In re MOTT, 17 F. Cas. 903

Objections have been taken to the petition to be decreed bankrupt because it is not in the form prescribed by the court, omitting the consideration or cause of indebtedness, as to various sums represented to be owing, and because it does not set forth the particulars of .property assigned by the bankrupt in 1S40 .for the satisfaction of his then existing debts. The counsel for petitioner supposes the forms imposed by the court are not obligatory; and, if the court has_such power to make them so, it has not exercised it in any notorious manner.

The counsel is mistaken, as the published rules and forms are accompanied by an order of this and the circuit court that they shall govern proceedings in bankruptcy. The court, however, is not tenacious of words and phrases, but requires that the substance shall be preserved and adhered to, whatever deviations there may be from mere form of expression. The court lias decided that when a debt no longer rests upon the personal undertaking of a bankrupt, but is converted into a judgment, it is unnecessary to give any other consideration, a judgment imputing the highest one in the law.

So much of the objections as apply to judgments are therefore overruled. There are, however, various other items defective in alleging only an indebtedness to individuals, without any distinct disclosure of the consideration or grounds of indebtedness. A further objection is that the bankrupt alleges that he made an assignment in 1840 of all his estate and effects for the' payment of his debts, but has not designated what his estate is, its location, &c.

The court, in numerous cases, has decided that it is incumbent on the bankrupt to apprise his creditors and assignee what estate remains undisposed of, in cases of trust conveyance, and that this must be done by giving the assignment itself. These were, however, in cases where there was a resulting trust to the debtor manifestly unextinguished. The present case differs from those in this: that the petition and

schedule nowhere represent that there is any residuary interest, as reserved to the bankrupt, and it does not therefore fall within the terms of those previous. This objection, at least, is an exceedingly sharp one, for the bankrupt swears explicitly that the assigned property will not pay the debts it was conveyed to provide for.

Had the creditors charged that this reason was studied and intentional, and that the bankrupt knew that there was a contingent interest to his own benefit accompanying the assignment, and established the allegation by proof, the question as to the effect of the statement in its present form would be very different, for the matters of merit would be directly connected with the defect of form. This shows that the objections are all strictissimi juris.

They- involve no higher ’consideration than whether the petitioner has-honestly and fully conformed to the form's prescribed by the court, and are undoubtedly well taken to the establishing a direction of that character.

It is better that all parties -should feel the necessity of adhering, to an uniform course of practice, and that no deficiency or uncertainty of information to creditors should be encouraged in the framing of bankrupt papers, and therefore the court places this in the category of those where the party has made default in complying with the rules, and holds that the bankrupt cannot proceed on these papers without perfecting them by a proper amendment. This order, however, is not to carry any costs against the bankrupt.