THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL ANDREW LINTON, Defendant and Appellant, 56 Cal. 4th 1146

Opinion CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. A jury convicted defendant Daniel Andrew Linton of the 1994 first degree murder of 12-year-old Melissa Middleton (Pen. Code, § 187) and found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during the commission of a first degree burglary, a forcible lewd act with a child under the age of 14 years, and the commission or attempted commission of rape (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(iii), (v), (vii), added by initiative, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978), Prop. 7, now subd. (a)(17)(C), (E), (G)).

The jury also convicted defendant of three offenses relating to a prior assault on Melissa—residential burglary (§ 459), attempted rape (§§ 664, 261, subd. (a)), and a forcible lewd act on a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (b)). The jury returned a verdict of death for Melissa’s murder. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for new trial and his motion to modify the verdict. The trial court sentenced defendant to death.

The court also imposed on defendant a determinate sentence of six years in prison for his conviction of a forcible lewd act on a child under the age of 14 and a concurrent term of four years for his conviction of attempted rape. The trial court imposed, but stayed pursuant to

section 654, an 18-month sentence for defendant’s conviction of burglary. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment. I. Facts A. Guilt phase evidence At trial it was undisputed that defendant strangled and killed 12-year-old Melissa Middleton. The defense theory was that defendant did so as a result of a panic attack, which was consistent with his cognitive psychological functioning, and as a result defendant lacked the specific intent necessary for the charged murder.

Contending defendant was coerced into false admissions and confessions by his interrogators, the defense disputed the special circumstance allegations that defendant murdered Melissa during the commission of a burglary, a lewd act on a child or attempted rape, as well as the offenses charged in connection with the alleged prior assault involving Melissa. 1. The prosecution’s case-in-chief a. Background In the fall of 1994, Linda and Robert Middleton lived with their 12-year-old daughter Melissa in a two-story home in San Jacinto, California.

Carl and Jean Linton lived next door with their two children, 20-year-old defendant Daniel Linton and eight-year-old Stacey. The two families had been next-door neighbors for about seven years and their daughters were close friends. The Middletons hired defendant to take care of their pets while they were away on vacation. After their last family vacation in April 1994, the Middletons forgot to retrieve from defendant the keys they had given him for their house. Defendant did not, however, have permission to be in the Middleton house any time after their vacation. b.

Prior attack: late September—early October 1994 Around 2:00 a.m. one night in late September or early October 1994, Melissa came into her parents’ bedroom upset and crying. Melissa told her parents that a man had been on top of her in her bedroom, choking her with his hands. Melissa told them she did not know what the man looked like. While Linda comforted Melissa, Robert went to check the house. The doors were locked and there were no signs of a break-in. He walked around the neighborhood, looking for anything unusual.

As Robert passed the Linton house, he noticed a light was on and he saw through a window Joseph Montero working on a computer. Montero was a friend of defendant’s who lived with the Lintons for a month in the fall of 1994. Robert spoke with Montero and told him that Melissa thought someone had been in the Middleton house. Montero told Robert he had not seen anyone. According to Montero, defendant was not home when Montero spoke with Robert. Defendant returned home approximately 15 to 20 minutes later, out of breath, and looking frightened.

Melissa had already fallen back asleep by the time Robert returned to their home. Linda and Robert discussed the incident and concluded Melissa must have had a nightmare. The next morning Melissa denied that it was a nightmare and said the man had been nude. Linda believed this incident occurred about two months prior to November 29, 1994. Robert also believed the attack occurred about that time, but in any event, he was certain there was only one such prior incident. c. The death of Melissa on November 29, 1994 Melissa was sick and stayed home from school on November 29, 1994.

Linda told Melissa to stay in bed, sleep, and take her medicine. Linda locked the front door and left for work. Robert had already left. Around noon, Linda telephoned Melissa to check on her. There was no answer. This worried Linda, but she concluded Melissa was probably sleeping and did not hear the phone. Linda returned home from work around midaftemoon, unlocked the door, and called for Melissa. There was no response, but everything looked normal. Linda went upstairs. Melissa was not in her bedroom.

When Linda went to the master bedroom, she saw Melissa sitting on the floor at the foot of the bed with her legs crossed, her “arms kind of out,” and her head to one side. Melissa was wearing shorts, one sock, and the same shirt that she had been wearing that morning. Melissa’s shorts were unbuttoned and unzipped. Linda called Melissa’s name a couple of times, touched her, and realized she was dead. After an unsuccessful resuscitation attempt, Linda ran to the home of a neighbor, asked for help, and called 911. San Jacinto Police Detective Michael Lynn arrived at the Middleton home a short time later.

He found no signs of forced entry into the house and no indication that the home had been burglarized. Lynn went up to the master bedroom, where Melissa had been placed on the floor. He observed red bruise lines on Melissa’s neck, including a red line leading from the middle of her throat up to behind her right earlobe area. Believing the injuries were suspicious, Lynn declared the area a homicide crime scene. Lynn collected a pair of stereo headphones with a broken cord, which was located near Melissa at the bottom of the bed. Lynn believed the cord could have been used to cause the injury on Melissa’s neck. Dr.

Joseph Choi, a forensic pathologist working for the coroner’s office, subsequently performed an autopsy of Melissa. He determined that Melissa died of asphyxiation due to strangulation. Melissa’s body had signs of both Ugature and manual strangulation. Choi opined that the linear abrasion on Melissa’s neck could have been caused by a cable, cord, or headphone wire. Melissa’s injuries were consistent with someone pulling on the ligature from behind, not someone putting the Ugature around her neck, crossing it in front and pulling it.

Alternatively, the linear marks on Melissa’s neck could have resulted from a cord placed around Melissa’s neck if her hair was between the cord and her neck and if the Ugature was pulled from one side. In addition to the linear abrasion, Choi found a large bruise on Melissa’s neck that could have been caused by a thumb or finger. Melissa also had signs of hemorrhaging that were consistent with strangulation. Swabs from Melissa’s mouth, anus and vagina tested negative for sperm, and Choi found no injuries or abnormalities on her genitalia.

The DNA profile found on two fragments of fingernail clippings from Melissa’s left hand was consistent with defendant’s profile. The DNA could have come from Melissa having scratched defendant. d. Defendant’s statements to police Shortly after 4:30 p.m. on November 29, Detective Glenn Stotz began to canvass neighbors regarding Melissa’s death. His first stop was the Linton home, where defendant answered the door. Stotz introduced himself and asked defendant if he had heard what happened next door. Defendant indicated he had already heard Melissa had been killed.

Defendant told Stotz that he had been home all day, but he did not see or hear anything out of the ordinary. He said he did not know Melissa well, although she was a good friend of defendant’s sister. Defendant asked Stotz how Melissa was killed and Stotz told him that it appeared she was choked to death. Stotz did not provide any further information. After canvassing other residences, Detective Stotz went back with Detective Lynn to the Linton residence. Defendant and his sister Stacey answered the door. Defendant had changed his clothes. Stotz asked defendant to confirm that he did not know Melissa very well.

Defendant responded that he hardly knew her. Stacey interjected, “Uh-huh. You used to fight with her all the time.” Defendant looked at Stacey and, according to the detectives, he appeared to be “shocked” and “appalled.” Stotz then spoke with defendant alone. Defendant continued to claim he did not know Melissa well. Detective Stotz asked defendant if he knew anything about an incident in which Melissa had told her parents that she had been attacked in her room in the middle of the night.

Defendant initially denied any knowledge of the previous assault, but later told Stotz about an occasion when two or three weeks earlier he woke up in his front yard around midnight wearing jeans and underwear, but no shirt or socks. Defendant thought he might have been sleepwalking. Stotz asked to look at defendant’s hands. When defendant held out his hands, Stotz noticed defendant had scratch and gouge marks on his lower right forearm. He was visibly nervous. His arms and hands were shaking and his palms were extremely sweaty. Defendant claimed he received the marks earlier in the day when playing with his cat.

In the evening a few hours later, Detective Stotz returned to the Linton home, accompanied by Deputy District Attorney William Mitchell. Defendant agreed to speak with them and they went back to defendant’s bedroom. Defendant spoke with Stotz and Mitchell for about a half-hour. Defendant claimed he was at home all morning and that he did not see Melissa that day. He had not been to the Middleton home since he last took care of their animals about three months earlier, and he had returned their keys at that time.

When asked if he heard what happened to Melissa that day, defendant said that he heard she had been strangled with a cord and that she was found dead on the floor in her parent’s room. Stotz had not told defendant these details. Stotz asked defendant if he had talked to anyone other than Stotz about Melissa’s death. Defendant said he had not. Mitchell and Stotz asked defendant if he would agree to speak with investigators the next day and defendant agreed. Stotz telephoned defendant the next morning and defendant again agreed to speak with investigators.

Detectives Stotz and Lynn picked defendant up from his home. During the drive to the police station, defendant said to the officers, “I’m sorry I wasted your time. I wanted to turn myself in last night, but I couldn’t do it in front of my parents.” Defendant also said, “I wasn’t sure I could admit it.” Defendant was crying and shaking. He appeared remorseful and sad. The officers asked him if he was willing to go to the office for a formal interview and he said, “Yeah. I’ll tell you everything.” At the police station, defendant was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v.

Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602] (Miranda) and agreed to answer questions. He gave a simplified account of the killing. He told Stotz that he went to the Middleton house about 10:00 or 11:00 the previous morning and noticed the front door was unlocked. He said he did not know why he went over to the house and he denied he had a key for the house. He said he had given the key back two months earlier after he watched the family’s pets. Defendant said that when he went inside the house, he heard a noise and thought Linda was home. He went upstairs and found Melissa instead.

Melissa told defendant she was going to call the police and as he was getting ready to leave, she started screaming. Defendant grabbed her by the throat and she stopped screaming. He did not really notice “how far [he] had gone until it was, until it was too late.” After a long pause waiting for defendant to add anything further, Detective Stotz asked defendant if it would be easier for defendant if Stotz asked some questions. Defendant said, “Yeah.” Stotz proceeded to elicit additional details about the murder and the prior assault by further questioning of defendant.

Defendant said when Melissa started screaming, she ran into her parents’ room to call the police. Stotz asked defendant if he had any idea why Melissa started screaming as soon as she saw him and wondered whether Melissa was afraid of defendant. Defendant agreed that she might have been afraid of him because of the incident that happened a couple of weeks earlier. Defendant said that after Melissa started screaming, he followed her into her parents’ bedroom, pushed her onto the bed so that she could not reach the telephone, grabbed her throat with both hands and started choking her.

As Melissa struggled and gasped for air, defendant grabbed the headphones that were on the nightstand by the bed. He did not recall how he put the cord around Melissa’s neck, although he was certain he was standing in front of her. He thought he may have put it around the back of her neck, crisscrossed it in front of her throat, and pulled. After a few seconds, the cord broke and defendant resumed choking Melissa with his hands. After she fell off the foot of the bed and was no longer “awake,” defendant sat her up against the bed.

He then picked up a rag and wiped the headphone cord, the stair rail, and the doorknobs on the front door to get rid of fingerprints. Stotz returned several times to the question of why defendant went over to the Middleton house. At first defendant said he went into the house just to look around. Later he admitted going into the home to look for money. Defendant said he needed money because someone had taken $100 from him. He unsuccessfully searched the downstairs area of the Middleton home before going upstairs.

Defendant said he had also gone to the Middleton house in the prior incident because he needed money then as well. Defendant repeatedly denied any sexual relationship with or sexual interest in Melissa as a motive for going over to the house. He specifically denied raping Melissa. Defendant denied trying to have sex with Melissa during the incident that he thought was two weeks prior to the killing, not two months earlier. He said he was half asleep at that time, although he did remember going up to Melissa’s room and then choking her when it seemed like she was going to wake her parents.

Asked to explain how Melissa’s shorts came to be unbuttoned and unzipped on the day of her death, defendant initially suggested she might have been changing them and said that if he had noticed her zipper was down, he would have zipped it up. Later he suggested her pants may have been tight and that was why the zipper came undone. At another point, he speculated that she may have needed to use the toilet and that she saw him as she was on her way to or from the bathroom.

Eventually, defendant admitted he had unzipped Melissa’s shorts during the struggle and said the thought crossed his mind to have sex with her, but he claimed it was more to scare her so she would not say anything. Finally, during an afternoon interview with Detectives Stotz and Fred Rodriguez, defendant admitted he tried to rape Melissa during the previous incident “whenever it was.” He also admitted that on the day of the killing, the thought crossed his mind to rape Melissa, but after he undid her zipper, he changed his mind.

Defendant said that after the killing, he returned home, took a shower, changed and washed his clothes. He also threw away the Middletons’ keys, which he ultimately admitted to using in order to gain entry into the Middleton house on both the previous day and on the prior occasion. He told Stotz they were still in the trash can at his house. During a subsequent search of defendant’s home, Stotz found the Middletons’ house keys, one of Melissa’s rings, and a pair of Melissa’s soiled underpants in the kitchen trash can. Melissa’s DNA was found on the crotch of the underpants.

Defendant’s DNA was found in sperm and semen on the front and back of the underpants. There was no semen on the clothes Melissa was wearing when she was murdered. 2. The defense case Defendant did not testify. To challenge the special circumstance allegations and the charges relating to the previous incident, the defense presented the testimony of several experts as well as a neighbor and the deputy district attorney who questioned defendant at the police station. Dr.

Werner Spitz, a forensic pathologist, reviewed autopsy photographs of Melissa and from them concluded Melissa was not strangled to death in the manner described by the prosecution. Spitz believed the marks on Melissa’s neck were consistent with someone grabbing and twisting Melissa’s shirt around her neck, thereby cutting off the blood flow to her brain. Spitz attributed the large bruise on her neck to a knuckle going into her neck as part of this twisting process. He theorized that Melissa may have lost consciousness and died within 20 to 30 seconds.

The defense called Deputy District Attorney John Chessell and questioned him regarding his participation with Detective Stotz in defendant’s interrogation at the police station. Chessell denied that he tried to plant in defendant’s mind the answers the prosecution wanted. Chessell admitted that, contrary to some of his previous testimony, there may have been some brief conversation with defendant that was not tape-recorded because it occurred while the cassette was being turned over. The defense called Dr.

Craig Rath, a licensed clinical psychologist, to testify regarding his interview and psychological testing of defendant at the police station on November 30, 1994. Rath interviewed and tested defendant that day at the request of the prosecution for the purpose of determining defendant’s mental functioning and mental status. According to Rath, defendant was generally alert and answered virtually all of Rath’s questions, although Rath found defendant’s affect to be flat. Rath and defendant discussed some of defendant’s medical, school, and family history.

They discussed some of the details regarding defendant’s killing of Melissa and the previous incident occurring at her house. Rath found no indication defendant was insane, had brain damage, suffered any deficits in cognitive function or had any major mental illness. Defendant scored high on social introversion and depression on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test administered by Rath. Defendant’s MMPI responses indicated he had low energy, particularly for a 20-year-old man.

His MMPI score was statistically elevated on the psychopathic deviant scale, but defendant did not meet the diagnostic criteria for a sociopath. Melody Morris, a nurse living next door to the Lintons, testified that defendant was socially awkward and that she suspected defendant was physically abused by his father. Dr. Cecil Whiting, a licensed psychologist, performed a psychological evaluation of defendant in 1997, three years after Melissa’s death.

Whiting spent 15 hours with defendant during six meetings and administered several psychological tests to him, including a version of the MMPI and the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery. Whiting listened to defendant’s interviews with the detectives and Dr. Rath, reviewed Rath’s written report and defendant’s school and medical records, and spoke to some of defendant’s family members. Dr. Whiting was critical of Dr. Rath’s interview methods and results, although he felt Rath’s testing supported his own diagnosis.

Whiting concluded defendant had neuropsychological impairment and suffered from depression, social phobia (manic panic disorder with manic attacks based on right temporal lobe damage), and avoidant personality disorder featuring social phobia and panic attacks. The most prominent part of defendant’s personality was self-isolation. According to Whiting, defendant’s social introversion and low level of energy may have lowered his ability to withstand the pressures of interrogation and increased his suggestibility. Dr.

Whiting opined defendant’s statements during his interviews with police about his loss of perception of time and fear during the killing of Melissa, as well as his inability to fully recall the earlier incident at the Middleton home, were consistent with his suffering a panic attack during both the killing and the prior incident. Whiting testified that a person experiencing a panic attack rarely can describe everything that was happening at the time. Such a person may fill in the blank spaces of his or her memory with a description of what logically should have happened. 3.

The prosecution’s rebuttal case Linda Middleton was recalled and testified that the button and zipper on Melissa’s shorts were in working order when she last saw them and that Melissa did not have the habit of wearing clothes in disrepair. Robert Middleton was recalled and testified that the cord of his headphones was not damaged before Melissa’s death. B. Penalty phase evidence 1. The prosecution’s case Both of Melissa’s parents, Linda and Robert Middleton, testified about Melissa’s sweet and friendly personality, musical talent, and interests in horseback riding, bicycling, Girl Scouts, camping, and dancing.

They testified about how hard her death was on them, their son (Melissa’s older brother), and Melissa’s grandparents. They testified to a number of fond memories of Melissa and their regret that they will never see her graduate, marry, or become a teacher. They no longer celebrate Thanksgiving or Christmas. Robert lives with images of Melissa being hurt and pleading for her life. He feels guilty about not protecting her and thinking that the prior assault had been a nightmare.

The Middletons sought psychiatric assistance for a year after the murder and tried different support groups until they found a group of parents of murdered children with whom they felt comfortable. Their son moved to Washington State and said he would never be able to live in California again. Two of Melissa’s close school friends testified concerning the impact of her murder on them. They testified that Melissa was a very loving and cheerful person who always tried to make others feel better. They gave examples of the fun they had together.

They testified to the shock and fear they felt when they learned of her murder, and said they still miss her. The Christmas parade at Melissa’s middle school was dedicated to Melissa after her death. The school also recognized her with a memorial plaque beneath the school flagpole and an empty chair at graduation, on which students placed flowers. The prosecution presented 13 still photographs that showed Melissa at various stages of her life, the memorial plaque at her school, and the empty chair at graduation. 2.

The defense case The defense presented the testimony of the two school psychologists who evaluated defendant when he was in kindergarten and when he was in third grade. Both described defendant’s behavior and opined that defendant was a significantly emotionally disturbed child. They testified that children with such problems identified so early in life have a high probability of continuing to experience them into adulthood. Defendant was in a special education class for emotionally disturbed children for both second and third grade. His teacher testified to defendant’s withdrawn nature and social isolation.

Defendant was one of the more disturbed children—in the top five—that she had encountered in her career. She related an incident of suspected physical abuse of defendant by his father. Although defendant was subsequently transferred to a private school and then to a regular classroom in public school, defendant finished high school in a continuation high school because he fell behind in credits. The lead teacher at the continuation high school testified that defendant continued to be a loner, his only friend being Montero. When defendant graduated, he was unprepared to go on to a four-year college.

The defense established, through the testimony of defendant’s father and other family members, that (

a) from an early age defendant was subjected to harsh and inappropriate physical discipline from his father, who had a quick and fiery temper, (

b) defendant was very shy, submissive and fearful, (

c) although defendant’s parents treated their daughter Stacey preferentially, defendant did not act resentfully of their favoritism, and (

d) defendant was not aggressive or violent, but kind and loving. Defendant’s grandmother testified that defendant had matured since his incarceration. She stated that he felt dreadful about Melissa. The leader of a live action role-playing game club testified regarding defendant’s participation in the club’s weekly games for several years prior to his arrest. Defendant was shy and lacked confidence. He was a follower who did not handle pressure well. Defendant could be talked into doing something he might not have wanted to do in the first place and then could become convinced it was his own idea.

The custodian of records for the Riverside County jail testified that the only disciplinary marker defendant received while in jail prior to and during trial in this case was for his possession of dice in violation of facility rules. II. Guilt Phase Issues A. The admissibility of defendant’s admissions and confessions Defendant unsuccessfully moved at his preliminary hearing to suppress his taped-recorded admissions and confessions on the ground that they were coerced by a promise of leniency.

He later renewed his suppression motion, claiming his statements to police were involuntary under the totality of the circumstances, that the police and Dr. Rath failed to respect his invocation of his right to remain silent in violation of Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, and that Rath failed to inform him of his rights in violation of Miranda. Defendant’s motion was ultimately heard as a pretrial motion in limine and after an extended evidentiary hearing, it was denied. The trial court found defendant’s statements were freely and voluntarily made and that there was no Miranda violation.

The trial court denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration made during the prosecution’s case-in-chief and denied defendant’s new trial motion, which included a claim that his statements were wrongly admitted. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court violated his rights to due process and against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

article I,

section 7 of the California Constitution, when it overruled his legal challenges to the police interrogation tactics, which he claims vitiated his Miranda waiver, overbore his will and rendered his confessions involuntary. We reject defendant’s contentions. 1. Defendant’s claim regarding the interview in his bedroom Defendant first contends his interrogation by Detective Stotz and Deputy District Attorney Mitchell in his bedroom on the evening of the killing was custodial and because he was not read and did not waive his Miranda rights, his responses should have been suppressed. a.

Additional factual background Detective Stotz first spoke with defendant on the day of the killing for about 10 minutes at defendant’s front door. Stotz went on to canvass other neighbors. He learned that Melissa had confided in a 13-year-old neighbor that, two or three weeks before the murder, defendant had entered the Middleton home around midnight, tried to rape Melissa and then choked her. Detective Stotz returned to defendant’s home with Detective Lynn, where they spoke with defendant and his sister Stacey.

After defendant misrepresented the level of his acquaintance with Melissa, Lynn asked Stacey to step away from defendant so he could talk to her in private. Stotz stayed with defendant and continued to talk with him. Stotz again questioned defendant about his relationship with Melissa and asked defendant if he knew anything about the alleged prior attack on Melissa. Defendant initially denied any knowledge of the alleged prior attack, but later said he thought he knew what Stotz was referring to.

Defendant told Stotz about an incident, which he thought occurred two or three weeks earlier, where he woke up in his front yard around midnight wearing jeans and underwear, but no shirt or socks. Detective Stotz returned to the Linton home around 8:00 p.m., accompanied by Mitchell, who was identified to defendant as a deputy district attorney. Mitchell was wearing a suit and tie. Stotz was in plain clothes. Stotz and Mitchell asked defendant to speak with them a little more, making it clear that defendant was not required to speak with them and that defendant was not under arrest.

Defendant agreed to speak with them and invited them into his house. Defendant wanted to speak to Stotz and Mitchell away from his parents. Defendant led Stotz and Mitchell back into his bedroom, where all three sat, Stotz and Mitchell in chairs next to each other, and defendant in a chair facing them, four to five feet away. Defendant was not handcuffed or restrained. Stotz repeated that defendant was not under arrest and that he was not required to speak with them.

During the ensuing interview, which Detective Stotz covertly tape-recorded by means of a microcassette recorder in his pocket, defendant denied seeing Melissa on the day of the killing. He denied any involvement in her death. When Stotz returned to the subject of the prior incident of sleepwalking that defendant had earlier recounted, defendant confirmed he had woken up outside of his house two or three weeks earlier, standing there in his pants and underwear. He stated that this occurred about the same time as he last saw Melissa.

When Deputy District Attorney Mitchell asked defendant what he had heard happened to Melissa, defendant asserted Stotz had told him that Melissa was strangled with a cord, that she was found dead on the floor of her parents’ bedroom, and that there were some fingerprints. Defendant denied speaking to anyone besides Stotz. The interview concluded after approximately a half-hour with defendant’s agreement to take a polygraph test and to speak with investigators again the next day. b.

Discussion Defendant did not challenge the admissibility of the statements he made during the bedroom interview on the ground that the interview was custodial for purposes of Miranda. As a consequence, the theory was not litigated and no opportunity was presented to the trial court to resolve any material factual disputes and make necessary factual findings. In fact, defense counsel was not merely silent regarding this issue; in response to trial court comments about defendant being questioned in his bedroom, defense counsel affirmatively conceded defendant was not in custody at the time.

Accordingly, defendant has waived his claim that the interview of him in his bedroom constituted custodial interrogation- in violation of Miranda. (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 669 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970]; People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 845 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007].) Defendant argues we should nevertheless consider the merits of his claim because it asserts a deprivation of his fundamental constitutional rights. (People v.

Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 277 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 934 P.2d 1279].) As we have recently explained, however, the dictum in Vera on which defendant relies “was not intended to provide defendants with an ‘end run’ around the forfeiture rule,” but was limited to a narrow class of constitutional rights, none of which are involved here. (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 980, fn. 9 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 146, 282 P.3d 173].) Defendant asserts that, if a waiver is found, his counsel’s concession of the issue had no tactical basis and therefore amounted to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

To establish ineffective assistance, defendant must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) Defendant fails to establish any deficient performance by his counsel on the record before us. “An interrogation is custodial, for purposes of requiring advisements under Miranda, when ‘a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” (People v.

Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 394-395 [121 Cal.Rptr.3d 280, 247 P.3d 515], quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.) Whether a person is in custody is an objective test; the pertinent question being whether the person was formally arrested or subject to a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 368, 157 P.3d 973].) “[C]ustody must be determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive his circumstances.” (Yarborough v.

Alvarado (2004) 541 U.S. 652, 662 [158 L.Ed.2d 938, 124 S.Ct. 2140].) The record on appeal reflects that Detective Stotz spoke with defendant twice at his front door as part of a canvass of the neighborhood after Melissa was found dead in her parents’ bedroom. Defendant appeared nervous, misrepresented his prior interaction with Melissa, had suspicious injuries on his arm, and connected himself to the prior nighttime incident with Melissa by offering his recollection of himself sleepwalking.

Obviously Stotz’s suspicions were aroused, but Miranda warnings are not required simply because a person has become a suspect in the officer’s mind. (Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495 [50 L.Ed.2d 714, 97 S.Ct. 711]; People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 402.) Detective Stotz returned with Deputy District Attorney Mitchell to the Linton home around 8:00 p.m. Stotz and Mitchell were not dressed in a manner that asserted official authority. After Mitchell identified himself to defendant, they asked to speak with him, making it clear that defendant did not have to do so and that he was not under arrest.

Defendant invited them into his house, taking them into his bedroom. There is no evidence that either Stotz or Mitchell was armed, or if armed, that any weapon was visible to defendant. There is no evidence that they blocked defendant’s exit from the bedroom to which defendant took them. Defendant was not restrained. All three of them sat in chairs. Stotz and Mitchell repeated that defendant was under no obligation to speak to them and that he was not under arrest. Stotz and Mitchell proceeded to talk with defendant for about a half-hour.

The nature of their questioning does not appear to have been aggressive or particularly confrontational. (See People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1050 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756], revd. on other grounds in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325-326 [128 L.Ed.2d 293, 114 S.Ct. 1526]; see also People v. Lopez (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 602, 608 & fn. 4 [209 Cal.Rptr. 575].) A reasonable person in defendant’s situation would have understood he was free to stop the interview and ask Stotz and Mitchell to leave at any time. Defendant was not in custody.

Defendant’s argument that the totality of the circumstances here is analogous to U.S. v. Craighead (9th Cir. 2008) 539 F.3d 1073 lacks merit. In Craighead, FBI agents obtained a warrant to search Craighead’s home for child pornography. (Id. at p. 1078.) Eight law enforcement officers from three different agencies participated in the subsequent search.

All of the officers were armed, some wore protective gear, and some unholstered their guns in Craighead’s presence. (Ibid.) Although one of the FBI agents stated that they would like to talk with Craighead, “that he was not under arrest, that any statement he might make would be voluntary, and that he would not be arrested that day regardless of the information he provided,” she and another officer “directed” Craighead to a cluttered storage room at the back of the house for a private conversation while other officers proceeded with the search of his home. (Ibid.) The second officer, who was dressed in a flak jacket and was visibly armed, stood leaning against the wall near the storage room door, in such a manner as to block Craighead’s exit from the room. (Id. at pp. 1078-1079.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the totality of these circumstances “turned the otherwise comfortable and familiar surroundings of the home into ‘a police-dominated atmosphere’ ” that amounted to custody for purposes of Miranda. (U.S. v.

Craighead, supra, at p. 1083.) No similar police-dominated atmosphere was shown here. Because there appears to have been no sound basis for counsel to have objected to the admission of defendant’s bedroom statements on the grounds of a Miranda violation, no deficient performance by counsel has been established. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 359 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34] [“Where ‘there was no sound legal basis for objection, counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the evidence cannot establish ineffective assistance.’ ”].) 2.

Defendant’s claim regarding his Miranda waiver at the police station Defendant contends Detective Stotz and Deputy District Attorney Mitchell made a false promise of leniency during their interview of him in his bedroom and that such promise vitiated his subsequent waiver of Miranda rights the next morning.

Specifically, defendant claims his Miranda waiver at the police station was not knowing and intelligent and, therefore, was invalid, because it was based on the misrepresentation by Stotz and Mitchell on the previous evening that defendant would not get into trouble for admitting the prior assault on Melissa or admitting a sexual interest in or sexual conduct with Melissa. a.

Additional factual background During the course of the interview of defendant in his bedroom on the night of Melissa’s death, defendant told Detective Stotz and Deputy District Attorney Mitchell that he had no recent fights or problems with Melissa, but that he had heard Melissa did not like him.

Stotz asked defendant why, if Melissa did not like him, she would tell her friends that she and defendant had “messed around.” Stotz asked defendant if he and Melissa had ever kissed and defendant said, “[n]o, I never.” Stotz continued, “or made out” and told defendant “you’re not gonna get in trouble for that, y’know, we just wanna know [that].” Defendant asked Stotz: “why wouldn’t I get in trouble for that?” Stotz replied: “Well, because, frankly, because she’s no longer living, y’know. Nothing would happen to you if—if you had kissed her or grabbed her or touched her or even had sex with her.

Y’know, at this point she’s—she’s no longer the victim wouldn’t be her. She’s no longer with us. [S]o nothing would happen to you. We just need to know because—okay.” Defendant responded: “Okay. Of course you know I’m not confessing to that.” Stotz and Mitchell both explained that they had a responsibility to inquire. Later in the interview, Mitchell asked defendant what he had heard happened to Melissa. Defendant provided details regarding the circumstances of Melissa’s death that Stotz had not told him. Defendant denied speaking to anyone else.

Deputy District Attorney Mitchell informed defendant that in order to clear everybody from the neighborhood of suspicion, they were going to ask all the neighbors who were home at the time of the murder to take a polygraph test. When Mitchell started to ask defendant if he was willing to take the test, defendant expressed concern that if he was nervous, the polygraph would be “set off.” Asked if he had something to be nervous about, defendant said he was just very nervous. Detective Stotz assured defendant that he would be told all the questions in advance and have a chance to go over them.

Defendant could tell the examiner if he had any concerns. Mitchell then stated: “Like, if—if you and Melissa had had some problems sexually in the past and you’re trying to hide that, that might set it off, so you’d have to tell us about that ahead of time. What we’re interested in, the murder, of course, we don’t care about anything else that happened, if you and Melissa, she stopped coming over here, ’kay, that’s something that’s water under the bridge now.

We’re looking for only the murderer, if you didn’t do that, take a polygraph and prove it with your background, with her as long as there isn’t something you’re hiding, worried about whether or not they’re gonna ask questions about this one area, if you actually didn’t do the murder but you’re trying to hide this other information or problems that you’ve had with her, that could kind’a skew the results one way or the other.” Defendant eventually agreed to take a polygraph test and speak with investigators the next day, but asked that his parents not be told about it.

He asked to be telephoned the next day after his parents left the house. Defendant continued to deny being at the Middleton house the day of the murder and asserted he had nothing to do with Melissa’s death. Stotz telephoned defendant the next morning, as arranged, after defendant’s parents left for work. Defendant agreed to meet with investigators. Detectives Lynn and Stotz retrieved defendant from his home in an unmarked car. As noted earlier, during the drive, defendant told the detectives that there was no need for a polygraph test and apologized for wasting their time.

He said that he had wanted to turn himself in the previous night, but was not sure he could admit it and he did not want to confess in front of his parents. The officers asked defendant if he was willing to go to the office for a formal interview and he said, “Yeah. I’ll tell you everything.” At the police station, defendant was taken to Detective Lynn’s office while Detective Stotz gathered the equipment necessary for a taped interview. When Stotz returned to the office, Lynn left. Stotz spent a few minutes answering defendant’s questions, one of which was whether defendant would be getting the death penalty.

Stotz told defendant that he only made recommendations to the district attorney’s office, that the district attorney’s office actually decided what charges to file and penalties to seek, and that the court determined the penalty. Stotz explained to defendant the interview procedure that would be followed. He then turned on the tape recorder and started the interview by advising defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant indicated he understood his rights and agreed to answer questions. He signed an advisement of rights form indicating the same thing. b.

Discussion Defendant claims his Miranda waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent because it was based on the false promise by Detective Stotz and Deputy District Attorney Mitchell the previous night that what he said about the prior incident or any sexual interest in or sexual conduct with Melissa would not be used against him. Defendant failed to assert this claim of invalidity of his Miranda waiver as part of his suppression motion in the trial court, thereby forfeiting the issue on appeal. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1094 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321].) Defendant’s claim is also meritless.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person may be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself. (Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 103 [175 L.Ed.2d 1045, 1052, 130 S.Ct. 1213]; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428].) In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court “adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right from the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial interrogation.” (Maryland v.

Shatzer, supra, at p. 103 [175 L.Ed.2d at p. 1052].) Pursuant to Miranda, a suspect “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 479.) It is well settled, however, that after the familiar Miranda advisements are given, a suspect can waive his or her constitutional rights. (People v.

Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 683.) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. (People v.

Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 [111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589, 233 P.3d 1000].) The record here reflects that defendant connected himself to the prior nighttime attack reported by Melissa to her parents and a neighborhood friend when he told Detective Stotz during their second conversation at his front door about an incident in which he recalled waking up semiclothed outside his house.

When Stotz and Deputy District Attorney Mitchell asked defendant about that incident during their subsequent bedroom interview, defendant confirmed he woke up outside of his house two or three weeks earlier standing in his pants and underwear. When asked about a report that Melissa and defendant had “messed around,” defendant denied he had ever kissed or “made out” with Melissa. Stotz assured defendant that he was not going to get in trouble for what happened earlier.

When defendant asked why not, Stotz explained the reason that he would not get in trouble—even if he kissed, grabbed, touched or had sex with Melissa—was because Melissa was no longer alive. Defendant responded; “Okay. Of course you know I’m not confessing to that.” Mitchell later told defendant that “[w]hat we’re interested in, the murder, of course, we don’t care about anything else that happened, if you and Melissa, she stopped coming over here, ’kay, that’s something that’s water under the bridge now.

We’re looking for only the murderer, if you didn’t do that, take a polygraph and prove it. . . .” Even if defendant understood the comments of Stotz and Mitchell to unconditionally promise that he would not “get in trouble” for any prior assault, we conclude the record does not support defendant’s claim that such comments invalidated his waiver of his Miranda rights the next morning.

After Detectives Stotz and Lynn picked defendant up from his house the next morning, and during the subsequent ride, defendant tacitly confessed to killing Melissa by telling the officers he had wanted to confess when he was questioned the previous evening, but he was not sure he could admit it. He also explained that he did not want to confess in front of his parents. He said he would “tell them everything” at the police station. At the station, defendant demonstrated his understanding of the seriousness of the potential charges against him by asking whether he was going to be getting the death penalty.

Nothing in Stotz’s response promised defendant that he would not face such penalty. When Stotz started the formal interview, he advised defendant of his Miranda rights. That is, defendant was expressly told at that point without qualification that “anything he [said could] be used against him in a court of law . . . .” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 479, italics added.) Defendant indicated he understood his rights and agreed to answer questions.

The totality of the circumstances reflects that defendant understood at the time of his waiver that one of the consequences of his decision to waive his rights and talk to police would be the availability of all of his statements for potential use by the prosecution. Indeed, when defendant subsequently expressed reluctance to talk on tape about the prior incident, Stotz assured defendant he understood, that this was just part of the interview, and that defendant was not going to get in trouble for what happened two weeks earlier.

Defendant asked, “Why not?” Stotz replied, “Well because like I told you last night, that’s water under the bridge.” Defendant’s response is telling: he next said, “That’s until today.” (See, post, at p. 1174.) That is, defendant had understood at the time of his Miranda waiver that he had not been promised any escape from the criminal consequences of the prior incident. He knew he had not been promised any leniency at all if he had murdered Melissa.

Thus, the record does not establish that at the time defendant waived his Miranda rights he was doing so based on an understanding that Stotz or Mitchell had earlier promised him that he would not be subject to the death penalty or that he would not face charges relating to the prior assault of Melissa. Therefore, in the absence of defendant’s forfeiture of the issue, we would conclude on the merits that defendant’s Miranda waiver was knowingly and intelligently given. 3.

Defendant’s claim regarding the voluntariness of his admissions and confessions Defendant does not challenge the voluntariness of his confession to killing Melissa. Defendant challenges the introduction of his statements admitting his sexual intent and conduct in connection with the murder, and confessing to the prior attempted rape. Defendant claims that he was coerced into making false admissions and confessions by false promises of leniency and by the length and nature of the interrogation given his personal characteristics.

We uphold the finding of the trial court that defendant’s statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. a. Additional factual background When Detective Stotz questioned defendant at his front door on the day of Melissa’s death, he noted that although defendant appeared physically immature for his age, he did not appear mentally immature. When defendant was brought to the police station the next morning, Detective Lynn sat with defendant while Stotz gathered the equipment necessary for a taped interview. According to Lynn, defendant did not appear intimidated or frightened.

At one point, defendant accused Lynn of laughing at him when Lynn had not done so. Lynn described defendant as being almost the opposite of submissive. When Stotz returned to the office, Lynn left. As noted earlier, Stotz spent a few minutes answering defendant’s questions, one of which was whether defendant would be getting the death penalty. Stotz explained his limited role in determining the charges and penalties defendant might face. Stotz then explained to defendant the interview procedure that would be followed.

He turned on the tape recorder and started the interview about 9:45 a.m. by advising defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant waived his rights and agreed to answer questions. At the beginning of the interview, defendant provided a brief description of entering the Middleton house, Melissa screaming, and his strangling her to death. In followup questioning, Stotz asked defendant if he had any idea why Melissa started screaming as soon as she saw him and speculated that Melissa was afraid of defendant because of the prior assault.

Defendant agreed that she might have been afraid of him and that something had happened a couple of weeks earlier. Defendant expressed reluctance to talk about the prior assault on tape. Specifically, defendant responded to Stotz, “Yeah, you know about that [(the prior assault)], yeah, you don’t need to record that do you?” Stotz replied that he needed to know a little background on what happened. Defendant again asked why that needed to be recorded. Stotz told defendant that he needed to know because when they talked the night before, defendant said nothing happened during that incident.

Defendant explained, “That’s because my parents were home.” Stotz explained that his questions regarding the prior incident were part of the interview and repeated that defendant would not “get in trouble for what happened two weeks ago, okay?” When defendant asked why not, Stotz responded, “Well because like I told you last night, that’s water under the bridge.” Defendant replied, “That’s until today.” Stotz answered, “No, that’s got nothing to do with it, I just need to know why she would see you and why she would run away from you screaming like that and it’s kind of odd for a neighbor who lived there for six years.

For instance, if my neighbor walked into my house that I’ve known for six years, I wouldn’t just run away screaming . . . .” Defendant responded that Melissa was just barely screaming when she ran into her parents’ room. Detective Stotz continued to question defendant about the circumstances of Melissa’s death. When he asked defendant if defendant raped Melissa, defendant denied doing so.

Defendant suggested that if he had, they would have “found something in there,” provided “you didn’t plant something.” Defendant also denied having sex or trying to have sex with Melissa during the prior incident two weeks earlier. Defendant was questioned a few minutes more before a 35-minute break was taken. Questioning resumed at 10:40 a.m. with Deputy District Attorney Chessell present in addition to Detective Stotz.

Over the course of the next 40 minutes, defendant admitted that he went to the Middleton house to steal on the day of the killing and was looking for money when he went into the house in the prior incident. Defendant denied that he went into the house intending to sexually assault Melissa that day or during the prior incident. The officers confronted him multiple times with a request for an explanation of why Melissa’s shorts were unzipped when she was found dead.

After offering a number of possible explanations, defendant eventually admitted that when he went into the house and realized Melissa was home, the thought crossed his mind to have sex with her, and he unzipped her shorts. He claimed he did so just to frighten her. He denied sexually assaulting her. After multiple denials, defendant additionally admitted he used a key to get into the Middleton house both times. He said he threw the key in the trash after the killing. This segment of the interview ended at 11:20 a.m., with Stotz offering defendant another soda and Chessell offering him something to eat. Dr.

Rath began his interview of defendant around 12:45 p.m. Rath explained that he had been asked by the prosecution to talk to defendant about his background and history in order “to figure out what was going on with you mentally at the time all of this happened.” Rath told defendant that the interview would be tape-recorded and that “[p]eople involved in your case will be listening to the tape to hear what you say later on.” Rath proceeded to ask defendant a number of questions about his medical, school, and family history.

They discussed some of the details regarding defendant’s killing of Melissa and the previous incident at her house. Defendant told Rath he went into the Middleton house both times looking for money. Asked by Rath how Melissa’s shorts came to be unbuttoned and unzipped, defendant said he was trying to scare her into thinking he was going to do something, but he claimed he “wasn’t gonna.” He denied he ever had sexual fantasies about Melissa or that he ever became sexually aroused when he had contact with her. After defendant finished taking the MMPI test given by Dr.

Rath, Detective Stotz resumed his interview of defendant. Detective Rodriguez joined Stotz and defendant about five minutes later. Stotz took defendant through the description of the killing once again, eventually expressing dissatisfaction with defendant’s continued claim that he went to the house looking for money, not sex, and that he did not have sex with Melissa. Stotz told defendant he thought defendant tried to rape Melissa during the prior assault and that was why Melissa was afraid when she saw defendant in her house on the day of the killing.

Defendant equivocated, saying he had been under the influence of speed on the earlier occasion. Detective Stotz told defendant: “The sooner you tell me the truth, the sooner I’ll turn this machine off and the sooner we’ll all be on our way.” Detective Rodriguez added his belief that defendant would feel a lot better if he told the entire truth.

After declining a glass of water and indicating he was not hungry, defendant asked, “So I have to say it?” Stotz responded, “I want [you] to tell me the truth.” Defendant asked, “Why with the tape on?” Stotz explained that he did not take notes well, to which defendant replied, “So I have to say it out loud?” Stotz answered, “Yes, you do.” Defendant then stated, “I tried to rape her.” He said this happened “the very first time like two months ago whatever whenever it was.” He also admitted the thought of raping Melissa crossed his mind when he unzipped her pants on the day of the killing, but he changed his mind.

He “disdained” the thought. Just before the interview ended at 4:00 p.m., defendant acknowledged that he had not been threatened or coerced to speak with the police. Defendant said, “I thought I should report myself.” b. Discussion According to defendant, the entire thrust of his interrogation was a prosecution effort to get him to admit a sexual motive that would support a special circumstances murder charge.

To that end, defendant claims both Detective Stotz and Deputy District Attorney Mitchell falsely told him during the bedroom interview he would not face any criminal consequences for any prior sexual encounter with Melissa. Defendant contends Stotz repeated the assurance the next morning a short time into the police station interview by again stating the prior incident was “water under the bridge” and affirming that was still true when defendant questioned whether circumstances had changed.

Defendant contends Stotz’s comments constituted promises of leniency that rendered his subsequent admissions and confession involuntary and inadmissible. Both the state and federal Constitutions bar the prosecution from introducing a defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial. (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 169 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 211 P.3d 617] (Carrington); People v.

Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 114 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164].) “ ‘A statement is involuntary if it is not the product of “ ‘a rational intellect and free will.’ ” [Citation.] The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant’s “will was overborne at the time he confessed.” ’ ” (People v.

McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346-347 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 412, 212 P.3d 692] (McWhorter); accord, Carrington, supra, at p. 169.) “ ‘A confession may be found involuntary if extracted by threats or violence, obtained by direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of improper influence. [Citation.] Although coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to establish an involuntary confession, it “does not itself compel a finding that a resulting confession is involuntary.” [Citation.] The statement and the inducement must be causally linked. [Citation.]’ [Citation].” (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 347.) A confession is not rendered involuntary by coercive police activity that is not the “motivating cause” of the defendant’s confession. (People v.

Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 661 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].) “The prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s confession was voluntarily made.” (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 169.) “Whether a confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 480 [129 Cal.Rptr.3d 91, 257 P.3d 703], accord, People v.

Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 993.) “On appeal, we conduct an independent review of the trial court’s legal determination and rely upon the trial court’s findings on disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v.

Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 425.) The facts surrounding an admission or confession are undisputed to the extent the interview is tape-recorded, making the issue subject to our independent review. (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 346.) Detective Stotz’s comments during the police station interview (ante, at p. 1174) constituted implied promises of leniency concerning prosecution of defendant for the prior assault or capital murder.

And, for purposes of this claim, we assume the statements made by Stotz and Deputy District Attorney Mitchell during their earlier interview of defendant in his bedroom were understood by defendant to be implied promises of leniency. (See ante, at pp. 1168-1170, 1171-1172.) Nevertheless, the evidence fails to show that they were the “motivating cause” of defendant’s subsequent admissions and confession. (People v.

Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 661.) The record reflects that defendant wanted to tell Detective Stotz and Deputy District Attorney Mitchell about the killing and the prior assault when they were questioning him in his bedroom on the evening of the killing, but defendant was not sure he could make the admissions then and, in any event, did not want to confess in front of his parents. Defendant apologized the next morning for wasting the officers’ time. He stated that a polygraph test was unnecessary; he would tell them everything.

During the questioning that followed, defendant expressed reluctance to talk about the prior assault only because he did not want his statements tape-recorded. When Stotz promised leniency to defendant, defendant did not immediately respond by admitting his sexual interest in or sexual conduct with Melissa, which would have reflected his reliance on such promise. Defendant consistently denied any sexual interest in or conduct with Melissa.

After a half-hour break, questioning resumed with Deputy District Attorney Chessell present; defendant then eventually admitted the thought crossed his mind to have sex with Melissa when he entered the house, but he vehemently denied that he acted on the thought, saying he unzipped her shorts only to frighten her. Defendant provided the same explanation to Dr. Rath and continued to deny any sexual interest in or conduct with Melissa.

Only late that afternoon during further questioning by Detectives Stotz and Rodriguez, after defendant was unable to adequately explain why he went upstairs when he realized Melissa was home, why she ran screaming from him, and how her shorts came to be unbuttoned and unzipped, did defendant admit his prior attempt to rape Melissa and his thought to rape her on the day of the killing. Defendant’s concern at that time still appeared to be having his confession tape-recorded—and not what additional punishment might result.

The record does not substantiate the claim that defendant’s admissions/confession and any promise of leniency were “ ‘causally linked.’ ” (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 347; accord, Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 170-171.) Defendant nevertheless claims coercive police interrogation tactics resulted in his admissions and confession, emphasizing the repetitive nature of the questions asked about his sexual interest in and sexual conduct with Melissa, the length of the interview from morning until late afternoon, and his personal psychological characteristics. We find no improper police conduct.

As we previously noted, defendant connected himself to the prior reported assault on Melissa when he was questioned the second time at his front door. It was natural and appropriate for the officers to seek clarification from defendant as to what happened. Because the prior assault would logically help explain defendant’s conduct on the day of the killing, there was nothing improper about the officers continuing to explore the subject when defendant was unable to adequately explain the motivation for his acts.

We see nothing improper in the officers asking defendant a number of times and in a number of different ways about his sexual motivation and conduct, especially given defendant’s pattern of evasive answers and his lies about the possession of the Middletons’ house keys. There was nothing coercive in the officers urging defendant to tell the truth and informing defendant of the obvious point that the sooner he told the truth, the sooner the interview would finish. (People v.

Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 600 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322, 208 P.3d 78].) Moreover, our review of the tapes of defendant’s interviews at the police station reveals that no one questioning defendant used any aggressive, hostile, or threatening tone in questioning defendant. Although there were repeated questions regarding defendant’s possible sexual interest in and sexual conduct with Melissa, the overall approach of the officers remained low key. There is nothing to indicate Dr.

Rath was employed, as defendant suggests, as part of an overall strategy to “soften him up.” With respect to the length of the interviews, the record reflects that defendant was questioned for a total of two and a quarter hours and spent an hour and 25 minutes completing the MMPI testing. Multiple breaks were taken. He was offered both food and drink. He accepted at least one soda, but declined any food. When he was asked if he was tired, he responded that he just did not like being questioned.

These circumstances hardly reflect the kind of continuous, prolonged interrogation that has been found to render a resulting confession involuntary. (See Reck v. Pate (1961) 367 U.S. 433, 441 [6 L.Ed.2d 948, 81 S.Ct. 1541]; Ashcraft v. Tennessee (1944) 322 U.S. 143, 153-154 [88 L.Ed. 1192, 64 S.Ct. 921].) Defendant emphasizes, however, that his personal characteristics rendered him more vulnerable to improper coercion. He notes that he was 20 years old, but looked 15. He still lived with his parents. He was not employed outside the home. He did not have a driver’s license.

He had a history of learning disabilities and had been in special education classes in elementary school. He had graduated high school, but was not going to college. He had no experience in the criminal justice system. Defendant claims he suffered from depression, anxiety, and headaches. According to defendant, he had been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and may have had a dissociative disorder. He had suffered physical abuse from his father.

Additionally, defendant argues, he had a history of methamphetamine and marijuana use. “Insofar as a defendant’s claims of involuntariness emphasize that defendant’s particular psychological state rendered him open to coercion, this court has noted that ‘[t]he Fifth Amendment is not “concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 502 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 245, 150 P.3d 1224]; accord, People v.

Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 753 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 78, 209 P.3d 1].) There is no indication here of coercive tactics by the individuals interviewing defendant, including any evidence that they exploited any personal characteristics of defendant in order to obtain his admissions and confession. Indeed, defendant expressly acknowledged at the end of the interview that he had not been threatened or coerced. He said he thought he should report himself. The trial court properly concluded defendant’s admissions and confession were voluntarily made and, therefore, admissible. B.

Exclusion of evidence relevant to defendant’s claim that he was coerced into making false admissions and confession Defendant contends the trial court unfairly frustrated defense efforts to present a defense establishing defendant was coerced into making false admissions and his confession. Defendant claims the trial court’s rulings violated his constitutional rights to due process and the confrontation of witnesses under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

article I,

section 7 of the California Constitution. We reject defendant’s claims. 1. The proffered expert testimony of Dr. Richard A. Leo a. Procedural background Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to introduce the expert testimony of social psychologist Dr. Richard Ofshe or Dr. Richard Leo regarding police interrogation techniques and false confessions. (See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action (1997) 74 Denv.U.

L.Rev. 979, 1117.) Defendant asserted such testimony was relevant to determine the voluntariness and trustworthiness of the statements he made at the police station. At trial, defendant sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Leo. In a declaration submitted by defendant to the trial court in connection with his efforts to introduce this testimony, Dr.

Leo averred that “[cjontrary to public myth and mis-perception, it is well documented that police interrogators can and do elicit false confessions in response to common, psychological methods of interrogation.” According to Leo, research has established that “certain police interrogation techniques are correlated with the likelihood of a false confession” and such “research findings are beyond the common understanding of the lay person.” Leo’s proposed trial testimony would address “the following general topics: the use of influence, persuasion and coercion during interrogation; how certain police interrogation techniques affect the decision-making of custodial suspects; why certain psychological techniques are coercive and their likely effects; how and why contemporary police interrogation techniques can lead guilty suspects to make the decision to confess; how and why contemporary police interrogation techniques can lead the innocent to make the decision to confess; and how to apply generally accepted principles to evaluate the reliability of confessions statements.” The prosecutor opposed the defense motion, arguing there was no foundation for such testimony because defendant had not recanted his confession and because there was no other evidence that his confession was false.

The prosecutor also contended that the defense had failed to show the subject matter was a valid, accepted area of expertise or that the testimony would assist the jury.

The defense countered that a recantation was unnecessary before an expert could be called, that it would be unconstitutional to require defendant to testify his confession was false before the testimony could be admitted, that there was sufficient evidence of falsity in the testimony from both pathologists that Melissa could not have been strangled with the headphone cord in the manner defendant described, and that testimony regarding the general factors that might lead to a false confession was beyond the knowledge of an average person.

The defense repeated the claims that express promises of leniency had been made to defendant and that the interviewers’ questioning was coercive in light of defendant’s personal characteristics. The trial court ultimately excluded Dr. Leo’s testimony under Evidence Code

section 352. Specifically, the court concluded the proffered testimony was “extremely speculative” because there was no “basis or foundation” to indicate defendant’s confession was false. The court noted defendant was not required to testify, but there was no evidence defendant had otherwise recanted his confession and the pathologists’ testimony and the physical evidence did not establish any falsity of defendant’s interview statements because the testimony and evidence were not incompatible with defendant’s explanation of how he choked Melissa.

Therefore, the probative value of Leo’s testimony, “if any,” was substantially outweighed by its undue consumption of time. Defendant subsequently challenged the trial court’s ruling in his new trial motion. The trial court reaffirmed its ruling and denied the motion. b. Discussion Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding his proffered expert testimony regarding false and coerced confessions. The Attorney General counters that the testimony was properly excluded under Evidence Code

section 352. A trial court has broad discretion to exclude relevant evidence under Evidence Code

section 352 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (

a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (

b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352; accord, People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 643 [122 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 248 P.3d 651].) Such “discretion extends to the admission or exclusion of expert testimony.” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1008 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 183 P.3d 1146]; accord, People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 359 [93 Cal.Rptr.3d 537, 207 P.3d 2].) We review rulings regarding relevancy and Evidence Code

section 352 under an abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Lee, at p. 643.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case by excluding defendant’s proffered evidence. At trial, defendant did not contend his confession to killing Melissa or admission of entering the Middleton house with the intent to steal were false. Defendant offered the expert testimony of Dr. Leo to assist the jury in evaluating only the truthfulness of his admissions of sexual intent and sexual conduct with Melissa and his commission of the prior offenses.

As was his right, defendant did not testify and thus did not deny the truth of his interview statements. There was no other evidence offered that logically called into question the veracity of his admissions. The only evidence that defendant pointed to as showing he made any false statements during his police station interview was the testimony of the two pathologists that Melissa was not likely strangled from the front in the manner described by defendant. And yet Dr.

Choi testified that the linear marks on Melissa’s neck could have resulted from a cord placed around Melissa’s neck if her hair was in between the cord and her neck and if the ligature was pulled from one side or another, a scenario not wholly unlike defendant’s uncertain recollection of his precise actions. Choi’s opinion accounted for the finding of the headphones with a broken cord near Melissa’s body, whereas Dr. Spitz’s version of the strangulation did not.

Not only was there a dearth of evidence indicating a false admission or confession, a multitude of corroborative evidence had been introduced at the time of the trial court’s ruling that suggested defendant’s admissions and confession were true. Melissa’s parents both testified regarding the prior assault on Melissa by a nude man, although they thought the incident was a nightmare. Defendant’s friend Montero also testified regarding the prior assault, stating that defendant returned home out of breath and looking frightened approximately 15 to 20 minutes after Montero spoke with Melissa’s father, Robert.

When Melissa was found dead, her shorts were unbuttoned and unzipped. And, a pair of her underpants was found in the trash can along with the keys to the Middleton home, which defendant described discarding after the killing. The fact that defendant’s semen was found on that underwear suggests an obvious sexual interest in Melissa.

We also note both our earlier conclusion that defendant’s interrogators did not act improperly in their questioning of him and the circumstance that defendant never claimed his interview confession to killing Melissa or his admission to entering the Middleton home looking for money to steal was false. Under these facts, it fell within the trial court’s broad discretion to determine that Dr. Leo’s proffered testimony had, at most, minimal probative value, which was substantially outweighed by its likely undue consumption of time. (People v.

Ramos (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1206-1207 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 167]; People v. Son (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 224, 241 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 871]; cf. People v. Page (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 161 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 898].) Our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code

section 352 is consistent with U.S. v. Hall (7th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 1337 (Hall), the case on which defendant primarily relies. In Hall, the federal district court rejected the proffer of Dr. Ofshe’s testimony in its entirety because “in the final analysis, Dr.

Ofshe’s testimony would add nothing to what the jury would know from common experience.” (93 F.3d at p. 1341.) The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed based on its inability to be confident that the district court had applied the correct legal framework in making its ruling. (Id. at p. 1342.) It stated that the district court’s ruling that Ofshe’s testimony had no potential usefulness because it was within the jury’s knowledge “overlooked the utility of valid social science.” (Id. at p. 1345.) “Properly conducted social science research often shows that commonly held beliefs are in error. Dr.

Ofshe’s testimony, assuming its scientific validity, would have let the jury know that a phenomenon known as false confessions exists, how to recognize it, and how to decide whether it fit the facts of the case being tried.” (Ibid.) In contrast to the ruling of the district court in Hall, the trial court here did not exclude the testimony of Dr. Leo based on a conclusion that this type of expert testimony was inadmissible per se. The trial court acknowledged that the expertise of Dr. Ofshe or Dr.

Leo might be helpful to a jury in certain factual situations, but concluded that under the specific facts here the proffered evidence was “highly speculative” and should be excluded under Evidence Code

section 352. This ruling is consistent with the observation in Hall that even if expert testimony will assist the jury, it is still subject to “the normal controls on scope of testimony and relevance.” (Hall, supra, 93 F.3d at p. 1344.) Our conclusion leads us to reject defendant’s claim that the trial court’s ruling violated his right to present a defense. (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 688-691 [90 L.Ed.2d 636, 106 S.Ct. 2142]; Chambers v.

Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302 [35 L.Ed.2d 297, 93 S.Ct. 1038] (Chambers).) Although a defendant has the general right to offer a defense through the testimony of his or her witnesses, “a state court’s application of ordinary rules of evidence—including the rule stated in Evidence Code

section 352—generally does not infringe upon this right . . . .” (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 82 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 198 P.3d 11]; see Crane v. Kentucky, at pp. 689-690.) The ruling excluding the testimony of Dr. Leo under Evidence Code

section 352 did not result in the blanket exclusion of evidence concerning the circumstances of defendant’s admissions and confession, which would have been necessary in order for defendant to claim undue influence. The jury listened to tape recordings of defendant’s interviews at the police station, heard the testimony of Detectives Lynn and Stotz, Deputy District Attorney Chessell, and Dr. Rath regarding the circumstances of those

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