Dr. Karen ROBERTS, Petitioner, v. Lainie and Casey WILLIAMSON, individually and as next friends of Courtnie Williamson, Respondents; Dr. Karen Roberts, Petitioner, v. Lainie and Casey Williamson, individually and as next friend of Courtnie Williamson, Respondents, 111 S.W.3d 113

Chief Justice PHILLIPS delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justice HECHT, Justice ENOCH, Justice OWEN, Justice SMITH and Justice WAINWRIGHT, and joined by Justice O’NEILL, Justice JEFFERSON, and Justice SCHNEIDER in all Parts except

Part II. In these consolidated cases involving two separate appeals in a medical malpractice action, we must decide an issue of first impression: whether Texas recognizes a common law cause of action for a parent’s loss of consortium resulting from a nonfatal injury to a child. In addition, we consider whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision to admit certain expert testimony or in failing to apply prior settlements to reduce the damages award. We also consider whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s allocation of the ad ¡item’s fee between the parties.

In one opinion, the court of appeals concluded that the common law recognizes a parent’s claim for loss of filial consortium and that the trial court had not erred in admitting certain expert testimony or in refusing to apply a settlement credit when calculating the defendant physician’s percentage of responsibility. 52 S.W.3d 343. In a separate opinion, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in taxing the guardian ad litem’s fee as costs evenly between the parents and the defendant physician, holding that the physician should pay all these costs. 52 S.W.3d 354.

Both judgments have been consolidated in this appeal. While we disagree that parents may recover for the loss of filial consortium, we agree with the remainder of the court of appeals’ judgments. We therefore render judgment, affirming in part and reversing in part. I The day after her birth, Courtnie Williamson began suffering from severe acidosis, a condition with a number of serious complications, including damage to the heart and brain. Dr. Roger Fowler, the attending physician, called Dr.

Karen Roberts, the only consulting pediatrician at Laird Memorial Hospital in Kilgore, Texas, and advised her that Courtnie was in respiratory distress. Dr. Roberts arrived from Longview approximately forty-five minutes later and began treating Courtnie. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Roberts and Dr. Fowler placed Courtnie on a pediatric ventilator. The ventilator was not functioning properly, however, and Courtnie did not receive needed oxygen for several minutes. About one hour after Dr. Roberts’ arrival, a colleague suggested that sodium bicarbonate should be administered to counteract Courtnie’s worsening acidosis.

Two hours later, after consulting with a neona-tologist in Shreveport, Dr. Roberts followed this advice, and Courtnie began to improve. Not long thereafter, Courtnie was transported to Schumpert Medical Center in Shreveport. Courtnie now has a permanent shunt implanted in her skull to drain fluids to her abdomen. She suffers from a weakened left side, requires braces to walk, has significant scarring, and is developmentally delayed. Courtnie’s parents, Lainie and Casey Williamson, individually and on behalf of their daughter, sued Dr. Roberts, Laird Memorial Hospital, Dr.

Mark Miller (the on-call physician), and Dr. Fowler. They contend that the malfunctioning ventilator, the delay in administering sodium bicarbonate, and the failure to immediately transfer Courtnie to a better-equipped hospital, combined to proximately cause Courtnie’s injuries. The trial judge appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Courtnie’s interests. The Williamsons’ claims against the hospital, Dr. Fowler, and a treating physician who was not named as a defendant were settled for $468,750. The claims against Dr. Roberts and Dr. Miller proceeded to trial. At trial, Dr.

Frank McGehee, a board-certified pediatrician, testified that Dr. Roberts was negligent in delaying Courtnie’s transfer to a hospital equipped to treat her condition and in failing to administer sodium bicarbonate sooner. Dr. McGehee testified that Dr. Roberts’ negligence proximately caused Courtnie to suffer from mental retardation, anti-social behavior, and hemiplegia, a partial paralysis of one side of body caused by an injury to the brain. The jury apportioned responsibility for Courtnie’s injuries as follows: 85 percent to the settling parties, 15 percent to Dr. Roberts, and zero percent to Dr. Miller.

The jury awarded $3,010,001 in damages, including $75,000 to the parents for past loss of filial consortium and one dollar for future loss thereof. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict, ordering Dr. Roberts to pay $451,500.15, or 15 percent of the entire award, with no deduction for the settlements. The trial court also awarded the ad litem a fee of $21,405.69, which it divided equally between Dr. Roberts and the Williamsons. Dr. Roberts and the Williamsons filed separate appeals. Dr. Roberts urged that

(1) Texas law does not permit a parent to recover for loss of consortium for non-fatal injuries to a child,

(2) Dr. McGehee was not qualified to testify as an expert on the cause and effect of Courtnie’s neurological injuries, (3) ho evidence supported the jury’s award of past and future medical expenses, and (4) the trial court erred in not applying a settlement credit before apportioning damages. The Williamsons complained only about having been taxed with one-half of the ad litem’s fee. The court of appeals rejected Dr. Roberts’ appeal and affirmed the trial court’s award of damages against her. 52 S.W.3d at 354.

However, the court of appeals agreed with the Williamsons’ separate appeal, reversing the trial court and rendering judgment that Dr. Roberts pay the full amount of the ad litem’s fee. Id. at 357. In this Court, Dr. Roberts has filed two separate appeals, complaining about both judgments.

We granted both petitions for review and consolidated the two appeals to decide four issues: (1) whether Texas common law recognizes a parent’s claim for loss of consortium when a child is seriously, but not fatally, injured; (2) whether a medical expert, who is not a neurologist, is nevertheless qualified to testify about the cause and effect of a child’s neurological injuries; (3) whether a defendant, who is not jointly and severally liable, is entitled to a settlement credit before the application of her percentage of responsibility; and (4) whether there is evidence of good cause sufficient to tax the prevailing party with part of the ad litem’s fee as costs.

II In Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tex.1990), we held that a child is entitled to seek damages for loss of consortium when a parent suffers a serious, permanent, and disabling injury. We equated the child’s relationship to the parent to that of one spouse to another, a relationship for which we had previously recognized consortium rights. Id. at 465-66 (citing Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 667-68 (Tex.1978)).

We further noted the vulnerable and dependent role of the child in this relationship and the profound harm that might befall a child who has been deprived of a parent’s love, care, companionship, and guidance. Id. at 466 (citing Villareal v. State, 160 Ariz. 474, 774 P.2d 213, 217 (1989)). The court of appeals concluded that .because of our emphasis in Reagan that the parent-child relationship deserved special protection, we must have intended for parents to have consortium rights in the relationship as well. 52 S.W.3d at 352.

The court suggests that the parent-child relationship is a reciprocal one, like husband and wife, and that all parties deserve the same protection. 52 S.W.Bd at 352. Dr. Roberts counters that Reagan does not extend so far, and that the loss to a child caused by a serious injury to the parent is uniquely different from that to a parent of a seriously injured child. We have not previously considered whether parents have a claim for loss of consortium in non-fatal injury cases, but some courts of appeals have assumed that such a claim is viable. See Schindler Elevator Corp, v.

Anderson, 78 S.W.3d 392, 414 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. filed); Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 322 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no writ); see also Parkway Hosp., Inc. v. Lee, 946 S.W.2d 580, 590 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied). We recognize the sympathetic and, on the surface, logical appeal to extending consortium rights to parents as well as children. But several states that have recognized a child’s right to loss of consortium have denied the parents any reciprocal right, including two of the first states in the nation to recognize the child’s right. See Norman v. Mass. Bay Transp.

Auth., 403 Mass. 303, 529 N.E.2d 139, 141—42 (1988); Sizemore v. Smock, 430 Mich. 283, 422 N.W.2d 666, 667-74 (1988). These courts have concluded that the child’s interest deserves greater protection because of the child’s singular emotional dependency on the parents. The Massachusetts Supreme Court explained this distinction in Norman as follows: In the ordinary course of things the dependence of spouses on one another for love and support is found to the same degree in no other relationship except, perhaps, in the relationship of a minor child to his or her parents.

Although parents customarily enjoy the consortium of their children, in the ordinary course of events a parent does not depend on a child’s companionship, love, support, guidance, and nurture in the same way and to the same degree that a husband depends on his wife, a wife depends on her husband, or a minor or disabled adult child depends on his or her parent. Of course, it is true that such dependency may exist in a particular situation, but it is not intrinsic to the parent-child relationship as is a minor child’s dependency on his or her parents and as is each spouse’s dependency on the other spouse.

Norman, 529 N.E.2d at 140-41. The Wyoming Supreme Court has also rejected a parent’s right to consortium damages while recognizing the child’s right. Some years after rejecting a parent’s claim for consortium in Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 201 (Wyo.1986), the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the child’s interest in the relationship was so different that it did deserve protection: In our society the minor child requires his or her parent’s nurturing, guidance, and supervision.

The child is uniquely dependent upon the parent for his or her socialization, that maturation process which turns a helpless infant into an independent, productive, responsible human being who has an opportunity to be a valuable, contributing member of our society. Without question, the child’s relational interest with the parent is characterized by dependence. In contrast, the parent’s relational interest with the child is not.

In a real sense, the child is “becoming” and the parent “has become.” Thus, the parent’s loss of an injured child’s consortium is different in kind from the child’s loss of an injured parent’s consortium. Viewed in this light, our refusal in Gates to recognize the parent’s claim is inapposite to the legal problem whether we recognize the child’s claim. Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1175 (Wyo.1990). The Vermont Supreme Court has similarly recognized that the “child is in a uniquely difficult position to make up for the loss of a parent.” Hay v. Med. Ctr.

Hosp. of Vt., 145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d 939, 942 (1985). It explained: "While “an adult is capable of seeking out new relationships in an attempt to fill in the void of his or her loss, a child may be virtually helpless in seeking out a new adult companion. Therefore, compensation through the courts may be the child’s only method of reducing his or her deprivation of the parent’s society and companionship.” Id. (quoting Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis.2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513, 516 (1984)).

We agree with these courts that the parent-child relationship is not reciprocal like husband and wife and that the child is the party to the relationship who needs special protection. We concede that serious injury to a child will have emotional consequences for the parents. Tort law, however, cannot remedy every wrong. Sound public policy requires an end at some point to the consequential damages that flow from a single negligent act. As the New York Court of Appeals has explained: “Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end.

The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.” Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (1969). Consequently, the law ordinarily denies recourse to those not directly injured by a negligent act, but whose injury is caused indirectly by the harm to another. There are exceptions to this general rule, including claims for loss of consortium. But all these exceptions have been narrowly cabined. Thus, while we have recognized that spouses and children can recover loss of consortium, we have concluded that siblings and step-parents cannot.

Compare Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667-68 (spousal consortium), and Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466 (parental consortium) with Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 383-84 (Tex.1998) (rejecting consortium claim for siblings and stepparent). When recognizing a new cause of action and the accompanying expansion of duty, we must perform something akin to a cost-benefit analysis to assure that this expansion of liability is justified. See, e.g., Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex.1994).

The fundamental purposes of our tort system are to deter wrongful conduct, shift losses to responsible parties, and fairly compensate deserving victims. While the recognition of an additional layer of liability to the parent clearly shifts the loss, it is not at all clear that this additional layer of liability will produce corresponding benefits of deterrence or fair compensation. It is clear, however, that it will foster further uncertainty and widen the divergence in recoveries among similarly situated victims.

Courts have generally been willing to tolerate more uncertainty in the calculation of damages when necessary to compensate the primary tort victim. That pain and mental anguish defy objective valuation or that money damages are a poor palliative for catastrophic injury do not justify the denial of a monetary remedy to a victim who has been severely injured. But once courts have fairly compensated the primary victim, they should be more troubled about the difficulties in measuring intangible losses to secondary victims.

The case before us demonstrates the challenges presented to a fact-finder when awarding consortium damages. The Wil-liamsons assert that the defendant’s negligence caused their daughter to sustain massive brain damage, particularly to the right side of her brain, resulting in permanent and in all likelihood progressive neurological and behavioral problems. They submit that their daughter has and will continue to have difficulty controlling her emotions and will likely suffer from some degree of retardation. Her injuries, however, have not shortened her life expectancy.

At the time of trial, the child was three years old. On this evidence, the jury concluded that the value of the “harm to the parent-child relationship” during the first three years of the relationship was $75,000, while future harm to the relationship over several score years was only a dollar. As for the child’s personal injury claim, the jury awarded, among other damages, $100,000 for past pain and mental anguish, $35,000 for past physical impairment, $750,000 for future pain and mental anguish, and $300,000 for future physical impairment.

The jury apparently concluded that while the child’s intangible losses would grow with time, her continuing impairment would have no substantial effect on the parent-child relationship in the future. Another jury after hearing the same evidence might well have reached a very different conclusion. In Reagan, we were willing to let the system sort through these difficulties because of the perceived social importance in protecting the child’s interests.

Moreover, we concluded that “ ‘limiting the plaintiffs in the consortium action to the victim’s children’ ” was a rational way to ensure the validity of these intangible losses. Miles, 967 S.W.2d at 384 (quoting Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466). That rationale, however, breaks down when we extend such rights to parents. Because the parent has a less dependent role than that of the child in the relationship, extending consortium rights here could logically lead to the recognition of such rights in other non-dependent relatives or even in close friends, given appropriate facts. See Norman, 529 N.E.2d at 141.

But, like every other jurisdiction, we have already concluded that consortium should not be expanded to this extent. See Miles, 967 S.W.2d at 383-84. We therefore decline to extend a claim for loss of consortium to parents of children who have been seriously injured. Some may argue that our refusal to extend consortium rights to parents creates a paradox because we permit parents to recover consortium damages in wrongful death cases. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex.1983) (abolishing pecuniary loss rule). But there are reasons for distinction.

Before abolition of the pecuniary loss rule, the wrongful death of a child did not ordinarily create pecuniary consequences for the negligent tortfea-sor because the child was of little monetary value to the family. Abolishing this rule and permitting the “[Recovery for loss of affection and society in a wrongful death action thus fulfills a deeply felt social belief that a tortfeasor who negligently kills someone should not escape liability completely, no matter how unproductive his victim.” Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858, 865 (1977).

But when the child survives, as here, so does the child’s own cause of action against the tortfeasor. And if the primary victim of the accident may bring an action, there is no need to recognize actions by other family members to prevent the tortfeasor from escaping liability. Thus, our law is not inconsistent in recognizing certain intangible damages for secondary victims in death actions but not in personal injury actions. But even if it were an anomaly to do so, we could not unify the rules for recovery of intangible damages in wrongful death and personal injury actions by any decision in this case.

All statutory beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act are entitled to recover intangible damages not only for loss of companionship but also mental anguish. See Estate of Clifton v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 709 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex.1986); Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex.1986). These same parties, however, have a much more circumscribed right to recover mental anguish damages when the family member survives. See United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Keith, 970 S.W.2d 540, 541-42 (Tex.1998) (per curiam) (bystander recovery).

Thus, whether or not we were to recognize a right to filial consortium in this case, differences in the award of intangible damages for wrongful death and personal injury would persist. See Reagan, 804 S.W.2d 463, 489-90 (op. on rehearing) (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting) (urging that close family members of a seriously injured person should also recover for mental anguish). We conclude that no compelling social policy impels us to recognize a parent’s right to damages for the loss of filial consortium. And, on balance, we believe that the common law is best served by the result we reach here.

Accordingly, we disapprove of those cases holding or suggesting to the contrary. See Schindler Elevator Corp., 78 S.W.3d at 414 (approving award of filial consortium); Enochs, 872 S.W.2d at 322 (recognizing parent’s right to filial consortium); see also Parkway Hosp., Inc., 946 S.W.2d at 590 (allowing filial consortium damages because error not preserved). Ill Dr. Roberts next complains about the court of appeals’ approval of the trial court’s decision to allow Dr. McGehee, a board-certified pediatrician, to testify as an expert about matters beyond his expertise.

Texas Rule of Evidence 702 provides that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Tex.R. Evid. 702. While Dr. Roberts does not question Dr. McGehee’s qualifications to testify about the appropriate standard of care, she argues that he was not qualified to render an opinion about the nature and effect of Courtnie’s neurological injuries.

Relying on our decision in Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.1996), Dr. Roberts contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted this neurological testimony. We disagree. In Broders, the trial court excluded expert testimony from an emergency-room physician who was prepared to testify about the cause of death in a medical malpractice action. The patient had suffered a head injury during an assault and was thereafter admitted to a hospital for observation and treatment.

The patient was released the next day by her attending physician but returned to the hospital a few hours later, complaining of an intense headache, nausea, and sensitivity to light. A neurosurgeon examined her this time and determined that she had a fractured skull, with bleeding and swelling in the brain. The swelling could not be controlled, and the patient died the next day. The decedent’s parents brought a wrongful death action against the hospital and three doctors. The defendants argued that the assault had caused an irreversible, untreatable, and fatal brain injury.

No treatment, they said, whether negligent or not, could have been a cause in fact of the patient’s death. The defendants presented expert testimony from two neurosurgeons to support their position. The plaintiffs expert would have testified that had the patient’s head trauma been promptly diagnosed and treated during her first hospitalization, the patient would, in all medical probability, have survived. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, eonclud-ing that the trial court had erred in excluding this testimony. Id. at 148-51.

We held that the trial court had correctly excluded this testimony because the emergency-room physician was not qualified as an expert under Rule 702 “on the issue of cause- in fact.” Id. at 153. While the emergency-room physician “knew both that neurosurgeons should be called to treat head injuries and what treatments they could provide, he never testified that he knew, from either experience or study, the effectiveness of those treatments in general, let alone in this case.” Id.

We further observed that a medical license does not automatically qualify the holder “to testify as an expert on every medical question.” Id. at 152; see also Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1112-1113 (5th Cir.1991) (inquiry is not simply whether expert has an M.D. degree, but also actual qualifications). But we likewise rejected the notion “that only a neurosurgeon can testify about the cause-in-fact of death from an injury to the brain, or even that a an emergency room physician could never so testify.” Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153.

Rather, we stated the test to be whether “the offering party [has] established] that the expert has ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education’ regarding the specific issue before the court which would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject.” Id. Unlike Broders, where the record failed to establish the emergency-room doctor’s qualifications, the record here does establish Dr. McGehee’s.

He is a board-certified pediatrician, holds certifications in pediatric advanced life support and advanced trauma life support, and has served as the Chief of Medical Staff at Denton Regional Medical Center and the Chief of Pediatrics at Flow Medical Hospital in Denton. Additionally, Dr. McGehee has studied the effects of pediatric neurological injuries and has extensive experience advising parents about the effects of those injuries. According to his testimony, Dr.

McGehee based his opinions about the cause and extent of Courtnie’s injuries on his experience, his medical training and education, a review of Courtnie’s diagnostic test results from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, and the diagnostic results from a Gregg County Early Childhood Development specialist. He also relied upon Courtnie’s MRIs and CT scans, and the

interpretation of these tests by Dr. Mark Laney, a pediatric neurologist whose qualifications Dr. Roberts did not challenge. Finally, Dr. McGehee consulted several peer-reviewed medical-journal articles and textbooks on pediatric neurology. Although Dr. McGehee is not a neurologist, the record reflects that he had experience and expertise regarding the specific causes and effects of Courtnie’s injuries. Therefore, we agree with the court of appeals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting his testimony on matters pertaining to Courtnie’s neurological injuries. IV Dr.

Roberts next asserts that, in calculating the damages against her, the trial court failed properly to apply the $468,750 settlement credit. She maintains that the trial court should have reduced the jury’s damage award with this credit before multiplying that number by her proportionate responsibility as found by the jury. In other words, Dr. Roberts contends that the judgment against her should be $369,937.50 (15% x $2,466,250) rather than $440,250. This reduction, she asserts, is required when a defendant timely elects to have a dollar-for-dollar credit. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 33.012(b)(1).

We disagree. The rules of proportionate responsibility and settlement credits are found in

Chapter 33 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code. Pertinent here are sections 33.012 and 33.013, which provide in relevant part: § 33.012. Amount of Recovery (a) ... the court shall reduce the amount of damages to be recovered by the claimant with respect to a cause of action by a percentage equal to the claimant’s percentage of responsibility. (

b) If the claimant has settled with one or more persons, the court shall further reduce the amount of damages to be recovered by the claimant with respect to a cause of action by a credit equal to one of the following (1) the sum of the dollar amounts of all settlements ... § 33.013. Amount of Liability (

a) Except [when a defendant is jointly and severally liable], a liable defendant is liable to a claimant only for the percentage of damages found by the trier of fact equal to that defendant’s percentage of responsibility with respect to the personal injury, property damage, death, or other harm for which the damages are allowed. Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code §§ 33.012(a), (b)(1), 33.013(a).

Section 33.012 refers to “the amount of damages to be recovered by the claimant”, while

section 33.013 refers to the “damages found by the trier of fact.” Id. The “amount of damages to be recovered by the claimant” under

section 33.012 must be reduced by the claimant’s proportionate responsibility and by settlements. No corresponding reduction is prescribed under

section 33.013 because the “damages found by the trier of fact” are not affected by settlement or the claimant’s shared responsibility. Thus, damages under these two sections are the same only when the claimant has not settled and shares no responsibility. And although related, the two sections pose separate inquiries.

Section 33.012 controls the claimant’s total recovery, while

section 33.013 governs the defendant’s separate liability. Under

section 33.012, the Williamsons’ total recovery, including amounts received in settlement, is limited to $2,935,000, so they can receive no more than $2,466,250 ($2,935,000 — $468,750) in satisfaction of this judgment. This limit, however, is independent of

section 33.013’s limitation on a particular defendant’s percentage of responsibility. And

section 33.013(

a) specifically pertains to defendants who, like Dr. Roberts here, are not jointly and severally liable. That

section provides that a severally-liable defendant’s monetary liability is calculated by multiplying the damages found by the trier of fact by the defendant’s percentage of responsibility. See C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315, 321 (Tex.1994) (“Section 33.013(

a) sets the liability to the claimant of each [severally liable] defendant at an amount equal to that defendant’s percentage of responsibility multiplied by the damages found by the trier of fact.”). The trial court did this when it multiplied the jury’s damage award by the 15 per cent of proportionate responsibility it assigned to Dr. Roberts. Because Dr. Roberts’ liability for $440,250, does not exceed the limit placed on the amount of damages the Wil-liamsons may recover under

section 33.012, no further credit is required. V Finally, Dr. Roberts challenges the court of appeals’ judgment assessing all guardian ad litem costs against her. She contends that, because the Williamsons were both a successful party (against Dr. Roberts) and a losing party (against Dr. Miller), the trial court properly apportioned the ad litem costs between them. The court approved an ad litem fee of $21,405.69 and divided it equally between Dr. Roberts and the Williamsons.

At the hearing for rendition of judgment, the court stated: I think that an attorney ad litem is there for the benefit of all the parties that are there. I would like to, for this to be assessed as court costs, and I would like for it to be split between the Plaintiffs and between the Defendant in that particular regard. And I think, that way, it would be a little bit more fair to all parties that are concerned. And I don’t think simply because there was a verdict returned against an individual, that he pays it all.

We’re looking at a situation where the Court feels that it would be in the best interest of the child for this individual to be appointed. And, therefore, as a result of that, it should be assessed as a court cost, and to be borne one half by [Dr. Roberts], and one half by [the Williamsons]. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that, because the Williamsons were the successful parties, “the trial court was required by Rule 141 to state good cause on the record for assessing costs against them.” 52 S.W.3d at 356.

Finding no good cause, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion. Id. We agree. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 131 provides that “[t]he successful party to a suit shall recover of his adversary all costs incurred therein, except where otherwise provided.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 131. Rule 141 permits a trial court, for good cause stated on the record, to “adjudge the costs otherwise than as provided by law or [the Rules of Civil Procedure].” Tex.R. Civ. P. 141.

Thus, it was the trial court’s responsibility to state on the record good cause for taxing a part of the court costs against the Williamsons, the successful party. Id. The trial court did explain its reasons for splitting costs. It observed that because an ad litem is there for the benefit of all parties, it is “fair” to split costs between the losing and prevailing parties. A guardian ad litem, however, does not serve for the benefit of all parties; the guardian is appointed to protect the child’s interests. See Am. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Vandewater, 907 S.W.2d 491, 493 n. 2 (Tex.1995).

Certainly, fairness can be good cause, but the record must substantiate the connection. For example, we concluded in Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex.1985), that the trial court had demonstrated good cause when assessing part of the ad litem costs against the prevailing party because the conduct of that party had unnecessarily prolonged and obstructed the trial. In Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v.

Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex.2001), however, we reversed the lower courts’ determination that the prevailing party should bear its own costs because the losing party was too emotionally fragile to bear them. We concluded that emotional distress at paying costs was not good cause under Rule 141. Id. Here, the trial court’s finding of good cause is premised on the perception that the prevailing party incidentally benefitted from the guardian ad litem’s services.

Assuming that such an incidental benefit might in a particular case provide good cause, Rule 141 still requires that the trial court state its reasons “on the record” and with more specificity than the court’s general notion of fairness here. Tex.R. Civ. P. 141. Grounds of perceived fairness, without more, are insufficient to constitute good cause. See Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc., 53 S.W.3d at 377-78. We reverse that part of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the award of damages for loss of filial consortium and render judgment that the Williamsons take nothing as to this claim.

The judgments of the court of appeals are otherwise affirmed. Justice JEFFERSON, joined by Justice O’NEILL and Justice SCHNEIDER, filed a dissent to

Part II of the Court’s Opinion. . Although the trial court and parties refer to the ad litem as an attorney ad litem, the court of appeals concluded that she was in fact a guardian ad litem appointed under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 173. 52 S.W.3d 354, 355 n. 1. Rule 173 provides that when a minor is a party to a suit and is represented by a next friend whose interests may be adverse to the minor, "the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for [the minor] and shall allow [her] a reasonable fee for [her] services to be taxed as a part of the costs.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 173. . Ferriterv.

Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) (child’s consortium right recognized). A parent in Massachusetts presently has a statutory claim for loss of consortium. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85X; Monahan v. Town of Methuen, 408 Mass. 381, 558 N.E.2d 951, 956 (1990). . Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981) (child’s consortium right recognized). .

The jury question asked what sum of money would fairly and reasonably compensate the parents "for the harm, if any, to the parent-child relationship as a result of the occurrences in question?” The jury was further instructed "that 'harm to the parent-child relationship’ means damage to the right of both parents and their child to the affection, comfort, companionship, society, assistance, emotional support, and love necessary to a parent-child relationship.” (emphasis added).

The defendant did not object to the instruction’s apparent erroneous inclusion of the child’s parental consortium claim, although the defendant did object to the issue on other grounds, i.e., its failure to include a predicate that the injury to the child must be serious, permanent, and disabling before a parent may recover filial consortium. . "An action to recover damages [for wrongful death] is for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, children, and parents of the deceased.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 71.004(a). .

The jury awarded damages totaling $3,010,001, which included $75,001 for loss of filial consortium. In keeping with our conclusion that the common law does not recognize a claim for loss of filial consortium, we have deducted $75,001 from the jury’s verdict, yielding the sum of $2,935,000. . Had the Williamsons negotiated a more favorable settlement, reducing

section 33.012’s limit on damages below Dr. Roberts proportionate share under

section 33.013, a further credit would have been required. Thus, a defendant may incidentally benefit from a claimant’s favorable settlement with others.