COUNTY OF FRESNO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents, 53 Cal. 3d 482

Opinion MOSK, J. —We granted review in this proceeding to decide whether

section 17556, subdivision (d), of the Government Code (section 17556(d)) is facially valid under

article XIII B,

section 6, of the California Constitution (article XIII B,

section 6).

Article XIII B,

section 6, provides: “Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any local government, the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of such program or increased level of service, except that the Legislature may, but need not, provide such subvention of funds for the following mandates: ffl] (

a) Legislative mandates requested by the local agency affected; [fi] (

b) Legislation defining a new crime or changing an existing definition of a crime; or [fl] (

c) Legislative mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or executive orders or regulations initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January 1, 1975.” The Legislature enacted Government Code sections 17500 through 17630 to implement

article XIII B,

section 6. (Gov. Code, § 17500.) It created a “quasi-judicial body” (ibid.) called the Commission on State Mandates (commission) (id., § 17525) to “hear and decide upon [any] claim” by a local government that the local government “is entitled to be reimbursed by the state for costs” as required by

article XIII B,

section 6. (Gov. Code, § 17551, subd. (a).) It defined “costs” as “costs mandated by the state”— “any increased costs” that the local government “is required to incur . . . as a result of any statute . . . , or any executive order implementing any statute . . . , which mandates a new program or higher level of service of any existing program" within the meaning of

article XIII B,

section 6. (Gov. Code, § 17514.) Finally, in

section 17556(

d) it declared that “The commission shall not find costs mandated by the state ... if, after a hearing, the commission finds that” the local government “has the authority to levy service charges, fees, or assessments sufficient to pay for the mandated program or increased level of service.” For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that

section 17556(

d) is facially constitutional under

article XIII B,

section 6. I. Facts and Procedural History The present proceeding arose after the Legislature enacted the Hazardous Materials Release Response Plans and Inventory Act (Act). (Health & Saf.

Code, § 25500 et seq.) The Act establishes minimum statewide standards for business and area plans relating to the handling and release or threatened release of hazardous materials. (Id., § 25500.) It requires local governments to implement its provisions. (Id., § 25502.) To cover the costs they may incur, it authorizes them to collect fees from those who handle hazardous materials. (Id., § 25513.) The County of Fresno (County) implemented the Act but chose not to impose the authorized fees. Instead, it filed a so-called “test” or initial claim with the commission (Gov.

Code, § 17521) seeking reimbursement from the State of California (State) under

article XIII B,

section 6. After a hearing, the commission rejected the claim. In its statement of decision, the commission made the following findings, among others: the Act constituted a “new program”; the County did indeed incur increased costs; but because it had authority under the Act to levy fees sufficient to cover such costs,

section 17556(

d) prohibited a finding of reimbursable costs. The County then filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief against the State, the commission, and others, seeking vacation of the commission’s decision and a declaration that

section 17556(

d) is unconstitutional under

article XIII B,

section 6. While the matter was pending, the commission amended its statement of decision to include another basis for denial of the test claim: the Act did not constitute a “program” under the rationale of County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46 [233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202] (County of Los Angeles), because it did not impose unique requirements on local governments. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition and effectively dismissed the complaint. It determined, inter alia, that mandate under Code of Civil Procedure

section 1094.5 was the County’s sole remedy, and that the commission was the sole properly named respondent. It also determined that

section 17556(

d) is constitutional under

article XIII B,

section 6. It did not address the question whether the Act constituted a “program” under County of Los Angeles. Judgment was entered accordingly. The Court of Appeal affirmed. It held the Act did indeed constitute a “program” under County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal. 3d 46. It also held

section 17556(

d) is constitutional under

article XIII B,

section 6. We granted review to decide a single issue, i.e., whether

section 17556(

d) is facially constitutional under

article XIII B,

section 6. II. Discussion We begin our analysis with the California Constitution. At the June 6, 1978, Primary Election,

article XIII A was added to the Constitution through the adoption of Proposition 13, an initiative measure aimed at controlling ad valorem property taxes and the imposition of new “special taxes.” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231-232 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) The constitutional provision imposes a limit on the power of state and local governments to adopt and levy taxes. (City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 59, fn. 1 [266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522] (City of Sacramento).) At the November 6, 1979, Special Statewide Election,

article XIII B was added to the Constitution through the adoption of Proposition 4, another initiative measure. That measure places limitations on the ability of both state and local governments to appropriate funds for expenditures. “Articles XIII A and XIII B work in tandem, together restricting California governments’ power both to levy and to spend [taxes] for public purposes.” (City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 59, fn. 1.)

Article XIII B of the Constitution was intended to apply to taxation— specifically, to provide “permanent protection for taxpayers from excessive taxation” and “a reasonable way to provide discipline in tax spending at state and local levels.” (See County of Placer v. Corin (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 443, 446 [170 Cal.Rptr. 232], quoting and following Ballot Pamp., Proposed Stats, and Amends, to Cal. Const, with arguments to voters, Special Statewide Elec. (Nov. 6, 1979), argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 18.) To this end, it establishes an “appropriations limit” for both state and local governments (Cal. Const., art.

XIII B, § 8, subd. (h)) and allows no “appropriations subject to limitation” in excess thereof (id., § 2). (See County of Placer v. Corin, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 446.) It defines the relevant “appropriations subject to limitation” as “any authorization to expend during a fiscal year the proceeds of taxes . . . .” (Cal. Const., art.

XIII B, § 8, subd. (b).) It defines “proceeds of taxes” as including “all tax revenues and the proceeds to . . . government from,” inter alia, “regulatory licenses, user charges, and user fees to the extent that such proceeds exceed the costs reasonably borne by \government) in providing the regulation, product, or service . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 8, subd. (c), italics added.) Such “excess” proceeds from “licenses,” “charges,” and “fees” “are but taxes” for purposes here. (County of Placer v. Corin, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 451, italics in original.)

Article XIII B of the Constitution, however, was not intended to reach beyond taxation. That fact is apparent from the language of the measure. It is confirmed by its history. In his analysis, the Legislative Analyst declared that Proposition 4 “would not restrict the growth in appropriations financed from other [i.e., nontax] sources of revenue, including federal funds, bond funds, traffic fines, user fees based on reasonable costs, and income from gifts.” (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Stats, and Amends, to Cal. Const, with arguments to voters, Special Statewide Elec. (Nov. 6, 1979), analysis by Legislative Analyst, p. 16.)

Section 6 was included in

article XIIIB in recognition that

article XIIIA of the Constitution severely restricted the taxing powers of local governments. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal. 3d at p. 61.) The provision was intended to preclude the state from shifting financial responsibility for carrying out governmental functions onto local entities that were ill equipped to handle the task. (Ibid.; see Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig (1988) 44 Cal.3d 830, 836, fn. 6 [244 Cal.Rptr. 677, 750 P.2d 318].) Specifically, it was designed to protect the tax revenues of local governments from state mandates that would require expenditure of such revenues.

Thus, although its language broadly declares that the “state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse . . . local government for the costs [of a state-mandated new] program or higher level of service,” read in its textual and historical context

section 6 of

article XIII B requires subvention only when the costs in question can be recovered solely from tax revenues. In view of the foregoing analysis, the question of the facial constitutionality of

section 17556(

d) under

article XIII B,

section 6, can be readily resolved. As noted, the statute provides that “The commission shall not find costs mandated by the state ... if, after a hearing, the commission finds that” the local government “has the authority to levy service charges, fees, or assessments sufficient to pay for the mandated program or increased level of service.” Considered within its context, the

section effectively construes the term “costs” in the constitutional provision as excluding expenses that are recoverable from sources other than taxes. Such a construction is altogether sound. As the discussion makes clear, the Constitution requires reimbursement only for those expenses that are recoverable solely from taxes. It follows that

section 17556(

d) is facially constitutional under

article XIII B,

section 6. The County argues to the contrary. It maintains that

section 17556(

d) in essence creates a new exception to the reimbursement requirement of

article XIII B,

section 6, for self-financing programs and that the Legislature cannot create exceptions to the reimbursement requirement beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. We do not agree that in enacting

section 17556(

d) the Legislature created a new exception to the reimbursement requirement of

article XIIIB,

section 6. As explained, the Legislature effectively—and properly—construed the term “costs” as excluding expenses that are recoverable from sources other than taxes. In a word, such expenses are outside of the scope of the requirement. Therefore, they need not be explicitly excepted from its reach. The County nevertheless argues that no matter how characterized,

section 17556(

d) is indeed inconsistent with

article XIII B,

section 6. Its contention is in substance as follows: the source of

section 17556(

d) is former Revenue and Taxation Code

section 2253.2; at the time of Proposition 4, subdivision (b)(4) of that former

section stated that the State Board of Control shall not allow a claim for reimbursement of costs mandated by the state if the legislation contains a self-financing authority; the drafters of Proposition 4 incorporated some of the provisions of former Revenue and Taxation Code

section 2253.2 into

article XIII B,

section 6, but did not incorporate former subdivision (b)(4); their failure to do so reveals an intent to treat as immaterial the presence or absence of a “self-financing” provision; and such an intent is confirmed by the “legislative history” set out at page 55 in Spirit of 13, Inc.,

Summary of Proposed Implementing Legislation and Drafters’ Intent: “the state may not arbitrarily declare that it is not going to comply with

Section 6 . . .if the state provides new compensating revenues.” In our view, the County’s argument is unpersuasive. Even if we assume arguendo that the intent of those who drafted Proposition 4 is as claimed, what is crucial here is the intent of those who voted for the measure. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56.) There is no substantial evidence that the voters sought what the County assumes the drafters desired. Moreover, the “legislative history” cited above cannot be considered relevant; it was written and circulated after the passage of Proposition 4.

As such, it could not have affected the voters in any way. To avoid this result, the County advances one final argument: “Based on the authority of [section 17556(d)], the Commission on State Mandates refuses to hear mandates on the merits once it finds that the authority to charge fees is given by the Legislature. This position is taken whether or not fees can actually or legally be charged to recover the entire costs of the program.” The County appears to be making one or both of the following arguments: (1) the commission applies

section 17556(

d) in an unconstitutional manner; or (2) the Act’s self-financing authority is somehow lacking. Such contentions, however, miss the designated mark. They raise questions bearing on the constitutionality of

section 17556(

d) as applied and the legal efficacy of the authority conferred by the Act. The sole issue on review, however, is the facial constitutionality of

section 17556(d). III. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that

section 17556(

d) is facially constitutional under

article XIII B,

section 6. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. Lucas, C. J., Broussard, J., Panelli, J., Kennard, J., and Best (Hollis G.), J., concurred. Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.