THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JOSE NAPOLEON SANTAMARIA, Defendant and Respondent, 8 Cal. 4th 903

Opinion ARABIAN, J. —Do collateral estoppel principles mandate that after a judgment is reversed on appeal, the original jury’s finding on a sentence enhancing allegation affects retrial of a murder charge, even though the same jury convicted defendant of that murder? This important question, implicating California’s ability to effectively prosecute violent crime, has divided the Courts of Appeal. Finding this case different from Ashe v.

Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436 [25 L.Ed.2d 469, 90 S.Ct. 1189], the landmark case engrafting collateral estoppel onto the double jeopardy clause, we conclude that the doctrine does not apply, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which affirmed the dismissal of a murder charge. I. Facts and Procedural History On September 5, 1985, the body of Victor Guadron was discovered in Moss Beach. Evidence indicated the body had been stabbed, run over by a car, and strangled, and that cash and jewelry had been taken from the victim. Defendant was charged with Guadron’s murder and robbery (Pen.

Code, §§ 187, 211), and with a robbery-murder special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)). The information also contained a sentence enhancing allegation that defendant personally used a knife in the commission of the crime. (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b).) The case was tried before a jury. The main prosecution witness was Anthony Nubia, who had pleaded guilty to being an accessory to the murder and agreed to cooperate with the prosecution. Nubia testified that in the morning of September 5, at defendant’s request, he gave him and Guadron a ride.

After running an errand, they drove to Dolores Park, where Nubia got out to buy marijuana. He heard someone yell “Help,” turned around, and saw defendant hugging Guadron’s neck and stabbing him. Nubia returned to the car. Defendant told him to drive toward Pacifica. On the way, defendant took Guadron’s jewelry and money. At Moss Beach, they stopped and pulled Guadron out of the car. Defendant then drove the car twice over Guadron’s body. The two returned to defendant’s house and cleaned the car. Nubia’s testimony and other evidence showed that about a week later Nubla and defendant pawned the stolen jewelry.

In May 1987, two conversations between Nubla and defendant were recorded. Defendant did not explicitly admit his involvement in the murder, but did make incriminating statements. The jury convicted defendant of murder and robbery, and found true the robbery-murder special circumstance, but found not true the allegation that defendant personally used a knife during the commission of the crime. On the first appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, finding that an 11-day continuance during jury deliberations was prejudicial error. (People v.

Santamaría (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 269 [280 Cal.Rptr. 43].) On remand, the People filed a new information identical to the previous one except that it did not include the weapon enhancement allegation. Defendant promptly moved, “based on double jeopardy clause, to prohibit retrial of defendant for use of dangerous weapon, to limit evidence and preclude prosecution’s reliance on theory adjudicated in defendant’s favor at first trial.” The trial court largely granted the motion. It ruled the prosecution could not retry the enhancement allegation (which the new information had not even alleged).

In addition, and pertinent here, the court precluded the prosecution “from retrying the defendant on the theory that he personally used the knife during the killing. [<]D To this end, the jury is to be instructed at appropriate intervals throughout the case that the defendant did not personally use a knife during the killing of the victim.” The defendant’s motion regarding the introduction of evidence was “denied without prejudice to objections, particularly, as to relevance during the course of the trial.” Among the evidence defendant had sought to exclude was Nubia’s testimony that he saw defendant stab the victim.

The court stated its belief that there were “several alternate instrumentalities of death.” The district attorney replied, “The cause of death in this case was a knife wound. It was not manual strangulation.” Defense counsel added, “My belief is that Dr. Benson testified that the cause of death was a stab wound to the hepatic artery complicated by the other factors . . . .” When the prosecution later stated that it was unable to proceed in light of the ruling, the court dismissed the case pursuant to Penal Code

section 1385. The People appealed. (Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(8).) The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that “the negative enhancement finding precludes the People from retrying defendant on the theory he personally killed the victim with a knife.” We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review. II. Discussion The parties agree that the jury’s “not true” finding on the knife-use enhancement allegation precludes retrial of that allegation. (People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 78, fn. 22 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 389, 820 P.2d 613]; see also People v.

Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 593 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093].) Defendant additionally argues that the finding limits the retrial of the murder charge of which the same jury had found him guilty. He claims that at retrial, the prosecution had to prove some basis for liability, such as that defendant aided and abetted the actual perpetrator, that did not involve personal knife use, and that the trial court correctly stated an intent to instruct the jury that he did not use the knife.

When the prosecution admitted an inability to prove defendant guilty on a different basis than before, he argues, the charges were properly dismissed. A. Background The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” (See also Cal. Const., art. I, § 15 [“Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense . . . .”]; People v.

Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 593.) “It has long been settled . . . that the Double Jeopardy Clause’s general prohibition against successive prosecutions does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction.” (Lockhart v. Nelson (1988) 488 U.S. 33, 38 [102 L.Ed.2d 265, 272, 109 S.Ct. 285]; see also United States v. Ball (1896) 163 U.S. 662 [41 L.Ed. 300, 16 S.Ct. 1192]; cf. Burks v.

United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1 [57 L.Ed.2d 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141] [recognizing an exception when the sole ground for the reversal is insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict].) “[T]o require a criminal defendant to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked a statutory right of appeal to upset his first conviction is not

an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect.” (United States v. Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 91 [57 L.Ed.2d 65, 74, 98 S.Ct. 2187].) It is equally settled that an inherently inconsistent verdict is allowed to stand; if an acquittal of one count is factually irreconcilable with a conviction on another, or if a not true finding of an enhancement allegation is inconsistent with a conviction of the substantive offense, effect is given to both. (United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57 [83 L.Ed.2d 461,105 S.Ct. 471]; People v.

Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651,1656-1657 [277 Cal.Rptr. 656]; see Pen. Code, § 954 [“An acquittal of one or more counts shall not be deemed an acquittal of any other count.”]; see also People v. Nunez (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 214, 225-228 [228 Cal.Rptr. 64] [applying the rule to an enhancement finding].) When a jury renders inconsistent verdicts, “it is unclear whose ox has been gored.” (United States v.

Powell, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 65 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 469].) The jury may have been convinced of guilt but arrived at an inconsistent acquittal or not true finding “through mistake, compromise, or lenity . . . .” (Ibid.) Because the defendant is given the benefit of the acquittal, “it is neither irrational nor illogical to require her to accept the burden of conviction on the counts on which the jury convicted.” (Id. at p. 69 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 471].) Thus, as a general matter, double jeopardy principles would not preclude defendant’s retrial on the murder charge despite the earlier reversal, and the murder conviction would be allowed to stand even if inconsistent with the not true finding on the use enhancement.

Defendant does not quarrel with these principles but, relying on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, he argues that the knife-use finding precludes retrial of the murder charge on the theory that he used a knife. For support, he cites Pettaway v. Plummer (9th Cir. 1991) 943 F.2d 1041 and People v. White (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 822 [231 Cal.Rptr. 569], which agreed with this contention under substantially similar facts. He contends that a contrary decision, People v.

Pettaway (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1312 [254 Cal.Rptr. 436], was wrongly decided. “ ‘Collateral estoppel’ is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” (Ashe v. Swenson, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 443 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 475] (Ashe).) In Ashe, six men playing poker were robbed. The defendant was tried for robbing one of the six.

The only disputed issue was defendant’s identity as one of the robbers. A jury acquitted him. He was then tried for robbing a second poker player. This time, a different jury convicted. Although, under strict application of double jeopardy law, the robbery of one victim was a distinct offense from the robbery of another (see Brown v.

Ohio (1977) 432 U.S. 161, 167, fn. 6 [53 L.Ed.2d 187, 195, 97 S.Ct. 2221]), the high court found the successive trials violated the collateral estoppel rule, which it found “is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.” (Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 445 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 476].) The high court stated that “the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality.

Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to ‘examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’ [Fn. omitted.] The inquiry ‘must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.’ Sealfon v.

United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 [92 L.Ed. 180, 184-185, 68 S.Ct. 237].” (Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 444 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 475-476].) With this background, we consider, first, whether collateral estoppel applies to retrial in the same proceeding of a charge of which the jury had convicted the defendant, and, second, whether, if so, the elements of collateral estoppel have been met in this case. B. Applicability of Collateral Estoppel to Retrial of Charges of Which the Defendant Had Been Convicted Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. 436, involved successive prosecutions. Defendant was charged only with the first robbery.

When that prosecution failed, the second was charged. The Ashe court stated that the collateral estoppel doctrine prevented relitigation of an ultimate fact “between the same parties in any future lawsuit." (Id. at p. 443 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 475], italics added.) Here, of course, we do not confront a future lawsuit, but retrial in the same one. The high court has never suggested the doctrine applies to the same proceeding. Indeed, it has consistently stated it applies to “successive prosecutions.” (Brown v. Ohio, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 167, fn. 6 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 195].) In Ohio v.

Johnson (1984) 467 U.S. 493, 500, footnote 9 [81 L.Ed.2d 425, 434, 104 S.Ct. 2536], the court specifically stated, “Moreover, in a case such as this, where the State has made no effort to prosecute the charges seriatim, the considerations of double jeopardy protection implicit in the application of collateral estoppel are inapplicable.” In United States v.

Dixon (1993) 509 U.S. _ [125 L.Ed.2d 556, 113 S.Ct. 2849], a case involving successive prosecutions, the high court, although expressly not deciding the collateral estoppel question in that case because the lower courts had not ruled on it (id. at p___ fn. 17 [125 L.Ed.2d at p. 578, 113 S.Ct. at p. 2864]), noted at page_[125 L.Ed.2d at pp. 572-573, 113 S.Ct. at p. 2860] that “[t]he collateral-estoppel effect attributed to the Double Jeopardy Clause, see Ashe v.

Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 [25 L.Ed.2d 469, 90 S.Ct. 1189] (1970), may bar a later prosecution for a separate offense where the Government has lost an earlier prosecution involving the same facts.” (First italics in original, second italics added.) Most recently, the court has stated, “Where . . . there is ‘no threat of either multiple punishment or successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended.’ [Citation.] Thus, our cases establish that the primary evil to be guarded against is successive prosecutions: ‘[T]he prohibition against multiple trials is the controlling constitutional principle.’ [Citation.]” (Schiro v.

Farley, supra, 510 U.S. at p. _ [127 L.Ed.2d at pp. 56-57, 114 S.Ct. at p. 789].) In the face of this, we question whether collateral estoppel applies to the same proceeding where the government won by securing a conviction of the substantive count. The policies behind the doctrine do not clearly support its application to a retrial of that count.

In Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at page 446 [25 L.Ed.2d at pages 476-479], the court attached the doctrine to the double jeopardy clause because that clause “surely protects a man who has been acquitted from having to ‘run the gantlet’ a second time. [Citation.]” Here, defendant was convicted, not acquitted, of the murder charge. Retrial after reversal is not the sort of “governmental oppression” protected by the double jeopardy clause. (United States v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 91 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 74].) In People v.

Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 695 [117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622], we stated “the purposes of an application of the doctrine to be: (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.” (Accord, People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 412.) None of these purposes apply here.

This is the same action, not repetitive litigation; a murder conviction by the second jury would be consistent, not inconsistent, with the original verdict; and retrial following reversal is not “vexatious litigation.” Defendant relies on Bullington v. Missouri (1981) 451 U.S. 430 [68 L.Ed.2d 270, 101 S.Ct. 1852] and Arizona v.

Rumsey (1984) 467 U.S. 203 [81 L.Ed.2d 164, 104 S.Ct. 2305], where the United States Supreme Court held that double jeopardy barred imposition of the death penalty at retrial after the state had failed to obtain the death penalty at the first trial. “Both Bullington and Rumsey were capital cases, and our reasoning in those cases was based largely on the unique circumstances of a capital sentencing proceeding." (Caspari v.

Bohlen (1994) 510 U.S._,_[127 L.Ed.2d 236, 247, 114 S.Ct. 948, 954.) Assuming the rationale of these cases applies to other sentencing decisions such as the enhancement finding here (an issue the high court expressly did not decide in Caspari v. Bohlen, supra, 510 U.S. at p._[127 L.Ed.2d at pp. 250-251, 114 S.Ct. at p. 957]), at most that would preclude retrial of the enhancement allegation, which, as noted, the parties agree cannot occur here. Nothing in those decisions suggests that sentencing decisions affect retrial of a substantive offense of which the jury had found the defendant guilty.

Defendant seems to agree that if the original split verdict had been inherently inconsistent, that is, if it were factually impossible for the jury to convict on one count and yet acquit on another or find an enhancement allegation not true, then collateral estoppel would not apply. This necessarily flows from the acceptance in United States v. Powell, supra, 469 U.S. 57 of inconsistent verdicts.

As the court in Powell noted, “The problem is that the same jury reached inconsistent results; once that is established principles of collateral estoppel—which are predicated on the assumption that the jury acted rationally and found certain facts in reaching its verdict—are no longer useful.” (Id. at p. 68 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 471]; see also Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at pp. 1045-1046.) Defendant argues, however, that what applies to an inconsistent verdict does not apply to a verdict that might have a rational basis.

This may be correct, but it would be odd if a conviction that is clearly inconsistent with an acquittal or not true finding may be retried without constraint after an appellate reversal, but a conviction that may, in theory at least, be reconciled with another verdict would, as here, be significantly affected by that verdict following a similar reversal. The not true finding may be explained by “mistake, compromise, or lenity” (United States v. Powell, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 65 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 468]) or “confusion or ennui.” (People v.

Pettaway, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1325.) Moreover, in the first appeal, the Court of Appeal found an 11-day continuance during jury deliberations “undoubtedly had some significant effect on jurors’ ability to remember complicated facts, as well as on their recall and understanding of instructions.” (People v. Santamaría, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 282.) The continuance might have adversely affected the enhancement verdict as well as the murder conviction.

For these reasons, the high court might well not apply Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. 436, to a retrial of a count the jury had convicted the defendant of in the same action. But that court has not decided the issue in a case like this. In Schiro v.

Farley, supra, 510 U.S. at page_[127 L.Ed.2d at p. 58, 114 S.Ct. at p. 790], the court did “not address whether collateral estoppel could bar use of the ‘intentional’ murder aggravating circumstance, because Schiro has not met his burden of establishing the factual predicate for the application of the doctrine, if it were applicable, namely that an ‘issue of ultimate fact has once been determined’ in his favor.” (Italics added.) Some federal courts have found that Ashe does apply to a retrial. (E.g., U.S. v. Bailin (7th Cir. 1992) 977 F.2d 270, 275-280; Pettaway v.

Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d 1041.) Under these circumstances, and because, as explained in the next part, defendant’s collateral estoppel claim can be rejected on the merits, “we do not reach the issue of whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel is limited, like its parent doctrine of double jeopardy, only to successive prosecutions.” (U.S. v. Farmer (11th Cir. 1991) 923 F.2d 1557, 1563, fn. 12.) Instead, we will follow the lead of the high court in Schiro v.

Farley, supra, 510 U.S__[127 L.Ed.2d 47, 114 S.Ct. 783], and proceed to examine whether, assuming the doctrine of collateral estoppel can apply to a retrial such as this, the necessary elements of the doctrine have been satisfied. C. Whether the Elements of Collateral Estoppel Have Been Satisfied Different courts have articulated the requirements for collateral estoppel differently.

The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the issue to be precluded must be “an issue of ultimate fact” that “has once been determined by a valid and final judgment” (Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 443 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 475]; see also Schiro v. Farley, supra, 510 U.S. at p._ [127 L.Ed.2d at pp. 58-59, 114 S.Ct. at p. 790]), and that the defendant has the burden of showing that the issue “was actually decided in the first proceeding." (Dowling v. United States (1990) 493 U.S. 342, 350 [107 L.Ed.2d 708, 718-719,110 S.Ct. 668], quoted in Schiro v.

Farley, supra, 510 U.S. at p. _ [127 L.Ed.2d at pp. 58-59, 114 S.Ct. at p. 791].) We have generally applied collateral estoppel “if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and if (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior trial." (People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 691; see also Gikas v.

Zolin, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 849.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated, “Collateral estoppel analysis involves a three-step process: ‘

(1) An identification of the issues in the two actions for the purpose of determining whether the issues are sufficiently similar and sufficiently material in both actions to justify invoking the doctrine; (2) an examination of the record of the prior case to decide whether the issue was “litigated” in the first case; and (3) an examination of the record of the prior proceeding to ascertain whether the issue was necessarily decided in the first case.’ ” (Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at pp. 1043-1044, quoting United States v.

Hernandez (9th Cir. 1978) 572 F.2d 218, 220.) We need not determine whether there are, or seek to reconcile, any substantive differences between these formulations, for defendant’s argument fails under any of them. Collateral estoppel does not apply for two reasons: (1) the issue sought to be precluded in the murder trial is not identical to any issue necessarily decided by the weapon enhancement verdict; and (2) whether defendant used a knife is not an “ultimate issue” of the murder charge. 1.

Identical Issue The issue sought to be precluded at retrial is not identical to any necessarily decided by the enhancement verdict. As defendant stresses, the jury returned an “express acquittal” of the enhancement allegation. (People v. Superior Court (Marks), supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 78, fn. 22.) But it also returned an express conviction of the murder and robbery charges. The pertinent issue decided by each verdict was quite different. To see why this is so, we turn to state law, the proper source for determining the meaning of the jury’s verdicts and whether the issues are identical. (Delap v.

Dugger (11th Cir. 1989) 890 F.2d 285, 315.) Murder is the substantive offense. The allegation of knife use was merely a sentence enhancing allegation attached to the murder charge. The requirements for murder and for the enhancing allegation are significantly different. The weapon enhancement under Penal Code

section 12022, subdivision (b), requires personal use, i.e., the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant personally used the knife to find the enhancement true. (People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 579 [183 Cal.Rptr. 350, 645 P.2d 1182].) Murder, however, like any substantive offense, need not be personal; an aider and abettor of the actual killer is equally guilty. (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1038-1039 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903]; People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 554-555 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].) This is unremarkable.

Defendant fully understands this, as did the Ninth Circuit. (Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 1044.) Both argue this proves that the jury’s verdict was not necessarily inconsistent. The jury, defendant argues, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, may have found he was an aider and abettor; this would allow the jury to convict of murder but would require the not true verdict on the enhancement allegation. (Id. at p. 1046.) If one stops there, the argument has appeal: if the jury found defendant did not use a knife, it must have found he was an aider and abettor.

But this merely begins the inquiry; it does not end it. Defendant wrings far more meaning from the verdict than is warranted under California law. At trial, there was much evidence defendant was involved in the murder, including the evidence that he helped pawn the victim’s jewelry. The only eyewitness to the killing was Nubia, an admitted accessory. His testimony minimized his own role. The jury may well have doubted that he was quite so innocent in the killing as he claimed. It might have suspected that he was involved in inflicting at least some of the injuries.

It might, for example, have suspected that one person, either defendant or Nubia, strangled the victim, while the other stabbed him. This would lead to a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s personal use of a knife, but would suffice for the verdict of guilty of murder. We now look more closely at California law. It is settled that as long as each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty of murder as that offense is defined by statute, it need not decide unanimously by which theory he is guilty. (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 249-250 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643]; People v.

Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 194-195 [107 Cal.Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956].) More specifically, the jury need not decide unanimously whether defendant was guilty as the aider and abettor or as the direct perpetrator. (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 92 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311]; People v. Forbes (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 807, 816-817 [221 Cal.Rptr. 275].) This rule of state law passes federal constitutional muster. (Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624 [115 L.Ed.2d 555, 111 S.Ct. 2491].) Defendant is not particularly troubled by this.

He argues that the jury did reach a unanimous verdict; it unanimously found the knife-use allegation not true. This is correct, but is of far less significance than defendant contends. It shows only that there was a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that defendant specifically used a knife. It does not show the reverse, that the jury specifically found defendant was an aider and abettor. Indeed, under the facts of this case, such a finding is most unlikely.

The jury may merely have believed, and most likely did believe, that defendant was guilty of murder as either a personal knife user or an aider and abettor but it may have been uncertain exactly which role defendant played. That, too, would fully explain, and necessitate, the split verdict. Not only is there no unanimity requirement as to the theory of guilt, the individual jurors themselves need not choose among the theories, so long as each is convinced of guilt. Sometimes, as probably occurred here, the jury simply cannot decide beyond a reasonable doubt exactly who did what.

There may be a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the direct perpetrator, and a similar doubt that he was the aider and abettor, but no such doubt that he was one or the other. This is illustrated by People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746 [254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419]. There the jury found the defendant guilty of murder and other offenses, but failed to reach a verdict as to personal use allegations. (Id. at p. 766.) The defendant argued this proved the jury found he aided and abetted a prosecution witness, one Roelle.

We disagreed, noting that although Roelle testified that defendant was the triggerman, “there was other evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably have inferred that defendant and Roelle were jointly involved in the commission of the offenses.” (Id. at p. 781.) We thus concluded that “it may be inferred that the jury determined that both Roelle and defendant were jointly involved in the criminal activity but could not decide beyond a reasonable doubt which one had pulled the trigger.” {Id. at p. 782.) Similarly, the jury here may not have been able to decide beyond a reasonable doubt whether defendant or Nubia actually wielded the knife, but was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that, either way, defendant was guilty of Guadron’s murder.

To go further and conclude that the jury specifically found defendant did not use the knife would not apply the collateral estoppel rule with “realism and rationality.” (Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 444 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 475].) This shows that the issue necessarily decided by the knife-use verdict and the issue sought to be precluded in the murder prosecution are not identical, but quite different.

Although defendant claims he merely seeks to preclude the theory that he used the knife, he necessarily is claiming more; he seeks to preclude the theory, and evidence to support the theory, that he either used the knife or aided and abetted the one who did. This, however, is not the issue decided regarding the enhancement allegation. Whether defendant specifically used a knife is one question; we may assume the prosecution did not prove that beyond a reasonable doubt, which explains the not true enhancement verdict.

Whether defendant committed murder by either using a knife or aiding and abetting the one who did is quite a different question; the prosecution did prove that to the jury’s satisfaction. It is theoretically possible the jury concluded defendant was specifically the aider and abettor, despite the paucity of supporting evidence. But that is not the test. Setting the inquiry ‘“in a practical frame’ ” and viewing it “ ‘with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings’ ” (Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 444 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 476]), we conclude the jury did not “ ‘necessarily decide[]’ ” (Pettaway v.

Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 1044; People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 691) that defendant was the aider and abettor, only that it had doubts as to his exact role. Defendant has the burden of showing that the issue he seeks to foreclose was actually decided by the jury. (Schiro v. Farley, supra, 510 U.S. at p._[127 L.Ed.2d at pp. 58-59, 114 S.Ct. at p. 791].) This he cannot do. 2.

Ultimate Fact Another fallacy in defendant’s argument is exposed by examining the requirement that the issue to be foreclosed be of “ultimate fact.” (Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 443 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 475].) Identity of the defendant in Ashe as one of the robbers was clearly an ultimate fact; it had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt for him to be found guilty of that robbery no matter what the rest of the evidence showed. Knife use is just as clearly an ultimate fact as to the use enhancement. But it is not an ultimate fact of murder. In Dowling v.

United States, supra, 493 U.S. 342, during the trial for one crime, the prosecution presented evidence of another crime for which the defendant had previously been tried and acquitted. The defendant argued this violated the collateral estoppel rule of Ashe. The high court disagreed “because, unlike the situation in Ashe v. Swenson, the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case.” (Dowling v.

United States, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 348 [107 L.Ed.2d at p. 717].) The court “assume[d] for the sake of argument that Dowling’s acquittal established that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Dowling was the [man who entered the house where the other crime was committed].” (Ibid.) But the court noted that the prosecution did not have to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt for the evidence to be admissible at the second trial; thus, “the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is inapposite.” (Id. at p. 349 [107 L.Ed.2d at p. 718].) Dowling involved separate prosecutions, not a retrial.

Two recent decisions that, like this case, did involve a retrial analyzed the relevance of Dowling to this situation. They independently reached the same conclusion, a conclusion fatal to defendant’s position. The first decision, U.S. v. Seley (9th Cir. 1992) 957 F.2d 717, 723, noted that “Dowling did not alter Ashe so much as it introduced a new perspective on the meaning of the ‘ultimate fact’ decided in the first trial. Instead of meaning that certain acts did not happen, an acquittal means that they were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If

an act that could have been proved to a lesser degree than that required for conviction is for some reason probative in a subsequent trial, it need not be excluded because of the prior acquittal.” (Italics added.) The second decision, U.S. v.

Bailin, supra, 977 F.2d at page 280, stated, “Dowling thus establishes that issue preclusion in criminal cases only applies when the relevant issue is ‘ultimate’ in the subsequent prosecution, i.e., when the issue must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” These cases confirm that the jury’s not true finding on the enhancement allegation does not mean defendant did not use the knife, only that there was a reasonable doubt that he did. In Ashe, the verdict, viewed realistically, showed the jury had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s identity as the robber.

That doubt necessarily precluded conviction of the robbery charge. But the same doubt as to knife use did not preclude a murder conviction here, although it did mandate a not true enhancement finding. Evidence that defendant personally used a knife was highly relevant to show that he was guilty of murder as that offense is defined by statute. That evidence, together with the evidence that if he did not use a knife, he was guilty as the aider and abettor, combined to permit the murder conviction.

But the specific fact of personal use does not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to find defendant guilty of murder. Hence, personal use is not an “ultimate fact” of murder. We thus hold that collateral estoppel does not apply. We disapprove of the contrary conclusion of People v. White, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 822. D. Pettaway v. Plummer People v. Pettaway, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d 1312, involved virtually the same issue and procedural posture as this case, except that there the weapon enhancement that the jury found not true was for use of a firearm, not a knife.

The holding of the Court of Appeal was consistent with our decision today, i.e., a judgment dismissing a murder charge was reversed. The defendant, Pettaway, however, sought relief on habeas corpus from the federal courts, making the same argument defendant makes here. The court in Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d 1041, agreed with the defendant, disagreed with the Court of Appeal decision, granted habeas corpus relief, and prohibited retrial. We thus have the situation that, although normally federal circuit court decisions are not binding on this court (Lockhart v.

Fretwell (1993) 506 U.S. _, _ [122 L.Ed.2d 180, 193-194, 113 S.Ct. 838, 846] (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.), and authority cited therein; Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 352 [276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077]), here they have the power to effectively overrule our decision. We believe the court in Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d 1041, misunderstood the relevant state law.

Noting that once the jury found the defendant guilty of murder, it was “required’ to “reach the question of personal use of the handgun” in deciding the enhancement allegation (id. at p. 1045, italics by the court), the court disagreed with the federal district court’s analysis that the jury might have determined “ ‘that [Pettaway] either personally shot [the victim] or aided and abetted in her killing without deciding between the two alternatives.’ ” {Id. at p. 1044.) But this misses the point.

The pertinent question is not did the jury decide whether defendant personally used the weapon, but rather could it make such a determination beyond a reasonable doubt. The inability of the jury to make that determination, because of a doubt as to defendant’s precise role in the crime, would require the jury to find the enhancing allegation not true. But a determination that defendant either used the weapon or aided and abetted the one who did sufficed to permit the murder verdict.

The court also stated that “the specific finding that [defendant] did not personally use a firearm was not inconsistent with the conviction; rather, it was as if the jury had issued a special verdict to that effect regarding the substantive offense.” (Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 1046, italics added.) However, as discussed above, the jury does not make any special verdict “regarding the substantive offense.” A combination of theories is sufficient. The court went on. “Pursuant to California law, Pettaway’s use of the handgun was pleaded and tried to the jury.

The jury necessarily decided that Pettaway did not fire the fatal shots.” (Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 1046.) The first sentence of the quoted language is correct, but the second is not. The jury merely found there was reasonable doubt on the question. (See Dowling v. United States, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 348 [107 L.Ed.2d at pp. 717-718]; U.S. v. Bailin, supra, 977 F.2d at p. 280; U.S. v. Seley, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 723, discussed above.) The Pettaway court “barred reprosecution on a theory the prosecution had tried and failed to prove before.” (Pettaway v.

Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 1047.) However, as explained above, the prosecution need not prosecute the case on a particular theory; it need only prove defendant guilty on any sufficient theory, which it did successfully “prove before.” The court also said, “If the state is allowed to proceed on the theory that Pettaway pulled the trigger himself, it is possible that the second jury would convict Pettaway by reaching a conclusion directly contrary to that reached by the jury in the first trial.” (Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 1047.) This is also incorrect.

The first jury convicted the defendant of murder, finding he was either the direct perpetrator or the aider and abettor. If the second jury does the same, the verdicts would be consistent, not inconsistent. The jury will never have to decide what defendant’s precise role was. Thus, a second conviction of murder, should it occur, could never be inconsistent with the first. The only danger of inconsistency would be if the second jury acquitted defendant of the crime the first found him guilty of committing.

The court argued “ ‘that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,’ ” and that “[a]Rowing the state to reprosecute Pettaway for murder on the theory that he was the actual perpetrator of the murder permits the state to remedy the flaws it perceives as having been fatal to its case the first time, and to attempt to convince a second jury of that which it tried and failed to prove to the first jury.” (Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 1048, quoting Green v.

United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 187 [2 L.Ed.2d 199,204, 78 S.Ct. 221, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119].) However, nothing was “fatal” to the murder case the first time. The jury found defendant guilty of that crime. The prosecution need not “remedy any flaws”; it only needs the opportunity to prove its case to the second jury just as it did to the first, an opportunity Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d 1041, would deny. Moreover, the court relied substantially on the decision of Grady v.

Corbin (1990) 495 U.S. 508 [109 L.Ed.2d 548, 110 S.Ct. 2084], stating that the two cases presented “essentially the same situation.” (Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 1047; see also id. at p. 1046.) The high court subsequently overruled the very portion of Grady v. Corbin that was relied upon. (United States v. Dixon, supra, 509 U.S. at p__[125 L.Ed.2d at pp. 572-573, 577-578, 113 S.Ct. at pp. 2860, 2864]; compare the language quoted and overruled, id. at p--[125 L.Ed.2d at pp. 572-573, 113 S.Ct. at p. 2860] with the language quoted in Pettaway v.

Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 1047.) The result of Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d 1041, unduly hampers prosecution of crimes involving weapons. A jury convinced that the defendant is guilty, although uncertain as to the precise role he or she played, may validly convict of the crime and simultaneously find a weapon enhancement not true; but if for any reason the judgment is reversed on appeal, retrial might be rendered effectively impossible, or at least very difficult, under that decision. Thus, charging weapon enhancements becomes risky.

Here, for example, the jury found defendant guilty of murder with special circumstances. Now, because of the relatively insignificant enhancement allegation and the intervening appellate reversal, the charges have been dismissed. Defendant will go free if that dismissal stands, despite the evidence that convinced the first jury that he was, in fact, guilty as either the actual killer or an aider and abettor. Because of this, we urge the federal courts to reconsider that decision if and when the issue is again before them in light of our analysis of state law and the subsequent decisions of Caspari v.

Bohlen, supra, 510 U.S--[127 L.Ed.2d 236, 114 S.Ct. 948]; Schiro v. Farley, supra, 510 U.S. _ [127 L.Ed.2d 47, 114 S.Ct. 783]; United States v. Dixon, supra, 509 U.S--[125 L.Ed.2d 556, 113 S.Ct. 2849]; U.S. v. Bailin, supra, 977 F.2d 270; and U.S. v. Seley, supra, 957 F.2d 717. E.

Summary The first jury, having heard and considered all the evidence, properly convicted defendant of murder even though it had a reasonable doubt who actually wielded the knife. The second jury should be allowed to do the same. A reasonable doubt that defendant used the knife precluded the use enhancement; it did not prevent conviction of murder at the first trial on the combined theory that he either used the knife or aided and abetted the one who did. It should not preclude conviction at retrial on the same basis.

Transforming a conviction into an effective acquittal because of the fortuity of an intervening reversal, as happened here, violates the mandate of Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 444 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 475-476], that collateral estoppel be applied with “realism and rationality.” “The state is entitled to ‘one fair opportunity’ to prosecute a defendant . . . .” (Schiro v. Farley, supra, 510 U.S. at p--[127 L.Ed.2d at p. 58, 114 S.Ct. at p. 790], quoting Bullington v.

Missouri, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 446 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 283-284].) In Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. 436, the prosecution was given one fair opportunity to prove the defendant was one of the robbers; it failed, and was not entitled to try again. Here, the prosecution did prove to the jury’s satisfaction that defendant was guilty. It should be allowed to do so again following reversal on appeal. To require the prosecution to specifically prove defendant was the aider and abettor, and not the knife user— which it did not have to prove to obtain the first conviction—would deny it that fair opportunity to prosecute defendant.

For these reasons, the trial court erred in its ruling on defendant’s collateral estoppel motion, and in dismissing the case when the prosecution announced an inability to proceed in light of that ruling. The matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the charges and proceed in a manner consistent with the views expressed herein. III. Disposition The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. Lucas, C. J., Baxter, J., George, J., and Puglia, J., concurred. Citing People v.

Yarbrough (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1650, 1653-1656 [278 Cal.Rptr. 703], the Court of Appeal held that the appeal from the dismissal “permits review of the underlying ruling.” Defendant does not challenge that holding. The doctrine is sometimes called “issue preclusion.” (E.g., Schiro v. Farley (1994) 510 U.S. _ [127 L.Ed.2d 47, 58, 114 S.Ct. 783, 790].) We will refer to it as “collateral estoppel,” as has been our practice. (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 848-849 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500, 863 P.2d 745]; People v.

Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 411 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) Collateral estoppel, which applies to relitigation of factual issues, is analytically distinct from double jeopardy, which applies to retrial of offenses. Thus, collateral estoppel is conceptually separate from double jeopardy, but, under Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. 436, when applicable, it is a component of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. One reason for this is the impropriety of penalizing a defendant for appealing, which would have a chilling effect on the exercise of that right. (People v.

Pettaway, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1331-1332.) This reason does not apply to retrial of the substantive charges. Defendant was convicted of those charges, so cannot be worse off for having appealed. U.S. v. Bailin, supra, 977 F.2d 270, contains the most extensive discussion of the applicability of collateral estoppel to retrial, and concludes that it does apply. That case might be distinguishable because, unlike here, it did not concern a retrial of a conviction reversed on appeal, but rather retrial of counts the first jury could not agree upon, a factor that plays a substantial role in the court’s analysis.

Moreover, the Bailin court relied heavily on civil decisions in concluding that collateral estoppel, or, as it analyzed it, “ ‘direct estoppel,’ ” applied. (Id. at p. 276.) But in a decision refusing to apply the civil doctrine of “nonmutual collateral estoppel” to a criminal case, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that civil rules do not necessarily apply to criminal cases. “This, however, is a criminal case, presenting considerations different from those in [the civil cases defendant relied upon].” (Standefer v.

United States (1980) 447 U.S. 10, 22 [64 L.Ed.2d 689, 699, 100 S.Ct. 1999].) Among the different considerations the high court cited are the inability of the prosecution to obtain a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial no “matter how clear the evidence in support of guilt,” or to appeal an adverse judgment, circumstances which permit juries “to acquit out of compassion or compromise” or lenity. (Ibid.) We need not inquire further into the correctness of this portion of Bailin, however, in light of our conclusion in the next part, bolstered by the analysis of Bailin itself, that defendant has not shown that the elements of collateral estoppel have been met.

The parties focus primarily on the federal constitutional standard, and not on whether the state standard is significantly different. In People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d 686, we afforded a defendant greater collateral estoppel protection than the high court later required under the United States Constitution. (See Standefer v. United States, supra, 447 U.S. 10.) Even if we assume that the state collateral estoppel elements are broader than required under the United States Constitution, that would not aid defendant. The state law doctrine of collateral estoppel has a public policy exception. (Lucido v.

Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342-343 [272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 2 A.L.R.Sth 995].) That exception applies here. The challenged theory of knife use and supporting evidence has already once validly helped produce a conviction of murder, and the murder charge is properly retriable following a reversal on appeal.

To allow an ancillary sentencing determination in the prior trial to govern what theories and evidence are available in a guilt retrial would not advance “the public policies underlying collateral estoppel—preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation . . . .” (Lucido v.

Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 343; see also id. at p. 351.) Moreover, telling the jury defendant did not use the knife, despite the evidence that he did, would undermine confidence in the truth-seeking function of the judicial system, and discourage the legitimate charging of enhancements. The factual issue is actually more complicated than this. Three types of injury were inflicted: the victim was stabbed, he was strangled, he was run over by a car. Although the district attorney stated the cause of death was stabbing, the jury may have been less certain.

It may have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt defendant was the stabber, or strangler, or car driver, or an aider and abettor of the stabber, strangler or driver, or some combination thereof, but have been uncertain as to his precise personal role. This, too, would explain and justify the not true finding and guilty verdict. The parties, however, focus on the dichotomy between defendant as the knife user and defendant as an aider and abettor, so we will also. The analysis is the same under any of these scenarios.

In analyzing the unanimity question in a robbery case, one Court of Appeal used this example. “ ‘Assume a robbery with two masked participants in a store, one as the gunman and one as the lookout. If one witness makes a voice identification of the defendant as the gunman who demanded money, but other evidence, such as a fingerprint, suggests the defendant was actually holding the door open as lookout, the jury would be faced with the same theories presented in this case: find the defendant was the gunman and therefore a direct perpetrator, or find he was at the door and therefore an aider and abettor.

Either way he would be guilty of robbery.’ If 12 jurors must agree on the role played by the defendant, the defendant may go free, even if the jurors all agree defendant committed the crime. That result is absurd.” (People v. Perez (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 214,222 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 691].) Equally absurd would be to let the defendant go free because each individual juror had a reasonable doubt as to his exact role. Another hypothetical illustrates why the issue as to the enhancement and that as to the substantive charge should not be deemed identical for collateral estoppel purposes.

Assume a convenience store holdup with two masked robbers and five eyewitnesses, and that all witnesses testified that robber A had a gun. Two witnesses also thought robber B had a gun, but the others did not see it. Assume the two defendants are tried together. Both left fingerprints, and both confessed to participation in the crime, but each denied possessing a gun, and claimed the other had the gun. The testimony of two witnesses that both robbers had a gun would justify charging a gun enhancement as to both. So both would be tried together for robbery and personal gun use.

If the jury had a reasonable doubt that both used a gun, and did not know which was robber A and which robber B, it could reasonably find both guilty of robbery but would have to find the enhancement allegation not true as to both. If the convictions were reversed on appeal for extraneous reasons, at retrial would the court have to instruct the jury that neither used a gun? Or that the jury could not convict on the basis that either used the gun? That would be absurd.

The first jury would have found both guilty as either the gun user or on some other basis, but would have been uncertain as to exactly who did what. A second jury should be allowed to do the same.

Justice Mosk agrees that the People “could attempt to prove that [defendant] was guilty, as it were, ‘unspecifically,’ that is, that although his precise role could not be determined, he was either a direct and active perpetrator or an aider and abettor.” (Cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J., post, at pp. 932-933, italics in original.) His only disagreement with the majority is his argument the trial court has to instruct that the jury “could not find that defendant was guilty as a principal as a direct and active perpetrator solely through his personal use of a knife.” {Id. at p. 935, italics in original.) As Justice Mosk notes, his analysis “yields little real benefit to defendant.” {Id. at p. 933.) Indeed, except for possibly confusing the jury, the proffered instruction would offer no real benefit to defendant.

A jury that could find defendant was either a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor would have no need to determine that he was solely guilty as a knife user. But contrary to Justice Mosk’s view (id. at p. 933), defendant has both sought and obtained much more.

In the trial court, he moved to exclude, among other things, Nubia’s testimony that he saw “defendant stab the victim.” The trial court ruled that it would periodically instruct the jury that defendant “did not personally use a knife during the killing of the victim.” Thus, depending on the evidentiary rulings the court would make at trial, either the court would tell the jury the main prosecution witness was lying, or the jury would hear no mention of who stabbed the victim, a critical matter since it would also hear that the cause of death was a stab wound.

Justice Mosk impliedly agrees the evidentiary contention was meritless, and expressly agrees the instructional ruling was error. (Id. at p. 934.) The ruling gave defendant a real benefit, and made conviction unrealistic, especially since the special circumstance allegation required a finding that defendant personally intended to kill. (See People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 973, fn. 4 [281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131].) We disagree that the court had to give the jury any special instruction. The jury returns a verdict of guilt or innocence of the charge, not a verdict on any particular theory.

Although knife use is an ultimate fact of one possible theory, that is not the test; knife use is not an ultimate fact of the charge of murder, the only question the jury has to decide. It would be absurd, and would only confuse the jury, to instruct that it could convict defendant if it thought him guilty on some valid theory, even if uncertain which, but could not convict him if it specifically believed he used the knife. For the reasons stated in the text, collateral estoppel simply does not apply here.

Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.