Warren Lee TUNE, Petitioner, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent, 23 S.W.3d 358

Justice ENOCH delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice HECHT, Justice OWEN, and Justice GONZALES join. This case presents us with two principal issues. First, we must determine whether the courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals involving the grant' or denial of a concealed-handgun license. We conclude that they do, because the amount in controversy in a license-denial case exceeds the statutory jurisdictional requirement of $100.

Second, we must consider the meaning of the term “convicted” as it is used in the Concealed Handgun Act, Subchapter H of the Texas Government Code. We conclude that petitioner, who entered a felony guilty plea and completed a probation period, and as a result had his conviction set aside and the indictment dismissed, remains “convicted” for purposes of the Handgun Act. We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ judgment that petitioner is not eligible for a concealed-handgun license. I. Background In 1972, Warren Lee Tune pled guilty to a felony charge and was sentenced to two years’ probation.

After Tune completed a year and five months of his probation, the district court issued an order setting aside his conviction, dismissing the indictment, and discharging him from probation. In 1996, Tune applied for a license to carry a concealed handgun under the Handgun Act. Generally, a person applying for such a license must pay the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) a nonrefundable $140 license and application fee for a four-year license.

But to avoid renewal congestion at the end of the first four years, DPS initially promulgated a rule that required some applicants to pay a prorated nonrefundable $70 fee for a two-year license. Tune applied for a license the first year that licenses were available. He was required, at random, to apply for a two-year license and pay a $70 fee. DPS denied Tune’s application because he had been convicted of a felony. Thereafter, as the Act permits, Tune requested a hearing before a justice of the peace.

Both DPS and the applicant may present evidence at such a hearing, and the justice of the peace determines whether the denial is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In this case, the justice court reversed DPS’s denial of Tune’s application and ordered DPS to issue a license to Tune. DPS appealed the justice court’s decision to the county court at law. The Act specifically authorizes such an appeal, and also states that “[t]he trial on appeal shall be a trial de novo 'without a jury.” After trial, the county court also ruled in Tune’s favor, and instructed DPS to issue him a license.

DPS thereafter appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the county court’s decision and held that Tune was not eligible for a concealed-handgun license. That court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal because “there are no restrictions or regulations on the D.P.S.’s appeal from the county court at law....” Thereafter, Tune petitioned for our review. He challenges both the court of appeals’ conclusion on jurisdiction and its ruling on the merits that he is not entitled to a concealed-handgun license. II.

Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals We first consider Tune’s jurisdictional challenge. This Court has jurisdiction to consider whether the court of appeals properly exercised jurisdiction over an appeal.

Article V,

section 6 of the Texas Constitution establishes that the courts of appeals have general jurisdiction over all cases “of which the District Courts or County Courts have original or appellate jurisdiction, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law.” In addition, the Texas Constitution vests courts of appeals with “such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be prescribed by law.” Thus, the court of appeals’ jurisdiction over this case must be based on either (1) the general constitutional grant, subject to any restrictions or regulations imposed by the Legislature; or (2) a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction.

We look first to the Handgun Act itself, to see whether it contains a specific grant of jurisdiction to the courts of appeals. It doesn’t. Although the Act expressly authorizes appeals to the county courts at law, it says nothing about subsequent appeals. Consequently, we consider whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction under the general constitutional grant. Because the county court’s jurisdiction here was appellate, the constitution vests jurisdiction in the court of appeals, subject to any restrictions and regulations prescribed by law.

In two statutes, the Legislature has limited the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to causes in which the amount in controversy or the judgment exceeds $100. These statutes provide a “restriction or regulation” on the courts of appeals’ general jurisdiction. Thus, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that there were no such restrictions or regulations on DPS’s ability to bring its appeal. But that conclusion does not end our inquiry. If the amount in controversy here exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of $100, the court of appeals correctly exercised its jurisdiction, albeit for the wrong reason.

It has long been the law that the phrase “amount in controversy,” in the jurisdictional context, means “the sum of money or the value of the thing originally sued for.... ” While the amount in controversy is frequently determined by the damages sought, that is not always so. The subjective value of a privilege, if asserted in good faith, establishes jurisdiction if that value meets the requisite amount in controversy. Certainly, the amount of money that a state’s citizens are willing to pay for a privilege is some evidence of its value.

Based on these principles, we hold that the $140 licensing fee establishes the minimum value of a concealed-handgun license. Therefore, the court of appeals correctly concluded that it had jurisdiction over DPS’s appeal in this case. Because the fee for a concealed-handgun license exceeds the $100 jurisdictional amount, there is no need to evaluate whether the license has any additional value particular to Tune. While the licensing fee may not capture the license’s entire worth, it establishes a minimum value, which in this case passes the jurisdictional threshold.

It is true that Tune himself paid $70 for a two-year license, rather than $140 for a four-year license. We also note that the Act permits certain classes of applicants to pay a reduced fee. Some might therefore argue that, when an applicant like Tune pays a reduced fee, the value of the license isn’t enough to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. We hold, however, that the general application fee of $140 satisfies the amount in controversy requirement in every case, regardless of whether the particular applicant paid that fee or a reduced fee.

Relying on the general application fee in every case establishes a consistent rule and keeps courts from having to inquire into the particularized value a concealed-handgun license has for each applicant. This approach promotes judicial economy because it provides an easy test for the courts of appeals to apply in determining the minimum amount in controversy in these cases.

And we can see no principled reason why an appeal should be allowed if an applicant pays $140, but denied for the same license if the applicant is like Tune and pays only $70 at DPS’s discretion for DPS’s administrative convenience, or is indigent and pays only $70, or is a senior citizen who pays only $70, or is a retired peace officer who pays only $25. There is no evidence that the Legislature intended to create different classes of concealed-handgun licenses and confer on licensees different rights and duties.

From our review of the statute, a person who receives a concealed-handgun license for $25 is subject to all of the same duties and obligations as a person who receives a license for $140. We see no basis for concluding that the Legislature intended that such a person would not also be entitled to all of the same rights, including the right to appeal beyond the county court. It is not that the amount of the particular fee paid by each applicant is somehow in controversy.

It is, rather, that the standard fee offers the minimum measure of “the value of the thing originally sued for....” Based on our holding today, we disapprove the contrary holding in Texas Department of Public Safety v. Levinson. III. Tune’s Eligibility for a Concealed-Handgun License We now examine whether the court of appeals correctly determined that Tune is not eligible for a concealed-handgun license. We have jurisdiction to do so because the case requires us to construe the Concealed Handgun Act.

Tune contends that the court of appeals erred in concluding that he is “convicted” within the meaning of the Handgun Act. When Tune applied for a license, the Act defined “convicted” as: an adjudication of guilt or an order of deferred adjudication entered against a person by a court of competent jurisdiction whether or not: (

A) the imposition of the sentence is subsequently probated and the person is discharged from community supervision; or (

B) the person is pardoned for the offense, unless the pardon is expressly granted for subsequent proof of innocence. A person is not eligible for a license to carry a concealed handgun if he has been convicted of a felony. Tune argues that because his conviction was set aside and the indictment against him dismissed, he is no longer “convicted” for Handgun Act purposes, and is therefore eligible for a concealed-handgun license. He points to

article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which, when his conviction was set aside, required the district court to discharge a defendant who had successfully completed probation.

That provision further stated: In ease the defendant has been convicted or has entered a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, and the court has discharged the defendant hereunder, such court may set aside the verdict or permit the defendant to withdraw his plea, and shall dismiss the accusation, complaint, information or indictment against such defendant, who shall thereafter he released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he been convicted or to which he has pleaded guilty except that proof of his said conviction or plea of guilty shall be made known to the court should the defendant again be convicted of any criminal offense.

Relying on the italicized language in this provision, Tune maintains that he is no longer disqualified from obtaining a concealed-handgun license. To determine whether Tune is in fact eligible for a license, we look to the Handgun Act’s relevant provisions. We must enforce the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to rules of construction or other extrinsic aid to construe it. Because the Handgun Act’s definition of “convicted” is clear and unambiguous, we follow its plain meaning.

The Act considers a person “convicted” after an adjudication of guilt is entered against him whether or not his sentence is subsequently probated and he is discharged from community supervision. On its face, this language covers Tune. That is: (1) he was adjudicated guilty of a felony by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (2) it doesn’t matter that his sentence was subsequently probated and he was discharged from community supervision.

The Legislature’s use of the phrase “whether or not” between these two conditions demonstrates its choice that a “conviction” under the first condition (adjudication of guilt) does not vanish for purposes of the Act when the second condition (completion of probation and discharge from community supervision) occurs. Nothing in the statute suggests any exception for those who successfully complete probation and are discharged and who have the indictment dismissed. Thus, the court of appeals correctly held that Tune is not eligible for a concealed-handgun license. The language Tune cites from

article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure doesn’t alter this result. The statutory definition of “convicted” we examine today applies only to the Concealed Handgun Act. We can see no reason why the Legislature could not provide in

article 42.12 that any general penalties and disabilities resulting from a conviction are lifted when a person is discharged from community supervision and the indictment is dismissed, and yet retain certain specific restrictions on those who have previously been convicted of felonies. If the Handgun Act didn’t include a specific definition of the term “convicted,” then the inability to obtain a concealed-handgun license might be one of the penalties and disabilities removed when the district court dismissed Tune’s indictment. But the Act does include a specific definition.

And for obvious reasons, the Legislature may wish to keep concealed handguns out of the hands of persons who have been convicted of a felony, even if those persons satisfactorily complete community supervision. Tune also complains that the court of appeals erred by failing to consider whether there was any evidence that he had been convicted of a felony. He argues that DPS failed to prove that he was the same person as the Warren Lee Tune who pled guilty in 1972 and thereafter had his conviction set aside and the indictment dismissed.

Not only did Tune waive this argument by failing to raise it in the trial court, he foreclosed it by submitting an affidavit to the trial court in which he admitted that in 1972 he was placed on a two-year probation for an alleged theft, and that after he had completed one year and five months of probation, the district court shortened the probation period, dismissed the indictment, and discharged him. Accordingly, we find this complaint without merit. IV.

Conclusion Because the amount in controversy in this case exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of $100, we conclude that the court of appeals correctly determined that it had jurisdiction to hear DPS’s appeal from the county court’s decision granting Tune a license to carry a concealed handgun. Because under the plain language of the Concealed Handgun Act Tune is not eligible for a concealed-handgun license, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Justice HECHT filed a concurring opinion. Justice ABBOTT filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice BAKER, Justice HANKINSON, and Justice O’NEILL joined. .

See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4413(29ee) (repealed; now codified as Tex Gov’t Code §§ 411.171 — .205) (all cites hereinafter to Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 411.171-.205). . See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 411.174(a)(6), 411.183(b). . See id. § 411.183(e). . Seeid. § 411.180(a). . Seeid. § 411.180(c). . See id.. § 411.180(e). . 977 S.W.2d 650, 653. . Id. at 652. . See Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 845 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex.1992). . Tex. Const, art. V, § 6. . Id. . See Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.180(e). . See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.220(a); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 51.012. . See 977 S.W.2d at 652. . Gulf, C. & S.F.Ry. Co. v.

Cunnigan, 95 Tex. 439, 67 S.W. 888, 890 (1902) (emphasis added). . See Brannon v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 224 S.W.2d 466, 468-69 (1949); see also Guerra v. Weatherly, 291 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1956, no writ). . See Long v. Fox, 625 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd. n.r.e.). . See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 411.194(a), 411.195, 411.199(d). . See id. . Cunnigan, 67 S.W. at 890. . 981 S.W.2d 5 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. dism’d by agr.). . See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 22.001(a)(3) and 22.225(b)(1). . See Tex.

Gov’t Code former § 411.171(4), amended by Acts 1999, 76 th Leg., ch. 62, §§ 9.01(a), 9.02(a). . See id. § 411.172(a)(3). . See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 7 (repealed and subsequently recodified at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 20). . Id. (emphasis added). . See St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex.1997). . See id. . See Tex. Gov't Code § 411.171(4). . See id.