RITA GENTRY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF MURRIETA et al., Defendants and Respondents; McMILLIN COMMUNITIES, Real Party in Interest and Respondent, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1359
Opinion
Opinion RICHLI, J. Appellant Rita Gentry (Gentry) raises virtually every conceivable objection under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) to the approval by respondent City of Murrieta (City) of a plan of respondent McMillin Communities (McMillin) to build 198 homes. The City found that the project, as mitigated, would have no significant environmental effects; as a result, it adopted a mitigated negative declaration and approved the project. The trial court rejected Gentry’s objections. We, too, reject the vast bulk of Gentry’s objections and contentions.
However, we agree with her that: (1) the City failed to comply with the requirement that it send a copy of its proposed negative declaration to one other public agency (not many other agencies, as Gentry claims); (2) the City imposed one mitigation condition (not many, as Gentry claims) which improperly deferred formulation of specific mitigation measures into the future; (3) the City improperly added certain mitigation conditions (but not as many as Gentry claims) after it released the proposed negative declaration for public review; (4) the trial court applied an incorrect standard of review; and (5) under the correct standard of review, there was substantial evidence to support a fair argument that the project would have certain significant adverse environmental effects (but, again, not as many as Gentry claims).
Accordingly, we reverse and we direct the trial court to void the City’s adoption of the negative declaration and approval of the project. I. Factual and Procedural Background Prior to 1988, McMillin’s predecessor in interest applied to the County of Riverside (County) for approval of a vesting tentative subdivision map for a project consisting of approximately 555 single-family homes near Murrieta Hot Springs, to be called Adobe Springs. In or about September 1988, in connection with Adobe Springs, the County prepared and certified an environmental impact report (EIR) (Adobe I EIR).
Meanwhile, the County was considering amending its comprehensive general plan (General Plan) by adopting the Southwest Area Community Plan (Community Plan), which would apply to, among other places, the Murrieta area. In March 1989, the County prepared and certified an EIR for the Community Plan (Plan EIR). On November 28, 1989, the County adopted the Community Plan. The Community Plan incorporated the Plan EIR by reference.
In February 1990, McMillin applied to the County for approval of a vesting tentative subdivision map for a 230-home project (later reduced to 198 homes) adjacent to Adobe Springs, to be called Adobe Springs II. Also in February 1990, McMillin applied for a zoning change for Adobe Springs EL The County and, later, the City treated these two applications interchangeably as a single “project” for CEQA purposes.
We will follow their lead and refer to the two applications, collectively, as “the Project.” As part of an initial study of the Project, the County considered reports prepared by or for McMillin’s predecessor in interest, including a general biological report, a biological report focused on the California gnatcatcher, a traffic report, a slope stability report, and an archeological report. The County solicited and received comments from other county departments, federal, state, and local agencies and other interested parties.
The County also received unsolicited comments from Gentry, acting as representative of the Los Alamos Neighborhood Association. On January 3, 1991, the County Planning Department staff completed an environmental assessment of the Project, Environmental Assessment No. 34807 (EA No. 34807). EA No. 34807 found that the Project as originally proposed would have a number of adverse environmental effects, including effects on traffic, water and sewer systems, recreational facilities, slopes, erosion, floodplains, and wildlife and vegetation.
It also found, however, that each of these effects would be mitigated by measures prescribed by various public agencies, or, in the case of wildlife and vegetation, measures prescribed by the biological reports. It concluded that “although the proposed project could have a significant effect on the environment, there will not be a significant effect in this case because the mitigation measures described . . . have been or will be incorporated into the project.” Thus, it attached a proposed negative declaration.
On February 13, 1991, the County gave notice of its intent to adopt the negative declaration, and set a public hearing. A County Planning Department staff report dated February 20, 1991 concluded that the Project was consistent with both the General Plan and the Community Plan, and would have no significant effects on the environment. Thus, it recommended adoption of the negative declaration and approval of the Project. County Planning Department staff also prepared a list of conditions of approval of the Project, numbered 1 through 32. Many of these were environmental mitigation conditions.
The County Planning Commission held public hearings regarding approval of the Project and the proposed negative declaration on March 6, 1991, April 10, 1991, and May 1, 1991. Gentry submitted written materials to the County and appeared at these hearings; she argued in favor of either additional mitigation measures, or the preparation of an EIR. On May 1, 1991, at the conclusion of the public hearings, the County Planning Commission unanimously recommended to the County Board of Supervisors that it adopt the negative declaration and approve the Project.
On June 11, 1991, however, McMillin asked the County to send the administrative record on the Project to the City, which was about to be incorporated and which would have jurisdiction over the Project. Accordingly, on June 18,1991, the Coúnty deferred further consideration of the Project to the City. The City was incorporated on July 1,1991. Also on July 1,1991, the City temporarily adopted all County ordinances, with the exception of the County’s General Plan. On October 22, 1991, the City adopted specified County ordinances permanently, again not including the County’s General Plan.
On January 9, 1992, McMillin submitted a planning application to the City in connection with the Project. On March 17,1992, the City gave notice of its intent to adopt a negative declaration regarding the Project, and set a public hearing. On April 3, 1992, the City released a City Planning Department staff report on the Project. The report incorporated the County’s staff report. It recommended that two of the County’s conditions of approval be modified, and one new condition added; subject thereto, the report recommended adoption of a negative declaration and approval of the Project.
On April 7, 1992, the City held a public hearing on the Project. Gentry again submitted written materials, appeared at the hearing, and argued in favor of preparation of an EIR. The April 7 public hearing was continued to May 5, 1992. In the interim, in response to comments at the April 7 hearing, McMillin procured supplemental reports on storm water drainage, groundwater recharge, and groundwater pollution. Two of these were dated April 22, 1992; the third was dated April 27,1992.
Gentry claims that one of the reports was released on May 1, 1992, but that the other two were not given to the City until the continued public hearing on May 5,1992 at which the Project was approved. This finds some support in the record. On May 5, 1992, the City released a second City Planning Department staff report, responding to issues raised at the April 7 public hearing. The report included a revised list of proposed conditions of approval numbered 1 through 128, together with a proposed mitigation monitoring program.
Subject to these conditions, it again recommended adoption of a negative declaration and approval of the Project. At the continued public hearing on May 5, 1992, one of the City staff’s proposed conditions of approval was modified and one new condition was added. McMillin accepted all the proposed conditions. Gentry again submitted written materials, appeared at the hearing, and spoke in favor of additional mitigation measures.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the City Council unanimously approved the negative declaration, the mitigation monitoring program, and McMillin’s application for subdivision map approval.
The City Council found that: (1) the Project was consistent with existing zoning and land uses, and with all applicable state laws, local ordinances, and City policies; (2) there was a reasonable probability that the Project would be consistent with the City’s proposed general plan; (3) even if the Project proved to be inconsistent with the City’s eventual general plan, there was little or no probability of substantial detriment to or interference with the general plan; (4) environmental concerns had been or would be mitigated by conditions of approval; and (5) the Project as mitigated was not likely to have substantial adverse environmental effects.
On May 19, 1992, the City Council approved McMillin’s application for a zoning change. On September 2, 1992, Gentry filed a petition for peremptory writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive relief. On January 29, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on the petition. Following the hearing, it took the matter under submission. The parties then submitted further briefing. On May 12, 1993, the trial court denied Gentry’s petition, finding, among other things, that: (1) the City proceeded pursuant to
section 21083.3, which applies when a proposed residential development project is consistent with a general plan for which an EIR has been certified; (2) the applicable standard of review was that set forth in Long Beach Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Long Beach Redevelopment Agency (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 249 [232 Cal.Rptr. 772]; and (3) the City’s determination that the Project would not have a substantial adverse effect on the environment was supported by substantial evidence. However, the trial court also noted that if
section 21083.3 had not applied, “then a negative declaration would not have been appropriate.” On May 20, 1993, the trial court entered a judgment denying the petition. On July 19, 1993, Gentry filed a timely notice of appeal. n. Outline of CEQA A. The Environmental Review Process. CEQA generally requires a state or local public agency to prepare an EIR on any activity it undertakes or approves which may have a significant effect on the environment. CEQA lays out a three-stage process. (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 74 [118 Cal.Rptr. 34, 529 P.2d 66]; Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15002, subd. (k).) First, the agency must determine whether the particular activity is covered by CEQA. (Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (k)(l).) CEQA applies to any activity which is a “project,” and which is not exempt.
Generally speaking, any activity a public agency has discretion to carry out or to approve which has the potential for resulting in a physical change in the environment is a “project.” (§§ 21065, 21080, subd. (a); Guidelines, §§ 15002, subds. (b), (c), (i), 15378, subd. (a).) Some “projects,” however, are statutorily exempt. (E.g., §§ 21080, subd. (b), 21080.01-21080.03, 21080.05, 21080.07-21080.08, 21080.7-21080.11, 21080.13, 21080.17-21080.19, 21080.21-21080.22; Guidelines, §§ 15260-15277, 15378, subd. (b).) In addition, if the Secretary of the Resources Agency finds that a class of projects will have no significant effect on the environment, he or she may declare such projects categorically exempt. (§ 21084, subd. (a); Guidelines, §§ 15300-15329, 15354.) Second, the agency must determine whether the project may have significant environmental effects. (Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (k)(2).) Except when the project clearly will have such effects, the agency must conduct an initial study to assist it in making this determination. (Guidelines, §§ 15063, subds. (a), (c)(1), 15365.) During the initial study, the agency must consult with certain other interested public agencies. (§ 21080.3, subd. (a); Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (g).) Based on the initial study, the agency may find no substantial evidence that the project may have a significant effect on the environment.
In that case, in lieu of an EIR, it may adopt a statement that the project will have no significant environmental effect.
Such a statement is called a negative declaration. (§§ 21064, 21080, subd. (c); Guidelines, §§ 15063, subd. (b)(2), 15064, subd. (g)(2), 15070, subd. (a), 15371.) Similarly, the agency may find that, although the project as originally proposed might have had potentially significant environmental effects, the project has been modified by measures which mitigate these environmental effects, and there is no substantial evidence that the project, as modified, may have a significant effect on the environment.
In that case, in lieu of an EIR, the agency may adopt a “mitigated” negative declaration. (Guidelines, § 15070, subd. (b).) Before an agency adopts either a negative declaration or a mitigated negative declaration, however, it must give public notice of its intent to do so. (§ 21092; Guidelines, § 15072.) It must make the proposed negative declaration available to the public and to certain other interested public agencies for a specified period for review and comment. (Guidelines, § 15073.) It then must consider the comments it receives in determining whether to adopt a negative declaration. (Guidelines, § 15074, subd. (b).) If the administrative record before the agency contains substantial evidence that the project may have a significant effect on the environment, it cannot adopt a negative declaration; it must go to on the third stage of the CEQA process: preparation and certification of an EIR. (§§ 21100, 21151; Guidelines, §§ 15002, subd. (k)(3), 15063, subd. (b)(1), 15064, subds. (a)(1), (g)(1), 15362.) The EIR is the “heart” of CEQA. (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v.
Regents of University of California, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1123; No Oil, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 84; Guidelines, § 15003, subd. (a) .) It is a vehicle for identifying, analyzing, disclosing, and, to the extent possible, avoiding a project’s significant environmental effects. (§§ 21002.1, subd. (a), 21061; Guidelines, § 15002, subds. (a), (f).) However, an agency may undertake or approve a project even though the EIR indicates that it will have significant environmental effects, provided the agency finds that the expected benefits of the project outweigh its environmental effects, and that further mitigation of these effects is not feasible. (§§ 21002, 21002.1, subds. (b) , (c), 21081; Guidelines, §§ 15043, §§ 15091, 15092, subd. (a), 15093, subd. (a).) B. “Piggy-Backing” Provisions for Basing an Environmental Review on a Previous Environmental Review.
Once a negative declaration has been adopted or an EIR has been certified for a project, this three-stage process is technically at an end. When new activities may come up for approval, however, they may be related to the original project in such a way that repeating the entire three-stage process would be wasteful. CEQA therefore affords a variety of mechanisms for “piggy-backing” environmental review of successive approvals.
First, if the new activity can be deemed a change to the original project, the agency may limit its environmental review to the question of whether to require a subsequent or supplemental EIR (SEIR). Generally, once an EIR has been prepared, a public agency cannot require the preparation of an SEIR unless either: “(
a) Substantial changes are proposed in the project which will require major revisions of the [EIR]. [<H] (
b) Substantial changes occur with respect to the circumstances under which the project is being undertaken which will require major revisions in the [EIR]. [f] (
c) New information, which was not known and could not have been known at the time the [EIR] was certified as complete, becomes available.” (§ 21166; see also Guidelines, § 15162.) A change is “substantial” and “require[s] major revisions” in a previous EIR only if it involves new significant environmental impacts that were not considered in the previous EIR. (Guidelines, § 15162, subds. (a)(1), (a)(2).) Thus, an SEIR may be required with respect to a new activity if it constitutes a substantial change in the original project, and if it involves significant environmental effects not considered in the original EIR.
Second, if the new activity is not deemed a mere change in the original project, the agency may still limit its environmental review of the new activity by “tiering.” “ ‘Tiering’ refers to the coverage of general matters in broader EIRs (such as on general plans or policy statements) with subsequent narrower EIRs or ultimately site-specific EIRs incorporating by reference the general discussions and concentrating solely on the issues specific to the EIR subsequently prepared.” (Guidelines, § 15385; see also §§ 21068.5, 21093, 21094; Guidelines, §§ 15152, 15168.) Finally, in various special situations, CEQA offers partial or conditional exemptions which operate much like “piggy-backing.” One such partial exemption applies to a residential development project that is consistent with a general plan for which an EIR has been certified. (Former § 21083.3, subd. (a), amended eff.
Jan. 1, 1993, now § 21083.3, subd. (b); see Guidelines, § 15183, subd. (b).) The application of CEQA to such a project is “limited to effects on the environment which are peculiar to the parcel or to the project and which were not addressed as significant effects in the prior [EIR].” (Former § 21083.3, subd. (a), amended eff. Jan. 1, 1993, now § 21083.3, subd. (b); see Guidelines, § 15183, subd. (a).) C.
Judicial Review. “In an action to set aside an agency’s determination under [CEQA], the appropriate standard of review is determined by the nature of the proceeding below. . . . [S]ection 21168 ‘establishes the standard of review in administrative mandamus proceedings’ under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.5 while
section 21168.5 ‘governs traditional mandamus actions’ under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1085. [Citation.] The former
section applies to proceedings normally termed ‘quasi-adjudicative, ’ ‘in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in a public agency . . . .’ [Citations.] The latter
section applies to all other actions taken pursuant to CEQA and generally encompasses ‘quasi-legislative’ decisions made by a public agency. [Citations.]” (Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 30, 38-39 [271 Cal.Rptr. 393], fn. omitted, disapproved on other grounds in Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 570, fn. 2, 576, fn. 6 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 888 P.2d 1268]; see also Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 559, 566-568; 2 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal.
Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 1993) [cited hereafter as Kostka & Zischke] § 23.32, pp. 947-948; Remy et al., Guide to the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (8th ed. 1994) [cited hereafter as Remy] at pp. 290-292; Selmi, The Judicial Development of the California Environmental Quality Act (1984) 18 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 197, 221-222.) The distinction, however, is rarely significant. In either case, the issue before the trial court is whether the agency abused its discretion.
Abuse of discretion is shown if (1) the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law, or (2) the determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at pp. 39-40; Long Beach Sav. & Loan Assn. v.
Long Beach Redevelopment Agency, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 260; 2 Kostka & Zischke, supra, §§ 23.33-23.35, pp. 948-949; Remy, supra, at p. 292.) “[I]n undertaking judicial review pursuant to Sections 21168 and 21168.5, courts shall continue to follow the established principle that there is no presumption that error is prejudicial.” (§ 21005, subd. (b).) However, “noncompliance with the information disclosure provisions of [CEQA] which precludes relevant information from being presented to the public agency, or noncompliance with substantive requirements of [CEQA], may constitute a prejudicial abuse of discretion within the meaning of Sections 21168 and 21168.5, regardless of whether a different outcome would have resulted if the public agency had complied with those provisions.” (§ 21005, subd. (a).) On appeal, the appellate court’s “task ... is the same as that of the trial court: that is, to review the agency’s actions to determine whether the agency complied with procedures required by law.” (Al Larson Boat Shop, Inc. v.
Board of Harbor Commissioners (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 729, 738 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 618].) The appellate court reviews the administrative record independently; the trial court’s conclusions are not binding on it. (Schaeffer Land Trust v. San Jose City Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 612, 622 [263 Cal.Rptr. 813]; Long Beach Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Long Beach Redevelopment Agency, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 260; City of South Gate v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1422 [229 Cal.Rptr. 568]; City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v.
Board of Supervisors (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 229, 239 [227 Cal.Rptr. 899]; 2 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 23.140, at p. 1043.) III. Procedural Compliance With CEQA: The Initial Study Gentry contends that the initial study was defective because (1) it did not provide evidence for its conclusions that the Project would have no significant impacts on scenic resources, historic resources, and water resources, and no cumulative impacts, (2) it did not discuss specific mitigation measures, and (3) it did not examine the Project’s consistency with existing zoning, plans, and policies.
The initial study is largely a creature of the Guidelines (see discussion to Guidelines, § 15063); CEQA refers to it only glancingly (e.g., § 21080, subd. (c)(2)).
The Guidelines require the lead agency to “conduct an Initial Study to determine if the project may have a significant effect on the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (a).) The initial study must include, among other things, a description of the project (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (d)(1)); an identification of its environmental effects “by use of a checklist, matrix, or other method” (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (d)(3)); “[a] discussion of ways to mitigate the significant effects identified, if any” (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (d)(4)); and “[a]n examination of whether the project would be consistent with existing zoning, plans, and other applicable land use controls.” (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (d)(5).) The Guidelines include a sample initial study, which uses a checklist format. (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (
f) and appens. H & I.) The sample is merely suggested, however, not mandatory; “. . . public agencies are free to devise their own format for an Initial Study.” (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (f); see also Guidelines, appen. I.) Here, the initial study was prepared by Alex Gann and John Lampe of the County Planning Department. They identified potentially significant effects primarily by sending information about the Project to interested local, state and federal public agencies and other entities, and soliciting their responses. They also relied on various studies and reports.
Lampe then recorded their findings in EA No. 34807. EA No. 34807 consisted of a checklist of possible environmental effects followed by a narrative
section in which to link each effect to particular information sources, agencies consulted, findings of fact, and recommended mitigation measures. According to the checklist, the Project as proposed would have effects on, among other things, traffic, water and sewer systems, recreational facilities, slopes, erosion, floodplains, wildlife, and vegetation. It would have no effect on scenic resources, historic resources, or water resources, and no cumulatively significant effects. The narrative
section listed the studies and reports relied upon, but did not specifically list the agencies or entities consulted or the responses received from them. It then indicated briefly why each potential environmental effect did not require an EIR. In most instances, it indicated that the effect would be mitigated by measures prescribed by a specified public agency, or in a specified report. For example, it stated that “[fjlood hazards shall be mitigated through the requirements imposed by Riverside County Flood Control and Conservation District.” It did not further specify any particular mitigation measures. A.
Evidence for the Initial Study’s Conclusions. Gentry contends that the initial study was defective because it provided no evidence for its conclusions that the Project would have no significant impacts on scenic resources, historic resources, and water resources, and no cumulative impacts.
One of the purposes of an initial study is to “[p]rovide documentation of the factual basis for the finding in a Negative Declaration that a project will not have a significant effect on the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (c)(5).) A negative declaration must include not only “a proposed finding that the project will not have a significant effect on the environment,” but also a “copy of the Initial Study documenting reasons to support the finding.” (Guidelines, § 15071, subds. (
c) and (d).) Accordingly, “[a]n initial study leading to a negative declaration should provide the basis for concluding that the project will not have a significant effect on the environment.” (Leonoff v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1337, 1347 [272 Cal.Rptr. 372].) In Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151 [217 Cal.Rptr. 893], we struck down two negative declarations on grounds unrelated to the adequacy of the initial studies.
We also held, however, that on remand, the evidence supporting the initial studies should be disclosed. (Id., at p. 172.) We noted that in an administrative mandamus proceeding, the court must determine whether the respondent’s findings were supported by the evidence. (Id., at p. 171.) “Therefore, although an initial study can identify environmental effects by use of a checklist [citation], it must also disclose the data or evidence upon which the person(
s) conducting the study relied. Mere conclusions simply provide no vehicle for judicial review.” (Ibid.) Gentry essentially contends that under Citizens, an initial study must disclose sufficient evidence to support each and every one of its findings. We disagree. In Citizens, we required an initial study to disclose the evidence upon which it is based in order to afford a basis for judicial review. However, we did not hold that the failure of an initial study to disclose the evidence supporting particular findings would necessarily be fatal to the resulting negative declaration.
There is “no authority . . . that an initial study is inadequate unless it amounts to a full-blown EIR based on expert studies of all potential environmental impacts. If this were true, the Legislature would not have provided in CEQA for negative declarations.” (Leonoff v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1347.) “The agency [will] not be allowed to hide behind its own failure to gather relevant data. . . . CEQA places the burden of environmental investigation on government rather than the public.
If the local agency has failed to study an area of possible environmental impact, a fair argument may be based on the limited facts in the record. Deficiencies in the record may actually enlarge the scope of fair argument by lending a logical plausibility to a wider range of inferences.” (Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 296, 311 [248 Cal.Rptr. 352]; see also Christward Ministry v.
Superior Court (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 180, 197 [228 Cal.Rptr. 868] [fact that initial study checklist was incomplete and marked every impact “no” supported fair argument that project would have significant environmental effects].) However, the ultimate issue is not the validity of the initial study, but rather the validity of the lead agency’s adoption of a negative declaration.
Even if the initial study fails to cite evidentiary support for its findings, “it remains the appellant’s burden to demonstrate by citation to the record the existence of substantial evidence supporting a fair argument of significant environmental impact.” (Leonoff v.
Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1348-1349.) “An absence of evidence in the record on a particular issue does not automatically invalidate a negative declaration. ‘The lack of study is hardly evidence that there will be a significant impact.’ ” (1 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 6.75, at p. 316, italics added, quoting Leonoff v.
Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1354.) An agency’s adoption of a negative declaration may be based on the initial study “together with any comments received during the public review process.” (Guidelines, § 15074, subd. (b).) Thus, “where the agency decision is based on more information than the initial study, the additional information may cure any defects in the initial study.” (Leonoff v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1347-1348; see also Sundstrom v.
County of Mendocino, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 305 [“Even if the initial study is defective, the record may be extensive enough to sustain the agency’s action.”].) EA No. 34807 does not cite any evidence supporting its conclusions that the Project would not adversely affect either scenic or historic resources. In addition, it does not appear that the County Planning Department relied on any relevant studies or reports, or consulted with any agencies or entities with expertise on these subjects.
Sometimes, however, expert planning personnel may be entitled to conclude without additional evidence or consultation that a project will not have a particular environmental impact. (Leonoff v.
Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1354 [given project’s urban setting, “it does not seem unreasonable to conclude” that it would have no significant noise or odor impacts]; 1 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 6.20, pp. 267-268.) Here, the County Planning Department could reasonably find, based on its experience and its review of the Project, that the Project would not impact scenic or historic resources. The initial study is not defective merely because it fails to disclose evidence supporting these two particular findings.
Even assuming, however, that the initial study was defective in this respect, we believe the defect was remedied in the course of public hearings on the Project. Both the County and the City had to give notice to residents in the vicinity of the Project (Guidelines, § 15072, subd. (a)(2) and (a)(3)), and many attended the public hearings. Residents’ observations, based on personal knowledge, may constitute substantial evidence that a project will have a particular environmental effect. (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v.
County of Inyo, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 173.) Nevertheless, no substantial evidence was ever offered to support a fair argument that the Project might adversely affect scenic resources. Even Gentry, who has pointed out every remotely challengeable aspect of the Project, does not contend otherwise. This lack of comment, like Sherlock Holmes’s “dog in the night-time” which tellingly failed to bark (2 Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Annotated Sherlock Holmes (Baring-Gould ed. 1967) pp. 277, 280), was in itself evidence. As we hold in
part VI.B.3., post, no substantial evidence was ever offered to support a fair argument that the Project might adversely affect historic resources. Under the circumstances, the City could properly conclude that the Project would not affect either scenic or historic resources. The initial study likewise does not cite any evidence supporting its conclusion that the Project would not adversely affect groundwater quantity or quality. The administrative record, however, sheds considerable light on this question.
During the initial study period, the County solicited comments from the Eastern Municipal Water District, which would have jurisdiction over the provision of water and sewer service to the Project; from the County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, which had jurisdiction over groundwater recharge in the area of the Project (Wat. Code, appen. § 48-9); and from the County Health Department. These agencies responded by proposing conditions to mitigate the Project’s effects on water resources. Their proposed conditions were incorporated in the County’s conditions of approval, and, later, in the City’s.
The record thus amply reveals the evidence on which the County Planning Department relied in concluding that the Project, as mitigated, would not adversely affect groundwater quantity or quality. Again, however, even assuming that the initial study was defective in this respect, the defect was remedied by the additional groundwater reports which McMillin submitted to the City before it adopted the negative declaration. These reports concluded that the Project would neither pollute groundwater nor prevent groundwater recharge.
Finally, Gentry also contends that the initial study provided no evidence for its conclusion that the Project would have no cumulative impacts.
A project’s environmental effects may be sufficiently significant to require the preparation of an EIR if they are “cumulatively considerable,” meaning that “the incremental effects of [the] individual project are considerable when viewed in connection with effects of past projects, the effects of other current projects, and the effects of probable future projects.” (Guidelines, § 15065, subd. (c).) This requires the lead agency to “consider^ the effects of other projects, but only as a context for considering whether the incremental effects of the project at issue are considerable.
In other words, the agency determines whether the incremental impacts of the project are ‘cumulatively considerable’ by evaluating them against the backdrop of the environmental effects of other projects.” (1 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 6.55, at p. 299.) EA No. 34807 expressly relied on the traffic report, which in turn expressly considered the Project’s traffic impacts together with those of other projects planned in the area. Other than as to traffic, however, the initial study does’ not indicate any evidence relied upon to support its conclusion that the Project would have no cumulative impacts.
Moreover, neither the County nor the City seems to have performed any analysis or received any evidence that would support such a conclusion. The County could not presume that the other agencies and entities it consulted would alert it to any cumulative impacts, because it does not appear to have furnished them with the necessary information about other projects in the vicinity. Moreover, the cumulative impacts of a project will not usually be apparent without study, even to expert planning personnel, much less to local residents.
This lack of study, standing alone, does not give rise to a fair argument that the Project will in fact have significant cumulative effects. (Leonoff v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1358 [lack of cumulative effects analysis in initial study did not invalidate negative declaration where there was no substantial evidence that project itself would have any individually significant effect].) However, it does “enlarge the scope” of the fair argument which may be made “based on the limited facts in the record.” (Sundstrom v.
County of Mendocino, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at P- 311.) As we will discuss in
part VI.A., post, there was substantial evidence in the record to support a fair argument that the Project would have significant adverse effects on wildlife, particularly the Stephens’ kangaroo rat. The lack of evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the Project would have no cumulative effects thus tends to support a fair argument that, at least as to wildlife, the Project will have such effects. B. Discussion of Mitigation in the Initial Study.
Gentry contends that the initial study violated the requirement that it include “[a] discussion of ways to mitigate the significant effects identified, if any.” (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (d)(4).) She points out, correctly, that EA No. 34807 contained no specific mitigation measures. It merely found that the Project’s potentially significant impacts could be mitigated by payment of various specified fees, by compliance with the “requirements” of various specified public agencies, and by “appropriate measures” as stated in specified reports.
We have been able to take most of EA No. 34807’s references to particular public agencies and reports and connect them to specific mitigation measures in the administrative record without too much difficulty. Nevertheless, for purposes of this issue, we assume without deciding that the initial study did not adequately incorporate by reference the specific mitigation measures that had been recommended. Even so, we do not believe EA No. 34807 violated the Guidelines.
When a proposed negative declaration is released to the public, it is to be accompanied by both a “copy of the Initial Study” (Guidelines, § 15071, subd. (d)) and the “[mjitigation measures . . . included in the project.” (Guidelines, § 15071, subd. (e).) Thus, the Guidelines contemplate that the initial study will not necessarily constitute the complete list of all specific mitigation measures. An initial study need only discuss possible avenues of mitigation. EA No. 34807 did discuss “ways to mitigate the significant effects identified,” and it therefore complied with this requirement. C.
The Initial Study’s Examination of the Project’s Consistency With Existing Land-use Controls. Gentry contends that the initial study violated the requirement that it include “[a]n examination of whether the project would be consistent with existing zoning, plans, and other applicable land use controls” (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (d)(5)) because it failed to examine the Project’s consistency with the City’s land use controls. EA No. 34807 did examine whether the Project would be consistent with the County’s land use controls, including the General Plan and the Community Plan; Gentry does not contend otherwise.
Respondents contend that this discussion was adequate because the City was required to apply the County’s land-use controls. They rely on Government Code
section 66474.2, subdivision (a), which provides that “in determining whether to approve or disapprove an application for a tentative map, the local agency shall apply only those ordinances, policies, and standards in effect at the date the local agency has determined that the application is complete . . . .” McMillin’s application to the County was complete some time in 1990. (See Gov. Code, § 65943, subd. (a).) Respondents conclude that the City had to apply the land use controls in effect in 1990, namely the County’s. This is by no means clear, however.
The record indicates that when the City was incorporated, McMillin filed a new application with the City. If so, then arguably the City was bound to apply the land use controls in effect when that application was complete. We prefer to resolve this issue on the ground that the City’s land use controls were not significantly different from the County’s. When the City was incorporated, it adopted all County ordinances, including the applicable zoning ordinance, with the exception of the County’s General Plan.
The City did not have to adopt its own general plan until 30 months (or more) after its incorporation. (Gov. Code, §§ 65360, 65361.) At least as of May 5, 1992, when it approved the Project, it had not yet done so. Thus, when the City released its proposed negative declaration, there was no applicable general plan. Otherwise, however, the City’s land use controls were the same as the County’s.
Accordingly, EA No. 34807’s discussion of the Project’s consistency with existing land use controls was relevant and applicable even after the City took jurisdiction, except for its discussion of consistency with the County’s General Plan, which was surplusage. In any event, the Guidelines contemplate that “only one initial study need be prepared for a project. If a project is modified after the study has been prepared, the [lead] agency need not prepare a second initial study.” (1 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 6.15, at p. 263; see also Uhler v.
City of Encinitas (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 795, 803 [278 Cal.Rptr. 157], disapproved on other grounds in Quail Botanical Gardens Foundation, Inc. v. City of Encinitas (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1597, 1603 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 470]; Guidelines, §§ 15063, subd. (a), 15070.) We believe this is equally true if the project remains the same, but the identity of the lead agency changes. Thus, the initial study was not deficient because it discussed the Project’s consistency with the County’s land use controls rather than with the City’s. IV.
Procedural Compliance With CEQA: the Mitigated Negative Declaration Gentry contends that the City failed to comply with CEQA procedures for adopting a mitigated negative declaration, in that: (1) the City failed to make the proposed negative declaration itself available for public review, (2) the City failed to send a copy of the proposed negative declaration to trustee agencies, (3) the proposed negative declaration failed to include all of the proposed mitigation measures which the City eventually adopted, (4) certain conditions improperly deferred the determination of appropriate mitigation measures, and (5) the negative declaration did not reflect the City’s independent judgment.
We address these contentions seriatim. A. Failure to Make the Negative Declaration Publicly Available. Gentry contends that the City never released the proposed negative declaration itself to the public for review. The lead agency must give public notice of its intent to adopt a negative declaration. (§ 21092, subd. (a); Guidelines, § 15072, subd. (a).) It also must make the proposed negative declaration available for public review, for a specified period; at all times relevant here, this period was at least 21 days. (Former § 21091, subd. (b) (Stats. 1989, ch. 907, § 2), amended eff.
Jan. 1, 1994 (Stats. 1993, ch. 1130, § 11); Guidelines, § 15073, subd. (
a) and discussion.) A proposed negative declaration must include the proposed finding that the project will not have any significant environmental effects, a copy of the initial study, and any mitigation measures included in the project. (Guidelines, § 15071.) The City gave notice of its intent to adopt a negative declaration on March 17, 1992. Preliminarily, Gentry contends that the City’s notice did not indicate that the negative declaration was available for review.
At the time, a notice of intent to adopt a negative declaration had to “specify ... the address where copies of the . . . negative declaration are available for review.” (Former § 21092, subd. (a) (Stats. 1989, ch. 907, § 3), amended eff. Jan. 1, 1994 (Stats. 1993, ch. 1130, § 12), now § 21092, subd. (b)(1).) The City’s notice announced that it was considering the adoption of a negative declaration, and stated where “[t]he environmental finding along with the proposed project application may be reviewed . . . .” Obviously, the “environmental finding” means the negative declaration.
Gentry also claims that the City released EA No. 34807 alone, without any proposed mitigation measures or other supporting documentation. Accordingly, she discusses the adequacy of the negative declaration in terms of whether EA No. 34807, standing alone, was an adequate negative declaration. She cites no evidence in the record to support her claim, however, and we have found none. The City is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that its official duty has been regularly performed. (Evid.
Code, § 664.) Thus, we presume that the City released all documents that it was required to release as part of the proposed negative declaration, to the extent that they existed and were part of the administrative record at the time. The administrative record as it then stood included the proposed negative declaration, EA No. 34807, the County’s proposed mitigation measures, supporting studies, letters, and other documentation. Taken together, these constituted an adequate negative declaration. B. Failure to Send the Proposed Negative Declaration to Trustee Agencies.
Gentry contends that the City failed to send its proposed negative declaration to trustee agencies, as required.
Before a lead agency determines whether a negative declaration or an EIR is required for a project, it must consult “with any other public agency which has jurisdiction by law over natural resources affected by the project which are held in trust for the people of the State of California.” (§ 21080.3, subd. (a).) To implement this provision, the Guidelines require the lead agency to send notice of its intent to adopt a negative declaration, together with a copy of a proposed negative declaration, “to every . . .
Trustee Agency[] concerned with the project and every other public agency with jurisdiction by law over resources affected by a project.” (Guidelines, § 15073, subd. (b).) Also, if one or more trustee agencies, or public agencies with jurisdiction over resources affected by the project, is a state agency, the Guidelines require the lead agency to send the proposed negative declaration to the State Clearinghouse maintained by the Office of Planning and Research, which distributes it to the state agencies. (Guidelines, § 15073, subd. (c); see also Guidelines, § 15023, subd. (c).) There is no indication that the County or the City ever sent the proposed negative declaration to any other public agencies.
Thus, we must determine whether there were any “trustee agencies” with respect to the Project to which the proposed negative declaration should have been sent. Gentry uses the initial study to identify trustee agencies. She presumes that the City had to send its proposed negative declaration to any public agency with jurisdiction over resources which the initial study found would be affected by the Project, as originally proposed.
For example, she notes that EA No. 34807 found that the Project would affect wildlife resources, and contends that the proposed negative declaration should have been sent to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and to the state Department of Fish and Game because they have jurisdiction over wildlife resources. Similarly, she notes that EA No. 34807 found that the Project would affect water erosion, and contends that the proposed negative declaration should have been sent to the Regional Water Quality Control Board because it has jurisdiction over water quality, and supposedly also over water erosion.
The process of identifying potential trustee agencies is distinct from the process of identifying a project’s significant effects on the environment. “As soon as a Lead Agency has determined that an Initial Study will be required for the project,” it must consult informally with “all Trustee Agencies responsible for resources affected by the project . . . .” (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (g).) One purpose of the initial study is to determine whether the project will have any significant environmental effects. (Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (c)(l-3, 5).) Thus, the lead agency must identify potential trustee agencies before it knows what the significant environmental effects of the project will be.
Similarly, the lead agency must send the proposed negative declaration to every “[tjrustee [ajgency.” (Guidelines, § 15073, subd. (b).) A public agency is a trustee agency only if it has jurisdiction over resources “affected by” a project. (Guidelines, § 15386; see also § 21080.3, subd. (a).) If the lead agency proposes to adopt a negative declaration, however, then by definition it has found that the project will have no significant effects on any resource.
We conclude that natural resources can be “affected by” a project, and hence the lead agency may have duties toward “trustee agencies,” even if the lead agency believes the project will have no significant effect on the environment. This broad construction of “trustee agency” serves the statutory purpose of fostering interagency consultation. Potential trustee agencies should have input at an early stage in the process into the question of whether the project affects resources within their jurisdiction, and hence into the very question of whether they are, in fact, trustee agencies.
Any difficulty a lead agency faces in identifying potential trustee agencies as a result of this apparent circularity is lessened by the provisions of the Guidelines which list state departments with statutory authority over specified environmental effects (Guidelines, appen.
B), which require public agencies to keep their own lists of “other agencies . . . which have jurisdiction by law and/or special expertise with respect to various projects and project locations” (Guidelines, § 15087, subd. (f)), and which permit a lead agency to send environmental documents to state and regional clearinghouses. (Guidelines, § 15087, subd. (d).) We therefore agree with Gentry that, at a minimum, if the initial study finds that a project as originally proposed would have a significant environmental effect on a natural resource, that resource is “affected by!’ the project. (Cf. Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 14, § 753.5, subd. (d).) Thus, the lead agency must send any proposed negative declaration to any public agency with jurisdiction over that resource. We caution that the initial study is not necessarily the only basis for finding that a proposed negative declaration must be sent to another public agency. The lead agency may want to consult with other public agencies, and to send them any proposed negative declaration, even if its initial study indicates that the project will not affect any resources within their jurisdiction. Such a practice would promote sound, informed decisionmaking.
On these facts, however, we need not decide whether CEQA so requires. Here, EA No. 34807 found that the Project, as proposed, would affect wildlife. By law, the Department of Fish and Game holds the fish and wildlife resources of the state in trust for the People of California. (Fish & G. Code, §711.7, subd. (a).) The Guidelines specifically provide that the Department of Fish and Game is a trustee agency “with regard to the fish and wildlife of the state.” (Guidelines, § 15386, subd. (a).) Thus, the City should have sent a copy of its proposed negative declaration to the Department of Fish and Game.
Moreover, as this trustee agency is a state agency, the City should also have sent a copy of its proposed negative declaration to the State Clearinghouse. (Guidelines, § 15073, subd. (c).) As respondents note, the County solicited comments during the initial study period from the Department of Fish and Game, which never responded.
This, however, is pertinent, if at all, only to compliance with the requirement that the lead agency consult with trustee agencies during the initial study period. (§ 21080.3, subd. (a); Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (g).) It is no substitute for compliance with the separate requirement that the lead agency send any resulting proposed negative declaration to all trustee agencies. In a supplemental letter brief, respondents also note that before the notice of determination could be filed, a fee had to be paid to the Department of Fish and Game. (See § 21089, subd. (b); Fish & G.
Code, § 711.4.) This fee, however, is paid by the project applicant to the county clerk, which sends the fee and a copy of the notice of determination to the Department of Fish and Game; it does not send a copy of the negative declaration. (Fish & G. Code, §711.4, subd. (e), (e)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 753.5, subds. (b)(2), (e)(1), (4) & (8).) In any event, the fee was paid after the City had already adopted the negative declaration; it was too late for the Department of Fish and Game to comment or to object.
Federal agencies, like the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, on the other hand, are not “public agencies” within the meaning of either CEQA or the Guidelines. (§ 21063; Guidelines, § 15379.) A trustee agency is one which has “jurisdiction by law over natural resources . . . which are held in trust for the people of the State of California.” (§ 21080.3, subd. (a); Guidelines, § 15386.) Thus, the Guidelines indicate that only a “state agency” can be a trustee agency. (Guidelines, § 15386.) We conclude that the City did not have to send a copy of its proposed negative declaration to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
EA No. 34807 also found that the Project, as proposed, would increase water erosion. Although the State Water Quality Control Board and the various regional water quality control boards have statutory jurisdiction over water quality (Wat. Code, § 13001), they have no particular authority over water erosion.
Thus, we have no basis for finding that the City was required to send the proposed negative declaration to the Regional Water Quality Control Board. (9c) In sum, the City abused its discretion by failing to send a copy of its proposed negative declaration to the Department of Fish and Game and to the State Clearinghouse before it adopted the negative declaration. In
part VI., post, we hold that for other reasons the adoption of the negative declaration cannot stand. Accordingly, we need not decide whether this abuse of discretion was so prejudicial that we would be required to reverse the judgment below on this ground alone. (See § 21005.) C. Failure to Recirculate the Negative Declaration After Adding New Mitigation Conditions. Gentry contends that the City improperly added mitigation measures to the proposed negative declaration after its release, without recirculating it.
On March 17, 1992, when the City gave notice of its intent to adopt a negative declaration, the only mitigation measures in the administrative record were those the County had proposed as conditions of approval, numbered 1 through 32. Several of these conditions incorporated conditions that had been proposed in letters from other agencies, by reference. On May 5, 1992, the City issued a second staff report which included a list of conditions of approval numbered 1 through 128, together with a proposed mitigation monitoring program.
The City’s list included all the conditions the County had proposed, replacing references to the County with references to the City as necessary. Where the County had incorporated conditions proposed by other agencies by reference, however, the City added each such condition to its own list verbatim. Thus, many of the City’s seemingly new conditions were ones the County had incorporated by reference, and hence were not truly new. We find that 43 conditions, however, were new:
(1) The City substantially modified two of the County’s traffic mitigation conditions.
(2) The County had received a letter from the Eastern Municipal Water District commenting extensively on the Project, but had never incorporated these comments into its proposed conditions. The City, by contrast, adopted some of them as its conditions 56 and 57. Also—presumably to save itself the effort of redacting the rest of the water district’s lengthy comments—the City added a third, blanket condition requiring McMillin to “comply with any other conditions required by the Water District.”
(3) The County’s engineering geologist had prepared a soil stability report, but the County had never incorporated his recommendations into its proposed conditions. The City adopted them as an additional six conditions.
(4) The City adopted 21 mitigation conditions from the Adobe I EDR.
(5) The City added two conditions expressly to respond to issues that had been raised at the April 7 public hearing.
(6) The City added one mitigation condition regarding the Stephens’ kangaroo rat.
(7) The City added two conditions dealing with landscaping and six conditions dealing with fire hazards, for reasons, and from sources, which we are unable to divine. Respondents argue that Gentry fails to identify the conditions she claims were improperly added. Of course, it is her contention that the City released only EA No. 34807, and hence that all the mitigation conditions, including the County’s, were improperly added later. As discussed in
part IV.A., ante, however, we presume that on March 17, 1992, the City duly released all documents comprising a negative declaration, including the County’s proposed mitigation conditions. Thus, with regard to conditions released thereafter which merely carried forward the County’s conditions, we reject Gentry’s contention. With regard to conditions released thereafter which were genuinely new, however, we feel we must reach the merits. Respondents argue that some of the “new” conditions in reality already applied as a matter of law.
For example, some of them required McMillin to comply with specified ordinances, codes, and standards with which it presumably would have had to comply in any event. (See Leonoff v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1357 [mitigation conditions which merely require compliance with applicable laws need not be circulated for public review].) However, this was not true of all the new conditions.
Respondents also contend that where there is no substantial evidence that the mitigation measures included in a proposed negative declaration when it was released were inadequate, further mitigation measures may be added thereafter, citing Leonoff v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d 1337.
In Leonoff, a county planning department adopted a negative declaration; when its action was appealed to the county’s board of supervisors, the board added three new mitigation measures, then denied the appeal. (Id., at pp. 1344, 1356.) Opponents of the project argued that the additional mitigation measures required the negative declaration to be recirculated for public review. (Id., at p. 1356.) As the court analyzed the issue: “CEQA contemplates public review of mitigation measures proposed in a negative declaration to reduce potentially significant effects. [Citations.] CEQA does not require mitigation of insignificant effects.
By interpolation, it would appear that if the initial public review demonstrates the need for further mitigation to reduce significant effects, any new mitigation proposal should be subject to further public review. [Citations.] On the other hand, if the initial public review demonstrates the initial mitigation will adequately reduce potential effects to insignificance, imposition of additional mitigation does not require further public review.” (222 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1356-1357.) It found “no substantial evidence that the initial mitigating measures were inadequate to reduce any impacts to insignificance.
Thus, if County imposed further conditions in an excess of caution, they were not subject to public review.” (222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1357; accord, Citizen Action to Serve All Students v. Thornley (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 748, 759 [272 Cal.Rptr. 83] [mitigation measures did not have to be incorporated into project prior to public release of negative declaration where measures did not relate to significant environmental effects].) We also note that in Long Beach Sav. & Loan Assn. v.
Long Beach Redevelopment Agency, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 249, the court held that CEQA simply did not require recirculation of “additional mitigation measures made in response to comments by those who oppose the project,” at least where the additional measures did not amount to “a fundamental reorganization of the negative declaration.” (Id., at p. 263.) It explained that “[t]o allow the public review period to proceed ad nauseam would only serve to arm persons dead set against a project with a paralyzing weapon—hired experts who can always ‘discover’ flaws in mitigation measures. . . .” (Ibid.) Long Beach is not applicable here, however, because the bulk of the City’s new conditions appear to have been added by City staff acting on their own, rather than in response to public comment on the Project.
The Long Beach court’s concern lest a lead agency’s very responsiveness to public comment unduly prolong the process is inapplicable here. Moreover, the addition of 43 new conditions would seem, on its face, to be a sufficiently substantial reorganization of a negative declaration to call for a renewed public comment period, provided at least some of the new conditions were imposed to mitigate significant environmental effects. Respondents therefore argue that some of the new conditions were imposed for reasons other than to mitigate a significant environmental impact, so that CEQA does not apply to them.
They also argue, pursuant to Leonojf, that there was no substantial evidence that the original conditions were inadequate to mitigate any significant environmental effect; hence the new conditions were added merely in “an excess of caution,” and did not have to be publicly circulated. We concur with Leonojf that conditions which do not address an otherwise significant environmental effect need not be publicly circulated. We therefore approach this issue much as we do the issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support a fair argument that the Project would have significant environmental effects.
Both issues require us to summarize the evidence in the record regarding the Project’s potential environmental effects. If there was no substantial evidence before the City to support a fair argument that the Project—as mitigated by the County’s conditions, which we assume the City released along with its negative declaration—would have a particular environmental effect, then the City was free to add mitigation conditions addressing that effect without recirculating the proposed negative declaration.
Gentry contends there is substantial evidence in the record to support a fair argument that the Project may have significant environmental effects on: (1) wildlife, (2) traffic, (3) recreational resources, (4) historical resources, (5) groundwater, flooding and erosion, and (6) the physical arrangement of the community. Many of the added conditions do not seem, even arguably, to relate to any of these environmental effects.
We will discuss the other added conditions, which do relate, at least arguably, to one or more of the environmental effects identified by Gentry, when we discuss the evidence as to each such effect in parts VI.A., VLB., and VI.C., post. D. Deferred Mitigation.
Gentry contends that some conditions improperly deferred the determination of appropriate mitigation into the future. “A negative declaration requiring formulation of mitigation measures at a future time violates the rule that members of the public and other agencies must be given an opportunity to review mitigation measures before a negative declaration is approved.” (1 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 6.72, at p. 310; see also Remy, supra, at pp. 113-114.) The leading case on deferred mitigation is Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 296.
There a county adopted a negative declaration including mitigation conditions which required the applicant to perform two studies. One, a hydrological study, would have had to show no adverse environmental effects.
The other, a soil study, was expected to propose mitigation measures; the negative declaration purported to incorporate such measures by reference, in advance, as mitigation conditions. (Id., at p. 306.) The court declared “[tjhis procedure . . . contrary to law,” as well as “counter to that policy of CEQA which requires environmental review at the earliest feasible stage in the planning process.” (Id., at p. 307.) Other mitigation conditions in Sundstrom, however, required that plans for compliance with air and water quality standards and for sludge disposal be approved by various public agencies. (202 Cal.App.3d at p. 308.) The court noted that such “[a] condition requiring compliance with environmental regulations is a common and reasonable mitigating measure.” (Ibid.) “In the case of the conditions regarding air and water quality standards, the County possessed ‘meaningful information’ reasonably justifying an expectation of compliance. [Citation.] Since compliance would indeed avoid significant environmental effects, the conditions were proper.” (Id., at pp. 308-309.) In the case of the sludge disposal condition, on the other hand, the court found the county had no reason to expect compliance, as there was no suitable sludge disposal site. (202 Cal.App.3d at p. 309.) Because it also found substantial evidence for a fair argument that sludge generation was a significant environmental effect, it held that the negative declaration was improperly adopted in reliance on this condition. (Id., at pp. 308-311; see also Oro Fino Gold Mining Corp. v.
County of El Dorado (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 872, 884-885 [274 Cal.Rptr. 720] [negative declaration improperly adopted in reliance on mitigation measures calling for future reclamation, erosion, dust, and fire plans].) Sundstrom, however, was distinguished in Sacramento Old City Assn. v. City Council (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1011 [280 Cal.Rptr. 478].
There a city certified an EIR which required traffic and parking effects to be mitigated by preparation of a transportation management plan; the EIR “recommended” seven potential mitigation measures to be “considered” as part of the plan. (Id., at pp. 1020-1023.) Opponents argued that this constituted impermissible deferred mitigation, citing Sundstrom. (Id., at pp. 1023, 1026-1027.) The court upheld the challenged mitigation condition because the city had recognized the significance of the traffic and parking effects, had committed itself to mitigating their impact, and had adequately discussed possible mitigation alternatives. (229 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1023, 1026-1027.) “ ‘[F]or kinds of impacts for which mitigation is known to be feasible, but where practical considerations prohibit devising such measures early in the planning process . . . , the agency can commit itself to eventually devising measures that will satisfy specific performance criteria articulated at the time of project approval.
Where future action to carry a project forward is contingent on devising means to satisfy such criteria, the agency should be able to rely on its commitment as evidence that significant impacts will in fact be mitigated.’ ” (Id., at pp. 1028-1029, quoting Remy (5th ed. 1991) at pp. 200-201; see also Rio Vista Farm Bureau Center v.
County of Solano (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 351, 376-377 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 307] [county, by adopting siting criteria for future projects, made firm commitment to mitigate significant impacts].) The court distinguished Sundstrom, first, because Sundstrom involved a negative declaration, rather than an EIR, and second, because in Sundstrom, the lead agency did not consider any mitigation measures, but rather left the formulation of a mitigation plan up to the applicant. (229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1028.) Gentry challenges the following conditions as impermissible deferred mitigation measures: 5-6, 16.e, 17.i, 24.c, 24.g, 24.h, 26,c, 26.d, 34-35, 41, 49.a, 67-69, 75, 83-84, 89, 121, and 126.
As to conditions 5-6, 41, 67-69, 83-84, and 121, the argument seems simply inapposite. For example, we perceive no futurity or deferral in condition 84, which merely requires McMillin to have a recorded easement for any off-site drainage structures. Conditions 5 and 41 require McMillin to submit soils reports; condition 6 requires it to submit a grading plan. Unlike the conditions requiring reports in Sundstrom, these conditions do not require that the reports contain any specified findings, or that McMillin comply with the reports’ recommendations.
It would appear that the reports are for the City’s information only. Conditions 16.e, 24.g, 26.c, 34-35, 49.a, and 126 provide for various City departments to direct or approve McMillin’s performance of specified mitigation measures. For example, condition 34 provides that McMillin “shall protect downstream properties from damages caused by alteration of the drainage patterns .... Protection shall be provided by constructing adequate drainage facilities including enlarging existing facilities and/or by securing a drainage easement. . . .
The Protection shall be as approved by the Engineering Department.” These conditions meet the requirements of Sacramento, in that the City recognized the significance of the potential environmental effects, committed itself to mitigating their impact, and articulated specific performance criteria. Condition 24.c provides that if the Project is phased, McMillin must submit an overall grading plan, which must be approved by the City Planning Director.
Similarly, condition 75 requires McMillin to submit improvement plans, grading plans, and a final map, which must be approved by the County Rood Control and Water Conservation District. These plans and maps were subject to a host of specific performance criteria imposed by various ordinances, codes, and standards, as well as other mitigation conditions. The City’s mitigation monitoring program committed it to monitoring McMillin’s compliance with these criteria.
Thus, we believe these conditions, too, were of the type approved in Sacramento. (See 1 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 6.72, at p. 311 [condition requiring applicant to avoid erosion and prevent siltation by developing “erosion control plan subject to review and approval by City staff’ avoids improperly deferred mitigation].) Conditions 17.i, 24.g, 26.c, and 26.d state that future federal or state (or, in one instance, local) gnatcatcher habitat conservation plans may be substituted for particular provisions of the gnatcatcher monitoring program, provided the City determines that the habitat conservation plans afford equivalent mitigation.
Yet again, these conditions commit the City to mitigating the impact of a recognized potential environmental effect and articulate specific performance criteria, and thus meet the requirements of Sacramento. Moreover, these conditions are analogous to the conditions upheld in Sundstrom, which required the applicant to comply with the environmental requirements of other agencies. (202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 308-309.) This leaves just one of the conditions which Gentry is challenging: condition 24.h, which requires McMillin to comply with any existing ordinance protecting the Stephens’ kangaroo rat.
However, it also provides that the City may request McMillin to obtain a biological report regarding the Stephens’ kangaroo rat; in that event, McMillin must comply with any recommendations in the report. Condition 24.h is on all fours with the condition in Sundstrom which required the applicant to comply with any recommendations of a report that had yet to be performed. It improperly defers the formulation of mitigation. As discussed in
part IV.C., ante, CEQA requires public review of proposed conditions only if those conditions are necessary to mitigate potentially significant environmental effects. Thus, if there is no substantial evidence that the mitigation measures in a proposed negative declaration released to the public are inadequate, new mitigation measures may be added without public review. (Leonoff v.
Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1356.) Arguably, a condition could validly allow for deferred mitigation, provided other mitigation measures were clearly adequate to reduce the project’s potential environmental impacts to insignificance. (See Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 308-311 [because there was substantial evidence that project would generate environmentally significant sludge, condition providing for future approval of sludge disposal plan was improper].) As we will discuss in
part VI.A., post, however, there was substantial evidence to support a fair argument that the Project, even as mitigated by the County, would have a significant impact on the Stephens’ kangaroo rat. Accordingly, any proposed mitigation for impacts on the Stephens’ kangaroo rat had to be made available for public review; it could not be left to be formulated in the future. By adopting the mitigated negative declaration in reliance on condition 24.h, the City abused its discretion. Because we hold in
part VI.A., post, that reversal is required based on substantial evidence to support a fair argument that the Project would have significant environmental effects, we need not decide whether this abuse of discretion was prejudicial. E. Failure to Exercise Independent Judgment. Gentry contends that the City’s proposed negative declaration was prepared by the County, and therefore did not reflect the City’s independent judgment.
A negative declaration must be prepared “directly by, or under contract to, a public agency.” (§21082.1, subd. (a).) Any draft negative declaration circulated by the lead agency must reflect its independent judgment. (§ 21082.1, subd. (c)(2).) Moreover, the final negative declaration must reflect the lead agency’s independent judgment (§21082.1, subd. (c)(1); see also Guidelines, § 15025, subd. (b)), and the lead agency must make a finding that it does so. (§ 21082.1, subd. (c)(3).) In Friends of La Vina v.
County of Los Angeles (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1446 [284 Cal.Rptr. 171], disapproved on other grounds in Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pages 570, footnote 2, 576, footnote 6, a county directed the applicant to hire a private consultant to prepare necessary EIR documentation. The consultant prepared an initial version of a draft EIR. The consultant revised his version several times in response to the county’s review and comments.
The county then released the draft EIR. (232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1450-1451.) The court held this procedure did not violate CEQA: “[A]n agency may comply with CEQA by adopting EIR materials drafted by the applicant’s consultant, so long as the agency independently reviews, evaluates, and exercises judgment over that documentation and the issues it raises and addresses.” (Id., at p. 1452.) Here, the proposed negative declaration was prepared by the County—at the time, the lead agency—rather than by the developer or a hired consultant, as in Friends of La Vina.
Thereafter, when the City was incorporated, it took over as lead agency. We have not been referred to any statutory or case authority on the effect of such a change in the identity of the lead agency, nor has our own research revealed any.
We note, however, that where two public agencies simultaneously have a substantial claim to be lead agency for a project, they may enter into an agreement designating one of them the lead agency; such an agreement may also “provide for cooperative efforts ... by contract, joint exercise of powers, or similar devices.” (Guidelines, § 15051, subd. (d).) This strongly suggests that where two public agencies successively are lead agency for a project, they could likewise engage in “cooperative efforts,” provided each agency exercises an independent judgment on the matters which actually come before it for decision.
It is undisputed that the County exercised its independent judgment in releasing a proposed negative declaration, in proposing mitigation conditions, and in holding public hearings. The City then rereleased the County’s proposed negative declaration on March 17, 1992. It explained its decision to do so in its first staff report. The staff report discussed the history of the Project, including the history of its consideration by the County.
The staff report discussed the issues that had been raised in the County’s public hearings, but concluded that “[e]ach of these issues has been resolved through the Conditions of Approval, as written by County staff and amended by City staff . . . .” This staff report shows that the City did review, analyze, and exercise independent judgment with respect to the proposed negative declaration. The proposed negative declaration adequately reflected the City’s independent judgment.
Gentry appears to contend that it is not enough that the proposed negative declaration in fact reflected the City’s independent judgment, as shown by the subsequently issued staff report; rather, the proposed negative declaration had to show on its face that it reflected the City’s independent judgment, to assure the public that the document was current and consistent with City policies. We are aware of no authority for such a requirement.
We believe the fact that the City released the proposed negative declaration as its own impliedly represented to all concerned that it did reflect the City’s independent judgment. If necessary, the truth of that implied representation can be tested in court, based on the entire administrative record. Gentry also contends, in her reply brief, that the City failed to make the finding required by
section 21082.1, subdivision (c)(3) that thq final negative declaration reflected its independent judgment. Because she raised this contention for the first time in her reply brief, respondents have been deprived of an opportunity to respond to it. We therefore need not consider this contention, and we do not. (Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11 [142 Cal.Rptr. 429, 572 P.2d 43]; see generally, 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) § 496 at pp. 484-485.) V.
Substantive Compliance With CEQA: the Standard of Review Gentry contends that the City’s determination to adopt a mitigated negative declaration must be reviewed using the “fair argument” test, and thus the trial court erred when it applied a substantial evidence standard of review. Respondents, however, contend that a substantial evidence standard of review applies whenever the lead agency is relying on a previously certified EIR, citing Long Beach Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Long Beach Redevelopment Agency, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 249.
Respondents also suggest that a substantial evidence standard of review should apply whenever the question before the lead agency is whether to prepare an EIR on a residential development project that is consistent with a general plan for which an EIR has been prepared, under
section 21083.3. The trial court accepted respondents’ position; it found that the City did proceed pursuant to
section 21083.3 and that the Long Beach standard of review did apply. We disagree. We find that the City did not rely on any previous EIR and did not proceed under
section 21083.3, and hence the fair argument test applies. Accordingly, we need not consider Gentry’s additional contentions that (1) the negative declaration failed to identify the previous EIR’s on which the City was relying and (2) the City did not follow the procedures required under
section 21083.3. A. The "Fair Argument” Test. Under
section 21151, a local agency (and, under § 21100, a state agency) ordinarily must prepare an EIR on any project which “may have a significant effect on the
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