LEGGETT v. THE STATE, 241 Ga. 237

Undercofler, Presiding Justice. The sole question presented by this case is whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance during Leggett’s murder trial. The jury convicted Leggett and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. His retained attorney sought a discharge, and a new attorney was appointed by the trial court to pursue Leggett’s motion for new trial and appeal.

In the motion, Leggett raised the ineffective assistance of counsel issue and supported his claim by an affidavit from his former attorney stating that he was a new and inexperienced member of the bar, that this was his first capital felony case, and that he was ineffective in failing to request a voluntary manslaughter charge. Leggett contends additionally that the attorney was ineffective in not interviewing the only eyewitness. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

"The constitutional right to the assistance of counsel does not guarantee errorless counsel, nor counsel judged ineffective by hindsight.” Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 771 (208 SE2d 825) (1974). Accord, Pitts v. Glass, 231 Ga. 638 (203 SE2d 515) (1974); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960). We can not say that Leggett’s counsel’s lack of experience rendered him ineffective. The defendant practically admitted the killing on the stand. The state: "You don’t deny . . . that you fired the gun and she was shot?” Leggett: "Like I said, firing the gun, I don’t know how it happened.

I know that I didn’t go over there to shoot her. The gun shot, but I didn’t go over there to do it. . .” And elsewhere, Q: "And you fired it?” A: "I don’t know, sir. I had the gun. I don’t know whether I did it or not.” We have said many times that the effectiveness of counsel cannot be measured by the outcome of the trial, but by reasonableness of the services rendered at the time. E.g., Brown v. Ricketts, 233 Ga. 809 (213 SE2d 672) (1975); Pitts v. Glass, supra.

This attorney filed a pre-trial discovery motion and managed to secure Leggett’s release on bail pending the trial; at trial, he cross examined the state’s witnesses, made objections, and polled the jury. We can not say in the face of this record and transcript that counsel was not reasonably effective. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327 (240 SE2d 833) (1977); Fortson v. State, 240 Ga. 5 (239 SE2d 335) (1977); Reid v. State, 235 Ga. 378 (219 SE2d 740) (1975). It is also apparent from the transcript that the attorney attempted several times to interview the state’s main witness, but that she refused to speak with him.

Therefore, he was not ineffective on this ground. Submitted March 24, 1978 Decided April 18, 1978. Douglass & Young, Orion L. Douglass, for appellant. Glenn Thomas, Jr., District Attorney, John D. Rivers, Assistant District Attorney, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. We find that the case was correctly presented to the jury by the trial court’s charge. The defendant admitted the shooting of his girl friend and stated that he and the victim were not quarreling or fighting.

He relied on accident — that the gun went off as he handed it to the victim — as a defense. An eyewitness generally corroborated the defendant’s story other than to state that Leggett suddenly grabbed the victim by the hair and shot her twice in the head. Leggett then went to his mother’s house and called the police to surrender voluntarily. The victim died a week later. Since it is clear that the evidence would not support a voluntary manslaughter verdict' Leggett’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to request! such a charge. Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Hill and Bowles, JJ., who concur specially.