CHARLES GOOCH et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. HANK HENDRIX et al., Defendants and Appellants, 5 Cal. 4th 266

Opinion LUCAS, C. J. May an election be annulled on clear and convincing evidence of illegal voting when it appears the illegal votes affected the outcome of the election, but it cannot otherwise be determined precisely for whom the illegal votes were cast? We conclude the controlling statute, Elections Code

section 20024, authorizes the annulment of a contested election under such circumstances. Accordingly, we reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeal. I. Facts A. The Election On November 5, 1991, consolidated elections were held in Fresno County for school board positions in one high school and four elementary school districts.

Two positions were open on the Washington Union High School District Board, three positions were open on the Orange Center Elementary School District Board, two positions were open on the Pacific Union Elementary School District Board, three positions were open on the West Fresno Elementary School District Board, and two positions were open on the West Park Elementary School District Board.

The four elementary schools are “feeder schools” for Washington Union High School; voters in each elementary school district received a ballot allowing them to vote for candidates for openings on their respective elementary school district boards, as well as for the Washington Union High School District Board.

On November 19, 1991, the results of the elections were certified by the Fresno County Clerk as follows (the names of the winning candidates are capitalized): Orange Center Linda Andrews (short term) 103 Tim Sanders (full term position) 95 Sam Hearnes (full term position) 82 John Graham 65 Lilo Santellano 60 Gene Balthrop 56 Pacific Union Lawrence Cato 358 Rosemary Garcia 316 Roland Lawrence 189 Delbert Cederquist 175 Tami Gandy 80 Toni Nagai 70 West Fresno Hank Hendrix 306 Oscar Robinson 292 Tony Taylor 270 Charles Gooch 114 Nadine Otschkal 81 Nancy Jones 67 ' West Park Steve Franklin 93 Carrie Schoals 79 Ernest Morales 69 Ed Randolph 57 Washington Union Mel Sanders 1,015 Mary Bess 902 Frank Butterfield 744 Jim Coito 744 Lucky Archuleta 237 Grant Mitchell 209 B.

The Absentee Voter Campaign In July 1991, the Fresno

Chapter of the Black American Political Association of California (BAPAC) launched its Voter Education Project (VEP). The project was described by Mel Sanders, president of the Fresno

Chapter of BAPAC, in his October 1991 written report to the statewide annual BAPAC conference in Sacramento, as follows: “This project has targeted 13 seats of several of the smaller school district boards that serve the southwest urban area of metropolitan Fresno. The central strategy in the election involves a highly selective process of both voter registration and absentee ballot applications. With some $10,000 in cash, equipment and materials, we are projecting a landslide in seven of the elections and comfortable wins in the others.” Frank Revis, a BAPAC member, was appointed director of VEP.

Revis recruited his family members, BAPAC members and their families, and other nonmembers of BAPAC, as volunteers for the project. Some VEP workers were also paid. The trial court made the following findings of fact, among others, regarding the manner in which VEP’s voter registration and absentee ballot “strategies” were effectuated (numerical paragraph designations and references to trial exhibits have been omitted): “A BAPAC solicitor would visit registered and unregistered voters’ residences to ask the resident to sign a registration affidavit and an absentee ballot application for the coming election.

The prospective voter would be told that BAPAC would mail the executed documents to the Elections Clerk and, when the ballot was received from the Clerk by BAPAC, it would hand-deliver the ballot to the voter. “Paragraph Three of the absentee ballot application form which called for the address to which the voter wants the ballot to be mailed by the Clerk, was with a few exceptions, never filled out by the voter. In some instances the paragraph was preaddressed and signed by the voter.

In most instances, the application was left blank when the voter signed the application and [was] filled in by BAPAC later. “The BAPAC solicitor would take the executed documents to BAPAC headquarters where a BAPAC address would be written on the application form as the address to which the voter wanted the ballot mailed.

BAPAC would hand carry the registration and application forms to the Clerk. “When BAPAC received the absentee ballots from the Clerk, it would identify from its records the school district in which the voter resided; it would notify Voter Education Project workers, the candidate and/or [the] candidate’s workers to pick up the ballot for delivery to the voter.

Ballots were delivered to voters either by BAPAC members, volunteers, paid workers, or by the candidates themselves. “If a voter was not home when delivery of the ballot was attempted, a notice was left at the door asking the voter to call a BAPAC telephone number listed on the notice so the ballot could be delivered to the voter as soon as possible. “When a ballot was delivered, the voter was encouraged to vote in the presence of the solicitor. In some instances, the solicitor would offer to answer questions about the candidates or issues.

After the voter punched the appropriate number opposite the candidate names, the voter would place the ballot in the envelope, seal, sign and date the envelope and hand it to the solicitor. The solicitor would then return the envelope containing the ballot to BAPAC headquarters where it would be mailed to the Clerk. “Prior to the election, [VEP Director] Frank Revis and [BAPAC Fresno

Chapter President] Mel Sanders met with Susan Anderson, the Fresno County Clerk, and Norma Logan, the head of the Elections Division of the Clerk’s Office. One purpose of the meeting was to be sure the applications for absentee ballots being distributed by BAPAC conformed to law. Revis revealed that BAPAC had already obtained a large number of absentee ballot applications—by his own estimate, approximately 800.

A number of these applications were then examined by Anderson and Logan who raised concerns that someone other than the voter was completing the portion of the application specifying the address to which the ballot was to be sent (Paragraph 3). Revis’ attention was directed to Elections Code § 1006 which provides that the voter must ‘personally affix[]’ the address in Paragraph 3.

BAPAC chose to ignore this warning and to follow its own ideas about permissible absentee ballot application and mailing procedures. “During their meeting, Anderson and Logan sought some assurance from Revis that BAPAC was not a political organization and that the ballots would not come into the possession of any candidates. Revis assured them that candidates would not have access to ballots and that BAPAC was not sponsoring candidates. “Subsequently, 1,292 completed [absentee ballot] applications were submitted in which paragraph 3 specified one of two BAPAC addresses, 2017 Tuolumne or 9584 South Chestnut.

Anderson and Logan believed these applications did not comply with Elections Code § 1006 because the address in Paragraph 3 was not personally affixed by the voter. Anderson and Logan also suspected BAPAC was a political organization which should not receive absentee ballots under Elections Code § 1006. “BAPAC was unable to secure the ballots at 2017 Tuolumne, where it shared space with another entity, and so Revis filed a request with the postmaster that all absentee ballots sent to 2017 Tuolumne [were] to be held for pickup by BAPAC. No hold arrangement was made with respect to 9854 S.

Chestnut, though that address was a rural postal box, also incapable of holding and securing all the ballots. Eventually, all the absentee ballots sent to BAPAC addresses were delivered to 705 Mayer, the headquarters of the Voter Education Project [which was also Revis’ home address], “Absentee ballots were provided Defendants Mel Sanders, Oscar Robinson, Linda Andrews, Tim Sanders, Samuel Heames, Mary Bess, Lawrence Cato, Tony Taylor, Steve Franklin, and Carrie Schoals directly by the Voter Education Project for delivery to voters.

Lawrence Cato gave some ballots to Defendant Rosemary Garcia for delivery to voters.” C. The Elections Contest On December 19, 1991, respondents, unsuccessful candidates in the consolidated elections, filed suit to contest the election results pursuant to

section 20021. The complaint alleged: (1) appellants had given or offered bribes to electors; (2) appellants had committed offenses against the elective franchise; and (3) illegal votes were cast sufficient to change the results of the elections. Trial lasted five days, during which numerous witnesses testified and various documents were admitted into evidence.

In addition to the findings of fact set forth above, the trial court made further findings concerning evidence of fraud and tampering, and other violations against the elective franchise, respecting ballots that were ultimately disqualified by clerk’s challenge. These included, among others: That the testimony of one elector of the West Fresno/Washington Union School Districts established she had not signed the absentee ballot application, nor the envelope for the ballot, which had been sent to one of the BAPAC addresses and returned to the clerk with signatures purporting to be hers.

Another elector of those districts testified through an interpreter that a person came to his home, urged him to “sign for the schools,” and further advised him it was all right for his daughter to sign the absentee ballot application for him. The clerk’s record established the ballot had been processed through BAP AC’s VEP. That the testimony of an elector from the Orange Center/Washington Union School Districts established three people came to his home late one night, “told him for whom to vote,” and were emphatic that he not seal his ballot.

They returned when only his wife was home and, discovering he had not signed the ballot, instructed her to sign her husband’s name for him. This ballot was shown to have been processed through BAPAC. That testimony of an elector of the West Park/Washington Union School Districts established he never completed an application for an absentee ballot, but recalled someone coming to his door requesting he sign a petition for a free breakfast program. Election records showed an absentee ballot had thereafter been mailed, ostensibly on his behalf, to a BAPAC address.

That testimony of an elector of the West Fresno/Washington Union School Districts established candidate Mary Bess and Leroy Brown brought an absentee ballot to the elector’s home, and that Brown completed her ballot for her. The witness denied she had either consented to this procedure, instructed Brown to vote her ballot, or been consulted by Brown concerning the choices made on her ballot. The trial court’s written findings further noted the testimony of the manager of a local copy shop.

BAPAC representatives had requested his shop to reproduce a large number of what were purportedly sample ballots; he in turn informed them he could not print the document, suggesting they instead “contact the State of California.” The trial court concluded BAPAC was in fact “an admitted political organization,” that through the auspices of the VEP it had assisted defendant-candidates in their campaigns by providing and distributing materials and furnishing access to information concerning voters, and that “[t]his assistance was not provided all candidates and would have been denied certain candidates even if requested.

In this manner, BAPAC assisted in the election of defendants to non-political offices.” In addition to the certified election results reported above {ante, at p. 270), the following statistical facts, among others, regarding the illegal absentee ballots that were counted, and those which were disqualified by clerk’s challenge, were established from official election records and other testimony and evidence adduced at trial: The Fresno County Clerk Elections Department mailed a total of 1,292 absentee ballots to the BAPAC addresses.

Of those, 269 were never returned to the elections department in any form, and BAPAC was unable to account with any degree of reliability for the disposition of those 269 nonreturned ballots. Of the remaining 1,023 absentee ballots that were sent to BAPAC and returned to the elections department, 93 were disqualified by clerk’s challenge, 63 of those on the basis of invalid signatures. Based on the advice of county counsel and the office of the Secretary of State, the remaining 930 absentee ballots were removed from their envelopes and counted. As explained below, all 930 ballots were illegal.

It is now impossible to distinguish these 930 illegal absentee ballots from the remaining valid ballots cast in the consolidated elections. The percentages of illegal ballots cast in each of the school district contests (obtained by dividing the number of illegal-but-counted BAPAC ballots by the total number of ballots counted in each district) were as follows: Orange Center Elementary, 70/173 = 40 percent; Pacific Union Elementary, 310/632 = 49 percent; West Fresno Elementary, 369/509 = 72 percent; West Park Elementary, 76/176 = 43 percent; and Washington Union High School, 930/2224 = 42 percent.

The trial court determined there had been fraud and tampering with respect to the 93 ballots disqualified by clerk’s challenge. It further found the remaining 930 absentee ballots from BAPAC were cast in violation of sections 1006 (address to which ballot is to be mailed must be “personally affixed” by voter and may not be a political campaign headquarters) and 1013 (requiring absentee voter to personally mail or return ballot to official from whom it came or precinct board at any polling place), were therefore illegal, and could not be counted.

It recognized it could not determine with certainty how the illegal ballots were cast, and thus could not deduct the illegal votes from the defendants to see who received a majority of lawful votes for each office. (§§ 20024, 20087.) But the court, “after careful consideration of the competing factors,” including “the wholesale violation of the mandatory requirements of the absentee voting laws in this case,” concluded the evidence showed the great majority of illegal-but-counted BAPAC ballots were voted for the defendants, and had been sufficient to affect the election of many of them.

It annulled the consolidated elections pursuant to

section 20086, and ordered new elections held forthwith, concluding “[ajnything less, under these facts, would result in a loss of public respect for and diminution of the integrity of the absentee ballot process” and would “tend to encourage even greater abuse of the process in future elections.” The Court of Appeal found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s factual findings regarding the illegal ballots. It nonetheless concluded the results of the consolidated elections could not be set aside because it could not be determined for whom the illegal ballots were cast. The court focused on the command of

section 20024, which states: “An election shall not be set aside on account of illegal votes, unless it appears that a number of illegal votes has been given to the person whose right to the office is contested or who has been certified as having tied for first place, which, if taken from him, would reduce the number of his legal votes below the number of votes given to some other person for the same office, after deducting therefrom the illegal votes which may be shown to have been given to that other person.” The Court of Appeal reasoned, “Even assuming in these circumstances it could be calculated how many votes were cast on each illegal ballot, in what district they were cast and in what proportion they were cast, any attempt to apportion pro rata must still meet the test of

section 20024. [ft] It would be futile for this court to remand for further findings. It is clear from the findings and the record before us it would be impossible to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the illegal votes were cast for the contestees in this case, [ft] Indeed, it is obvious to this court it would be impossible in any multi-issue or multi-candidate primary or general election to determine the effect of illegal voting of the type and extent at issue here.

Once illegal ballots are cast and commingled with the legal ballots, they cannot be traced to reveal for whom they were cast.” The irony of this conclusion was not lost on the Court of Appeal, which concluded: “The violations of election laws pertaining to absentee balloting in this case were pervasive and significant, yet the very nature and extent of the illegal voting renders any remedy illusory. The court is constrained by the statutory limitation on the authority to annul and set aside the election based upon illegal votes.” II. Discussion A.

Standard of Review Strict rules embodied in the Elections Code govern a court’s review of a properly contested election. “ ‘It is a primary principle of law as applied to election contests that it is the duty of the court to validate the election if possible. That is to say, the election must be held valid unless plainly illegal. [Citations.]’ ” (Wilks v. Mouton (1986) 42 Cal.3d 400, 404 [229 Cal.Rptr. 1, 722 P.2d 187], quoting Rideout v.

City of Los Angeles (1921) 185 Cal. 426, 430 [197 P. 74].) There is an express legislative policy requiring liberal construction of absentee ballot provisions in favor of the absentee voter. (§ 1001; Wilks v. Mouton, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 404.) Of competing importance, however, is the principle that, “preservation of the integrity of the election process is far more important in the long run than the resolution of any one particular election.” (Fair v.

Hernandez (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [172 Cal.Rptr. 379].) To this end, we have observed that, “The policy in favor of upholding elections appears in the cases in conjunction with the rule that ‘[t]echnical errors or irregularities arising in carrying out directory provisions which do not affect the result will not [void] the election.’ (Davis v. County of Los Angeles [(1938)] 12 Cal.2d [412,] 426 [84 P.2d 1034] (italics added); Rideout v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 185 Cal. at p. 430; People v.

Prewett [(1899)] 124 Cal. [7,] 10 [56 P. 619].) Both the policy and the rule manifest the fact that ‘[c]ourts are reluctant to defeat the fair expression of popular will in elections. . . .’ (Simpson v. City of Los Angeles [(1953)] 40 Cal.2d [271,] 277 [253 P.2d 464]); neither has been invoked to uphold an election in the face of illegalities which affected the result—a situation in which the will of the people may be thwarted by upholding an election.” (Canales v.

City of Alviso (1970) 3 Cal.3d 118, 127 [89 Cal.Rptr. 601, 474 P.2d 417].) “ ‘The scope of review in an election contest is not different from other cases. Where the evidence is in conflict, [the appellate court] will defer to the trial court where events at trial and demeanor of the witnesses play an important

part in the decision.’ ” (Escalante v. City of Hermosa Beach (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1014 [241 Cal.Rptr. 199], quoting Fair v. Hernandez, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 874; see also Hardeman v. Thomas (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 153,166 [256 Cal.Rptr. 158].) “The contestant has the burden of proving the defect in the election by clear and convincing evidence. (Smith v. Thomas (1898) 121 Cal. 533, 536 [54 P. 71]; Hawkins v. Sanguinetti (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 278, 283 [220 P.2d 58]; Wilburn v. Wixson [(1974)] 37 Cal.App.3d [730,] 737 [112 Cal.Rptr. 620].)” (Wilks v.

Mouton, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 404.) “[W]e must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving such party the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving all conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citation.]” (Wilks v. Mouton, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 408, fn. 7.) And “[w]e are . . . bound by the trial court’s determination of the facts except to the extent that they are not supported by substantial evidence. (Wilburn v. Wixson, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 730, 737; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 278, p. 289.)” (Wilks v. Mouton, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 404.) B.

Section 1013 Illegal votes are votes which have not been cast in the manner provided by law. (Bush v. Head (1908) 154 Cal. 277, 281-282 [97 P. 512].) Illegal votes include votes by persons receiving their absentee ballots in a manner that violates election laws governing absentee balloting. (Hardeman v. Thomas, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 153, at p. 168.) As noted above, the Court of Appeal concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that counting the 930 absentee ballots violated the mandatory provisions of

section 1013. We agree.

Section 1013 provides, in pertinent part: “All absentee ballots cast. . . shall be voted on or before the day of the election. After marking the ballot, the absent voter shall either: (1) return the ballot by mail or in person to the official from whom it came or (2) return the ballot in person to any member of a precinct board at any polling place within the jurisdiction.

However, an absent voter who, because of illness or other physical disability, is unable to return the ballot, may designate his or her spouse, child, parent, grandparent, grandchild, brother, or sister to return the ballot to the official from whom it came or to the precinct board at any polling place within the jurisdiction. [<[[]... [<j[] The provisions of this

section are mandatory, not directory, and no ballot shall be counted if it is not delivered in compliance with this section.” In the present case, the 930 absentee ballots at issue were collected from the absentee voters by BAPAC and returned to the county clerk by BAPAC, a clear violation of

section 1013. The fact that BAPAC may have been given permission by the absentee voters to return the ballots on behalf of them does not satisfy

section 1013; in such instance the voter has not delivered the ballot to the official from whom it came or to a precinct board either personally, directly to such official by mail, or by one of the family members designated in the statute as authorized to hand-deliver the ballot when the voter is unable to do so because of illness or other physical disability. Accordingly, the 930 ballots delivered in violation of

section 1013 are clearly illegal and cannot be counted. (Rideout v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 185 Cal. at p. 430; Escalante v. City of Hermosa Beach, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 1009 [absentee referendum ballot returned by third party to city clerk’s office at absentee voter’s request, could not be counted]; Fair v. Hernandez (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 578 [188 Cal.Rptr. 45] [ballots must be returned personally by voter without use of another person or agent].) C.

Section 1006 An application for an absentee ballot must provide a space for the address to which the ballot is to be sent. (§ 1006, subd. (a)(2).)

Section 1006, subdivision (b)(1) requires that this information “shall be personally affixed by the voter.”

Section 1006, subdivision (b)(2) prohibits an applicant from entering the address of a political campaign headquarters as the address to which the absentee ballot is to be sent. The trial court found that in the majority of cases, the YEP “solicitor” filled in the information regarding the address to which the absentee ballot was to be sent for the voter, and that the address provided was that of BAPAC. Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support these findings.

The trial court also found that BAPAC was engaged in a political campaign through the YEP to defeat the incumbents in the consolidated elections, and that entering BAP AC’s address as the address to which the ballot was to be sent violated

section 1006, subdivision (b)(2). This finding, too, is supported by substantial evidence. In his 1991 report to the BAPAC statewide convention, Fresno

Chapter President Mel Sanders indicated BAPAC’s YEP “has targeted 13 seats of several of the smaller school district boards that serve the southwest urban area of metropolitan Fresno,” and that “The central strategy in the election involves a highly selective process of both voter registration and absentee ballot applications. . . . [W]e are projecting a landslide in seven of the elections and comfortable wins in the others.”

Section 1006 is silent as to whether its provisions are mandatory or directory. As the Court of Appeal properly concluded, however, the point need not be decided in this case; the 930 BAPAC ballots were cast in violation of the mandatory provisions of

section 1013, thereby rendering those ballots illegal. D. The Remedy As explained above, it is presently impossible to distinguish the 930 illegal BAPAC absentee ballots from the remaining valid ballots cast in the consolidated elections. Thus, it cannot now be determined with mathematical certainty how the illegal votes on the illegal ballots were cast. The trial court recognized it could not deduct the illegal votes from the defendants to see who received a majority of lawful votes for each office. (§§ 20024, 20087.) The trial court nevertheless concluded, “in light of the wholesale violation” of the absentee voting laws in this case—including (

i) the

section 1013 and

section 1006 violations, (ii) the improper involvement of BAPAC “solicitors” and candidates themselves in soliciting absentee votes (at least 4 of the 12 defendant-candidates were members of BAPAC; 11 of the 12 had been given BAPAC absentee ballots for delivery to the voters), (iii) BAPAC’s inability to account for 269 mailed absentee ballots which were never returned to the elections department in any form, and (iv) the fraud, tampering, and overreaching established with respect to the 93 ballots disqualified by clerk’s challenge—that the evidence showed the great majority of illegal-but-counted BAPAC ballots were voted for the defendant-candidates, and were sufficient to affect the election of many of them.

The trial court therefore annulled the consolidated election results and ordered new elections. In reversing that order, the Court of Appeal concluded that, “[e]ven assuming in these circumstances it could be calculated how many votes were cast on each illegal ballot, in what district they were cast and in what proportion they were cast, any attempt to apportion pro rata must still meet the test of

section 20024.” The court further stated its opinion that “it would be impossible in any multi-issue or multi-candidate primary or general election to determine the effect of illegal voting of the type and extent at issue here.”

Section 20024 provides, “An election shall not be set aside on account of illegal votes, unless it appears that a number of illegal votes has been given to the person whose right to the office is contested or who has been certified as having tied for first place, which, if taken from him, would reduce the number of his legal votes below the number of votes given to some other person for the same office, after deducting therefrom the illegal votes which may be shown to have been given to that other person.” (Italics added.) The Court of Appeal’s construction of the language of

section 20024 fails to heed the fundamental premise that a court must not “sacrifice the integrity of the [elective] process on the altar of electoral finality.” (Hardeman v.

Thomas, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 167.) We do not believe the Legislature intended that under circumstances such as these, where clear and convincing evidence established pervasive illegalities that permeated the election process, and where, although it cannot be determined on a vote-by-vote basis for whom the illegal votes were cast, it nonetheless “appears” the illegal votes affected the outcome of the election, a trial court is without authority to annul and set aside the election results within its discretion under

section 20086. Fundamentally, the objective of statutory

interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154]; People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].) In determining intent, we look first to the words of the statute themselves. (Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1007; Overstreet, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 895; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 40 [127 Cal.Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322].)

Section 20024 states an election shall not be set aside on account of illegal votes unless “it appears” a number of illegal votes were given to the election winner. In utilizing the phrase “it appears,” we think the Legislature contemplated circumstances, such as those at hand, in which illegal votes cannot be attributed to any one candidate, but nevertheless “appear” sufficient in number or effect to have altered the outcome of the election. In contrast, the Court of Appeal’s construction of

section 20024 reads the phrase “it appears” right out of the statutory language. Likewise,

section 20052, enacted at the same time as

section 20024, which sets forth the pleading requirements for election contests based on illegal votes pursuant to

section 20021, subdivision (d), provides that, “When the reception of illegal votes is alleged as a cause of contest, it is sufficient to state generally that in one or more specified voting precincts illegal votes were given to the defendant, which, if taken from him, will reduce the number of his legal votes below the number of legal votes given to some other person for the same office.” (Italics added; see Stats. 1961, ch. 23, § 3, p. 834.) Our

interpretation of

section 20024 is further supported by our decision in Canales v. City of Alviso, supra, 3 Cal.3d 118. In Canales, several electors of the City of Alviso brought an action to contest an election held to determine whether that city should be consolidated with the City of San Jose. The electors complained that the vote to consolidate passed only because (

i) the election board committed various acts of misconduct under

section 20021, (ii) Alvisans were thereby induced to vote in favor of consolidation, and (iii) several illegal votes were cast for consolidation. During trial on the contest, several votes were disqualified because the voters were nonresidents, or because city officials made illegal offers of consideration to prospective voters, including promises of improved city services in the event consolidation passed. These promises were in the form of contracts between the City of San Jose and the Alviso Improvement Corporation, an organization with close ties to the San Jose City Manager’s office.

The election results were 189 votes in favor of and 180 votes opposed to consolidation. (Canales v. City of Alviso, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 123-124.) Thereafter, 21 votes were challenged by the contestants. The trial court upheld the election after finding that “of the 21 challenged voters, 10 were disqualified by nonresidence in Alviso and one by virtue of a felony conviction; that of these 11 illegal votes, one was cast for and one against consolidation.” (Canales v. City of Alviso, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 125.) The court could not, however, determine how the remaining nine illegal votes were cast.

It therefore concluded the remaining nine votes should be apportioned by “tak[ing] half from each side—leaving a final tally of 1831/2 votes in favor and 174!/2 votes opposed to consolidation.” (Ibid.) Based on this conclusion, the trial court confirmed the election results. In reversing the judgment, we acknowledged that

section 20024 requires a showing that “illegal votes were sufficient in number to account for the result but also that illegal votes were cast in such a manner as in fact to determine the result.” (Canales v. City of Alviso, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 126.) Nonetheless, after noting that the only evidence as to how the remaining nine illegal votes were cast were the signatures of the voters on the “petition by virtue of which the election was held,” we concluded such evidence, albeit circumstantial, was admissible on the question (citing Robinson v.

McAbee (1923) 64 Cal.App. 709, 718 [222 P. 871]), that “[the] contestants met their burden as to the crucial nine votes,” and that “in the absence of any contrary evidence, the trial court erred in refusing to so find.” (Canales, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 126.) We observed in Canales that, “[t]he policy in favor of upholding elections appears in the cases in conjunction with the rule that ‘[t]echnical errors or irregularities . . . which do not affect the result will not [void] the election.’ [Citations.]” (Canales v.

City of Alviso, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 127; see discussion ante, at p. 278.) We further recognized that “neither [the policy nor the rule] has been invoked to uphold an election in the face of illegalities which affected the result—a situation in which the will of the people may be thwarted by upholding an election.” (Ibid.) We rejected the respondents’ claim that the election contestants’ evidentiary showing, which was largely circumstantial (illegal voters had signed a petition to put the consolidation measure on the ballot), was insufficient to establish that the election had in fact been affected by the illegal votes.

Opining that “a voter’s signature on a petition urging that an issue be put on the ballot so that a certain result may be obtained is circumstantial evidence which is admissible to show that he in fact voted in favor of that result [Citation],” we concluded that the “[respondents had the same . . . opportunity to ask voters how they voted, but did not cross-examine the witnesses who testified that they signed the petition or favored consolidation to attempt to rebut [contestants’] circumstantial showing that the witnesses voted in accord with their signatures on the petition. [1] Although an elector who signed the petition may subsequently have changed his mind, respondents made no effort to show that this ever occurred in fact.

As a result the record clearly contains substantial evidence tending to show that all nine illegal votes were cast in favor of consolidation, and absolutely no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, this judgment [confirming the election] must be reversed for lack of any evidentiary support. [Citation.]” (Canales v. City of Alviso, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 128.) We are of the opinion that here, the election contestants made a much stronger circumstantial evidentiary showing that illegal votes affected the outcome of these consolidated elections than was made in Canales, supra, 3 Cal.3d 118.

The widespread illegal voting practices that permeated this election—including fraud and tampering, the clearly established violations of sections 1006 and 1013, BAPAC’s “loss” of 269 absentee ballots mailed to it by the Fresno County Clerk, the fact that nearly all of the candidates themselves, knowingly or otherwise, took

part in the malconduct of “soliciting” absentee votes in violation of specific Elections Code provisions, the large percentages (40 percent to 72 percent) of illegal BAPAC absentee ballots cast and counted in each election, and the fact that all BAPACsupported candidates won handily in each and every one of the election contests—together furnished sufficient, essentially uncontroverted circumstantial evidence in support of the conclusion that “it appealed]” the illegal votes affected the outcomes of the consolidated elections. (§ 20024.) III.

Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Mosk, J., Panelli, J., Arabian, J., Baxter, J., and George, J., concurred. All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated. Mel Sanders, himself a candidate for an open board position in the Washington Union High School District, received the highest number of votes in that election. Mary Bess, a BAPAC member, received the second highest number of votes in that contest.

Hank Hendrix, an officer in the statewide BAPAC organization, and Oscar Robinson, also a BAPAC member, received the first and second highest number of votes in the contest for the West Fresno Elementary School District Board. All four are named in the election contest as defendants.

Section 20021 states: “Any elector of a county, city, or of any political subdivision of either may contest any election held therein, for any of the following causes: [1] (

a) That the precinct board or any member thereof was guilty of malconduct. [1] (

b) That the person who has been declared elected to an office was not, at the time of the election, eligible to that office. [1] (

c) That the defendant has given to any elector or member of a precinct board any bribe or reward, or has offered any bribe or reward for the purpose of procuring his election, or has committed any other offense against the elective franchise defined in Division 17 (commencing with

Section 29100). [1] (

d) That illegal votes were cast. ffl] (

e) That the precinct board in conducting the election or in canvassing the returns, made errors sufficient to change the result of the election as to any person who has been declared elected. [1] (

f) That there was an error in the vote—counting programs or summation of ballot counts.” Although the Court of Appeal focused on the illegal votes cast and the extent to which they impacted on the election results (§§ 20021, subd, (d), 20024), we note that various Elections Code violations were arguably established on this record.

Section 29473 provides that: “(

a) No candidate or representative of a candidate, and no proponent, opponent, or representative of a proponent or opponent, of an initiative, referendum, or recall measure, or of a charter amendment, shall solicit the vote of an absentee voter, or do any electioneering, while in the residence or in the immediate presence of the voter, and during the time he or she knows the absentee voter is voting.” The statute makes knowing violations of its provisions a misdemeanor.

Section 29505 provides that: “Any individual, group, or organization which knowingly distributes any application for an absent voter’s ballot which does not conform to the requirements of [the Elections Code provisions prescribing the form for, and rules governing, such absentee ballot applications] is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

Section 29653 makes it a felony to: “furnishf] any voter wishing to vote, who cannot read, with a ballot, informing or giving that voter to understand that it contains a name written or printed thereon different from the name which is written or printed thereon, or defrauds any voter at any election by deceiving and causing him to vote for a different person for any office other than he intended or desired to vote for.”

Section 29658 provides that: “Any person who applies for, or who votes or attempts to vote, an absent voter’s ballot by fraudulently signing the name of a fictitious person, or of a regularly qualified voter, or of a person who is not qualified to vote, is guilty of a felony >> Each of the aforesaid provisions of law was in full force and effect at the time of the consolidated elections herein concerned.

Each constitutes an “offense against the elective franchise defined in Division 17” of the Elections Code, violations of which themselves can furnish independent statutory grounds for contesting and annulling the election, separate and apart from the effects of any illegal votes actually counted. (§ 20021, subd. (c); see Stebbins v. White (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 769, 788-791 [235 Cal.Rptr. 656].) The printing or duplication of simulated or sample ballots is strictly proscribed by statute, violations of which may be punishable as a misdemeanor. (§ 29414.)

Section 20086 states: “The court shall continue in special session to hear and determine all issues arising in contested elections. After hearing the proofs and allegations of the parties and within 10 days after the submission thereof, the court shall file its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and immediately thereafter shall pronounce judgment. . . either confirming or annulling and setting aside the election. The judgment shall be entered immediately thereafter.” In Rideout v.

City of Los Angeles, supra, 185 Cal. 426, this court stated, “[A] distinction has been developed between mandatory and directory provisions in election laws; a violation of a mandatory provision vitiates the election, whereas a departure from a directory provision does not render the election void if there is a substantial observance of the law and no showing that the result of the election has been changed or the rights of the voters injuriously affected by the deviation. [Citations.]" (185 Cal. at p. 430, italics added.) Although the distinction between “mandatory” and “directory” provisions in the election laws remains an important one today, the above underscored passage cannot be read for the proposition that every violation of a mandatory provision in the Elections Code will “vitiate”—i.e., invalidate or annul—the results of a contested election.

In Rideout we explained that, “If the act enjoined goes to the substance or necessarily affects the merits or results of the election, it is mandatory; otherwise directory. [Citations.]” (Rideout v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 185 Cal. at p. 431.) The modem Elections Code provisions, which postdate Rideout, in many instances explicitly state whether they are “mandatory” or “directory,” and set forth the legislatively intended effect of such characterization. For example,

section 1013, which prescribes the manner in which absentee ballots are to be returned to election officials, states: “The provisions of this

section are mandatory, not directory, and no ballot shall be counted if it is not delivered in compliance with this section.” (Italics added.) Hence, a violation of this “mandatory” provision results in disqualification of the ballot.

The court’s jurisdiction to confirm or annul the results of an election based upon one or more such violations is more broadly governed by sections 20021 (ante, at p. 273, fn. 3) (setting forth the statutory grounds for elections contests), 20086 (vesting the court with authority to pronounce judgment confirming or annulling an election), 20024 (authorizing the setting aside of an election where it appears illegal votes affected its outcome) and 20087 (authorizing the court to declare another person the winner of an election where it can be established such person has the highest number of legal votes).

The Legislature amended

section 1013 in response to Wilks v. Mouton, supra, 42 Cal.3d 400, which had held that the provisions of

section 1013 were directory, not mandatory. The Legislature specifically announced that its purpose in amending

section 1013 was “to clarify potential ambiguity in Wilks v. Mouton, and to declare that its intent ‘is and always has been’ that

section 1013 be given mandatory effect.” (Escalante v. City of Hermosa Beach, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 1020; Stats. 1987, ch. 22, § 1, pp. 59-60.) Our

interpretation of

section 1013 is not governed by the holdings pertaining to that statute in Wilks v. Mouton, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pages 410-412, and Beatie v. Davila (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 424, 429 [183 Cal.Rptr. 179]—viz., that third parties may mail or deliver completed absentee ballots to election officials on behalf of the absentee voter—because those cases construed

section 1013 prior to its amendment in 1987. (See ante, at pp. 279-280, fn. 8.) Although the language of former

section 1013 was susceptible of an

interpretation that third parties could return completed absentee ballots to election officials on behalf of an absentee voter, the amended statutory language precludes any such construction now. (Cf. Stats. 1976, ch. 1275, § 18, with Stats. 1987, ch. 22, § 2.) If the current version of

section 1013 were to be construed to permit any absentee voter to hand his or her completed ballot to any third party for mailing or delivery to election officials, then the language expressly authorizing ill or physically disabled absentee voters to enlist the assistance of certain specified close family members in returning their completed absentee ballots to the election officials would be rendered superfluous.

Section 1013 in effect specifies the method that will best protect against any tampering with, or nondelivery of, the absentee ballot: the voter may either personally deliver or mail the ballot, or, in the case of “illness or other physical disability,” direct a close family member to return the completed ballot. In light of our conclusion that there is substantial, uncontroverted evidence that illegal absentee ballot voting appears to have affected the results of these consolidated elections within the meaning of sections 20021, subdivision (

d) and 20024, we need not and do not determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and its judgment annulling and setting aside the consolidated elections, agreed with contestants’ further claim, pleaded in the complaint, that evidence of “other offense[s] against the elective franchise” (§ 20021, subd. (c)) furnished a separate and independent basis for annulling the election results. (See ante, at pp. 274-275, and fn. 4.)