HEZEKIAH H. GEAR, pl'ff in error, vs. CHARLES BRACKEN, def't in error, 1 Bur. 88

Opinion of the court by Chief Justice Dunn: This is an action of debt upon an arbitration bond, brought by the plaintiff. Gear, against the defendant, Bracken, in the District Court of Iowa county. At the April term, 1842, the defendant filed his general demurrer to plaintiff’s declaration, after oyer craved, and setting out the agreement to submit to arbitration, bond, and award; which demurrer was sustained by the Court, and judgment entered for the defendant. To the decision of (lie District Court sustaining tho demurrer, the plaintiff excepts, and prosecutes this writ of error to reverso the decision.

From an inspection of the record, it is apparent that the plaintiff’s declaration is justly obnoxious to this objection: a material averment is wanting, that the arbitration was had, and the award made, according to the rules and regulations established by the by-laws of the Galena Chamber ofComrnorce. The award is liable to those objections: it does not show upon its face, that the arbitration was conducted and the award made agreeably to said rules and regulations.

It exceeds the powers given by the submission, in awarding that upon the payment by Bracken to Gear of the sum awarded, that each should execute to the other a general release in writing of all manner of demands whatever to the date of the award; in awarding costs against Bracken; and in awarding that payment should be made by Bracken to Gear of the sum awarded within fifteen days after the date of the award. Moses M. Strong, for pl’ff in error. Dunn and Burnett for def’t in error.

There is no principle of pleading better settled than that a plaintiff is required to set out in his declaration every matter material to show his right of action, with sufficient legal certainty. In this case, the committee of awards of the Galena Chamber of Commerce, derive their sole power to arbitrate in the premises from the agreement between Gear and Bracken to submit the matters in dispute to their award and decision. They must conform in every respect to the agreement, and cannot exceed the powers conferred, or award less, or stop short of the matters submitted.

Then it is material that the declaration should aver that the said committee did arbitrate and award on the matters submitted, according to the rules and regulations of the said chamber of commerce, as prescribed in their by-laws, this being a substantive part of the agreement of submission. The objections to the award are well founded; it must show that the said committee of awards arbitrated and awarded agreeably to the rules and regulations of-the said chamber, as prescribed in their by-laws. To award generally that the arbitration and award was “ in proper manner and form,” is not sufficient.

It exceeds the authority and power conferred by the agreement to submit, in awarding'that the said Gear and Bracken, upon payment by Bracken to Gear of the sum awarded, should each execute to the other a general release of all demands whatever to the date of the award. The matters submitted were the matters in dispute; this part of the award is so comprehensive as to embrace all matters of demand,, even those not in dispute. It goes beyond the1 powevs conferred in awarding costs against Bracken, and payment by him of the sum awarded to Gear, in fifteen days from the dale of the award.

The authorities on these points are full in 1 Chitt’y Plead, and Kidd on Awards. We are therefore unanimously of opinion that the judgment of the District Court of Iowa be affirmed, with costs.