NICHOLAS GIKAS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FRANK S. ZOLIN, as Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent, 6 Cal. 4th 841

Opinion ARABIAN. J. Alarmed by the death and destruction that drunk drivers cruelly perpetrate upon our highways, the Legislature has empowered the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to promptly suspend the drivers’ licenses of those who drive while intoxicated. We are asked to decide whether a determination in a criminal prosecution that a defendant had been illegally arrested for driving under the influence precludes relitigation of the same question in the DMV’s administrative proceeding to suspend the license. We conclude it does not. I.

Facts In the early morning hours of July 20, 1990, California Highway Patrol Officer Kenneth Jolly arrested appellant, Nicholas Gikas, for driving while under the influence of alcohol. A blood test showed that appellant’s blood-alcohol level was 0.10 percent. Officer Jolly served appellant with an “administrative per se order of suspension,” giving appellant a 45-day driving license, but notifying him that his license would be suspended after that time because of the results of the blood test. Appellant moved to suppress evidence in the criminal proceeding.

Officer Jolly and a defense investigator testified at the hearing. The municipal court ruled that the original stop and detention were unreasonable, and granted the motion. The People, represented by the San Diego City Attorney, indicated they were unable to proceed, and the criminal case was dismissed. The People did not appeal. Thereafter, the DMV conducted an administrative hearing to consider suspending appellant’s driver’s license because of the July 20, 1990, blood test.

Relying on the municipal court’s grant of the suppression motion and the subsequent dismissal of the criminal charges, appellant argued that the DMV was collaterally estopped from relitigating the legality of his arrest. The DMV rejected the claim, and suspended appellant’s driver’s license for four months. It later denied relief on administrative review. Appellant filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court.

The court denied the petition, finding that the DMV “is not collaterally estopped from determining that plaintiff’s stop and detention was lawful.” The Court of Appeal stayed the suspension pending appeal and, by a two-to-one vote, with Justice Huffman dissenting, reversed.

It found that the “DMV is collaterally estopped from relitigating the cited issues [essentially the lawfulness of the arrest] which were necessarily resolved by the municipal court decision to grant the suppression motion.” Because of this holding, the court did not decide appellant’s alternate contention, that the dismissal of the criminal charges was an “acquitt[al]” that also precluded the administrative proceeding under Vehicle Code

section 13353.2, subdivision (e). We granted the DMV’s petition for review. II. Discussion A. Introduction It is a criminal offense to drive while under the influence of alcohol or a drug, or to drive with 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in the blood. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (

a) and (b); see also Veh. Code, § 23153 [similar, but also involving bodily injury].) In addition to criminal sanctions, the Legislature has established administrative procedures whereby the DMV may suspend a person’s driver’s license for driving under the influence or with a specified blood-alcohol level.

The DMV has long been authorized to suspend drivers’ licenses of persons convicted of specified alcohol related driving offenses, or of persons who refused to submit to a chemical test to determine their blood-alcohol level. (E.g., §§ 13352, 13353.) At issue here is legislation enacted in 1989, operative July 1, 1990, designed to allow suspension of drivers’ licenses before conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.10 percent or more, later reduced to 0.08 percent. (Stats. 1989, ch. 1460, p. 6501; Stats. 1990, ch. 431.) “Similar laws providing for administrative license suspension or revocation, sometimes called ‘administrative per se’ laws, have been enacted and are in effect in at least 23 states, and are reported to be an effective deterrent to driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. [Citation.]” (Peretto v.

Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 449, 452 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 392]; see also, generally, id. at pp. 452-453 and Claxton v.

Zolin (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 553, 558-559 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 319].) Under this legislation, when a person is arrested for driving under the influence and is determined to have a prohibited blood-alcohol level, the arresting officer or the DMV serves the person with a “notice of the order of suspension.” (§§ 13353.2, subds. (b) & (c), 23158.5, subds. (a) & (b).) The notice informs the person that his or her driver’s license will be suspended 45 days from the date of service, states the reason and statutory grounds for the suspension, and explains the person’s right to seek an administrative hearing. (§§ 13353.2, subd. (c), 13353.3, subd. (a).) If the arresting officer serves the notice, the officer also confiscates the person’s driver’s license, and issues a 45-day temporary license. (§ 23158.5, subd. (b).) The period of suspension is four months for a person with no prior record. (§ 13353.3, subd. (b)(1).) The DMV automatically reviews the suspension order to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether: (1) the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe the person was driving in violation of

section 23152 or

section 23153; (2) the person was placed under arrest; and (3) the person was driving with 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in the blood. (§ 13557.) The determination is based upon the officer’s report and any evidence accompanying the report. (§ 13557, subd. (a).) The person may request a hearing with the DMV limited to these issues, at which additional evidence may be presented.

Upon a timely request, the hearing must be held before the effective date of the order of suspension. (§ 13558.) The person may seek judicial review of an adverse decision. (§ 13559.) None of these review proceedings have a “collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent criminal prosecution” or “preclude litigation of those same facts in the criminal proceeding.” (§§ 13557, subd. (f), 13558, subd. (g), 13559, subd. (b).) The express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension procedure are: (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive blood-alcohol levels; (2) to guard against erroneous deprivation by providing a prompt administrative review of the suspension; and (3) to place no restriction on the ability of a prosecutor to pursue related criminal actions. (Stats. 1989, ch. 1460, § 1, pp. 6501-6502; Agresti v.

Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 599, 603 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353].) The legislative history reveals that “[t]he need for the administrative per se statutes arose from the fact that ‘[t]he legal process leading to imposition of a suspension sometimes [took] years from the time of arrest.’ [Citation.] ‘Many drivers with high chemical test results fail[ed] to have sanctions taken against their driving privilege because of reduction in charges as the result of “plea-bargaining” or pre-trial diversion programs.’ [Citation.] In enacting the administrative per se law, the Legislature intended to establish ‘an expedited driver’s license suspension system’ [citation] that would ‘reduce court delays.

The suspension will be swift and certain and will be more effective as a deterrent . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Bell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 304, 312 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 830].) “[T]he Legislature, in enacting these statutes, contemplated two processes—one involving court proceedings and criminal in nature, the other involving administrative proceedings and civil in nature; and that these processes are, for the most part, intended to operate independently of each other and to provide for different dispositions.” (Robertson v.

Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 938, 947 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 319].) However, as relevant here, one important requirement is common to both. For the incriminating evidence to be admissible in the criminal proceeding, or for the DMV to suspend the driver’s license, the underlying arrest must have been lawful. (§ 13557, subd. (b)(2)(A); Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 607; see also Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 760 [280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404]; Zapata v.

Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 108, 111 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 855]; and Music v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 841, 847 [270 Cal.Rptr. 692] [interpreting similar statutory language in § 13353, involving the “implied consent” law].) In the criminal proceeding of this case, the court concluded that the arrest was unlawful. The precise question confronting us is whether that determination precludes relitigation of the issue in the administrative proceeding. Especially pertinent to this inquiry is

section 13353.2. Subdivision (

a) of that

section provides: “The [DMV] shall immediately suspend the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle if the person was driving a motor vehicle when the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood.” Subdivision (

e) of

section 13353.2 provides in pertinent part: “The determination of the facts in subdivision (

a) is a civil matter which is independent of the determination of the person’s guilt or innocence, shall have no collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent criminal prosecution, and shall not preclude the litigation of the same or similar facts in the criminal proceeding. If a person is acquitted of criminal charges relating to a determination of facts under subdivision (a), the [DMV] shall immediately reinstate the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle if the [DMV] has suspended it administratively pursuant to subdivision (a), and the [DMV] shall return or reissue for the remaining term any driver’s license which has been taken from the person pursuant to

Section 23158.5 or otherwise.” (Italics added.) Appellant contends that collateral estoppel principles prevent relitigation of the lawfulness of the arrest in the administrative proceeding, and that he was “acquitted” of the criminal charges within the meaning of

section 13353.2, subdivision (e). The California Public Defender’s Association, as amicus curiae in support of appellant, also argues that Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d), prohibits use in the administrative proceeding of evidence suppressed in the criminal case. We consider the three arguments in order. B. Collateral Estoppel In general, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues litigated and decided in a prior proceeding. (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 477 [186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321]; Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604 [25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439].) “Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled.

First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.” (Lucido v.

Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 [272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 2 A.L.R.5th 995].) Even if these threshold requirements are satisfied, the doctrine will not be applied if such application would not serve its underlying fundamental principles. (Id. at p. 339.) The DMV concedes that the first four requirements are satisfied: the identical issue—the lawfulness of the arrest—was litigated in the criminal proceeding, and it was necessarily and finally decided on the merits.

Appellant, for his part, does not argue that the prosecution in the criminal proceeding is the same party as the DMV in the administrative proceeding. The disagreement centers around whether the DMV is in privity with the prosecution. “[T]he determination whether a party is in privity with another for purposes of collateral estoppel is a policy decision.” (Dyson v. State Personnel Bd. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 711, 724 [262 Cal.Rptr. 112]; see also Lucido v.

Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 342-343 [“We have repeatedly looked to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting.”]; People v.

Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 477 [“this court must consider whether the traditional requirements and policy reasons for applying collateral estoppel were satisfied by the facts of this case”].) “Privity is essentially a shorthand statement that collateral estoppel is to be applied in a given case [assuming the other requirements are satisfied]; there is no universally applicable definition of privity.” (Lynch v. Glass (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 943, 947 [119 Cal.Rptr. 139]; also quoted in People v.

Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 486.) “The concept refers ‘to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’ ” (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 486-487, quoting Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 875 [151 Cal.Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098].) Numerous cases involving a refusal to take a chemical test under

section 13353 have examined whether the DMV and criminal prosecutors are in privity with each other, and have reached conflicting conclusions. (Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 108 [privity]; Pawlowski v. Pierce (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 692 [249 Cal.Rptr. 49] [no privity]; Buttimer v. Alexis (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 754, 760 [194 Cal.Rptr. 603) [privity]; Lofthouse v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 730, 736-738 [177 Cal.Rptr. 601] [no privity]; Shackelton v.

Department of Motor Vehicles (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 327, 331 [119 Cal.Rptr. 921] [privity].) Appellant cites the cases finding privity. In Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 108, the court compared the district attorney’s prosecution of drunk-driving cases and the DMV’s handling of administrative proceedings, and concluded: “The obvious purpose of both agencies in both proceedings is to protect the public from those who drive under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

From each proceeding, sanctions may flow that will hopefully deter such conduct. . . . [¶] Since both agencies represent the state, both have the same interest of protecting the public from those who drive under the influence, and both initiate proceedings in an effort to obtain sanctions to deter such conduct, it is clear that the relationship between the district attorney and DMV in the context of [driving under the influence] enforcement is ‘sufficiently close’ to support a finding of privity for the purpose of applying collateral estoppel. (See People v.

Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 486-488.)” (Id. at p. 115.) The Zapata court further concluded that the public policy considerations of “preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation” favor application of the collateral estoppel doctrine. (Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 115.) The DMV and dissent below counter with the cases finding no privity. Justice Huffman argued: “Common sense indicates the public prosecutors and a state licensing agency are totally separate entities.

Zapata, seeking to find privity by the use of generalization, concludes that since both agencies represent the state and have an interest in protecting the public from drunk drivers, they are in privity.

Respectfully, that logic would place the Governor, the Legislature, the public prosecutors, the DMV, and any agency devoted to the rehabilitation of alcoholics in privity as they represent state agencies and have an interest in protecting the public from drunk drivers. “In this case the San Diego City Attorney of necessity has its own agenda in selecting the cases to prosecute, determining how to marshal its evidence, and whether to seek review of potentially erroneous decisions issued by the municipal courts.

Both the prosecutor and DMV exist in a time of limited resources with crushing workloads and must set their own agendas independent of each other. There is absolutely no indication in this record the city attorney is aware of or has any interest in furthering the administrative responsibilities of the DMV. To find privity for purposes of collateral estoppel on this record is to simply create it out of thin air.” In deciding this question, we face a significant constraint not present in the earlier cases. The Legislature has now addressed the matter, and made the policy decisions.

The 1989 legislation, operative July 1, 1990, repeatedly states that the results of the administrative proceeding have no collateral estoppel effect on the criminal prosecution. (§§ 13353.2, subd. (e), 13557, subd. (f), 13558, subd. (g), 13559, subd. (b).) This was an apparent reaction to People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468, which held that the results of administrative hearings could preclude criminal prosecution for welfare fraud. The Sims result was itself a policy decision, but one informed by the “unique statutory scheme” at issue there. (Id. at p. 490; see Lucido v.

Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 349.) The Legislature thus made the policy decision that, whatever similarities there may or may not be between this situation and that of People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468, administrative proceedings before the DMV will not have a preclusive effect on related criminal proceedings. If, today, a defendant were to argue that a favorable administrative outcome collaterally es-topped a criminal prosecution, and cited Sims to support the contention, the contrary legislative enactment would clearly prevail.

Absent constitutional constraints, when the Legislature has established policy, it is not for the courts to differ. (Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 761, 769; AIU Ins. Co. v.

Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 818 [274 Cal.Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253] [because the legislative bodies made the policy decision that environmental cleanup costs may be insured, “public policy considerations” were not relevant to deciding whether the specific insurance policies at issue did cover the costs].) Here, of course, appellant does not seek to have the administrative proceeding preclude the criminal, but the reverse. As will be explained further in

part II. C., post, the bill that was eventually enacted into law, as originally introduced in the Legislature, provided that neither the criminal nor the administrative proceeding would have any effect on the other. If this original version had been enacted, we would have had to reject out of hand appellant’s collateral estoppel argument, whatever we might otherwise think of the policy considerations.

The bill was significantly amended during the legislative process, and the enacted statute specifies that an “acquitt[al]” of the criminal charges does preclude the administrative sanction. (§ 13353.2, subd. (e).) The Legislature has thus chosen to have the administrative proceeding not affect the criminal at all, but to have the criminal affect the administrative in a specified limited manner. Because the Legislature has specified exactly what preclusive effect the criminal proceeding has on the administrative, we may not grant greater preclusive effect merely because we may find it to be desirable.

Expressio unius est exclusio aiterius. The expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1391, fn. 13 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].) The expression of preclusion by an acquittal excludes preclusion in other regards not expressed. The answer to the instant question is therefore not to be found by applying “[t]raditional[]” (Lucido v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341) collateral estoppel analysis, but rather by interpreting

section 13353.2, subdivision (e). If appellant was “acquitted” of the criminal charges within the meaning of that subsection, the DMV is precluded from suspending his license; otherwise, it is not so precluded. We turn now to a consideration of that question. C. Acquittal As noted in footnote 3, ante, an acquittal in a criminal case does not necessarily preclude administrative proceedings based upon the same facts.

The Legislature could have made the administrative suspension proceeding of this case completely independent of the criminal. “An acquittal of a criminal charge might represent only a conclusion that the proof was not sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not an adjudication that the driver did not actually drive with the unlawful blood-alcohol level.” (Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 462; see One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v.

United States, supra, 409 U.S. at pp. 234-235 [34 L.Ed.2d at pp. 441-442].) The bill that became the “administrative per se” law originally provided that neither the criminal nor the administrative proceeding would have any impact on the other. Under Senate Bill No. 1623, 1989-1990 Regular Session, as introduced on March 10, 1989,

section 13353.2, subdivision (f), would have stated in pertinent part: “The determination of the facts in subdivision (

a) is a civil matter which is independent of the determination of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence. The disposition of those criminal charges shall not affect any revocation action taken under this section.” During the legislative process, the final sentence of the language quoted in the previous paragraph was deleted, and replaced with language substantially identical to the current second sentence of

section 13353.2, subdivision (e), i.e., “If a person is acquitted of criminal charges relating to a determination of facts under subdivision (a),” the suspended license must be reinstated. (Assem. Amend, to Sen. Bill No. 1623 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 21, 1989, § 4.) A later amendment and subsequent clean-up legislation renumbered subdivision (

f) of

section 13353.2 as subdivision (e), and amended it to read as it now does. (Assem. Amend, to Sen. Bill No. 1623 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 11, 1989, § 4; Stats. 1990, ch. 431, § 4.) It is apparent from this legislative history and the language of

section 13353.2, subdivision (e), that the Legislature assumed the administrative proceeding would finish before the criminal, and the license would therefore be suspended before any acquittal. The Legislature did not contemplate the situation here, where the criminal action was terminated at an early stage before the administrative suspension. We do not believe, however, that this circumstance affects the outcome of this case.

If, as the statute provides, an acquittal necessitates the reinstatement of a license already suspended, it would also clearly preclude the DMV from later suspending the license for the same conduct. The Legislature did not intend the specified preclusive effect to be controlled by the sequence of events. We must determine what the Legislature intended when it chose to have an acquittal preclude an administrative suspension. Obviously, when a trial on the merits of a criminal charge results in a verdict of not guilty, the defendant has been acquitted.

Is one also acquitted when, as here, the charges are dismissed following suppression of the relevant evidence and the prosecution’s statement that it is therefore unable to proceed? In interpreting the language of a statute, we first turn to the words themselves. (IT Corp. v.

Solano County Bd. of Supervisors (1991) 1 Cal.4th 81, 98 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 820 P.2d 1023].) The key word here, of course, is “acquitted.” The statute does not define the word, and our review of available legislative materials discloses nothing that sheds light on its meaning not apparent from the language of the bills and the statute itself. However, the term “acquitted” or “acquittal” is used throughout the Penal Code in contexts consistently indicating a decision on the merits by the fact finder following the attachment of jeopardy. (E.g., Pen.

Code, §§ 654, 656, 793, 794, 1022, 1023, 1096, 1118, 1118.1, 1151, 1161, 1165, 1447.) The only apparent exception is the reference to “acquitted on the ground of variance between the accusatory pleading and the proof’ in Penal Code

section 1021. But even that statute provides that if the defendant was so acquitted, but “without a judgment of acquittal, it is not an acquittal of the same offense.” Judicial decisions have construed the term consistently with its use throughout the Penal Code. When a statute uses terms that have been judicially construed, it is presumed that the terms have been used in the sense that the courts have placed upon them. (People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 845-846 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380].) A question similar to the one here has arisen in death penalty cases. Penal Code

section 190.3 provides that at the penalty phase, no evidence may be admitted of criminal activity for which the defendant had been “prosecuted and acquitted.” In 1987 and 1988 (and again after the adoption of the statute at issue here), this court held that a “dismissal not based on any judicial determination with respect to the truth or falsity of the charge is not an acquittal under

section 190.3.” (People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 193 [246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]; see also People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 907 [274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282] and People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 774 [239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) A dismissal under Penal Code

section 995, for example, is not an acquittal. (People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 774; People v.

Reeves (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 490, 492 [58 Cal.Rptr. 517].) We therefore conclude that when the Legislature used the word “acquitted” it did not intend to necessarily include a dismissal. “The term ‘acquittal,’ . . . generally refers to a disposition based upon a determination of the merits. [Fn. omitted.] ‘[A] defendant is acquitted only when “the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” [Citation.]’ (United States v.

Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 97 [57 L.Ed.2d 65, 78, 98 S.Ct. 2187] [defining the term in the context of double jeopardy].)” (Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at pp. 604-605; see also Snow v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 230, 233 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 68] [dismissal of criminal charges after a trial resulted in a hung jury is not an acquittal under

section 13353.2].) In Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at page 604, the record did not disclose the reason for the dismissal, and the court held that it was not an acquittal. The court specifically noted the case did not involve a dismissal following a finding by the trial court that the defendant had been unlawfully arrested. (Id. at pp. 604-605, fn. 2.) This case does. However, we do not believe the result here should be different. The context in which the word “acquitted” is used in the statute also shows that the Legislature intended it to have its usual meaning, and not a broader meaning encompassing dismissals for reasons unrelated to actual innocence.

Section 13353.2, subdivision (e), refers to a person “acquitted of criminal charges relating to a determination of facts under subdivision (a) . . . .” (Italics added.) The only facts mentioned in subdivision (

a) are those relating to actual guilt or innocence, specifically (1) driving (2) with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more. (See Claxton v. Zolin, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 560; Helmandollar v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 52, 56 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 155].) The requirement of a lawful arrest is found elsewhere, in

section 13557, subdivision (b)(2)(A). Therefore, only an acquittal relating to the person’s actual innocence of driving with the prohibited blood-alcohol level comes within the scope of

section 13353.2, subdivision (e); a ruling regarding the lawfulness of the arrest does not. This

interpretation of the word “acquitted” is consistent with the purposes of the administrative per se legislation. One purpose is to provide a prompt administrative review of the suspension. This review includes a determination of the lawfulness of the arrest, and is itself subject to judicial review. Another purpose is to make the highways of California safer. “Deterring drunk driving and identifying and removing drunk drivers from the roadways undeniably serves a highly important governmental interest. . . .

Stopping the carnage wrought on California highways by drunk drivers is a concern the importance of which is difficult to overestimate.” (Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1338-1339 [241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299].) In furthering these purposes, the Legislature used precise language.

It chose to prevent the DMV from suspending a driver’s license if the criminal courts found the person in fact not guilty of drunk driving, but not otherwise. “It would be inconsistent with the purpose of this factfinding procedure [administrative review], and with the intent to suspend the driving privilege of those who are thus found to have been driving under the influence, to rescind the suspension for reasons that have nothing to do with whether the person was in fact driving while intoxicated.” (Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 606; see also Claxton v.

Zolin, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.) Appellant relies on cases holding either that a dismissal is the equivalent of an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes when based upon insufficiency of the evidence to establish factual guilt (e.g., Smalis v. Pennsylvania (1986) 476 U.S. 140, 144 [90 L.Ed.2d 121, 116, 106 S.Ct. 1745]), or that a certain dismissal prohibited further criminal proceedings. (People v. Superior Court (Lauman) (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 517 [31 Cal.Rptr. 710].) These cases do not aid him.

Here, there was never a judicial finding of insufficient evidence to establish the relevant facts; rather, the evidence that would prove them was suppressed. Moreover, as explained in Agresti v.

Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at page 606, “The question here is not whether the dismissal of charges barred further criminal prosecution, but whether it also was intended to have the effect of overturning a prior, separate civil order suspending Agresti’s driving privilege [or prohibiting such suspension in the first place].” We thus hold that a person is “acquitted” of the criminal charges within the meaning of

section 13353.2, subdivision (e), if, but only if, the ruling represents a judicial determination in the person’s favor of one or more of the factual elements of subdivision (

a) of

section 13353.2, that is, that the person either was not driving the motor vehicle or did not have the prohibited blood-alcohol level. The dismissal here was based upon the finding that the arrest was unlawful and the resultant inability of the prosecution to proceed. There was no judicial ruling that appellant did not in fact drive while intoxicated. In this situation, the Legislature allows the DMV to conduct the administrative suspension process independently of the criminal action. Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal charges did not prevent the DMV from determining the lawfulness of the arrest, subject to judicial review under

section 13559. D. Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (

d) Amicus curiae in support of appellant argues that Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d), makes the evidence suppressed in the criminal case inadmissible in the administrative matter. That subdivision provides: “If a search or seizure motion is granted pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section, the property or evidence shall not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing unless further proceedings authorized by this section,

Section 871.5,

Section 1238, or

Section 1466 are utilized by the people.” (Ibid., italics added.) The argument of amicus curiae is straightforward: the administrative hearing of this case is “any trial or other hearing” within the meaning of Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d); since the People did not utilize any of the further proceedings listed in the subdivision, the evidence is not admissible in the administrative hearing. No authority directly on point is cited. Indeed, only criminal cases are cited at all. Despite the fact that

section 1538.5, subdivision (d), has been part of Penal Code

section 1538.5 ever since its enactment in 1967, no court has ever applied it outside of criminal cases. Specifically, in the 26 years since that subdivision was enacted, it has never been interpreted to require exclusion of evidence at an administrative hearing. We do not believe that when it enacted

section 13353.2, subdivision (e), relating to the administrative proceeding, the Legislature intended that a part of the Penal Code be suddenly interpreted, 26 years after its enactment, to mandate a greater preclusive effect in the administrative proceeding than the Legislature specifically granted. We also find it unlikely the Legislature intended Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d), to have the all-encompassing application that the argument of amicus curiae necessarily implies. As we noted in Schlick v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 310, 316 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 841 P.2d 926], “ ‘According to committee reports prepared prior to the enactment of

section 1538.5, the intent underlying that

section was to reduce the unnecessary waste of judicial time and effort involved in the prior procedures, whereby search and seizure questions could be repeatedly raised in criminal proceedings. [Citation.]’ (People v. Superior Court [Edmonds] (1971) 4 Cal.3d 605, 610 [94 Cal.Rptr. 250, 483 P.2d 1202].)” (Italics added.) This intent does not suggest extending the coverage of that subdivision to civil or administrative matters. A literal, universal, application of Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d), would have results the Legislature certainly did not intend. For example, if evidence proving that a person murdered someone were suppressed under

section 1538.5, we doubt that the Legislature intended the evidence be similarly suppressed in a civil wrongful death action brought by the survivors against the murderer. The Legislature no doubt intended subdivision (

d) of that

section to apply solely to criminal cases. We should not extend it to other cases at this late date. Other statutory provisions bolster the conclusion that Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d), does not apply. Vehicle Code

section 14112 provides that “All matters in a hearing not covered by this

chapter shall be governed, as far as applicable, by

Chapter 5 (commencing with

Section 11500) of

Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code.” The administrative proceedings at issue here are not part of the

chapter mentioned in

section 14112 (which commences with Vehicle Code

section 13800), and are therefore governed by

chapter 5 of the Government Code. Government Code

section 11513, subdivision (c), part of that chapter, provides in pertinent part: “The hearing need not be conducted according to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses, except as hereinafter provided.

Any relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the existence of any common law or statutory rule which might make improper the admission of the evidence over objection in civil actions.” Citing this provision, we have held, “Technical rules of evidence do not apply to administrative hearings.” (Big Boy Liquors, Ltd. v. Alcoholic Bev. etc.

Appeals Bd. (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1226, 1230 [81 Cal.Rptr. 258, 459 P.2d 674].) It is settled that the exclusionary rule does not apply to all administrative hearings. (E.g., Emslie v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 210, 229 [113 Cal.Rptr. 175, 520 P.2d 991] [attorney disciplinary proceeding]; Finkelstein v. State Personnel Bd. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 264 [267 Cal.Rptr. 133] [disciplinary proceeding]; see generally 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Introduction, § 55, p. 49.) We find nothing in Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d), or the cases construing it suggesting the exclusionary rule must apply whenever there has been a suppression hearing in some criminal case. This court has construed Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d), on two occasions. We have held that it made suppressed evidence inadmissible at the sentencing hearing in the same case in which the Penal Code

section 1538.5 hearing was held (People v. Belled (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879 [157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473]), and prohibits refiling the same charges that were dismissed because of a suppression ruling. (Schlick v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.4th 310.) Nothing in either case suggests that the subdivision applies outside the criminal law realm. In Schlick v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.4th at page 316, we left open the possibility that Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d), might not even apply to all criminal cases. We distinguished the refiling of the same charges in the same county, the situation in Schlick, from “multi-county prosecutions, or . . . cases wherein new or different charges are brought,” and did not decide the latter questions. (Schlick v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 316.) As in Schlick, we need not now decide the difficult question of the application of that subdivision to other criminal cases. We conclude, however, that Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d), does not itself prohibit relitigation of the legality of the arrest in the administrative proceeding. III. Conclusion The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the DMV was precluded from relitigating the lawfulness of the arrest. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is therefore reversed. Each party shall bear its own costs. Lucas, C. J., Baxter, J., and George, J., concurred. All statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated. In Zapata v.

Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at page 116, footnote 2, the court itself recognized the enactment of this legislation, which also affects refusal cases, but noted that it “became effective after the events” of that case. Appellant argues that imposing administrative sanctions despite the dismissal of criminal charges would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The claim lacks merit. It has long been generally held that even an acquittal of criminal charges does not prohibit civil proceedings based upon the same underlying conduct. (United States v.

Ward (1980) 448 U.S. 242, 248, 250 [65 L.Ed.2d 742, 749, 100 S.Ct. 2636]; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States (1972) 409 U.S. 232, 234-236 [34 L.Ed.2d 438, 441-443, 93 S.Ct. 489]; In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 58 [127 Cal.Rptr. 337, 545 P.2d 249]; Zitny v. State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787, 790-791, fn. 1 [51 Cal.Rptr. 825, 415 P.2d 521] [acquittal of criminal charges no bar to attorney disbarment proceedings based upon the same conduct]; Lofthouse v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at pp. 736-737; see generally 7 Witkin, Cal.

Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, § 234, pp. 671-672; and Annot., Conviction or Acquittal in Previous Criminal Case as Bar to Revocation or Suspension of Driver’s License on Same Factual Charges (1964) 96 A.L.R.2d 612, and Later Case Service.) Contrary to the dissenting opinion of Justice Mosk, we are not “interpreting]

section 13353.2 to reinsert what the Legislature has deleted.” (Dis. opn. of Mosk, J., post, at p. 861.) The Legislature deleted language that would have given no preclusive effect whatsoever to the criminal proceeding. We interpret the legislation, as enacted, to give the preclusive effect specified, but no more. The dissenting opinions of Justices Mosk and Kennard apparently would make the sequence of events control. Those opinions either render the second sentence of

section 13353.2, subdivision (e), meaningless, or would hold that when, as normally would be the case, the administrative proceeding precedes the criminal, only a later acquittal would affect an earlier administrative determination; a judicial finding of an unlawful arrest would not have an effect. (Dis. opn. of Mosk, J., post, at pp. 860-861 [the preclusion rules of § 13353.2, subd. (e), apply when the DMV “hearing occurs before criminal court proceedings, and not the converse”]; id. at p. 861 [the “lawmakers . . . limited] the statute’s preclusion rules to disputes in which the DMV hearing occurred first”]; dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at p. 875.) We do not believe the Legislature engaged in a meaningless exercise in enacting the second sentence of

section 13353.2, subdivision (e), or that it intended the outcome to depend upon a race between the judicial and administrative proceedings. As originally enacted,

section 13353.2, subdivision (a), applied to a person who was driving or “was in actual physical control of’ a motor vehicle. In 1992, the statute was amended to include only a person “driving a motor vehicle.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 1281, § 4.) In People v. Williams (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032 [152 Cal.Rptr. 892], the court stated in dicta, “Clearly, [Penal Code

section 1538.5, subdivision (d),] does not refer to a subsequent civil trial or to a subsequent administrative hearing.” The correctness of this dicta was questioned in Buttimer v. Alexis, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at pages 762-763, footnote 4.