3, and therefore the statute does not guide the jury’s discretion as he asserts is constitutionally required by, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909], We decline at this time to reconsider the previous majority decisions in the areas of lying in wait (People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244]) or victim-impact statements (People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th 865, 959). And not least because the prosecutor essentially conceded in this case that age was a mitigating factor (see pt.

III.A.l., ante), we find unpersuasive defendant’s contention that the jury was given unconstitutionally excessive leeway to consider age as a factor in aggravation. L. Motion to Modify the Penalty. Defendant asserts that the court erred under state law in denying his application to modify the death sentence by failing to independently review the evidence to determine whether the jury’s findings and verdict were contrary to the law and evidence, and by failing to state the reasons for its ruling. He also contends

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