Lawton LIMEHOUSE, Sr., Respondent, v. Paul H. HULSEY and The Hulsey Litigation Group, LLC, Appellants, 397 S.C. 49

THOMAS, J. This is an appeal from an entry of default and the subsequent default damages trial based on a slander action against Paul Hulsey and the Hulsey Litigation Group, LLC (collectively Hulsey). Damages (actual and punitive) were found in excess of $7.3 million. Hulsey now appeals, alleging the trial court erred in (1) granting entry of default without subject matter jurisdiction, (2) failing to grant a motion to set aside the entry of default, (3) allegedly depriving Hulsey of due process in the default damages trial, and (4) allowing an award of $5 million in punitive damages. We affirm.

FACTS In 2004, Hulsey filed a class action suit against Lawton Limehouse, Limehouse’s son, and L & L Services, Inc., a staffing agency owned by the pair. The suit alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as well as other state and federal laws. Although the case eventually settled, during its pendency, Hulsey made allegedly slanderous statements that the “[Charleston] Post & Courier” published, including

(1) Limehouse engaged in a classic racketeering scheme,

(2) Limehouse’s conduct set the community back 150 years,

(3) Limehouse engaged in blatant indentured servitude, and

(4) Limehouse created a perfect racketeering scheme just like Tony Soprano. In response, Limehouse filed suit against Hulsey on April 19, 2006. Service was perfected upon the Hulsey Litigation Group, LLC on April 20, 2006, and Paul Hulsey personally on April 21, 2006. On May 5, 2006, Hulsey filed a notice of removal to federal district court without filing an answer to the complaint. On June 2, 2006, Limehouse filed a motion to remand to state court. A federal district judge remanded the case to state court by an order dated July 19, 2006, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.

The federal court electronically transmitted this order to counsel on July 20. The Charleston County Clerk of Court also received an uncertified copy and filed the order on July 21. The Charleston County Clerk of Court mailed notice of the filing to all parties on July 27. On August 21, 2006, Limehouse filed a request for entry of default. The Charleston County Clerk of Court entered default on August 21, and filed the same on August 22. Subsequently, the clerk mailed a Form 4 to all parties on August 24, 2006, noticing entry of default.

On August 29, upon receipt of the Form 4, Hulsey filed an answer and motion to set aside entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(c), SCRCP. In December, 2006, a circuit judge denied Hulsey’s motion to set aside entry of default, and in February 2008, a different circuit judge presided over a jury trial on the issue of damages. On February 6, 2008, the jury returned a verdict for actual damages in the amount of $2.39 million and awarded punitive damages in the amount of $5 million.

Nine days later, on February 15, 2008, Hulsey filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, after discovering there was no certified copy of the remand order on file with the Charleston County Clerk of Court. The trial court denied the motion, as well as the accompanying motion for a new trial. This appeal follows. ISSUES ON APPEAL I. Did the trial court err in exercising jurisdiction over the case after remand? II. Did the trial court err in failing to set aside the entry of default? III. Did the trial court err in the manner in which the default damages trial was conducted? IV.

Did the trial court err in allowing an award of punitive damages? LAW/ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction Hulsey argues the trial court was, and still is, without jurisdiction over this matter because the clerk of the federal court failed to mail a certified copy of the remand order to the Charleston County Clerk of Court. We disagree and find the mailing of the certified copy is not a jurisdictional requirement. Upon removal, the federal court acquires jurisdiction over the case, for the limited purpose of determining jurisdiction. See Davis v. Davis, 267 S.C. 508, 511, 229 S.E.2d 847, 848 (1976).

Once the federal court determines that federal jurisdiction is not appropriate, the case is remanded to state court, and the remand ends the federal court’s jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1996). Congress has provided for a federal court’s jurisdiction in

section 1446(d): “Promptly after the filing of such notice of removal ... the defendant ... shall give written notice thereof to ... the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” (emphasis added). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1996) provides for “Procedure^] after removal generally,” and states: A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under

section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case. In interpreting

section 1447(c), a majority of federal circuits take the position that the finality of the remand and the accompanying loss of federal jurisdiction requires both entry of the order with the federal clerk of court and a certified copy being mailed to the state court. See, e.g., Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 227 (3rd Cir.1995); Hunt v. Acromed Corp., 961 F.2d 1079, 1081-82 (3rd Cir.1992); Browning v. Navarro, 743 F.2d 1069, 1078-79 (5th Cir.1984); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Santiago Plaza, 598 F.2d 634, 636 (1st Cir.1979).

However, the Fourth Circuit takes a minority view, reasoning that because remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defect in removal are unappealable, “the plain language of the statute! ] • • supports] the conclusion that § 1447 divests a district court of jurisdiction upon the entry of its remand order” despite the federal clerk’s duty to send a certified copy.

In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 735 (4th Cir.1996) (considering and declining the majority approach, holding “a federal court loses jurisdiction over [the] case as soon as its order to remand the case is entered[ ] ... [f]rom that point on, it cannot reconsider its ruling even if the district court clerk fails to mail ... a certified copy”); see also Bryan v.

BellSouth Commc’ns, Inc., 492 F.3d 231, 235 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing “a remand is effective when the district court mails a certified copy ... see [1447(c) ] ... or ... if the remand is based on the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ... when the remand order is entered, see [Lowe]”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the South Carolina Federal District Court lost jurisdiction when the order of remand was entered. We believe this ends the inquiry.

However, because Hulsey’s assertion that the state court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction seems to leave the case caught in jurisdictional limbo, or as other courts have dubbed it, on “a jurisdictional hiatus,” for lack of the mailing, State v. City of Albuquerque, 119 N.M. 169, 889 P.2d 204, 207 (Ct.App.1993) aff’d 119 N.M. 150, 889 P.2d 185 (1994), we therefore address whether the mailing is required for the South Carolina Circuit Court to exercise jurisdiction. We start with the premise that our state court’s jurisdiction is general, derived exclusively from

article V,

section 11 of the South Carolina Constitution, not from federal law. S.C. Const. art. V, § 11; see, e.g., Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass’n v. Fairfax County, 571 F.2d 1299, 1304 (4th Cir.1978) (indicating that unlike federal courts, state courts are courts of general jurisdiction). On the other hand, the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to that expressly authorized by the United States Constitution or statute enacted by Congress pursuant thereto. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005); Victory Carriers Inc. v.

Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) (“The power reserved to the states, under the Constitution, to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections of the Constitution.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); U.S. Const. art.

III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); see The Federalist No. 82, at 515-16 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wright ed., 2002) (considering the federal government has only the power exclusively delegated to it, it stands as a “rule” that “the State courts will retain ... jurisdiction[,] ... unless it appears to have been taken away in one of the enumerated modes”); Thus, unless otherwise prohibited by statute, a state court’s jurisdiction is limited only by the federal court’s proper exercise of jurisdiction over a case pursuant to Congressional act — which according to Fourth Circuit jurisprudence in Lowe, ceased upon entry of the remand order.

In this regard, the distinction between the majority and minority views becomes significant.

Section 1446(

d) provides a prohibition on state action in that once removal is properly effectuated, “the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” (emphasis added).

Section 1447(

c) states: “A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed.” (emphasis added). Naturally, if a federal court takes the majority view, making the remand dependent upon the mailing, the case is remanded and the order is mailed at the same point in time. Therefore, the lack of a mailing forecloses state court jurisdiction not because a state court should interpret

section 1447(

c) to provide the state may only proceed upon the mailing but because

section 1446(

d) prohibits state action until remanded. However, under the minority view, this is not the case as a remand does not require the mailing. Thus, in this circuit, a state court exercising jurisdiction over a case upon entry of remand neither imposes on federal jurisdiction nor violates these federal jurisdiction provisions. Similarly, the states that have confronted this issue recognize the significance of the distinction between the majority and minority view.

In the cases applying the majority view, the revesting of jurisdiction occurs on the mailing because the finality of the remand and accompanying loss of federal jurisdiction requires the same. See, e.g., Nixon v. Moore, 108 S.W.3d 813, 817-18 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (adopting the majority approach that the mailing is the operative event at which jurisdiction switches, but recognizing the minority reaches a different result); Quaestor Invs., Inc. v.

State of Chiapas, 997 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex.1999) (noting that “[i]n answering the question of when a jurisdictional transfer occurs between federal and state court, most courts[ ] ... interpret

Section 1447(c) ] ... to mean that the federal court loses jurisdiction once the federal court clerk has mailed a certified copy” but others, particularly the Fourth Circuit in Lowe, take an opposite view). However, the same rationale compels a different result under the minority view.

See Nixon, 108 S.W.3d at 817 (citing Lowe for the proposition that a “few federal [circuits] have reached [a minority approach] ... holding that jurisdiction transfers back to the state as soon as an order of remand is entered”); Quaestor, 997 S.W.2d at 228 (stating that Lowe “hold[s] that jurisdiction returns to the state court when the district court enters the remand”). Thus, whether the mailing of the certified copy is required to revest jurisdiction is simply a product of what

interpretation is employed to determine when the federal court loses jurisdiction. Thus, the minority view accepts that the “require[ment that] the clerk of the district court [ ] mail a certified copy of the remand order to the clerk of the state court, is not jurisdictional.” Int’l Lottery, Inc. v. Kerouac, 102 Ohio App.3d 660, 657 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1995) (emphasis added) (citing Van Ryn v.

Korean Air Lines, 640 F.Supp. 284 (C.D.Cal.1985) (standing for the proposition that entry of remand divests the federal court of jurisdiction notwithstanding the failure of the clerk to send a certified copy)); see Albuquerque, 889 P.2d at 206 (holding “the actions of a federal judge in signing and entering a remand order authorize subsequent state court actions even when the federal court clerk fails to mail the remand order to the clerk of the state court”); see also Lowe, 102 F.3d at 735 (“ ‘Logic also indicates that it should be the action of a court (entering the order of remand) rather than the action of a clerk (mailing a certified copy) of the order that should determine vesting of jurisdiction’ ”) (quoting Van Ryn, 640 F.Supp. at 285) (emphasis added).

In light of the Fourth Circuit having taken the minority approach, we must agree that the duty to send the mailing is not a jurisdictional requirement but a procedural one. Therefore, we find the South Carolina Circuit Court did not act without subject matter jurisdiction. This is bolstered by the fact that even in jurisdictions requiring the mailing for finality of the remand, the same is not necessarily required for the state to exercise jurisdiction. For instance, in Nixon the Missouri Court of Appeals recognized: The state court may not be immediately notified by the federal court of the order of remand.

Counsel, of course, are promptly notified of the order of remand, and often counsel will, in the interest of saving time, notify the state court and proceed in the interim with the state court action. There is nothing in the federal statutory scheme prohibiting the parties from proceeding at that point. Nixon, 108 S.W.3d at 817 (emphasis added). Thus, although requiring the mailing to make the remand order final, the same is not an indispensable jurisdictional requirement. See Bacon v.

Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo., 948 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (“Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by ... consent, and the lack thereof cannot be waived.”). With nothing in the federal statutory scheme to prohibit this, the same would hold true in South Carolina, supporting our disinclination to see the mailing requirement as jurisdictional. See In re Nov. 4, 2008 Bluffton Town Council Election, 385 S.C. 632, 636, 686 S.E.2d 683, 686 (2009) (“The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, even by consent of the parties.... ”).

Because we find the mailing requirement is procedural not jurisdictional, the issue is not properly before this court as a result of Hulsey’s failure to timely object. See Beaufort County v. Butler, 316 S.C. 465, 467, 451 S.E.2d 386, 387-88 (1994) (stating “a procedural right may be waived ... [and a] party who fails to object to the trial of a case ... cannot later assert the trial court erred in trying the case ... ”); Doe v.

S.B.M., 327 S.C. 352, 356, 488 S.E.2d 878, 880 (Ct.App.1997) (stating that “[t]he duty is on the litigant to make a timely objection in order to preserve the right to review ... [and] ... [a] contemporaneous objection is required to properly preserve an error for appellate review”); In re Michael H., 360 S.C. 540, 546, 602 S.E.2d 729, 732 (2004) (“In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court.”). Further, to warrant reversal a party must demonstrate the alleged procedural failure caused him prejudice. See Chastain v.

Hiltabidle, 381 S.C. 508, 519, 673 S.E.2d 826, 831 (Ct.App.2009) (stating in order to demonstrate prejudice from procedural non-compliance, a party must establish it “would have done something different” had procedure been followed). Hulsey has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the absence of the certified copy. Here, Hulsey cannot, and does not, maintain notice was insufficient.

The record makes clear that the Charleston County Clerk of Court received notice of a final and unappealable order of remand on July 21, 2006, and that on July 27, 2006, she mailed notice that she received and entered this final and unappealable order to all parties, just as she would have done had she received of a certified copy of the order. Moreover, Husley personally received notice. The notice sent to Hulsey from the Charleston County Clerk makes no indication of whether the notice of remand it received was certified or not.

Consequently, Hulsey’s notice was not impacted by the fact that the Charleston County Clerk did not receive a certified copy of the order. Further, pursuant to

Section 5 of the Policies and Procedures for the electronic case filing system (ECF) employed in the federal court, by removing the case Hulsey agreed to receive notice of entry of any order or judgment through electronic transmittal. Thus, in addition to notice from the state court, Hulsey had notice from the federal court of the entry of the final and unappealable remand order and consequently was not prejudiced.

Accordingly, the South Carolina Circuit Court did not act without subject matter jurisdiction, and Hulsey was not otherwise prejudiced by the Federal Clerk’s failure to send a certified copy of the order of remand. II. Entry of Default Hulsey argues the trial court erred in failing to set aside entry of default because (

a) the answer was timely or (

b) good cause existed to set aside the entry of default under Rule 55(c), SCRCP. We disagree. As to the issue of whether the answer was timely filed, Hulsey points out this is an issue of

interpretation of a rule or statute and is therefore reviewed de novo. See Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. State, 372 S.C. 519, 524, 642 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2007) (stating the

interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which the appellate court is free to decide with no particular deference to the trial court). Further, our standard of review leaves the decision to set aside an entry of default within the sound discretion of the trial court, which we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Stark Truss Co. v. Superior Const. Corp., 360 S.C. 503, 508, 602 S.E.2d 99, 101 (Ct.App.2004). Such an abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is based upon an error of law or when the order is without evidentiary support. Id. a.

Timeliness of the Answer In order to find the August 29 answer was timely Husley urges this court to adopt a rule that the thirty-day time period in which to answer starts over upon remand. We are not inclined to adopt such a rule. Rule 12(a), SCRCP, provides: “A defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days after the service of the complaint upon him[ ]....” However, federal rules provide “[a] defendant who did not answer [in state court] before removal must answer ... within the longest of ...:” (

A) twenty days after being served or otherwise receiving the initial pleading or (

B) within five days after notice of removal is filed. Rule 81(c)(2), FRCP. In this case, Hulsey removed fourteen days after being served. Thus, although under Rule 12(a), SCRCP, he was entitled to another sixteen days to answer, by choosing to remove the case to federal court, he willfully subjected himself to the shortened time period of Rule 81(c)(2), FRCP — providing he must answer within six days (twenty days after being served). However, in the seventy-six days between removal and the entry of remand, Husley neglected to answer.

Initially, we find no authority in this state to support the position that a removing party is entitled to a fresh thirty days to answer a complaint upon remand. Neither did the trial court. Rather, looking at both the federal rules and state rules, in the exceptionally rare circumstance in which a case would be remanded to the state court before an answer was due pursuant to Federal Rule 81(c)(2), a plain reading of South Carolina Rule 12(

a) would require an answer within thirty days of service. However, seemingly giving Hulsey the benefit of the doubt, the trial court determined that because the state court is to proceed as if no removal had been attempted, removal to federal court tolls the thirty day time period and therefore, upon remand Hulsey should be allowed the remainder of any unexpired time. See State v. Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec., 112 S.C. 528, 587, 100 S.E. 355, 357 (1919) (stating that upon remand it is the duty of the state court to proceed as if no removal had been attempted).

In this case, because Hulsey failed to answer under the plain reading of either Rule 12(a), SCRCP, or Rule 81(c)(2), FRCP; or under the more liberal approach provided by the trial court, it is of no consequence which approach we would adopt. Therefore, we are not occasioned to opine on the more acceptable method. It suffices that we find no indication that a party is entitled to a fresh thirty-day period upon remand. Accordingly, we are disinclined to adopt a rule allowing the same. Such action is not the province of this court, but that of our legislature or supreme court. b. Rule 55(

c) Hulsey next argues the trial court erred in failing to set aside the entry of default under Rule 55(c), SCRCP. We disagree. The issue before this court is not whether we would find good cause, but whether the decision to deny the motion to set aside default is supportable by the evidence and not controlled by an error of law. Williams v. Vanvolkenburg, 312 S.C. 373, 375, 440 S.E.2d 408, 409 (Ct.App.1994). A motion to set aside entry of default under Rule 55(

c) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. Under Rule 55(c), the entry of default may be set aside for “good cause shown,” which is a less stringent standard than the excusable neglect standard of Rule 60(b). Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus. Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607, 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009). The good cause standard of Rule 55(

c) requires, as a threshold burden, a party to put forth “an explanation for the default and give reasons why vacation of the default entry would serve the interests of justice.” Id. “Once a party has put forth a satisfactory explanation ... the trial court must also consider [the Wham factors]: (1) the timing of the motion for relief; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the degree of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief is granted.” Id. at 607-08, 681 S.E.2d at 888.

However, a trial court need not make specific findings of fact for each factor if sufficient evidence supports a trial court’s determination that no reasonable explanation exists for vacation of default. Id.

In this case, the trial court held that because “there appears ... to be no reasonable basis for [Hulsey’s] assumption that the [thirty] day time to file an answer starts completely anew upon remand[,] ... no good cause has been demonstrated.... ” While we appreciate the trial court did not have the benefit of the Sundown opinion, we find Sundown did nothing to abate the discretion to which a trial court is entitled in ruling on a Rule 55(

c) motion. Nor did it change the standard this court applies when reviewing such a decision. What constitutes a satisfactory explanation that serves the interests of justice remains within the sound discretion of the trial court. In South Carolina, negligence on the part of an attorney is imputable to the client and will not be the basis of finding good cause to set aside entry of default. See Vanvolkenburg, 312 S.C. at 375, 440 S.E.2d at 410 (indicating, prior to Sundown, that the imputed negligence of an attorney to a defaulting litigant is not good cause).

Similarly, our supreme court has recognized subsequent to Sundown that the good cause standard of Rule 55(c), encompasses a degree of reasonableness. See Richardson v. P.V., Inc., 383 S.C. 610, 618-19, 682 S.E.2d 263, 267 (2009) (finding, after Sundown, that negligence on the part of an insurance company or attorney will be imputed to a defaulting litigant and negligence does not constitute good cause to relieve an appellant from entry of default); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1133 (9th ed.2009) (defining negligence as the failure to act reasonably under a specific set of circumstances).

It stands, therefore, that because unreasonable conduct does not amount to good cause, an unreasonable explanation for defaulting is not a satisfactory explanation that serves a sufficient interest of justice. In the case at bar, although the supreme court had not yet issued the Sundown opinion, the trial court nonetheless addressed Hulsey’s explanation of default and specifically found it unreasonable. We find the record supports the finding that Husley’s explanation for default is unreasonable.

Vanvolk enburg, 312 S.C. at 375, 440 S.E.2d at 409 (stating the “issue before this [c]ourt ... is not whether we believe good cause existed ... [but] whether the trial court’s determination is supported by the evidence”). Further, we are aware of no authority either prior to or after Sundown that compels this court to find it is not within the trial court’s discretion to deny a Rule 55(

c) motion for an unreasonable failure to answer. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion. III. Default Damages Trial Hulsey’s allegation of error as to the damages trial is threefold. He argues (

a) the process employed by South Carolina courts is unconstitutional and deprives a default defendant of due process; (

b) specifically as to this case, the trial court erred in allowing introduction of new allegations during the damages hearing, in the form of testimony about a link on Hulsey’s website to the slanderous article; and (

c) the trial court erred by improperly commenting on the facts. This court’s standard of review for the grant or denial of a motion for a new trial extends substantial deference to the trial court. Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 404, 477 S.E.2d 715, 723 (Ct.App.1996). The trial court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless the finding is wholly unsupported by the evidence or based on an error of law. Stevens v. Allen, 336 S.C. 439, 446, 520 S.E.2d 625, 628-29 (Ct.App.1999). a.

South Carolina’s default damages procedure Hulsey argues the process employed by the State of South Carolina during a default damages hearing is unconstitutional. We must disagree. During a default damages trial, the defendant’s participation shall be limited to cross-examination and objection to the plaintiffs evidence. Roche v. Young Bros. of Florence, 332 S.C. 75, 81-82, 504 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1998); Howard v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 271 S.C. 238, 241, 246 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1978); Doe v. SBM, 327 S.C. 352, 356, 488 S.E.2d 878, 881 (Ct.App.1997); Ammons v. Hood, 288 S.C. 278, 282, 341 S.E.2d 816, 818 (Ct.App.1986).

On appeal, Hulsey provides no controlling authority for his position that this court can, or should, diverge from longstanding rules established by our supreme court. Accordingly, we cannot and do not find the default damages hearing to be unconstitutional. b. Introduction of testimony about the website link Hulsey maintains that the entry of default is tantamount to admission of the allegations of the complaint, but nothing more. See Wiggins v.

Todd, 296 S.C. 432, 435, 373 S.E.2d 704, 705-06 (Ct.App.1988) (stating that when a defendant is in default, the plaintiffs right to recover is circumscribed by the complaint drafted). Therefore, Hulsey alleges the trial court erred in allowing Limehouse to testify to new allegations outside the confines of the complaint, particularly about a link on Hulsey’s website to the slanderous newspaper article. However, an allegation of error as to the introduction of evidence during a default damages proceeding will not be preserved for appellate review absent a contemporaneous objection.

SBM, 327 S.C. at 356, 488 S.E.2d at 881. Here, Hulsey failed to object to any testimony regarding the publication or link on the website. Accordingly, this allegation of error is not preserved for our review. c. Trial court commenting on the facts Generally a “trial [court] should not intimate to the jury any opinion on the facts of a case, whether intentionally or unintentionally.” Sierra v. Skelton, 307 S.C. 217, 225, 414 S.E.2d 169, 174 (Ct.App.1992). In this case, during deliberations, the jury sent out a question inquiring whether “the link to the April 24, 2004,

article [was] still on ... Hulsey’s website? [And i]f not, when was it removed?” The trial court responded by informing the jury that there was testimony that as of the Monday of trial, the link remained on the website.

Hulsey argues this “constitute[s] an improper comment on the facts.” Further, Hulsey argues “even more inexplicably, Limehouse was allowed to testify that the link on the website was a violation of a court order while Hulsey was precluded from introducing the very court order ... which indisputably evidences that there was no prohibition from mentioning the case on the firm website.” Initially, Hulsey made no objection to the testimony regarding the court order, and under the default damages procedure, would have been free to cross-examine Limehouse on this matter.

Furthermore, Hulsey does nothing to demonstrate how the trial court’s answer to the jury’s inquiry demonstrated an imparting of opinion on the facts of the case. Accordingly, we find no error. IY. Punitive Damages Hulsey argues the award of punitive damages was founded on trial court error and constituted a denial of due process. Hulsey presents four separate arguments on this issue: (

a) due process demands a default litigant be given an opportunity to defend punitive damages, (

b) the jury should have been instructed that it could return an award of no punitive damages, (

c) the trial court allowed and actually invited the jury to consider matters not proper for their consideration in awarding punitive damages, and (

d) the trial court erred in confirming the award. Generally, the trial court’s decision on a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal unless the finding is wholly unsupported by the evidence or based on an error of law. Stevens v. Allen, 336 S.C. 439, 446, 520 S.E.2d 625, 628-29 (Ct.App.1999). a. Due Process Hulsey maintains employing South Carolina’s procedures for a default damages hearing in a case in which punitive damages are sought amounts to a constitutional due process violation.

Hulsey further argues this due process violation was compounded by the facts that the trial court failed to exercise its obligation to independently make a threshold determination of whether the defendants’ conduct rose to the level of warranting punitive damages, and that Limehouse was allowed to go into matters beyond the bounds of the complaint. Initially, Hulsey cites no authority to support the proposition that South Carolina should employ a different default damages procedure for punitive damages than for actual damages.

See Roche, 332 S.C. 75, 504 S.E.2d 311 (making no distinction on appeal between punitive damages and actual damages during a default damages trial). As to the trial court’s failure to make a threshold determination that Hulsey’s conduct warranted punitive damages, this issue was specifically addressed when the trial court denied Hulsey’s motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages.

Although it is unclear from the briefs on appeal whether Hulsey challenges this ruling on appeal, to the extent that he may be alleging the trial court improperly denied the directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages, we briefly address the issue. In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, this court applies the same standard as the trial court, viewing the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and will not reverse the denial unless there is no evidence to support the ruling. All Saints Parish Waccamaw v.

Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of S.C., 385 S.C. 428, 441-42, 685 S.E.2d 163, 170 (2009). When viewed in the light most favorable to Limehouse, there exists evidence which supports submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury for consideration, including the intentional nature of the action, Hulsey’s degree of culpability, and his awareness of the conduct. Accordingly, to the extent Hulsey may be challenging this ruling, we find no error. b. Instruction on punitive damages Hulsey next argues the trial court erred by telling the jury it was required to award punitive damages.

We find no such instruction. Punitive damages may be awarded, in the interest of society in punishing or deterring the conduct, or vindicating a private right, when the plaintiff proves entitlement to such damages by clear and convincing evidence. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-33-135 (2005) (stating punitive damages must be proved by clear and convincing evidence); Austin v. Specialty Transp. Servs., Inc., 358 S.C. 298, 312, 594 S.E.2d 867, 874 (Ct.App.2004) (indicating punitive damages may be awarded for various reasons).

Generally, this court will not reverse the decision of the trial court as to a particular jury instruction absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Cole v. Raut, 378 S.C. 398, 405, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008). A trial court abuses its discretion in this regard when the ruling is not supported by the evidence or is based on an error of law. Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000). Hulsey argues the trial court instructed the jury it had to award punitive damages and submitted a jury verdict form that required an award of punitive damages.

However, upon review of the verdict form we see nothing that required the jury to return punitive damages. Furthermore, Hulsey does not cite, or otherwise bring to this court’s attention, any specific language used by the trial court to support that it instructed the jury it had to award punitive damages.

Initially, the trial court instructed the jury: “Punitive damages can only be awarded where the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions were willful, wanton, malicious, or in reckless disregard for the plaintiffs rights.” Although not specified, the basis for Hulsey’s allegation of error is presumably premised upon the use of the word “duty” in a single statement in an otherwise lengthy and thorough instruction in which the trial court stated: “Under proper allegations, a[sic] plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence a willful, wanton, reckless, and malicious violation of his rights.

It is not only the right, but the duty of the jury to award punitive damages.” However, the trial court’s very next sentence clarified the use of this term, stating: “Accordingly, if you should find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages in addition to actual damages, it would be your duty to include such damages in your verdict and award such an amount as you may deem reasonable and proper in light of the facts and circumstances.” (emphasis added). Upon review of the record we find the trial court properly-instructed the jury on the law.

See S.C.Code Ann. § 15-33-135 (2005) (stating punitive damages must be proved by clear and convincing evidence). The trial court did not instruct the jury it had to award punitive damages, but simply instructed the jury that if it found the plaintiff entitled to punitive damages it was their duty to determine the amount to which the Limehouse was entitled. Therefore, we find no error. c.

Matters not appropriate for consideration of punitive damages Next, Hulsey alleges his constitutional due process rights were violated because of the trial court’s and Limehouse’s repeated references to the default, arguing this referencing insinuated that the jury should punish Hulsey for his failure to follow the procedural rules. Further, Hulsey alleges this error was compounded by the trial court allowing Limehouse’s wife to testify as to the link on Hulsey’s website, as well as to statements about how the ordeal affected Limehouse’s family.

Finally, Hulsey argues the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the settlement of the RICO case, and admitting testimony as to Hulsey’s net worth. We disagree. First, Hulsey does not cite any authority to support the position that discussion of the default would support a finding that due process had been denied. Further, we find no indication on the record that the trial court suggested or otherwise implied that Hulsey’s failure to answer should support the imposition of punitive damages.

Second, as to the allegations pertaining to the website link, as noted Hulsey made no objection to this during the damages trial and consequently the issue is not preserved for our review. See SBM, 327 S.C. at 356, 488 S.E.2d at 881 (indicating an allegation of error as to the introduction of evidence during a default damages proceeding will not be preserved for appellate review absent a contemporaneous objection to the same). Third, Hulsey contends it was error to allow Lime-house’s wife to mention the impact of the slander on his family because pursuant to Philip Morris USA v.

Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 166 L.Ed.2d 940 (2007), punitive damages cannot be imposed to punish a defendant for harm visited upon others. However, at trial, this argument was specifically presented as one of relevance. Evidence is relevant, and generally admissible, if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Rules 401, 402, SCRE. The introduction of evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Richardson v.

Donald Hawkins Const., Inc., 381 S.C. 347, 352, 673 S.E.2d 808, 811 (2009); Jamison v. Ford Motor Co., 373 S.C. 248, 268, 644 S.E.2d 755, 765 (Ct.App.2007). In this case, the trial court found the testimony to be relevant because it was “within the scope of how it affected [Limehouse], and his family relationships.” We agree that the impact on Lime-house’s immediate family bears on the extent of the impact he suffered, and accordingly we find no abuse of discretion.

Finally, Hulsey argues the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the settlement of the prior RICO case as well as erroneous testimony that Hulsey’s net worth was in excess of $81 million. Initially, contrary to Hulsey’s position that Limehouse was able to paint him as a “greedy hotshot lawyer,” Limehouse’s own witness, John Massalon, conceded he was aware Hulsey was pro bono counsel on the previous RICO case. Furthermore, the record does not indicate any objection was made to the testimony of Bank of America employee Bernadette DeWitt when she testified as to Hulsey’s net worth.

The evidence bears out the financial declaration on which she relied was certified as a true, complete, and accurate statement of Hulsey’s financials and as such, any misinformation presented on this issue was the result of Hulsey’s own misrepresentation. Accordingly, we find no error. d. Confírmation of punitive damages. Finally, Hulsey argues the trial court erred in confirming the award of punitive damages. We disagree. Our supreme court recently indicated an appellate court’s scope of review to be de novo. Mitchell v. Fortis Ins. Co., 385 S.C. 570, 583, 686 S.E.2d 176, 185, 183 (2009).

The Fortis, court consolidated the post judgment due process analysis for punitive damages. In reviewing an award of punitive damages, we consider (1) the reprehensibility of the conduct, (2) the disparity or “ratio” between actual harm and the punitive damage award, and (3) the comparative penalties. Fortis, 385 S.C. at 587-89, 686 S.E.2d at 185-86. 1. Reprehensibility In considering reprehensibility, a court should consider whether: (

i) the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; (ii) the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard for the health or safety of others; (iii) the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; (iv) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and (

v) the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, rather than mere accident. Id. at 185, 686 S.E.2d at 587. This encompasses the defendant’s culpability, the duration of the conduct, the defendant’s awareness or concealment, and the existence of similar past conduct. Id. at 185 n. 7, 686 S.E.2d at 587 n. 7. Although the harm here was not physical, and posed no threat to health or safety, the evidence indicates Hulsey, through involvement in the underlying RICO action, was aware of the nature and vulnerability of Limehouse’s business.

Also, although the statements were made in a single incident, because the statements were made to the press, the evidence shows that the circumstances clearly indicated that the statements would be publicly reported and widely disseminated. Finally, this conduct was not the result of accident or inadvertence. The statements were contemplated, intentionally made, and coincided precisely with a filing of a lawsuit against Limehouse. Accordingly, our review of the evidence convinces us that Hulsey’s conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to support punitive damages. 2.

Ratio The courts of this state have affirmed punitive damage awards in excess of six times actual damages. See James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 371 S.C. 187, 196, 638 S.E.2d 667, 672 (2006) (affirming an award of punitive damages of 6.82 times actual damages); Cock-N-Bull Steak House, Inc. v. Generali Ins. Co., 321 S.C. 1, 11, 466 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1996) (affirming an award of punitive damages roughly twenty-eight times actual damages). Similarly, the supreme court has modified awards to reflect a 9.2:1 ratio. See Fortis, 385 S.C. at 594, 686 S.E.2d at 188.

Here, the punitive damage award was slightly above twice actual damages. Accordingly, we do not And such an award to violate due process. 3. Comparative Penalty In looking to comparative cases, we find that in similar matters, our supreme court has upheld punitive damages which were over ten times that of actual damages. See, e.g., Weir v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 312, S.C. 511, 518, 435 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1993) (affirming an award of $275,000 in punitive damages, in a slander case, where actual damages were found to be $25,000). Accordingly, we find no error here.

CONCLUSION For the reasons above, the ruling of the trial court is AFFIRMED. HUFF, J., concurs. FEW, C.J., dissents. . Tony Soprano is a fictional television character involved in organized crime. . Hulsey did not answer the complaint in federal court. . The essence of our inquiry, as opposed to the federal court, is not whether the federal scheme provides for state court jurisdiction, but rather, whether it prohibits state court jurisdiction. See infra.

Naturally, because a federal court does not determine state court jurisdiction, this distinction allays the dissent’s concern that the question confronted in Lowe is different than the one we face here. . We do not rely on Bryan as dispositive of this case, nor do we find any reason to interpret this purely explanatory note — which specifically cites Lowe — to imply that Lowe does not stand for what it explicitly holds, i.e., a federal court loses jurisdiction upon entry of a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Although the dissent agrees the note is purely dicta, to the extent it is suggested the footnote bears on this matter, we note that the dissenting opinion ignores the second clause of the note, in which the Fourth Circuit reiterates the Lowe holding; presumably because its

interpretation of the first clause is irreconcilable with Lowe. Further, the

interpretation of the first clause is premised on a presumption, allegedly from Bryan, that remands for reasons other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defect in removal are not subject to

section 1447(c). Flowever, neither the Fourth Circuit, nor any other circuit, has put forth such a ruling, and Biyan itself refutes this presumption by recognizing, in a case in which the remand was based upon a reason other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defect in removal, that the state court could continue upon receipt of the certified mailing, citing

section 1447(c). See Bryan, 492 F.3d at 241. . The exercise of mandamus power is, by its very nature, not an exercise of the court's jurisdiction over the case and controversy. . For this reason, we disagree with the dissent’s indication that we must interpret

section 1447(c), as to do so in light of Lowe’s

interpretation of when federal jurisdiction ends under that section, we must invariably presume that our jurisdiction is derived from that federal statute rather than limited by it. . We are aware of no jurisdiction that has taken the position that neither the state nor federal court has jurisdiction over a case. Further, it is not inconsistent with our federalist form of government to allow a state court to exercise its general jurisdiction when a federal court has finally decided its Congressionally authorized jurisdiction has ceased.

See Lowe, 102 F.3d at 735 ("Removal in diversity cases, to the prejudice of state court jurisdiction, is a privilege to be strictly construed[.j”) (quoting In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 406 F.2d 251, 252 (1st Cir.1969)). . This statement recognizes that a state court, as opposed to a federal court, confronts whether the exercise of jurisdiction is prohibited by federal statute, not proscribed by it. Similarly it undermines the notion that the statement in

section 1447(c): that once a certified copy is mailed "[tjhe State court may thereupon proceed,” operates as an absolute prohibition on state action, (emphasis added). . The dissent posits that our distinction between a jurisdictional requirement and a procedural one is irrelevant and that we erroneously suggest the issue is not preserved for appeal because it was not raised before the judgment was entered. To the contrary, it is precisely because of the rules of issue preservation that the distinction is not only relevant but imperative.

The only question we confront in this case is whether the action of the trial court is void for lack of jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time. However, the dissent elects not to squarely answer this question, instead finding the judgment void because the trial court lacked the "power to proceed” with the case under the federal statute. Because it is the only issue before this court, we must presume that this alleged powerlessness is due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

To the extent the dissent suggests the circuit court is powerless to proceed for any reason other than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the issue is not properly before this court. Further, the dissent’s analogy to the bankruptcy code is misplaced. Notwithstanding the manifest dissimilarities between the realm of bankruptcy law and this case, the federal jurisdictional statutes at issue here do not provide for a stay. The concept is also not analogous to this case as a stay, by definition and nature, operates only as a suspension of jurisdiction, not a termination.

Contra Davis, 267 S.C. at 511, 229 S.E.2d at 848 ("[O]nce removal proceedings to federal court are fulfilled and requisite notice accomplished, the State court loses all jurisdiction in the matter.”). . Respectfully, we disagree with the dissent’s "summary of the rules that apply to remand in the Fourth Circuit.” We find these conclusions irreconcilable with the holding of Lowe and contrary to the expressed rational of both Lowe and Bryan. Similarly, we find these rules to be contrary to the reasoning and holdings of the state courts that have confronted the issue.

Finally, from a practical perspective, we find the

summary illogical as it proposes to create (1) a scenario in which a state court is permitted to resume action on a case even though the remand order is appealable and remains subject to the federal court’s jurisdiction, and (2) a scenario that denies a state court jurisdiction over a matter in which federal jurisdiction has been terminated, and a final and unappealable order has been issued. . Hulsey avers jurisdiction has not yet revested in the state court and maintains this as an alternative position. . This amounted to sixteen days after the remand because fourteen days had elapsed prior to removal. .

The inquiry of whether failure to comply with Rule 81(c)(2), FRCP, would support entry of default in state court if the case is remanded unanswered appears novel in this state. However, we need not address it. . Although the South Carolina Supreme Court decided this case during the pendency of this appeal, Hulsey notified this court via writing of the intent to rely on this authority. . Wham v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 298 S.C. 462, 465, 381 S.E.2d 499, 502 (Ct.App.1989). .

As our colleague in the dissent points out and the trial court’s ruling indicates: in practice, both the bench and bar have been aware that the explanation for the default is significant. See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Bey Corp., 312 S.C. 47, 50, 435 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ct.App.1993) (indicating the reason for failure to act is relevant under a Rule 55(

c) analysis). . We recognize the dissent's position that reasonableness is not required of the excuse itself but merely a factor to be considered in a "broader inquiry” of whether the vacation serves the interests of justice.

While this is certainly a mode of analysis within the trial court’s discretion, in light of our standard of review, whether the trial court finds vacation does not serve an interest of justice because the excuse is unreasonable or finds the excuse is unreasonable because vacation does not serve an interest of justice, so long as supported by the evidence, is a distinction without a consequence. . Notwithstanding, we respectfully disagree that good cause likely existed in this case.

Hulsey’s contempt for the rules of procedure both in federal court and state court, indicates this was not a "failure at an attempt” but rather a "failure to attempt” an answer. This issue would not have arisen had the rules been followed. Thus, we suggest there is ample "guidance” for Hulsey to know a party is not entitled to 130 days to answer. . Hulsey cites Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-34, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), for the proposition that due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Hulsey also cites to two appellate decisions from the foreign jurisdictions of Florida and North Carolina to support his argument to change the default damages procedure in South Carolina, specifically as to punitive damages. . The trial court specifically noted the statements were intentionally made, the award would deter similar conduct in the future, the award was just over twice actual damages and was thus reasonably related to the actual harm suffered.

The trial court also noted Hulsey was of the rare few who can afford to pay the award, and although South Carolina's procedure did not permit Hulsey to put forth evidence, the verdict remained reasonable.