LAIDLAW WASTE SYSTEMS (DALLAS), INC., Petitioner v. CITY OF WILMER, Texas, Respondent, 904 S.W.2d 656

OWEN, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, and HIGHTOWER, HECHT, GAMMAGE, ENOCH and SPECTOR, Justices, join. In this case we must determine whether a Type A general-law municipality may annex a contiguous area pursuant to

section 43.024 of the Local Government Code, when the annexation causes it to exceed the statutory area limitations that were applicable when it initially incorporated under

section 6.001 of the Code. Laidlaw Waste Systems (Dallas), Inc. brought suit to void the annexation of its property by the City of Wilmer, Texas, a Type A municipality. The trial court rendered

summary judgment in favor of Laid-law. The court of appeals reversed. 890 S.W.2d 459. Because we conclude that

section 43.024 authorizes such an annexation, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. I In 1990, Laidlaw received a permit to construct and operate a municipal solid waste landfill on property adjacent to Wilmer. The City subsequently annexed approximately 205 acres of land in its extraterritorial jurisdiction, including a portion of the site of the proposed landfill. The temporary zoning designation for the annexed land does not include operation of a landfill as a permissible use. Laidlaw initiated a declaratory judgment action, challenging the validity of the annexation on several fronts. Laidlaw filed a motion for

summary judgment on a single ground, asserting that the annexation was void and invalid under

section 5.901(2) of the Texas Local Government Code because a Type A municipality of Wilmer’s size was precluded from having a surface area in excess of four miles, and that the surface area of Wilmer already exceeded that limit. The City filed its own motion for

summary judgment, attempting to negate this and the other allegations in Laidlaw’s petition. The City’s motion asserted that Laidlaw lacked standing to challenge the annexation; that the area limitations in

section 5.901(2) applied only to the incorporation of a municipality, not to annexation; that the area annexed did not exceed the one-half mile limitation in

section 48.024(

a) of the Code; and that the metes and bounds description of the annexed territory did close, contrary to Laidlaw’s assertions. The trial court denied the City’s motion and granted Laidlaw’s motion for

summary judgment, declaring the annexation void. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment in favor of the City. 890 S.W.2d 459. II The first question we must resolve is whether Laidlaw has standing to challenge the annexation. Generally a quo warranto proceeding is the only appropriate mechanism for challenging the validity of an annexation. Alexander Oil Co. v. City of Seguin, 825 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex.1991). The City contends that as a private party, Laidlaw lacks standing. However, a private party may collaterally attack an annexation that exceeds the annexation authority granted by statute.

See id. at 436-38. Laidlaw’s argument is that the City’s attempted annexation is wholly void because it exceeds the statutory area limitations. Laidlaw does have standing to attack the annexation on this ground. However, Laidlaw has no standing to challenge the annexation on procedural grounds, such as alleged failures to meet the notice and signature requirements, and accordingly, we do not consider those procedural challenges. Ill In resolving this case, it is crucial to understand the different classifications of municipalities in the Local Government Code.

Municipalities in Texas may be divided into three broad categories: general-law, special-law, and home rule. Laws expressly applicable to one category are not applicable to others. See Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 214 S.W.2d 282, 285 (1948). The Local Government Code further subdivides general-law municipalities into three types: A, B, and C. See Tex.Local Gov’t Code §§ 5.001-5.003. These classifications preserve distinctions established in the predecessor statutes enacted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

See former Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 961 (1875) (repealed 1987), art. 1133 (1897) (repealed 1987), and art. 1154 (1909) (repealed 1987). Communities with 600 or more inhabitants may incorporate as Type A municipalities. TexLocal Gov’t Code § 6.001. Communities with more than 200 but less than 10,000 inhabitants may incorporate as Type B municipalities. Tex.Local Gov’t Code § 7.001. Communities with more than 200 but less than 5,000 inhabitants that adopt a commission form of government may incorporate as Type C municipalities. Tex.Local Gov’t Code § 8.001.

Section 5.901 of the Local Government Code, which applies to all general-law municipalities, provides that “[a] community may not incorporate as a general-law municipality unless it meets the following territorial requirements: ... a community with 2,001 to 4,999 inhabitants must have not more than four square miles of surface area.... ” TexLocal Gov’t Code § 5.901. It is undisputed that this would prohibit a municipality with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants from incorporating within an area of more than four square miles. The dispute in this case arises from the application of these territorial limits to subsequent annexations. For Type B municipalities, the application is clear.

Section 43.025 of the Local Government Code, which governs annexations by Type B municipalities, provides that “[t]he municipality may not be enlarged under this

section to exceed the area requirements established by

Section 5.901.” TexLocal Gov’t Code § 43.025(d). Subsection (

d) specifically incorporates the territorial limits of

section 5.901. There is no parallel provision in

section 48.024, which governs Type A municipalities. The only territorial requirement in

section 43.024 is that the annexed area be less than one-half mile in width, which has no counterpart in

section 43.025. In fact,

section 43.025(

d) is the only annexation provision that refers to the limits in

section 5.901, and it is applicable only to Type B municipalities. This is entirely consistent with the predecessors of sections 43.024 and 43.025. A Type B municipality (referred to as a town or village under the older statutes) was restricted to its original incorporated limits in annexing contiguous area. See former Tex. Rev.Civ.StatAnn. art. 1135 (1903) (repealed 1987) and art. 971 (1895) (repealed 1987). A Type A municipality (referred to as a city or town in the older statutes) was not so restricted. See former Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 974 (1875) (repealed 1987). In Cameron v.

Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.1981), we held: It is a rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose. Likewise, we believe every word excluded from a statute must also be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose. Id. at 540 (citations omitted). Laidlaw’s construction of the statute in this case violates both of these basic precepts. If, as Laidlaw argues, the territorial limits in

section 5.901 apply automatically to any annexation by a general-law municipality,

section 43.025(

d) is entirely superfluous. By the same token, Laidlaw’s construction assumes that the territorial limits were excluded from

section 43.024 for no purpose. When the Legislature employs a term in one

section of a statute and excludes it in another section, the term should not be implied where excluded. Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex.1980). This principle is related to a more general rule that courts should not insert words in a statute except to give effect to clear legislative intent. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex.1981). In this case, there is no clear legislative intent to apply territorial limits to annexations by Type A municipalities.

On the contrary, an examination of the statute as a whole reveals that the Legislature frequently treats Type A municipalities differently from Type B municipalities. See, e.g., TexLoc.Gov’t Code §§ 315.005 (Type A municipalities may operate free libraries); 341.001 (Type A municipalities may establish police forces); 341.021(e) (marshal of Type A municipality has same power as sheriff); 341.902 (Type A municipalities may build houses of correction); 342.001 (fire protection provisions apply only to Type A municipalities); 402.015 (Type A municipalities may provide municipal water supply system).

In light of these statutory distinctions, we would not be justified in assuming that the Legislature intended to apply the same rules to Type A and Type B municipalities. Laidlaw relies on lower court opinions in City of Northlake v. East Justin Joint Venture and Sentry Environmental, 873 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied) and City of Deer Park v. State ex rel. Shell Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 284 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 154 Tex. 174, 275 S.W.2d 77 (1955). In Deer Park, the court of appeals concluded that the city was governed by the limits applicable to Type B municipalities.

The court went on to note in dicta that the territorial limits would also apply to a Type A municipality. The court of appeals reasoned that allowing unlimited annexation would render the territorial limits “vain, futile and meaningless.” Deer Park, 259 S.W.2d at 287. In reviewing Deer Park, our Court expressly declined to reach the issue of whether the territorial limits apply to annexation by a Type A municipality. Deer Park, 275 S.W.2d at 82. Moreover, the Deer Park analysis is flawed in assuming that annexation would be unlimited in the absence of territorial restrictions.

Section 43.024 itself limits any given annexation to an area “one-half mile or less in width” and contiguous to the municipality. Tex.Loc. Gov’t Code § 43.024(a). In this respect,

section 43.024 is similar to sections 43.023 and 43.028, which limit the size of the area annexed but do not refer to the territorial restrictions in

section 5.901. Further, the Legislature has imposed additional limitations on annexation since Deer Park was decided.

Section 43.055 limits the total surface area that a municipality may annex in a calendar year. (The municipality cannot annex in excess of ten percent of its area as of January 1 of that year, plus any area carried over, as provided in that section.)

Section 43.051, which applies to all municipalities, provides that a municipality may annex only land that it owns or that is within its extraterritorial jurisdiction. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is a function of population. § 42.021. For example, a municipality with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants would have only one-half mile of extraterritorial jurisdiction. § 42.021(1). In light of these statutory restrictions, the fear of unfettered annexation in Deer Park is somewhat overstated. Northlake involved similar facts.

As in Deer Park, the court of appeals first concluded that Northlake was a Type B municipality, but went on to hold that the territorial limits would apply to a Type A municipality as well. Northlake, 873 S.W.2d at 419. The court explained the absence of a territorial restriction in

section 43.024 by pointing out that the predecessor to

section 43.024 was adopted before territorial limitations applicable upon incorporation were enacted in 1895. Id. If this reasoning were valid, the other annexation provisions adopted after 1895 should contain language similar to that of subsection (

d) of

section 43.025. Sections 43.023 (annexation by a municipality with a population of more than 5,000), 43.028 (annexation of certain sparsely populated areas) and 43.029 (annexation of unoccupied areas on petition of the school board), all adopted after 1895, contain no references to the territorial limits. Neither Deer Park nor Northlake offers a convincing rationale for disregarding the language of the statute. Under the terms of

section 43.024, the City of Wilmer may annex land without reference to the territorial limits imposed in

section 5.901. IV. Laidlaw also argues that the court of appeals erred in rendering judgment for the City. Specifically, Laidlaw contends that it raised fact issues as to (1) whether the metes and bounds description of the annexed property was proper, (2) whether the annexed property exceeded one-half mile in width, and (3) whether the City complied with the Open Meetings Act. With respect to the first two issues, Laidlaw did have standing as a private party to challenge the annexation.

See Alexander Oil, 825 S.W.2d at 438 (private party has standing when annexation exceeds statutory limitations or description of property does not close). As to the third issue, Laidlaw argues that the Open Meetings Act confers standing upon any interested person to prevent or undo governmental action that does not comply with the Act. See Tex.Gov’t Code § 551.142. Assuming without deciding that Laidlaw had standing to challenge the annexation under the Open Meetings Act, Laidlaw’s

summary judgment evidence failed to raise a fact issue as to any of the issues. In its motion for

summary judgment, the City presented evidence that its metes and bounds description was proper, that the annexed property was less than one-half mile in width, and that it complied with the Open Meetings Act. As a part of its response to the City’s motion, Laidlaw attached a copy of its verified original petition. Laidlaw asserts that the specific facts set out in its petition that are verified by two sworn statements are competent

summary judgment evidence. Generally, pleadings are not competent evidence, even if sworn or verified. Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 462 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Tex.1971). In Hidalgo, we recognized that some jurisdictions and at least one commentator would allow sworn pleadings to be used as proof in a

summary judgment proceeding if the pleadings set out in “great detail” the essential facts and were properly supported by a sworn statement. 462 S.W.2d at 544-45, (citing Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis, 102 So.2d 600 (Fla.1958), and 6 MooRe’s Federal Practice 2176 (2d. ed. 1960)). We noted that a Texas court of appeals had held to this effect. Pine v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n, 427 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ). Our Court concluded, however: On balance, we are convinced that orderly-judicial administration will be better served in the long run if we refuse to regard pleadings, even if sworn, as

summary judgment evidence.... If we took the opposite course, we would be confront ed with constant problems concerning whether there was an adequate showing that the person making oath was personally acquainted with the facts and was competent to testify to the facts alleged. Hidalgo, 462 S.W.2d at 545. We do not revisit this holding today in light of the fact that the sworn pleadings relied upon by Laidlaw do not otherwise meet the requirements of Rule 166a. Tex.

R.Civ.P. 166a. (“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”) The statements in the petition are conclusory. They do not set forth facts.

The sworn statement of one Larry Conwell states only “that he is personally familiar” with the following “facts”: “[t]he area proposed for annexation by defendant exceeds the statutory maximum one-half mile limitation,” and that the “boundary described by the metes and bounds contained in defendant’s proposed ordinance does not close.” These conclusory averments would be insufficient even if set out in a separate affidavit. There is no indication that Larry Conwell is competent to testify as to either of these matters. Laid-law also submitted a sworn statement from one Fran Stall.

She verified certain allegations relating to Laidlaw’s contention that the City failed to comply with the Open Meetings Act. With one arguable exception (the date of the public hearings), the statements she verified are likewise conclusory, and there has been no showing she is competent to testify to the matters set out in the petition. In the absence of any competent

summary judgment evidence, the court of appeals was correct in rendering judgment for the City. For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. . ECO Land, Inc. was also a plaintiff in the trial court and an appellee in the court of appeals. ECO did not file an application for writ of error in this Court and has not joined in Laidlaw’s application.