TOWN OF BELLEAIR, a Municipal Corporation, and United States Steel Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, Appellants, v. Edward MORAN, George Mariani, Robert M. Snibbe, Dorrance S. Roysdon, Miriam Van Vliet, Mabel P. Ahlf and William R. LaRosa, Appellees, 244 So. 2d 532

McNULTY, Judge. This controversy involves certain rezoning ordinances enacted by appellant Town of Belleair allegedly at the instance of appellant United States Steel Corporation. Plaintiffs-appellees filed suit for injunc-tive relief challenging such ordinances alleging the interrelationship of appellants, and the interests of United States Steel Corporation in the resultant rezoning.

Additionally, it is alleged that such rezoning is “not in the best interest of the community” — that it favors “the private interests of United States Steel Corporation to the detriment of the public interests of the community” — that the “change in zoning was not made in accordance with a comprehensive plan” — that it “did not promote health and the general welfare” — that it “failed to conserve the value of buildings in the remainder of the community or to encourage the most appropriate use of the land throughout such municipality”— that it “substantially altered and drastically changed the character of the town” — that it “was not made with reasonable consideration, among, other things of the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular purposes” — and that it caused “permanent impairment and damage to the existing zoning * * * tax structure * * * topography * * * ecology * * * climatology * * * and * * * rustic and residential character of the area, thereby causing serious and substantial harm to the aesthetic qualities to the area.” Appellants’ motions to dismiss this complaint were denied. and this interlocutory appeal followed.

We affirm. Only two points on appeal merit discussion. First, whether an injunction suit is proper instead of a certiorari proceeding pursuant to Rule 4.1, F.A.R., 32 F.S.A. and (since we answer that question in the affirmative), secondly, whether the complaint failed to show that the Town had not acted within the permissible scope of its authority and discretion in taking the action complained of. As to the first question, a suit for injunctive relief is proper since the proceedings under review were legislative rather than quasi-judicial in nature. In such case certiorari is inappropriate.

Additionally, this case is a direct attack on the validity of the Town’s actions and clearly differs from one in which an appeal is sought from a decision of a Board of Adjustment relating to a variance and made pursuant to Ch. 176, F.S.A. As to the second point on appeal which we will discuss, we are of the view that the complaint is sufficient.

First of all, it is well settled that a zoning ordinance is a valid exercise of police power only when there is a statutory authority to enact it and when it bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, or when it is in aid of a comprehensive plan favorable to such objectives. Here, the express statutory authority given to the Town of Belleair to zone is found in C. 14583, Spec.Acts 1929, the criteria of which are adopted in

Section 54 of the Belleair Code as follows: “Such [zoning] regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements.

Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.” There is no contention made that either the special act or the

section of the Town code referred to is invalid or insufficient, and their provisions substantially satisfy the objectives for which the zoning power may be granted. Accordingly, a zoning ordinance enacted pursuant thereto is presumptively valid, and one seeking to invalidate it has the burden of showing its invalidity. Now, as we’ve noted, a zoning ordinance must bear a substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals or general welfare.

When, therefore, from the facts and circumstances alleged in a complaint attacking the validity of a zoning ordinance it patently appears that any such relationship is nonexistent, or at most sophistically apparent, the duty should be on the zoning authority to respond and allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that the matter is at least “fairly debatable.” Here, the petition can hardly be couched in stronger terms insofar as it charges noncompliance with the required criteria.

True it is that the ultimate charges are conclusionary in nature, but they are conclusions based on facts otherwise stated or inferred from the allegations in the complaint and the attached exhibits. Additionally, from the facts and circumstances pleaded as leading up to the enactment of the challenged actions of the Town, together with the pleaded physical and use character of the areas affected and the alleged results, it is difficult prima facie to see how such actions inure substantially to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community.

They may indeed so inure; but this is not demonstrated, we submit, by rhetoric or necessary implication from the picture drawn within the four corners of the complaint, nor is it patently “fairly debatable.” The Town, by answer, ought to put plaintiffs on strict proof of their charges or affirmatively plead facts which bring these essential matters within the “fairly debatable” rule. Upon full hearing, then, the material ultimate facts on the issues thus framed can be determined and the proper conclusions of law drawn accordingly. In its present posture the case is not yet ripe for dismissal. Affirmed.

MANN, J., concurs. PIERCE, C. J., dissents with opinion. . See, Harris v. Goff (Fla.App.1963), 151 So.2d 642. . See, e. g., Thompson v. City of Miami (Fla.1964), 167 So.2d 841 and Josephson v. Autrey (Fla.1957), 96 So.2d 784. .See, e. g., State ex rel. Helsetli v. Du-Bose (1930), 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4. . See, e. g., Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., Inc., (Fla.1954), 77 So.2d 428. . See, e. g., State ex rel. Henry v. Miami, (1934), 117 Fla. 594, 158 So. 82. . See, St. Petersburg v. Aikin, (Fla.1968), 217 So.2d 315. . Cf., Hillsborough County v.

Twin Lakes Mobile Homes Village, Inc., (Fla.App. 1963), 153 So.2d 64.