Dewey Lee EDGE and Terry Lee Bobich, Appellants (Defendants), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff), 647 P.2d 557

ROONEY, Justice. Appellants-defendants, Dewey Lee Edge and Terry Lee Bobich, were tried together before a jury and found guilty of aggravated assault in violation of § 6-4-506, W.S. 1977, and kidnapping in violation of § 6-4-201, W.S.1977. Appellants word the issue on appeal from the judgment and sentence as follows: “Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants’ motion for judgment of acquittal since the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction of either charge pending against Appellants.” We affirm.

We recently set out the standard used by this court in reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. “In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we examine and accept as true the evidence of the prosecution together with all logical and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, [citations] leaving out entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith [citations]. “A motion for judgment of acquittal is to be granted only when the evidence is such that a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime.

Or, stated another way, if there is substantial evidence to sustain a conviction of the crime, the motion should not be granted. [Citations.] This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial. [Citations.]” Leppek v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1981). Viewed by this standard, the evidence is as follows: On the afternoon of August 7, 1981, a Wyoming Highway Patrolman was given the description of an automobile which had been used in a recent armed robbery. A short time later, he observed an automobile matching this description traveling east on Interstate 90, and followed it.

A radio inquiry concerning the license number resulted in advice that the automobile was stolen. Appellants were in it. When the patrolmen attempted to stop the automobile, a high speed chase ensued. After running through a roadblock, a tire on appellants’ automobile went flat. They, then, abandoned the automobile and ran to a nearby trailer park where they entered a trailer belonging to Herman Carrier. Edge was carrying a butcher knife. Mr. Carrier, who was 74 years old and had difficulty walking, was in the trailer watching television when appellants entered.

One of the appellants picked up another knife from Mr. Carrier’s kitchen table. Appellants then took Mr. Carrier to the back bedroom of his trailer where they held him for two and one-half hours. Appellants barricaded themselves in this back bedroom, placing mattresses over the windows. They negotiated with the police through a window of this back bedroom, demanding prescription drugs (Quaaludes), the presence of the President of the United States, the Governor, the Buffalo Police Chief, Johnson County Sheriff and reporters. They threatened several times to kill Carrier unless their demands were met.

At the insistence of the police, they permitted Carrier to talk to the police on one occasion. He then said he had not been harmed but requested the police to do as appellants asked or they would kill him. Finally, appellants demanded television coverage of their surrender. The police agreed to videotape the surrender. They then surrendered, and Mr. Carrier was released unharmed. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT We recently set out the elements of assault with a deadly weapon in Brightwell v.

State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1981). “ * * * [T]he elements of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon in Wyoming are now the unlawful attempt with unlawful intent (maliciously) to commit a violent injury (attempted battery) upon the person of another, with the use of a deadly weapon in that attempt and the apparent ability to accomplish that injury.” Appellants contend that the evidence presented in this case is insufficient on three of these elements: “the attempted battery, the apparent ability to injure, and — as to Appellant Bobich — the use of a deadly weapon.” In Brightwell, supra, we discussed the actions of Miss Brightwell which constituted an attempted battery and contrasted those actions with the actions of Miss Harper, a co-defendant who was acquitted of aggravated assault.

The victim, Miss Brightwell and Miss Harper were in the cab of the victim’s pickup at the time of the incident. The victim was driving, Miss Brightwell was sitting next to the victim and Miss Harper was sitting next to the door on the passenger side. We said there at page 1050: “As further support for this conclusion, it is easy to see why Ms. Brightwell committed an assault with a deadly weapon and why Ms. Harper did not. Ms. Harper may have been holding a knife at the time of the incident, but she never pointed it in Mr. Emerson’s direction nor threatened him with it.

In juxtaposition to this is Brightwell’s conduct. She not only had her arm around Emerson’s neck and pointed a knife at him, but also threatened him by stating ‘I mean business.’ Clearly she attempted a battery upon him.” Accepting as true the evidence of the prosecution together with all logical and reasonable references to be drawn therefrom and viewing that evidence in light of our discussion of attempted battery in Brightwell, supra, we find that the evidence of attempted battery in this case is sufficient.

Carrier testified that he saw a butcher knife in the hands of one of the appellants when they entered his trailer and that they took another butcher knife off the table in the trailer. He said that they “taked me to move in the back room.” They kept him in the back room with them during the negotiations. Carrier asked the police to do as appellants asked or they would kill him. Appellants told the police several times that they would kill him if the demands were not met. As in Brightwell, the knives in the hands of appellants were deadly weapons.

Appellants had the “apparent ability” to commit violent injury on Mr. Carrier, a 74-year-old man who had trouble walking and who they “taked * * * to move in the back room” with them and held there. As in Bright-well, the intent to commit violent injury upon Mr. Carrier can be “inferred from the conduct of * * * [appellants] and from circumstantial evidence.” Appellants threatened to kill him. They “taked” him with them into the small room which they barricaded against police action. Again, as in Brightwell, the attempted battery requirement was present. There was no attempt to use the knife (as in Brightwell).

Appellant was not physically" injured (as in Brightwell). Mr. Carrier was in a small room with appellants, unable to walk very well, at age 74, and able to avoid injury only if the police acceded to the conditions imposed by appellants. In Brightwell, we said: “ * * * She [Brightwell] indicated that he could avoid injury from use of the knife only on condition that he comply with her directions. * * * ” (Emphasis in original.) 631 P.2d at 1050. The evidence in favor of the State, together with the reasonable inferences therefrom, is sufficient to establish the elements necessary for aggravated assault.

But appellant Bobich contends that such evidence is not directed at him. He points to the evidence which placed the first knife in appellant Edge’s possession when the trailer was entered and to the fact that all of the conversation with the police was by appellant Edge.

The jury was instructed with reference to § 6-1-114, W.S.1977, which provides: “Every person who shall aid or abet in the commission of any felony, or who shall counsel, encourage, hire, command, or otherwise procure such felony to be committed, shall be deemed an accessory before the fact, and may be indicted, informed against, tried and convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal, and either before or after the principal offender is convicted or indicted or informed against; and upon such conviction he shall suffer the same punishment and penalties as are prescribed by law for the punishment of the principal.” Appellant Bobich was associated with appellant Edge throughout the entire escapade.

They entered the trailer together. They “taked” Mr. Carrier to the back room. The negotiations were carried on for both of them. It isn’t necessary to prove that each of them did that necessary to establish each element of the offense. It is sufficient to show that they were associated together in doing that which comprises each element of the offense. State v. Thompson, 253 Or. 430, 452 P.2d 754, reh. denied 455 P.2d 179 (1969); Goldsmith v. Cheney, 447 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1971); Jones v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 837 (1977); Hawkes v. State, Wyo., 626 P.2d 1041 (1981); Jacobs v. State, Wyo., 641 P.2d 197 (1982).

KIDNAPPING Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motions for judgment of acquittal on the charge of kidnapping arguing that there was insufficient evidence of asportation or of “ransom or reward” for the case to go to the jury. At common law the taking of a person out of his own country was required as an element of the crime of kidnapping. 51 C.J.S. Kidnapping § 1, p. 490; 1 Am.Jur.2d Abduction and Kidnapping § 1, pp. 160-161. Wyoming’s early statutory

definitions of kidnapping also contained an asportation requirement. Revised Statutes of Wyoming 1899, § 4962. However, in 1935 Wyoming adopted its present and much broader definition of kidnapping. Ch. 85, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming 1935 (see footnote 2).

Section 6-4-201, W.S.1977, makes it illegal for a person to “seize” or “confine” “and hold or detain any person, for ransom, reward, or robbery.” Asportation or the transporting of the person is but an alternate means of committing the crime. Appellants argue that the asportation requirement is necessary to avoid the possible elevation of a lesser crime to kidnapping. False imprisonment was referred to as an example of such. However, the purpose of false imprisonment is not for ransom or reward. If it should be, then, properly, kidnapping has resulted.

Appellants do not point to another crime which has the same elements as does kidnapping. Appellants also contend that there was insufficient evidence on the element of ransom or reward. Reward can consist of freedom from arrest, obtaining prescription drugs, publicity, etc. However, appellants cite no authority and do not present cogent argument in support of the contention that appellants’ actions were not for reward. Accordingly, we will not further consider the contention. Weddle v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 231 (1980); and Cherniwchan v. State, Wyo., 594 P.2d 464 (1979). Affirmed. .

Section 6-4-506(b), W.S.1977, provides: “(

b) With dangerous weapon. — Whoever, while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon, including an unloaded firearm, maliciously perpetrates an assault or an assault and battery upon any human being, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than fourteen (14) years, or both.” .

Section 6-4-201, W.S.1977, provides: “Whoever shall willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, forcibly or unlawfully seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap, abduct, entice away or carry away by any means whatsoever and hold or detain any person, for ransom, reward, or robbery; or whoever shall transport or aid or abet in transporting any person, knowing such person to have been willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, forcibly or unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, enticed away or carried away by any means whatsoever to be held or detained for ransom, reward, or for robbery, shall, upon conviction, be punished by death if the verdict of the jury so recommend, provided that the sentence of death shall not in any case be imposed by the court if, prior to the commencement of the trial of the case in which the defendant is charged, the kidnapped person has been liberated unharmed.

If the death penalty shall not apply or be imposed the convicted person shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period of not more than twenty (20) years.” . The police used a videotape recorder but its batteries were dead. . The acquittal of Miss Harper made unnecessary an appeal by her. We were not called upon to determine whether or not her actions were sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. . “To escape physical arrest, or to attempt to do so, as the defendant did here, is within the broad definition of ‘reward.’ ” State v.

Aleck, 10 Wash.App. 796, 520 P.2d 645, 649 (1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 937, 95 S.Ct. 1146, 43 L.Ed.2d 413 (1975). . The United States Supreme Court has defined reward as “something given in return for good or evil done or received.” Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 126, 56 S.Ct. 395, 396, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936).