CARPENTERS SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EL CAPITAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent, 53 Cal. 3d 1041

Opinion PANELLI, J. —The issue presented is whether Civil Code

section 3111, which creates liens on real property in favor of trust funds established pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). (29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.) We conclude that ERISA does preempt

section 3111. Facts Carpenters Southern California Administrative Corporation (CSCAC) is the administrator and the assignee of rights of various multiemployer trust funds established under collective bargaining agreements, including the Carpenters’ Trust Funds.

The Carpenters’ Trust Funds are employee pension benefit plans or employee welfare benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA. (See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2)(A), & (21)(A).) CSCAC is a “fiduciary” as defined in ERISA. (29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).) Collective bargaining agreements often require employers to make contributions to trust funds for the benefit of covered employees. In the present case, the covered employees are members of unions affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Unions).

CSCAC, due to its fiduciary relationship with the Unions and in its role as administrator of the trust, has a duty to collect contributions from employers who fail to make the required payments to the trust. El Capitan Development Company (El Capitan) developed a condominium project on its property in Bakersfield. The general contractor was Grupe Construction (Grupe). Grupe subcontracted with Pacific Southwest Framing for part of the framing work.

In its complaint, CSCAC alleges that John Hall Enterprises (John K[all), with which CSCAC made a collective bargaining agreement, and Pacific Southwest Framing are a single entity. John Hall failed to make fringe benefit contributions to the trust funds in excess of $121,000. Pursuant to

section 3111, CSCAC recorded trust fund liens against El Capitan’s real property in order to collect the delinquent contributions to the trust funds. CSCAC later sued El Capitan in Kern County Superior Court to foreclose the liens. CSCAC alleged that, because John Hall and Pacific Southwest Framing are a single entity, Pacific Southwest Framing was bound by CSCAC’s agreement with John Hall and was therefore obligated to make the contributions to the trust. CSCAC further alleged that because the unpaid contributions were due on account of work performed on El Capitan’s property,

section 3111 created liens on that property. El Capitan, which has not signed a collective bargaining agreement with CSCAC, demurred to CSCAC’s complaint, arguing that ERISA preempted

section 3111. (See 29 U.S.C. § 1144.) The trial court granted El Capitan’s demurrer with leave to amend. When CSCAC declined to amend, the court entered a judgment of dismissal. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. We granted El Capitan’s petition for review and retransferred the matter to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux (1987) 481 U.S. 41 [95 L.Ed.2d 39, 107 S.Ct. 1549] (hereafter Pilot Life). On remand, the Court of Appeal concluded that ERISA preempted

section 3111 and affirmed the judgment of dismissal. We affirm. Discussion Introduction

Section 3111 creates liens on real property in favor of trust funds established pursuant to collective bargaining agreements in amounts equal to the fringe benefit contributions which are due under those collective bargaining agreements. Under

section 3111, if an employer fails to make contributions, the trust fund can record a lien on the property where the work was performed and foreclose the lien to compel payment of the debt. ERISA is a comprehensive federal statutory scheme designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. (Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (1983) 463 U.S. 85, 90 [77 L.Ed.2d 490, 497, 103 S.Ct. 2890].) “[ERISA] imposes participation, funding, and vesting requirements on pension plans. ...

As part of this closely integrated regulatory system Congress included various safeguards to preclude abuse and ‘to completely secure the rights and expectations brought into being by this landmark reform legislation.’ S. Rep. No. 93-127, p. 36 (1973). Prominent among these safeguards [is] ... § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144, ERISA’s broad pre-emption provision . . . .” (Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon (1990) 498 U.S. _, _ [112 L.Ed.2d 474, 482-483, 111 S.Ct. 478, 482] (hereafter Ingersoll-Rand).) We must decide whether ERISA’s broad preemption provision encompasses

section 3111. We conclude that it does. “ ‘[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent. “The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” ’ [Citations.] To discern Congress’ intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute. [Citations.] . . . [ft] Where, as here, Congress has expressly included a broadly worded pre-emption provision in a comprehensive statute such as ERISA, our task of discerning Congressional intent is considerably simplified.” (Ingersoll-Rand, supra, 498 U.S. at p._ [112 L.Ed.2d at p. 483, 111 S.Ct. at p. 482].)

Section 514(

a) of ERISA expressly preempts “any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), italics added.)

Section 514(

c) of ERISA defines the terms used in

section 514(a): “

(1) The term ‘State Law’ includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State. . . . flj]

(2) The term ‘State’ includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this subchapter.” (29 U.S.C. § 1144(c).) CSCAC argues that ERISA preempts only those state laws that regulate the terms and conditions of ERISA plans. This argument derives from the phrase “purports to regulate,” which appears in the definition of “State” in

section 514(c)(2) of ERISA. (29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2).) The case law, however, does not support CSCAC’s argument. All that is necessary to invoke ERISA’s statutory preemption provision is that the state law in question “relate to” an ERISA plan. As will be shown,

section 3111 “relates to” such plans by creating a mechanism for enforcing an employer’s contribution obligations that Congress did not provide. Furthermore, even if we were to accept for the sake of argument CSCAC’s proposition that a state law, to be preempted, must regulate an ERISA plan,

section 3111 still would be preempted. Although

section 3111 does not specifically require that certain terms be included in a plan, it does purport to regulate the conditions under which the terms of a plan can be enforced. The

section does so by creating an additional cause of action for enforcing contribution obligations and by making an additional entity liable for such contributions. (See Iron Workers Pension Fund v. Terotechnology (5th Cir. 1990) 891 F.2d 548, 553 (hereafter Iron Workers).) The Breadth of Federal Preemption Under ERISA The United States Supreme Court in a series of opinions has emphasized the unusual breadth of ERISA’s express preemption provision, describing

section 514(

a) of ERISA as a “virtually unique pre-emption provision” (Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust (1988) 463 U.S. 1, 24, fn. 26 [77 L.Ed.2d 420, 440, 103 S.Ct. 2841]), and as a clause “conspicuous for its breadth.” (FMC Corp. v. Holliday (1990) 498 U.S. _, _ [112 L.Ed.2d 356, 364, 111 S.Ct. 403, 407].) The court has also characterized the provision as “deliberately expansive” (Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 46 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 46], citing Alessi v.

Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. (1981) 451 U.S. 504, 523 [68 L.Ed.2d 402, 416, 101 S.Ct. 1895]), and as “establishing] as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that lrelate[s] to’ an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA.” (FMC Corp. v. Holliday, supra, 498 U.S. at p. _ [112 L.Ed.2d at p. 364, 111 S.Ct. at p.407].) Consistent with the foregoing, the high court has also interpreted broadly the statutory term “relate to.” (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).) Most recently, in Ingersoll-Rand, supra, the court explained that “[t]he key to § 514(

a) is found in the words ‘relate to.’ Congress used those words in their broad sense, rejecting more limited pre-emption language that would have made the clause ‘applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA.’” (Ingersoll-Rand, supra, 498 U.S. at p._ [112 L.Ed.2d at p. 483, 111 S.Ct. at p. 482], citations omitted.) This is consistent with the court’s previous instruction in Pilot Life that “ ‘a state law “relatéis] to” a benefit plan, “in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” ’ ” (Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 47 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 48], citations omitted.) “Because of the breadth of the preemption clause and the broad remedial purpose of ERISA, ‘state laws found to be beyond the scope of [section 514(

a) of ERISA] are few.’ ” (Cefalu v. B. F Goodrich Co. (5th Cir. 1989) 871 F.2d 1290, 1294, fn. omitted.) In determining whether

section 3111 “relates to” a benefit plan, we take note that the United States Supreme Court has on several occasions stated that “state laws which make ‘reference to’ ERISA plans are laws that ‘relate to’ those plans within the meaning of § 514(a) [of ERISA].” (Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv. (1988) 486 U.S. 825, 829 [100 L.Ed.2d 836, 843, 108 S.Ct. 2182], citing Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 47-48 [95 L.Ed.2d at pp. 47-48]; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

Massachusetts (1985) 471 U.S. 724, 739 [85 L.Ed.2d 728, 740, 105 S.Ct. 2380].) Indeed, the court has “virtually taken it for granted that state laws which are ‘specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans’ are pre-empted under § 514(a).” (Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., supra, 486 U.S. at p. 829 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 844].)

Section 3111 Is Specifically Designed to Affect Employee Benefit Plans

Section 3111 is specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans. The

section expressly refers to “trust fund[s] established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement” and provides to such funds a mechanic’s lien remedy not provided by Congress. Thus,

section 3111 singles out ERISA plans for special treatment. CSCAC argues that “ERISA trust funds receive no greater benefits under [section 3111] than any other party entitled to invoke the mechanics’ lien remedy.” To be sure,

section 3111 does treat ERISA plans the same as other parties whose claims are based on having furnished labor or materials for a construction project. The significant difference, however, is that ERISA plans do not furnish labor or materials for construction projects. Accordingly, to treat them as persons who do furnish labor or materials is to single them out for special treatment. Because

section 3111 singles out ERISA plans for special treatment and is, in fact, designed to affect them specifically, we conclude the statute “relates to” ERISA plans. Preemption Does Not Require Regulation of the Terms and Conditions of an ERISA Plan Contrary to CSCAC’s argument, it is well settled that a state law need not regulate the terms and conditions of an ERISA plan for preemption to apply. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the similar argument that the statutory term “purports to regulate” in

section 514(c)(2) of ERISA causes

section 514(

a) of ERISA to preempt only those state laws that affect a plan’s terms, conditions, or administration. (Ingersoll-Rand, supra, 498 U.S. at p._ [112 L.Ed.2d at p.485, 111 S.Ct. at p. 484].) In rejecting this argument, the court stated that, “[the argument] misreads § 514(c)(2) [of ERISA] and consequently misapprehends its purpose. . . .

Section 514(c)(2) expands, rather than restricts, [the] definition [of State] for pre-emption purposes in order to ‘include’ state agencies and instrumentalities whose actions might not otherwise be considered state law. Had Congress intended to restrict ERISA’s pre-emptive effect to state laws purporting to regulate plan terms and conditions, it surely would not have done so by placing the restriction in an adjunct definition

section while using the broad phrase ‘relate to’ in the pre-emption

section itself. Moreover, if § 514(a) [of ERISA] were construed as [defendant] urges, the ‘relate to’ language would be superfluous—Congress need only have said that ‘all’ state laws would be pre-empted. Moreover, our precedents foreclose this argument. In Mackey, the Court held that ERISA pre-empted a Georgia garnishment statute that excluded from garnishment ERISA plan benefits. [Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 828, fin. 2, 830 (100 L.Ed.2d at pp. 843, 844).] Such a law clearly did not regulate the terms or conditions of ERISA-covered plans, and yet we found preemption. Mackey demonstrates that § 514(

a) cannot be read so restrictively.” (Ingersoll-Rand, supra, 498 U.S. at p._ [112 L.Ed.2d at p.485, 111 S.Ct. at p. 484].)

Section 3111 Also Regulates ERISA Plans Even though a state law need not regulate ERISA plans to be preempted, a finding that a state law does regulate ERISA plans necessarily includes a finding that the law “relates to” such a plan. (Local Union 598 Etc. v. J.A. Jones Const. Co. (9th Cir. 1988) 846 F.2d 1213, 1218, affd. (1988) 488 U.S. 881 [102 L.Ed.2d 202, 109 S.Ct. 210] (hereafter Jones).)

Section 3111 regulates ERISA plans by creating a funding mechanism not provided by Congress. Hence, the fact that

section 3111 regulates ERISA plans provides further support for the conclusion that

section 3111 “relates to” ERISA plans and is preempted. Federal case law directly on point supports our view that

section 3111, by creating an additional funding mechanism for ERISA plans not provided for by Congress, “regulates,” and hence “relates to,” ERISA plans and is for that reason preempted. In Iron Workers, supra, 891 F.2d 548, the Fifth Circuit considered a Louisiana mechanic’s lien law that was functionally identical to

section 3111. Borden Chemical had entered into a contract for maintenance services with Terotechnology Corporation. A trade council, on behalf of several unions, executed a collective bargaining agreement with Terotechnology for work to be performed at the Borden plant. The agreement required Terotechnology to contribute to employee benefit funds for the work by its employees at the Borden plant. After a period of compliance, Terotechnology stopped contributing. The unions and funds filed liens pursuant to Louisiana’s Private Works Act against Borden’s real property.

The Fifth Circuit held that the Louisiana law, because it created an additional method of enforcing the funding requirements of employee benefit plans, was preempted under

section 514(

a) of ERISA. In reaching its conclusion, the Iron Workers court discussed the kinds of state laws that have been found to “relate to” employee benefit plans: “The state laws that have previously been found to be preempted by

section 514(a) [of ERISA] because they ‘relate’ to ERISA plans fall into four categoriesf: (1)] laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA plans[; (2)] laws that create reporting, disclosure, funding or vesting requirements for ERISA plans[; (3)] laws that provide rules for the calculation of the amount of benefits to be paid under ERISA plans[; and (4)] laws and common law rules that provide remedies for misconduct growing out of the administration of the ERISA plan. The principle underlying all of these decisions [preempting state laws] would appear to be that the state law is preempted by

section 514(

a) if the conduct sought to be regulated by the state law is ‘part of the administration of an employee benefit plan’: that is, the state law is preempted if it regulates the matters regulated by ERISA: disclosure, funding, reporting, vesting, and enforcement of benefit plans.” (Iron Workers, supra, 891 F.2d at p. 553, italics added.)

Section 3111 specifically purports to regulate employee benefit plans by providing an additional method of funding, a lien against real property, which is not provided by, and therefore is not allowed under, ERISA. In essence,

section 3111 creates a new state cause of action for the collection of contributions owed to benefit plans and makes an additional entity liable for such contributions. Lien actions under

section 3111, which are governed by state law, are not subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts under ERISA. (Carpenters Southern Cal. Admin, v. Majestic Housing (9th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2d 1341, 1346.) ERISA preempts new state-law causes of action for the collection of contributions because, consistent with its goal of providing “appropriate sanctions and ready access to federal courts” (29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)), ERISA itself provides the remedies for the collection of contributions.

Section 502(

a) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)) provides in part that “[a] civil action may be brought—. . . [f[] (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (

A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan or (

B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (

i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan.” (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), italics added.) Additionally,

section 515 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1145) provides: “Delinquent Contributors.

Section 515. Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such an agreement.” Hence, a participant, beneficiary or a fiduciary can bring an action under

section 502(

a) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)) to enforce an employer’s obligation under

section 515 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1145). As the Court of Appeal in this case and the federal court in Iron Workers, supra, noted, Pilot Life, supra, establishes that the remedies in

section 502 of ERISA are exclusive and displace state laws which purport to create parallel remedies. “[T]he detailed provisions of § 502(

a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme. . . . The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA. ‘The . . . carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(

a) of the statute as finally enacted . . . provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.’ ” (Iron Workers, supra, 891 F.2d at p. 555, quoting Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 54 [95 L.Ed.2d at pp. 52], italics in original.) “The expectations that a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans would develop, . . . would make little sense if the remedies available to ERISA participants and beneficiaries under § 502(a) [of ERISA] could be supplemented or supplanted by varying state laws.” (Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 56 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 53].) In essence, CSCAC’s action under

section 3111 is a civil action by a fiduciary to enforce the provisions of ERISA with regard to employer contributions (i.e., § 502(

a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) & § 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145) and to enforce the terms of the plan (i.e., the funding contributions required by the collective bargaining agreement). Like the Louisiana law in Iron Workers, supra, 891 F.2d 548, the state is attempting to “regulate” the terms and conditions of a pension plan through the use of a new cause of action, its lien laws. State laws, however, may not be used to supplement or supplant the civil enforcement scheme developed by ERISA. (See Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 56 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 53].) In

summary, by providing an additional cause of action to those already provided by ERISA,

section 3111, like the Louisiana law in Iron Workers (supra, 891 F.2d 548), “regulates” ERISA plans. This recognition further supports the conclusion that the

section “relates to” ERISA plans and is, thus, preempted. Other Arguments Invoking Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., supra, 486 U.S. 825 [100 L.Ed.2d 836, 108 S.Ct. 2182] (Mackey), CSCAC argues that

section 3111 is not preempted because it is an “ancillary state collection remedfy].” In Mackey, a creditor sought to garnish money that an ERISA plan owed to its beneficiaries, who were the creditor’s debtors. The Mackey court analyzed a Georgia antigarnishment statute and Georgia’s general garnishment procedures. The court concluded that a Georgia statute that barred the garnishment of funds or benefits of an employee benefit plan subject to ERISA was preempted by ERISA.

The court held that this antigarnishment statute expressly referred to, and solely applied to, ERISA plans, and that state laws which make reference to ERISA plans are laws that “relate to” those plans within the meaning of

section 514(

a) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). (Mackey, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 829 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 843].) The ERISA plan beneficiaries in Mackey further argued that the entire Georgia garnishment procedure is preempted by ERISA. The United States Supreme Court held that Georgia’s garnishment statute, as a generally applicable mechanism for the enforcement of judgments, was not preempted by ERISA. (Id. at p. 841 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 851].) Mackey's analysis of Georgia’s general garnishment procedures does not save

section 3111 from preemption. The decision concerned a third party action for enforcement of judgments against beneficiaries of an ERISA plan. ERISA does not contain remedial provisions for such actions.

Largely for this reason, the United States Supreme Court concluded that “state-law methods for collecting money judgments must, as a general matter, remain undisturbed by ERISA; otherwise, there would be no way to enforce such a judgment won against an ERISA plan.” (Mackey, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 834 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 846].) The present case is not similar because ERISA expressly provides remedies for recovery of delinquent contributions to employee benefit plans.

Furthermore, in holding that the Georgia garnishment statute was not preempted, the high court noted that the statute “createfd] no substantive causes of action, nor new bases for relief, or any grounds for recovery; [it] does not create the rule of decision in any case affixing liability.” (Mackey, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 10 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 847].) In contrast, California’s trust fund lien statute does more than provide a new enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments; it creates new substantive rights. (Cf. Iron Workers, supra, 891 F.2d at p. 555.)

Section 3111 permits the creditor (the trust fund) to enforce a debt (for outstanding fringe benefit contributions) not against the debtor (the defaulting employer), but against the property of a third party that is not a party to the collective bargaining agreement.

Section 3111 gives a trust fund a right to a lien against the property of third parties, such as El Capitan, that the fund would not, and does not, have under ERISA. In the absence of

section 3111, El Capitan would have no liability to the funds for the fringe benefit contributions. Therefore,

section 3111 cannot be upheld under Mackey as it creates a new substantive right against the property of a third party that is not created by ERISA and, thus, goes beyond being a mere means of enforcing a judgment. (See Iron Workers, supra, 891 F.2d at p. 556.) CSCAC next argues that

section 3111 is not preempted because “[i]t regulates land rights, historically a power reserved to the state.” However, “[i]n order to avoid preemption, it is not sufficient that a state statute represent the exercise of traditional state power. [Citation.] A purported fundamental state interest is relevant only when there is an element of uncertainty as to whether the challenged state law falls within the scope of the ERISA preemption clause. . . . [fl] However, the strength of the state interest is of no consequence where the state law clearly ‘purports to regulate’ an employee benefit plan. ‘In order to avoid being preempted, a state law in addition to being an exercise of traditional police powers must also affect the plan “in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan. ” ’ ” (Jones, supra, 846 F.2d at pp. 1220-1221, citations omitted, italics added.)

Section 3111 does not affect ERISA plans merely in a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” manner; instead, it has a substantive effect. The

section makes an additional entity liable to plans for contributions. (See Iron Workers, supra, 891 F.2d at p. 556.) Lastly, CSCAC argues that

section 3111 “provides an effective and necessary remedy for employee benefit plans.” That this may be so is irrelevant. The United States Supreme Court has specifically held that even state laws which may help to effectuate ERISA’s underlying purposes are still preempted. (Mackey, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 829-830 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 844].) In Mackey, the United States Supreme Court explained that “ ‘[t]he pre-emption provision [of § 514(a)] . . . displace[s] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA’s substantive requirements.’ Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

Massachusetts, [471 U.S. 724, 739] .... Legislative ‘good intentions’ do not save a state law within the broad pre-emptive scope of § 514(a).” (Mackey, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 829-830 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 844], italics added.) Thus, the fact that the trust fund lien procedure may provide a remedy useful to CSCAC is irrelevant. Disposition For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Civil Code

section 3111 is preempted by ERISA. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. Lucas, C. J., Kennard, J., Arabian, J., and Baxter, J., concurred. Civil Code

section 3111 provides: “For the purposes of this chapter, an express trust fund established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement to which payments are required to be made on account of fringe benefits supplemental to a wage agreement for the benefit of a claimant on particular real property shall have a lien on such property in the amount of the supplemental fringe benefit payments owing to it pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.” All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.

Pacific Southwest Framing has not signed a collective bargaining agreement with CSCAC. Another significant difference between ERISA plans and other persons whose claims are based on furnishing labor or materials is that the latter assert their claims under

section

Section 3111 is specifically for the use of express trust funds established pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. CSCAC contends that because

section 514(

a) of ERISA refers to “plans” and

section 3111 refers to “trust funds,”

section 3111 is not preempted by ERISA. However, other statements and arguments made by CSCAC belie the contention that

section 3111 does not affect ERISA plans. For example, CSCAC states that the “Carpenters Trust Funds are employee pension benefit plans or employee welfare benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1) and 1002(2)(a).” (Italics added.) Also, CSCAC argues that the mechanic’s lien action codified in

section 3111 provides an effective and necessary remedy for employee benefit plans to enforce an employer’s promise to pay fringe benefit contributions and that preemption of

section 3111 may affect the plans’ ability to maintain benefit levels for their participants. The Court of Appeal originally decided this case by relying on Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Pamas Corp. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1196 [222 Cal.Rptr. 668]. The Pamas case was decided before, and is inconsistent with, Pilot Life.

Rather than using the “relate to” test, the Pamas decision used the much narrower preemption standard discussed above: “ERISA’s preemption of‘State law’ is only of such laws as regulate the ‘terms and conditions’ of employer benefit plans.” (Pamas, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 1201, italics in original.) As the Pamas decision conflicts with Pilot Life and our decision in this case, it is disapproved. Similarly, Sheet Metal Workers Pension Plan v. Columbia Savings & Loan Assn. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d Supp. 21 [270 Cal.Rptr. 608], which relies on Pamas in concluding that

section 3111 is not preempted, is disapproved. In discussing the interrelationship of the “purports to regulate” and “relate to” language, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “[t]he narrower ‘purports to regulate’ test is included within the broader ‘relates to’ test. [Citations.] Thus a finding that a statute ‘purports to regulate’ an employee benefit plan necessarily includes a finding that it ‘relates to’ such a plan.” (Fn. omitted. Jones, supra, 846 F.2d at p. 1218.) In Majestic Housing, supra, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the connection between

section 3111 and ERISA. The court held that “[an] action to enforce [a] lien against Majestic’s property [was] one under state, and not federal law. Consequently, the district court was without jurisdiction to rule on the motion for

summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 1346.) CSCAC argues that ERISA, as originally enacted in 1974, did not include a cause of action for the collection of benefit contributions and, hence, Congress could not have intended to preempt state law causes of action. The dissent adopts CSCAC’s position, arguing further that we must determine the scope of ERISA’s preemption provision as of 1974, without regard to subsequent amendments. (Dis. opn., post, pp. 1059-1060.) The premise of these arguments is incorrect. Even in 1974 ERISA contained a cause of action to enforce its terms,

section 502 (29 U.S.C. § 1132), and the remedies provided in

section 502 of ERISA are exclusive. With the addition of

section 515 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1145) in 1980, Congress sought only to streamline the process of collecting delinquent contributions exclusively under federal law. (See 126 Cong. Rec. 23029 (1980): “Recourse available under current law for collecting delinquent contributions is insufficient and unnecessarily cumbersome .... Federal pension law must permit trustees of plans to recover delinquent contributions efficaciously, and without regard to issues which might arise under labor-management relations law—other than 29 U.S.C. § 186.”) Various amici curiae have asserted that

section 3111 is saved from preemption by a statement in the legislative history of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (Pub.L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 [hereafter Amendments]). We disagree. The Amendments, among other things, added

section 515 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1145) and revised

section 502(

g) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)) pertaining to awards of attorney fees, costs, and liquidated damages in actions for delinquent contributions. Commenting on the statutory provisions of

section 502(

g) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)), the relevant House committee stated: “The Bill preempts any state or other law which would prevent the award of reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs or liquidated damages, or which would limit liquidated damages to an amount below the twenty percent level. However, the Bill does not preclude the award of liquidated damages in excess of the twenty percent level if an award of such a higher level of liquidated damages is permitted under state or other law.

The Committee Amendment does not change any other type of remedy permitted under state or federal law with respect to delinquent multiemployer contributions.” (H.R. No. 96-868, pt. 2, on H.R. No. 3909 of the House Com. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3037-3038 (1980).) Amici curiae argue that this

section of the legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws granting mechanic’s lien rights to employee benefit plans. This reading of the House report is too broad. This single comment, pertaining to specific collateral remedies such as liquidated damages and attorney fees against delinquent employers, does not evidence a legislative intent to allow for remedies against delinquent employers that are not provided for in ERISA. Such an

interpretation of this comment would vitiate the extensive legislative history of ERISA and the numerous United States Supreme Court statements regarding Congress’s choice of certain enforcement provisions and the exclusion of all others.