FRANCES KINLAW et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents, 54 Cal. 3d 326

Opinion BAXTER, J. Plaintiffs, medically indigent adults and taxpayers, seek to enforce

section 6 of

article XIII B (hereafter,

section 6) of the California Constitution through an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. They invoked the jurisdiction of the superior court as taxpayers pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure

section 526a and as persons affected by the alleged failure of the state to comply with

section 6. The superior court granted

summary judgment for defendants State of California and Director of the Department of Health Services, after concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs have standing and that the action is not barred by the availability of administrative remedies. We reverse. The administrative procedures established by the Legislature, which are available only to local agencies and school districts directly affected by a state mandate, are the exclusive means by which the state’s obligations under

section 6 are to be determined and enforced. Plaintiffs therefore lack standing. I State Mandates

Section 6, adopted on November 6, 1979, as part of an initiative measure imposing spending limits on state and local government, also imposes on the state an obligation to reimburse local agencies for the cost of most programs and services which they must provide pursuant to a state mandate if the local agencies were not under a preexisting duty to fund the activity.

It provides: “Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any local government, the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of such program or increased level of service, except that the Legislature may, but need not, provide such subvention of funds for the following mandates: “(

a) Legislative mandates requested by the local agency affected; “(

b) Legislation defining a new crime or changing an existing definition of a crime; or “(

c) Legislative mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or executive orders or regulations initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January 1, 1975.” A complementary provision,

section 3 of

article XIII B, provides for a shift from the state to the local agency of a portion of the spending or “appropriation” limit of the state when responsibility for funding an activity is shifted to a local agency: “The appropriations limit for any fiscal year . . . shall be adjusted as follows: [10 (

a) In the event that the financial responsibility of providing services is transferred, in whole or in part, . . . from one entity of government to another, then for the year in which such transfer becomes effective the appropriations limit of the transferee entity shall be increased by such reasonable amount as the said entities shall mutually agree and the appropriations limit of the transferor entity shall be decreased by the same amount.” II Plaintiffs’ Action The underlying issue in this action is whether the state is obligated to reimburse the County of Alameda, and shift to Alameda County a concomitant portion of the state’s spending limit, for the cost of providing health care services to medically indigent adults who prior to 1983 had been included in the state Medi-Cal program.

Assembly Bill No. 799 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) (AB 799) (Stats. 1982, ch. 328, p. 1568) removed medically indigent adults from Medi-Cal effective January 1, 1983. At the time

section 6 was adopted, the state was funding Medi-Cal coverage for these persons without requiring any county financial contribution. Plaintiffs initiated this action in the Alameda County Superior Court. They sought relief on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated medically indigent adult residents of Alameda County. The only named defendants were the State of California, the Director of the Department of Health Services, and the County of Alameda.

In the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs sought an injunction compelling the state to restore Medi-Cal eligibility to medically indigent adults or to reimburse the County of Alameda for the cost of providing health care to those persons. They also prayed for a declaration that the transfer of responsibility from the state-financed Medi-Cal program to the counties without adequate reimbursement violated the California Constitution.

At the time plaintiffs initiated their action neither Alameda County, nor any other county or local agency, had filed a reimbursement claim with the Commission on State Mandates (Commission). Whether viewed as an action seeking restoration of Medi-Cal benefits, one to compel state reimbursement of county costs, or one for declaratory relief, therefore, the action required a determination that the enactment of AB 799 created a state mandate within the contemplation of

section 6. Only upon resolution of that issue favorably to plaintiffs would the state have an obligation to reimburse the county for its increased expense and shift a portion of its appropriation limit, or to reinstate Medi-Cal benefits for plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent. The gravamen of the action is, therefore, enforcement of

section 6. III Enforcement of

Article XIII B,

Section 6 In 1984, almost five years after the adoption of

article XIII B, the Legislature enacted comprehensive administrative procedures for resolution of claims arising out of

section 6. (§ 17500.) The Legislature did so because the absence of a uniform procedure had resulted in inconsistent rulings on the existence of state mandates, unnecessary litigation, reimbursement delays, and, apparently, resultant uncertainties in accommodating reimbursement requirements in the budgetary process. The necessity for the legislation was explained in

section 17500: “The Legislature finds and declares that the existing system for reimbursing local agencies and school districts for the costs of state-mandated local programs has not provided for the effective determination of the state’s responsibilities under

Section 6 of

Article XIII B of the California Constitution. The Legislature finds and declares that the failure of the existing process to adequately and consistently resolve the complex legal questions involved in the determination of state-mandated costs has led to an increasing reliance by local agencies and school districts on the judiciary and, therefore, in order to relieve unnecessary congestion of the judicial system, it is necessary to create a mechanism which is capable of rendering sound quasi-judicial decisions and providing an effective means of resolving disputes over the existence of state-mandated local programs(Italics added.) In

part 7 of division 4 of title 2 of the Government Code, “State-Mandated Costs,” which commences with

section 17500, the Legislature created the Commission (§ 17525), to adjudicate disputes over the existence of a state-mandated program (§§ 17551, 17557) and to adopt procedures for submission and adjudication of reimbursement claims (§ 17553).

The five-member Commission includes the Controller, the Treasurer, the Director of Finance, the Director of the Office of Planning and Research, and a public member experienced in public finance. (§ 17525.) The legislation establishes a test-claim procedure to expeditiously resolve disputes affecting multiple agencies (§ 17554), establishes the method of payment of claims (§§ 17558, 17561), and creates reporting procedures which enable the Legislature to budget adequate funds to meet the expense of state mandates (§§ 17562, 17600, 17612, subd. (a).) Pursuant to procedures which the Commission was authorized to establish (§ 17553), local agencies and school districts are to file claims for reimbursement of state-mandated costs with the Commission (§§ 17551, 17560), and reimbursement is to be provided only through this statutory procedure. (§§ 17550, 17552.) The first reimbursement claim filed which alleges that a state mandate has been created under a statute or executive order is treated as a “test claim.” (§ 17521.) A public hearing must be held promptly on any test claim.

At the hearing on a test claim or on any other reimbursement claim, evidence may be presented not only by the claimant, but also by the Department of Finance and any other department or agency potentially affected by the claim. (§ 17553.) Any interested organization or individual may participate in the hearing. (§ 17555.) A local agency filing a test claim need not first expend sums to comply with the alleged state mandate, but may base its claim on estimated costs. (§ 17555.) The Commission must determine both whether a state mandate exists and, if so, the amount to be reimbursed to local agencies and school districts, adopting “parameters and guidelines” for reimbursement of any claims relating to that statute or executive order. (§ 17557.) Procedures for determining whether local agencies have achieved statutorily authorized cost savings and for offsetting these savings against reimbursements are also provided. (§ 17620 et seq.) Finally, judicial review of the Commission decision is available through petition for writ of mandate filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure

section 1094.5. (§ 17559.) The legislative scheme is not limited to establishing the claims procedure, however. It also contemplates reporting to the Legislature and to departments and agencies of the state which have responsibilities related to funding state mandates, budget planning, and payment.

The parameters and guidelines adopted by the Commission must be submitted to the Controller, who is to pay subsequent claims arising out of the mandate. (§ 17558.) Executive orders mandating costs are to be accompanied by an appropriations bill to cover the costs if the costs are not included in the budget bill, and in subsequent years the costs must be included in the budget bill. (§ 17561, subds. (a) & (b).) Regular review of the costs is to be made by the Legislative Analyst, who must report to the Legislature and recommend whether the mandate should be continued. (§ 17562.) The Commission is also required to make semiannual reports to the Legislature of the number of mandates found and the estimated reimbursement cost to the state. (§ 17600.) The Legislature must then adopt a “local government claims bill.” If that bill does not include funding for a state mandate, an affected local agency or school district may seek a declaration from the superior court for the County of Sacramento that the mandate is unenforceable, and an injunction against enforcement. (§ 17612.) Additional procedures, enacted in 1985, create a system of state-mandate apportionments to fund reimbursement. (§ 17615 et seq.) It is apparent from the comprehensive nature of this legislative scheme, and from the Legislature’s expressed intent, that the exclusive remedy for a claimed violation of

section 6 lies in these procedures. The statutes create an administrative forum for resolution of state mandate claims, and establishes procedures which exist for the express purpose of avoiding multiple proceedings, judicial and administrative, addressing the same claim that a reimbursable state mandate has been created. The statutory scheme also designates the Sacramento County Superior Court as the venue for judicial actions to declare unfunded mandates invalid (§ 17612). The legislative intent is clearly stated in

section 17500: “It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this part to provide for the implementation of

Section 6 of

Article XIIIB of the California Constitution and to consolidate the procedures for reimbursement of statutes specified in the Revenue and Taxation Code with those identified in the Constitution. . . .” And

section 17550 states: “Reimbursement of local agencies and school districts for costs mandated by the state shall be provided pursuant to this chapter.” Finally,

section 17552 provides: “This

chapter shall provide the sole and exclusive procedure by which a local agency or school district may claim reimbursement for costs mandated by the state as required by

Section 6 of

Article XIII B of the California Constitution.” (Italics added.) In short, the Legislature has created what is clearly intended to be a comprehensive and exclusive procedure by which to implement and enforce

section 6. IV Exclusivity Plaintiffs argued, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that the existence of an administrative remedy by which affected local agencies could enforce their right under

section 6 to reimbursement for the cost of state mandates did not bar this action because the administrative remedy is available only to local agencies and school districts. The Court of Appeal recognized that the decision of the County of Alameda, which had not filed a claim for reimbursement at the time the complaint was filed, was a discretionary decision which plaintiffs could not challenge. (Dunn v. Long Beach L. & W. Co. (1896) 114 Cal. 605, 609, 610-611 [46 P. 607]; Silver v. Watson (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 905, 909 [103 Cal.Rptr. 576]; Whitson v.

City of Long Beach (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 486, 506 [19 Cal.Rptr. 668]; Elliott v. Superior Court (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 894, 897 [5 Cal.Rptr. 116].) The court concluded, however, that public policy and practical necessity required that plaintiffs have a remedy for enforcement of

section 6 independent of the statutory procedure. The right involved, however, is a right given by the Constitution to local agencies, not individuals either as taxpayers or recipients of government benefits and services.

Section 6 provides that the “state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse . . . local governments . . . .” (Italics added.) The administrative remedy created by the Legislature is adequate to fully implement

section 6. That Alameda County did not file a reimbursement claim does not establish that the enforcement remedy is inadequate. Any of the 58 counties was free to file a claim, and other counties did so. The test claim is now before the Court of Appeal. The administrative procedure has operated as intended. The Legislature has the authority to establish procedures for the implementation of local agency rights under

section 6. Unless the exercise of a constitutional right is unduly restricted, the court must limit enforcement to the procedures established by the Legislature. (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 637 [268 P.2d 723]; Chesney v. Byram (1940) 15 Cal.2d 460, 463 [101 P.2d 1106]; County of Contra Costa v. State of California (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 62, 75 [222 Cal.Rptr. 750].) Plaintiffs’ argument that they must be permitted to enforce

section 6 as individuals because their right to adequate health care services has been compromised by the failure of the state to reimburse the county for the cost of services to medically indigent adults is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs’ interest, although pressing, is indirect and does not differ from the interest of the public at large in the financial plight of local government. Although the basis for the claim that the state must reimburse the county for its costs of providing the care that was formerly available to plaintiffs under Medi-Cal is that AB 799 created a state mandate, plaintiffs have no right to have any reimbursement expended for health care services of any kind. Nothing in

article XIII B or other provision of law controls the county’s expenditure of the funds plaintiffs claim must be paid to the county. To the contrary,

section 17563 gives the local agency complete discretion in the expenditure of funds received pursuant to

section 6, providing: “Any funds received by a local agency or school district pursuant to the provisions of this

chapter may be used for any public purpose.” The relief plaintiffs seek in their prayer for state reimbursement of county expenses is, in the end, a reallocation of general revenues between the state and the county. Neither public policy nor practical necessity compels creation of a judicial remedy by which individuals may enforce the right of the county to such revenues. The Legislature has established a procedure by which the county may claim any revenues to which it believes it is entitled under

section 6. That test-claim statute expressly provides that not only the claimant, but also “any other interested organization or individual may participate” in the hearing before the Commission (§ 17555) at which the right to reimbursement of the costs of such mandate is to be determined. Procedures for receiving any claims must “provide for presentation of evidence by the claimant, the Department of Finance and any other affected department or agency, and my other interested person.” (§ 17553.

Italics added.) Neither the county nor an interested individual is without an opportunity to be heard on these questions. These procedures are both adequate and exclusive. The alternative relief plaintiffs seek—reinstatement to Medi-Cal pending further action by the state—is not a remedy available under the statute, and thus is not one which this court may award. The remedy for the failure to fund a program is a declaration that the mandate is unenforceable.

That relief is available only after the Commission has determined that a mandate exists and the Legislature has failed to include the cost in a local government claims bill, and only on petition by the county. (§ 17612.) Moreover, the judicial remedy approved by the Court of Appeal permits resolution of the issues raised in a state mandate claim without the participation of those officers and individuals the Legislature deems necessary to a full and fair exposition and resolution of the issues. Neither the Controller nor the Director of Finance was named a defendant in this action.

The Treasurer and the Director of the Office of Planning and Research did not participate. All of these officers would have been involved in determining the question as members of the Commission, as would the public member of the Commission. The judicial procedures were not equivalent to the public hearing required on test claims before the Commission by

section 17555. Therefore, other affected departments, organizations, and individuals had no opportunity to be heard. Finally, since a determination that a state mandate has been created in a judicial proceeding rather than one before the Commission does not trigger the procedures for creating parameters and guidelines for payment of claims, or for inclusion of estimated costs in the state budget, there is no source of funds available for compliance with the judicial decision other than the appropriations for the Department of Health Services.

Payment from those funds can only be at the expense of another program which the department is obligated to fiind. No public policy supports, let alone requires, this result. The superior court acted properly in dismissing this action. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. Lucas, C. J., Panelli, J., Kennard, J., and Arabian, J., concurred. The complaint also sought a declaration that the county was obliged to provide health care services to indigents that were equivalent to those available to nonindigents. This issue is not before us.

The County of Alameda aligned itself with plaintiffs in the superior court and did not oppose plaintiffs’ effort to enforce

section 6. On November 23, 1987, the County of Los Angeles filed a test claim with the Commission. San Bernardino County joined as a test claimant. The Commission ruled against the counties, concluding that no state mandate had been created. The Los Angeles County Superior Court subsequently granted the counties’ petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5), reversing the Commission, on April 27, 1989. (No. C-731033.) An appeal from that judgment is presently pending in the Court of Appeal. (County of Los Angeles v. State of California, No.

B049625.) Plaintiffs argue that they seek only a declaration that AB 799 created a state mandate and an injunction against the shift of costs until the state decides what action to take. This is inconsistent with the prayer of their complaint which sought an injunction requiring defendants to restore Medi-Cal eligibility to all medically indigent adults until the state paid the cost of full health services for them. It is also unavailing.

An injunction against enforcement of a state mandate is available only after the Legislature fails to include funding in a local government claims bill following a determination by the Commission that a state mandate exists. (Gov. Code, § 17612.) Whether plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and/or an injunction, therefore, they are seeking to enforce

section 6. All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. The test claim by the County of Los Angeles was filed prior to that proposed by Alameda County. The Alameda County claim was rejected for that reason. (See § 17521.) Los Angeles County permitted San Bernardino County to join in its claim which the Commission accepted as a test claim intended to resolve the issues the majority elects to address instead in this proceeding.

Los Angeles County declined a request from Alameda County that it be included in the test claim because the two counties’ systems of documentation were so similar that joining Alameda County would not be of any benefit.

Alameda County and these plaintiffs were, of course, free to participate in the Commission hearing on the test claim. (§ 17555.) “ ‘Local agency’ means any city, county, special district, authority, or other political subdivision of the state.” (§ 17518.) “ ‘School district’ means any school district, community college district, or county superintendant of schools.” (§ 17519.) Plaintiffs’ argument, that the Legislature’s failure to make provision for individual enforcement of

section 6 before the Commission demonstrates an intent to permit legal actions, is not persuasive. The legislative statement of intent to relegate all mandate disputes to the Commission is clear. A more likely explanation of the failure to provide for test cases to be initiated by individuals lies in recognition that (1) because

section 6 creates rights only in governmental entities, individuals lack sufficient beneficial interest in either the receipt or expenditure of reimbursement funds to accord them standing; and (2) the number of local agencies having a direct interest in obtaining reimbursement is large enough to ensure that citizen interests will be adequately represented. Plaintiffs are not without a remedy if the county fails to provide adequate health care, however. They may enforce the obligation imposed on the county by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 17000 and 17001, and by judicial action. (See, e.g., Mooney v.

Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669 [94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231].) For this reason, it would be inappropriate to address the merits of plaintiff’s claim in this proceeding. (Cf. Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442 [279 Cal.Rptr. 834, 807 P.2d 1063].) Unlike the dissent, we do not assume that in representing the state in this proceeding, the Attorney General necessarily represented the interests and views of these officials.