DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Kenneth W. BODIE, Mary W. Livingston and Mary C. Livingston, Appellees, 237 So. 2d 553

CARROLL, Judge. Kenneth W. Bodie, the appellee, sued the owner and the operator of an automobile for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the negligent operation thereof. Bodie was treated for such injuries in Jackson Memorial Hospital, a county hospital of Dade County, which filed and perfected a lien for its charges in the amount of $4,362.05, as provided for by

Chapter 27032, Laws of Florida 1951. While the cause was pending the parties thereto jointly filed a “Motion to Settle Hospital Lien.” The motion recited that the case was one of questionable liability; that the plaintiff had received serious injuries and had incurred extensive medical costs; “That the plaintiff was treated at Jackson Memorial Hospital and the hospital bill there totals $4,362.05;” and that “an equitable settlement” of the cause for the amount of $5,000 was in prospect.

The prayer of the motion was that the court “settle the lien so that the matter can be settled in amicable fashion.” That motion was filed on November 27, 1968. On January 29, 1969, the parties filed a stipulation announcing settlement of the cause, with the settlement figure not shown. Based thereon the court dismissed the damage suit on January 31, 1969. Thereafter, on June 2, 1969, the trial court entered the order from which Dade County has appealed.

Therein, acting on the joint motion of the parties to the damage suit to “settle” Dade County’s hospital lien, the trial court pared the hospital lien to $1,000, viz: “Ordered and Adjudged that the joint motion to settle hospital lien be, and the same is hereby granted, and the sum of $1,000.00 shall be paid to Jackson Memorial Hospital and that upon payment made to Jackson Memorial Hospital a release of lien shall be furnished to the Defendant.

The settlement of this case in all further respects is approved and confirmed.” The determinative question presented on the appeal by Dade County is whether the amount which the patient may receive from the tort-feasor by suit or by settlement is subject to the hospital lien, or is subject only to such part thereof as the circuit court in its discretion shall determine may be allowed and enforced against the proceeds of a judgment or settlement. The validity of the legislative act providing for such liens was upheld by this court in Palm Springs Gen. Hosp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., Fla.App.1969, 218 So.2d 793, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Palm Springs Gen. Hosp., Fla. 1970, 232 So.2d 737. No questions were raised here as to the validity of the lien or as to the propriety of the amount ó'f the hospital’s charges for which the lien was filed. The statute contains no provision for such a lien to be reduced or pared down by a court in its discretion.

On the contrary the statute contains provisions which reveal legislative intent for the amount represented by such a lien to be received by the hospital out of sums recovered by or on behalf of the patient through suit or settlement with a tort-feasor. For example, the lien provided for in § 1 of the statute is for all reasonable charges for hospital care, etc.

Also, in § 4 it is provided that a satisfaction of judgment or a settlement will not be effectual against such a lien unless the lienholder joins therein and executes a release of the lien, and further, that acceptance of such a release or satisfaction, in the absence of a release of the lien, shall be regarded prima facie as an impairment of such lien, for which the lienholder is given a right of action against the one accepting such settlement release or judgment satisfaction for “the reasonable cost of such hospital care, treatment and maintenance,” plus attorney fees and costs.

If the lien of a hospital as provided for in the statute was not meant to be effective for its full amount (subject to a right to question the propriety of the charges comprising the same), it would not be reasonable or consistent for the statute to authorize recovery of the full amount of the hospital’s (lien) charges against one who, without the hospital lien having been released, should receive a satisfaction of judgment or a release upon settlement.

Conversely, since the statute allows a hospital lienor full recovery in the situation outlined above, it would be illogical to conclude that such a hospital lien should not be applied in full against proceeds of a judgment or a settlement. We hold, therefore, that the trial court was in error in ruling that the hospital lien should be enforceable only to the extent of $1,000, against the proceeds of the settlement. Reversed.