THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, James Parsons, III, in his capacity as President of the State Bar of Texas and Karen Johnson, in her capacity as Executive Director of the State Bar of Texas, Petitioners, v. Maria GOMEZ, Alicia Naveja, and Leonardo Chavez, on Behalf of Themselves and Others Similarly Situated, Respondents, 891 S.W.2d 243

CORNYN, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, and HECHT and ENOCH, Justices, join. The sole question presented for our determination is whether the district court below has jurisdiction of this suit, which complains of the failure of the State Bar of Texas to compel member lawyers to provide free legal services to Texans who cannot pay for those services. We conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss.

After being refused free legal services, Maria Gomez, Alicia Naveja, and Leonardo Chaves, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated (collectively, Gomez), filed suit in a Travis County district court against the State Bar of Texas and two of its officials at that time, James Parsons III, President, and Karen Johnson, Executive Director (collectively, State Bar). Gomez contends that the State Bar, by not effectively encouraging attorneys to volunteer free legal services, has illegally failed to meet the legal needs of indigent Texans.

Specifically, Gomez alleges violations of the following provisions of the Texas Constitution:

(1) Article I,

Section 13 (open courts);

(2) Article I,

Section 3 (equal protection);

(3) Article I,

Section 3a (equal rights);

(4) Article I,

Section 19 (due course of law); and

(5) Article I,

Section 29 (inviolate nature of the Bill of Rights). Gomez further asserts violations of the Texas anti-discrimination statute, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Texas Lawyer’s Creed. The district court dismissed the case, concluding it lacked jurisdiction under

Article V,

Section 8, of the Texas Constitution. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide the merits of Gomez’s claims, but because of this Court’s exclusive authority to regulate the legal profession in Texas, it held that the district court could levy only a prohibitory, and not a mandatory injunction against the State Bar. 856 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.1993). The court of appeals explained: We conclude that a district court does not have authority to grant relief that would unreasonably usurp the supervisory control vested exclusively in the supreme court.

By vesting the supreme court with supervisory control of the practice of law, the constitution and the State Bar Act grant the supreme court discretion to decide issues concerning the State Bar and the practice of law. Whether a district court has authority to grant a particular form of injunctive relief depends, we believe, on whether granting such relief would effectively exercise the kind of supervisory discretion that is vested exclusively in the supreme court. 856 S.W.2d at 815. We agree with the court of appeals’ identification of the issue but not its conclusion.

The jurisdictional question presented is complex and in some ways unique. As a general proposition, before a court may address the merits of any case, the court must have jurisdiction over the party or the property subject to the suit, jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, and capacity to act as a court. See Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex.1973). Subject matter jurisdiction requires that the party bringing the suit have standing, that there be a five controversy between the parties, and that the case be justiciable.

See Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-46 (Tex.1993). If the district court lacks jurisdiction, in any of these senses, then its decision would not bind the parties. See Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 495 S.W.2d at 881 (noting that collateral attacks on a judgment are allowed when the district court lacked jurisdiction). And, a decision that does not bind the parties is, by definition, an advisory opinion prohibited by Texas law. See Texas Ass’n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 444 (citing

Article II,

Section 1, of the Texas Constitution as prohibiting advisory opinions). The unique aspect of this jurisdictional inquiry, as the court of appeals recognized, arises out of this Court’s power to regulate the practice of law in the State of Texas. This power is derived from both statutory and inherent powers. The primary statutory grant of power is found in the State Bar Act, which gives the Court administrative control over the State Bar and provides a statutory mechanism for promulgating regulations governing the practice of law. See Tex.Gov’t Code § 81.011(c).

The other source of this court’s power to regulate the practice of law in this state, its inherent power, is not secured by any legislative grant or specific constitutional provision, but is necessarily implied to enable the Court to discharge its constitutionally imposed duties. See Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex.1979) (noting that doctrine of inherent power is derived, in part, from the separation of powers dictated by

Article II,

Section 1 of the Texas Constitution). Those duties include our obligation, as the head of the judicial department, to regulate judicial affairs. Because the admission and practice of Texas attorneys is inextricably intertwined with the administration of justice, the Court must have the power to regulate these activities in order to fulfill its constitutional role. See generally Jim R.

Carrigan, Inherent Powers of the Courts 2 (1973) (defining inherent powers as those “reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective”). The Court’s inherent powers, such as the power to regulate the practice of law, are not jurisdictional powers. See Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 399. These powers are administrative powers, necessary to the preservation of the judiciary’s independence and integrity.

Because the Court’s power to regulate the practice of law is an administrative one, the exercise of that power does not in and of itself deprive lower courts of general subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to that governance. They do not, however, have jurisdiction over all such challenges because in every individual case, jurisdiction also depends on justiciability.

And, as the court of appeals acknowledged, for a controversy to be justiciable, there must be a real controversy between the parties that will be actually resolved by the judicial relief sought. 856 S.W.2d 804, 811 (citing Texas Ass’n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 446 and Board of Water Eng’rs v. City of San Antonio, 155 Tex. 111, 283 S.W.2d 722, 724 (1955)). While we do not find it necessary to set the precise boundaries of the district court’s jurisdiction under these circumstances, we hold that these facts do not present a justiciable controversy and that the district court therefore has no jurisdiction.

Gomez seeks to compel either the State Bar or this Court to implement a mandatory pro bono program for Texas lawyers. To the extent a remedy is sought against the State Bar, Gomez seeks relief from an entity that is powerless, acting alone, to implement that remedy. The State Bar's authority is limited to proposing regulations to this Court, which may accept or reject any recommendation, in whole or in part. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.024(a). For example, when the latest amendment to the rules governing lawyer advertising was recommended by the State Bar, we modified the proposed amendment before promulgation.

See Amended Order of Promulgation and Adoption of Disciplinary Rules, West’s Texas Cases Advance Sheet 884-885 issue 49, pp. LXIX-LXXXI. Thus, the relief sought against the State Bar, even if granted by the trial court, could not resolve the dispute between these litigants. Moreover, to the extent the remedies are sought against the Supreme Court, they would clearly impinge on the Court’s exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.

The Legislature itself implicitly acknowledged the Court’s fundamental authority in this area when it enacted the State Bar Act as an aid to the Court in carrying out this function. See Tex.Gov’t Code § 81.011(b). No subordinate court in Texas has the power to usurp our authority or responsibility in this area. The dissenting justices acknowledge this limitation when they say, “An injunction mandating this court or the State Bar to implement a mandatory pro bono program would be improper.

It would inappropriately involve the district court in the regulation of the practice of law.” Infra, 891 S.W.2d at 252 (citations omitted). This is not to say that all remedies bearing upon the regulation of the legal profession would be unacceptable infringements on the inherent powers of the Court. Had this Court actually promulgated rules establishing a pro bono program and had Gomez challenged the constitutionality of such rules, the district court would have jurisdiction to decide, in the first instance, whether such rules met constitutional standards. See O’Quinn v.

State Bar, 763 S.W.2d 397 (Tex.1988) (upholding the trial court’s decision on a constitutional challenge to the rules of disciplinary conduct promulgated by the Court). In due course, we would review any adverse determination in our adjudicative capacity. See Cameron v. Greenhill, 582 S.W.2d 775, 777 & n. 3 (Tex.1979) (holding that the Court could both promulgate a rule and determine its constitutionality).

The important distinction between such a case and the one at" hand is that in the former case, the district court would not be cast in the impermissible role of effectively promulgating policies and regulations governing Texas lawyers. Such a case would be justiciable because the district court would be capable of rendering a judgment that accords the parties complete relief, subject of course to appellate review.

But when, as here, the essence of a complaint is that this Court has failed to establish rules governing some aspect of lawyer conduct, a district court has no authority to assume this Court’s authority to regulate the legal profession. This prohibition includes the rendition of orders that would, as a practical matter, preempt this Court’s authority. Because the district court cannot effect a remedy that would resolve this dispute, this ease does not present a justiciable controversy.

Once again, acknowledging the limitations on the district court’s authority in this area, the dissenting justices nevertheless contend, “The district court does, however, have jurisdiction to issue a mandatory injunction which requires the State Bar to implement a more effective voluntary pro bono program calculated to meet constitutional and statutory demands which may exist.” Infra, 891 S.W.2d at 252 (emphasis added). We are at a loss to understand, and the dissenting justices do not explain, how a mandatory injunction to enforce a voluntary program could ever be enforced by any court.

By limiting the district court’s jurisdiction to such illusory relief, the dissenting justices have, in effect, conceded that the trial court cannot grant plaintiffs the real relief they seek. Our decision that the district court lacks jurisdiction does not, however, leave the parties without a forum in which to seek redress of their grievances. This Court, in the exercise of its constitutional responsibilities, wants and needs input from interested persons concerning its supervisory responsibility over Texas lawyers.

Ordinarily, interested parties would be free to informally petition this Court in its administrative capacity, to urge reconsideration of the proper constitutional mandates for this Court’s regulation of attorney conduct. However, given the potentially far-reaching effects of this particular challenge to our scheme of regulation, we direct that this matter be placed on the Court’s administrative agenda for further consideration. All interested parties have until April 14, 1995, to submit their written arguments on the merits of the underlying claims. Cf. Barger v.

Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tenn.1976) (ordering a lower court to dismiss a challenge to the Supreme Court’s rules but directing the lower court to forward the petitions for further consideration as a direct motion in the Supreme Court). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. DOGGETT, J., dissents. . This disposition of the limited issue before us means that we do not, as Justice Gonzalez's concurring opinion does, comment on the merits of the underlying claims. . Tex Civ.Prac. & RemCode § 106.001.

This statute generally prohibits the state or its agents from discriminating against persons because of race, religion, color, sex, or national origin. Remedies available to a successful litigant include injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and court costs. Id. § 106.002. A person who knowingly violates this statute is subject to a fine and confinement in the county jail. Id. § 106.003. . Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct, pmbl. ¶ 6, reprinted in Tex.Gov’t Code, tit. 2, subtit. G app. (West Supp.1992) (State Bar Rules art.

X, § 9) ("The provision of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees is a moral obligation of each lawyer as well as the profession generally.”). . Texas Lawyer's Creed — A Mandate for Professionalism (adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Nov. 7, 1989), reprinted in Texas Rules of Court 487 (West 1994). In the Creed, lawyers are urged to commit themselves "to an adequate and effective pro bono program.” Id. .

Section 8 defines the district courts' jurisdiction, but excepts those cases where jurisdiction has been conferred on some other court. See Tex Const art. V, § 8. The district court held that this Court's power to regulate the practice of law was sufficient to bring this case within

Section 8’s exception.