The Honorable Mark HENRY, County Judge of Galveston County, Appellant v. The Honorable Lonnie COX, Judge of the 56th District Court of Galveston County, Appellee, 483 S.W.3d 119

OPINION Terry Jennings, Justice In this interlocutory appeal, appellant, the Honorable Mark Henry, County Judge of Galveston County, challenges the district court’s order granting appellee, the Honorable Lonnie Cox, Judge of the 56th District Court añd Local Administrative Judge of Galveston County, a temporary injunction suspending the termination of the employment of Bonita Quiroga, the Galveston County Director of Judicial Administration, directing the' reinstatement of her employment, and enjoining Henry and “his agents, servants, and representatives, and those acting in concert with him,” from taking action against Quiroga, her department, and her staff In four issues, Henry contends that the “temporary injunction order has become moot on appeal,” the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the temporary injunction, the district court “did not validly exercise its supervisory jurisdiction” in granting the temporary injunction, and the temporary injunction is otherwise invalid.

We affirm. Background In his amended petition, Judge Cox alleges that in 2000, the judges of the Galveston County District Courts and County Courts at Law “selected” Quiroga as Director of Judicial Administration (“DJA”) and the Galveston County Commissioners Court approved their selection. Athough her DJA duties were “overwhelmingly judicial in nature,” Quiroga also performed certain duties for the county judge and commissioners. Fourteen years later, on July 24, 2014, Judge Henry, who had taken office in 2011, purported to unilaterally terminate Quiroga’s employment as DJA.

In the months that followed, certain Galveston Coujnty District Court Judges, County Court at Law Judges, and a Probate Court Judge (collectively, “the judges”), speaking through Judge Cox, the Local Administrative Judge, endeavored to reinstate Quiroga to her position. At Cox’s request, the Office of Court Administration of the State of Texas (“OCA”) sought an opinion in the matter from the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Texas (“OAG”).

In August 2014, Peri Bluemer, Chief Human Resources Officer for Galveston County, acting at Judge Henry’s direction, publicly posted Quiroga’s position to solicit applications, conducted telephone interviews with candidates, and began scheduling interviews with the three “finalists.” On September 24, 2014, the day that Bluemer had scheduled final interviews to begin, Judge Cox issued an order directing that Judge Henry and the commissioners cease searching for a replacement for Qui-roga.

Cox concluded that Henry’s termination of Quiroga’s employment as DJA was “void” because the judges, not Henry and the commissioners, had the authority to appoint and terminate the employment of court personnel; Henry’s termination of Quiroga’s employment and his proposed selection of a replacement violated the Separation of Powers Provision of the Texas Constitution and infringed on the inherent powers of the Galveston County Judiciary; and Henry’s actions constituted an illegal attempt to influence the appointment óf a person to a position authorized by the commissioners court for the department of another district, county or precinct officer in the county.

Days later, Judge Henry filed in this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus, requesting that this Court vacate Judge Cox’s order. After Henry notified the OAG of the filing of his mandamus petition, it declined to issue an opinion on the issue of Henry’s purported termination of the employment of Quiroga. And after this Court denied Henry mandamus relief, he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court, which also denied him relief Subsequently, OCA crafted a proposed compromise for the judges to submit to Judge Henry and the commissioners.

Under the proposed compromise, two separate positions would be created: (1) “Director of Court Administration” (“DCA”) and (2) a “public safety position.” Judge Henry and the commissioners requested that the judges submit a supplemental proposal regarding the salary for the newly proposed D.CA position. On May 12,2015, the judges attended a “compromise meeting workshop,” at which they submitted their recommendation that the newly proposed DCA position encompass certain duties and have an annual salary of no less than $85,000 and no more than $120,000.

On May 29,2015, after Judge Henry and the commissioners had not acted, the judges issued an order, concluding that it was “in the best interest of the Court system and the citizens of Galveston County to reinstate the position of Justice Administrator,” which' was to be filled by Quiroga, effective June 8, 2015. And Judge Cox issued an order to “carry out the reinstatement of Quiroga,” directing Henry to provide her with a key to her office, a personal computer with employee email access, and an office telephone.

Cox further ordered that Henry direct “Human Resources to allow [Quiroga] to complete all paperwork necessary for her to be reinstated as a full time employee” and the “Treasurer to reinstate and pay [Quiro-ga].” However, when Quiroga, accompanied by some of the judges and Galveston County Sheriff H. Trochessett, arrived at the Galveston County Justice Center on the morning of June 8, 2015, they found that the lock on Quiroga’s office door had been changed. After the Sheriff used his own key to admit Quiroga to her office, she discovered that her personal computer and telephone had been removed.

The next day, Quiroga arrived at the Justice Center to find that, once again, the lock on her -office door had been changed and she had been locked out. After Judge. Cox arranged for her to work, on her personal computer in an empty office space, Judge Henry scheduled a: meeting with the commissioners court to discuss the “[a]u-thority of county and [district [c]ourt judges to appoint administrative employees” and the filing of litigation against the judges and a judicial-conduct complaint against Cox.

Also on June 9, 2015, Judge Cox filed in the 405th District Court of Galveston County his original petition in the instant case, seeking injunctive relief. The district court subsequently granted a temporary restraining order, prohibiting Judge Henry and “all acting in concert with [him]” from taking any official action on the agenda posted for the special meeting of June 9, 2015.

In-response, Henry tabled matters in the commissioners court until June -13, .2015. ' And, at a June 13, 2015 “special meeting,” Henry and the commissioners “authorized” a reduction in the salary for -Quiroga’s position from $113,000 to $63,695. Even though, as noted by Cox, Henry and the commissioners, by comparison, had previously authorized a salary of $65,000 for a candidate who had been appointed to perform just “one” of Quiroga’s former duties.

In his amended petition, Cox sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief and a declaration that the “purported firing of [Quiroga] on July 24, 2014 was void and'is void at the present time”; “subsequent purported changes to the salary scale and administrative organization of the Galveston County Department of Justice Administration” are “void”; and Qui-roga’s salary is “as of the date of final judgment the same rate ... as was applicable on July 23, 2014.” In making his request for a temporary injunction, Judge Cox asked the district court to preserve the “last, actual, peaceable noncontested status that preceded the controversy.” He asserted that Judge Henry’s actions were causing harm to the Galveston County district and county courts, and he argued that the harm is “imminent and ongoing” because Henry was continuing to “reassign” department employees.

Cox further sought “to invoke statutory rights of non-interference”; “enforcement of constitutional rights and powers under the inherent power of courts to demand and receive adequate funding, personnel, and facilities”; and to “enforce the separation of powers” and “supervisory control” of district courts over Henry and the commissioners court.. And he requested an order enjoining “Henry and all those acting in concert with him” from: 1. Taking any action on the agenda items Nos. [enumerated], posted for the special meeting of June 9, 2015 and June 13, 2015, or any future action concerning those items[.] 2.

Barring entrance by [Quiroga] to that portion of the Galveston County Justice Center previously occupied by her as [DJA.] 3. Preventing or impeding in any way the provision of computer services to [Quiroga] ...[.] 4. Instructing any employee of Galveston County to disregard any directive, instruction, or request of [Quiroga] relating to the administration ...[.] 5. Appointing or employing any person other than [Quiroga] to perform the duties of specified above as the job description of the [DJA.] 7.

Employing or authorizing any person to fill the duties of the posts purportedly created and, pertaining to justice administration in the meeting of June 13,2015. 8. Reassigning or relocating any employee who occupies a position or duties which, as of July 23, 2014, reported to [Quiroga] as [DJA], including but not limited to ... Gra-cia, and Deputy Clint Purcell.

In his brief, filed in opposition to Judge Cox’s request for a temporary injunction, Judge Henry contended that Cox was seeking, “by way of temporary injunction,” the “very remedy (on many of the same grounds)” that Quiroga seeks “in her earlier filed lawsuit.” He asserted that if the district court granted Cox the temporary injunction, it would be awarding Quiroga the ultimate relief that she seeks, i.e., reinstatement of her employment.

Henry further argued that Cox’s lawsuit is moot because the commissioners court had already “abolished” Quiroga’s DJA position and, by order issued June 13, 2015, approved the judges’ application to appoint Quiroga to a new “court administrator position.” And he argued that Cox could not invoke the judges’ statutory right of noninterference because “Quiroga was never appointed to her position as Director” pursuant to statute.

At the temporary-injunction hearing, the district court admitted into evidence copies of a 1995 commissioners court, meeting agenda and minutes, which included “authorizing the employment of a Professional Services Director and Justice Administration Director submitted by the County Judge”; a May 1, 2000 letter .from the Honorable David E. Gamer, Judge of the 10th District Court of Galveston County, to then Galveston County Judge Jim Yar-borough; and a May 8, 2000 commissioner’s court agenda.

The minutes of the April 13, 1995 “Special Called Session” of the commissioners court reflects that the then commissioners court voted to appoint Ed Wells, who was then “employed as Court Administrator for the District Courts of Galveston County,” to “the Director of Justice Administration.” The commissioners agreed that “■[t]he duties of the position will include continuing helping the District Courts Administration, but also broadening that responsibility to the County Courts at Law and also the current Justices of the Peace throughout the county.” The minutes do not reflect that Wells was to perform any duties for the commissioners court.

After Wells had subsequently resigned his position, Judge Gamer, the Local Administrative Judge, acting on behalf of three district court judges, two county court at law judges, and a probate judge, submitted to then County Judge Yarbor-ough a May 1, 2000 letter, stating that "after careful’ consideration of the applications for the position of Director of Justice Administration for Galveston County,” the Galveston County judges collectively recommended that Bonnié Quiroga be appointed to fill the vacancy.

They further requested that the “matter be placed on the [commissioners court’s] agenda for action.” And the May 8, 2000 commissioners court agenda includes “Consideration of appointment of Director of Justice Administration submitted by the Administrative Law Judge.” The commissioners court subsequently ratified Quiroga’s appointment. The district court also admitted into evidence a 2005 “Job Description Certification,” signed by Quiroga, and various excerpts of “Program Budget[s]” from fiscal years 2004 and 2009 through 2012.

The excerpts contain, for each year, an organizational chart, which shows the “commissioners court” in a position over the department of “Justice Administration,” but includes in a position below the department only the duties of “Court Collections,” “Justice of Peace Task Force,” “Law Library,” and “Pre-Trial Release.” The 2005 “Job Description Certification” reflects that Quiroga reported to the “County Judge.” However, the “Position

Summary,” contained in the description, states that she “manages, coordinates, directs, and plans the operations and activities of all courts.” And it lists her “Essential Functions” as follows: • Oversees the Texas Fair Defense Act-Galveston' County Plan to ensure compliance with all procedures. • Prepares and presents monthly activity and status reports, as requested or required. • Provides on-call assistance to judiciary, county jail, and related county departments. • Develops, implements, and oversees collection procedures for the county courts. • Coordinates and schedules courtroom security. • Plans, schedules, and implements requests by visiting judges, including courtroom space, lodging, and travel • Audits and processes claims for payment of indigent representation. • Manages caseloads; develops and . implements more efficient procedures for processing dockets and ca-seflow. • Determines eligibility of attorneys to serve under the Texas Fair Defense ■ Act-Galveston County Plan. • Maintains statistical data and records on easeflow and case management. • Develops and implements automated documents for use by the court. • Provides for the comfort, convenience, and security of jurors. • Develops and maintains court calendar. , • Plans- and assigns space for court : hearings- and court-related services. • Assists in the preparation, review, and implementation of legislation affecting the courts and related county departmeiits. • Assesses and analyzes the court’s current and future technology needs. • Plans and coordinates training for court employees. • Inspects property in court, arranging for maintenance, repairs, and replacement as necessary. • Directs the administrative operations of the Justice Administration Department, including development of all department and court budgets, audit and approval of department expenditures arid payroll, supervision and discipline of employees, and related duties. • Performs other related duties as assigned.

Judge Henry testified that he took office as Galveston County Judge on January 1, 2011 and is a member of the commissioners court. From 2000 to July 24, 2014, Quiroga was the DJA and reported to the county judge and the commissioners court. He explained that “because it becamé convenient over time,” the DJA position had both judicial and non-judicial responsibilities. Henry admitted that on July 24, 2014, he terminated Quiroga’s employment solely on his own ‘initiative as county judge, and not on behalf of the commissioners court.

Although he had discussed terminating Quiroga’s employment with one of the other commissioners, he did not raise the matter at á commissioners court meeting, nor did he confer with the judges before terminating.her employment. Henry also conceded that neither he nor the commissioners court had given Quiroga any prior job performance reviews,' nor had there been any documented dissatisfaction with her job performance. However, he opined that it was “in the public’s best interest” to amend the 2015 fiscal-year budget and restructure and reorganize certain County departments.

He noted that after he had terminated Quiroga’s employment, “it was important to have that role filled,” and he assigned Bluemer to “spearhead[ ]’’ the effort. Judge Henry further testified that for “months”, after he. had terminated Quiro-ga’s employment, he and the judges had discussed the “possible mechanism by which [they] could appoint personnel.” And the judges “agreed” that the county law library, building facilities, personal bonds, and collections were “exclusively in the domain” of the commissioners court.

In May 2015, after the judges submitted an application to the commissioners court seeking a “pay grade” for the new position of DCA in the range of $85,000 to $120,000, Henry assigned his chief of staff, Tyler Drummond, to “find internal and external comparable[ ]” positions. Based on Drummond’s research,, Henry and the commissioners court, set an annual salary for the new DCA position at $63,695. And the district court admitted into evidence a June 9, 2015 commissioners court order, which shows that they set the salary range for the new DCA position at $57,705 to $63,695.

Although the commissioners court had, prior to Judge Henry’s purported termination of Quiroga’s employment, approved her DJA salary of $113,000, it cut the salary .for the new DCA position by $49,305 because, as per Henry, “all” the commissioners court “functions” were removed. He claimed that the new DCA position would have “approximately 25 percent of the responsibility that the old [DJA] position had,” based on the number of people reporting to‘the new DCA, although the number of judges to whom the DCA would report was not considered, nor was the gravity and time commitment of one duty over another.

Henry noted that the “Pre-Trial Release Department” had been renamed the “Personal Bond Office.” And he had hired one of the September 2014 candidates at an annual salary of $65,000 to perform pre-trial bond requests. Drummond testified that Judge Henry, in May 2015, asked him to assist in determining the salary range for the new DCA position. He explained that he based his research on the job description that the judges had submitted in their May 12, 2015 application.

And he noted that the commissioners court duties removed from the new DCA position included the law library, personal bond office, building facilities, and collections, which together had constituted a “significant portion” of the duties of the DJA. In arriving at his salary recommendation for the new DCA position, Drummond utilized various online resources and census data from Galveston and Cameron counties, and he' contacted three of the counties listed in the judges’ salary survey, as well as others.

He presented His findings to the commissioners court, and he drafted portions of their June 9, 2015 order setting the salary range for the new DCA position. Drummond explained that he graduated from Vermont Law School in 2012 and does not hold a Texas law license, has prior experience working for the Vermont Legislature, and took a statistics class and several economics classes in college. Drummond admitted that, in determining salary ranges for Galveston County positions, he does not apply any methodology that is generally accepted by counties in setting such salary ranges.

Bluemer testified that in early August 2014, Judge Henry “asked” her “to find candidates for [Quiroga’s] position as it stood, Director, of Justice Administration.” After she publicly posted the position, “probably a hundred, maybe 150” people applied for the job. Bluemer selected the “10 to 15” candidates who “fit the role.” She then conducted telephone interviews, narrowed the field to “four,” and set up interviews with Henry and Ryan Dennayd, Galveston County Commissioner, Precinct One. Ultimately, Henry and Dennard chose three “final” candidates, none of whom had experience in court administration.

One candidate “had formerly been an attorney” and “had a very passionate story to tell about his [previous] drug addiction.” Bluemer noted, however, that he “had a very strong passion for the judicial system” and “knew some of our players.” She also noted that “two members of the [district attorney’s] office” had applied for the position, but were eliminated as “way underqualified.” And a former Galveston County judge had applied, but did not “make the cut” for “the final three.” On cross-examination, Bluemer admitted that she.was not familiar with the court system and had no previous experience working in a courthouse or with any court administrators.

Judge Cox testified' that up until July 2014, his and Quiroga’s offices were located one floor apart at the Justice Center, he “saw her almost every day,” and they “talk[ed] all the time.” And he testified at length about her many essential duties to the judges in Galveston County. For instance, Quiroga “did the budget for all of the Courts, except the Probate Court; and she did the budget for the Department of Justice Administration.” And she was “instrumental” in developing, and “responsible” for administering, the judiciary’s “Fair Defense Plan,” which provides counsel to indigent parties.

A significant portion of her duties also involved the provision of interpreters. Noting that he was not warned prior to the termination of her employment, Cox chronicled the events, as outlined in his amended petition, surrounding Judge Henry’s lock-out of Quiroga from her office, removal of her personal computer and telephone, “filing [of] criminal trespass warnings or notices” against her, and attempts to conduct interviews for her replacement. Judge Cox explained that after he went to OCA for assistance with a compromise, the judges submitted a proposal to the commissioners court.

And the district court admitted into evidence the May 12, 2015 application submitted by the “Administrative Judges of the Galveston County District Courts, County Courts at Law, and Probate Court” to the commissioners, requesting approval to hire a “Director of Court Administration” with an annual salary range of $85,000 to $120,000. The judges’ application includes a job description and a “Salary Survey,” which provides the salary ranges, varying from a low of $45,894 to a high of $149,488, for court administrators in Bexar, Collin, Dallas, Denton, Tarrant, and Williamson counties.

The survey also indicates the number of courts to which each administrator reports. Judge Cox noted that the court administrators in Lubbock and Montgomery counties have annual salaries of $110,000 and $100,00d, respectively. Judge Cox further testified that at the May 12, 2015 workshop, Judge Henry expressly stated that “he would never pay” the new DCA in the judges’ requested salary range of $85,000 to $120,000. The judges, who had not had a court administrator since the purported termination of Quiroga’s employment ten months earlier, then began their attempt to reinstate her.

Cox explained that although the revised job description for the new DCA position does have fewer job duties with fewer employees reporting to the director, the proposed salary range . of $57,705 . to $63,695, based on his experience, is “ridiculously low.” Commissioner Dennard testified that although “[t]he judges were the primary customer of the Department of Justice Administration,” statutory amendments in 2005 and 2011. require • that “Personal Bond, Building Security,. Collections, and the Law Library” be supervised by the commissioners court.

After the hearing, the district court issued its temporary injunction order, finding, in pertinent part, as follows: ['Judge Henry] intentionally interfered with the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial functions .... Galveston County created an adminis- ' trative department to serve toe administrative needs of its courts and to assist county government in court related projects.

Fourteen years ago, the judges selected Bonnie Quiroga as the second director of Judicial Administration, and such selection was approved by the Commissioner’s Court. The testimony was that Ms. Quiroga had been employed by Galveston County for thirty years at the time [her employment] was terminated by [Henry] on July 24, 2014, so [she] was well known by the other employees and elected officials.

The director of th[e] hybrid judicial-governmental administrative department, called Justice Administration, reported to the County Judge for the county government related duties and to toe local Administrative Judge for the judicial administrative duties. The principal duties of Justice Administration are judicial administration. This department had a Director and other employees supervised by toé Director. Offices for Judicial Administration are located in' proximity to the Galveston County courts in the Galveston Justice Center.' The other-employees’ duties are judicial in nature.

The Director reported daily to the local Administrative Judge. The Director also reported to the County Judge for the government related projects.

On July 24, 2014, [Henry] terminated the employment of the Director of Judicial Administration from both her governmental related responsibilities as well as her duties to the Galveston County judiciary. [Henry] did not consult with the judiciary, nor did he advise the judiciary that he intended to terminate the Director of Judicial Administration’s duties performed for the Galveston County Courts. [Cox] disputes that grounds existed to terminate [Quiroga’s employment]. .... [Henry] placed his HR employee Peri Bluemer in charge of choosing the replacement [DCA]. In her testimony, Ms.

Bluemer demonstrated a lack of knowledge about courts, administrative duties of the court, and the nature of trust and confidence necessary in any person holding this sensitive court position. ... [Bluemer] used standards she designed to limit the consideration to only three applicants, eliminating applicants familiar with the Galveston County courts and attorneys in good standing with the State Bar, while including a wholly unacceptable applicant, who could not meet the standards of integrity necessary in such a sensitive position due to addiction to drugs and whose law license had been suspended-by the State Bar. ■ ■ The Court finds this qualification and interview process was designed to orchestrate the selection of the replacement administrator for the courts without ... the advice or consent of the judiciary.

The Court finds that ... [Henry] abandoned his plan to force a handpicked candidate as the judiciary’s chief administrative officer,- yet, used the ability to set the salary for the new position at a sufficiently low salary to continue to control the hiring process. [Henry’s] staff member Tyler Drum-mond was assigned to determine the salary for- the new judicial administrator, Mr. Drummond graduated from a Vermont law school two years ago and did not demonstrate knowledge -.about courts, administrative duties of the courts, and court administrators.

He had prior experience working for the Vermont legislature. ... [Drummond] performed his salary search without including the salaries from other area counties and without input from the Galveston judiciary, or the judiciary in any of his comparative counties. ... [And he] used standards he designed without sufficient expertise to establish an appropriate salary range for such a position. !.. [Drummond’s] salary survey process was arbitrary and designed to orchestrate the salary of the replacement administrator for the courts at the lowest possible level, improperly undermining the independence of the judiciary. [And] Henry’s attempts to force his will as to employmént of the judicial administrator included the attempt to intimidate the Galveston judges'by including filing complaints with the Judicial Conduct Commission as part of the Agenda for June 9 and June 13 Commissioner’s Court meetings.

The Court finds that [Cox] has demonstrated irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not issued as shown by the conduct of [Henry,] who attempted to stymie the effort of the judges to restore a judicial administrator by holding an emergency Commissioner’s .

Court meeting on June 13, 2015, to create a new judicial administrator position at the salary level [Henry] knew was at a salary level the judiciary-considered arbitrarily low to attract a suitable candidate. (Emphasis added.) The district court concluded, in pertinent part, as follows: • [Cox] has the probable right to recover relief in his suit that [Henry] may not eliminate and attempt to control the replacement of the administrator for the courts in Galveston County and, then, manipulate employment terms and applicants to replace the administrator position to eliminate suitable applicants; • [Cox] and the courts of Galveston County are irreparably injured by the acts committed by [Henry], and will be irreparably injured by further. , acts, to interfere with the administrative ability of the courts to perform their judicial junctions; • the last peaceable status quo should be restored pending final trial in the case; and, • if not enjoined, [Henry] will continue to deny administrative support for the Galveston Cdunty, courts, further interfering with the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial functions. (Emphasis added.) Based on its findings and conclusions, the district court ordered .Judge Henry, and “his agents, servants, and representatives, and aE those acting in concert with him”: [to] restore the employment of the Justice Administration Director [Quiroga] as an employee of Galveston County, under the same terms, judicial administrative organization, and salary scale of employment, as employed on July 23, 2014, to perform all administrative duties serving the courts of Galveston County as performed on July 23, 2014, which employment shall be supervised by the Galveston County local Administrative Judge.... ... [And] perform all necessary actions to carry out the reinstatement of [Quiro-ga] to her position as Galveston County Justice Administrator, including, but not limited to: a. issuing to [her] a key to her office in the Justice Center; b. directing IT to provide a computer and access to Galveston County Employee e-mail and other systems necessary for the performance of her job duties; c. providing [her] with a phone for her office; d. directing Human Resources to allow [her] to complete all paperwork for her to be reinstated, effective June 8,2015, as a full time employee; and e. directing the Treasurer to reinstate [her], effective June 8, 2015, and pay ... [her] her same salary as was paid prior to July 24, 2014.

The district court further enjoined Henry, “his agents, servants, and representatives, and all those acting in concert with him,” from: 1.Taking any action on the matters: (a)relating to [the] application by county and district court judges for authority to appoint administrative employees for the courts other than in compliance with this temporary in~ ■ junction; (

b) relating to justice administration other than in compliance with this temporary injunction; (

c) relating to Galveston County staff and agents regarding [Quiroga] other than in compliance with this temporary injunction; (

d) relating to Galveston County facilities used by Galveston County courts, court staff, and administrative staff other than in compliance with this temporary injunction; and (

e) relating to applications to appoint court administrative employees other than in compliance with this temporary injunction. 2. Barring entrance to the Galveston County Justice Center by Justice Administration personnel, including [Quiroga]. 3. Preventing or impeding in any way the provision of, and the use of, county equipment and furnishings necessary to Justice Administration personnel, including [Quiroga], to perform their administrative duties. 4.

Instructing any Galveston County employees to disregard directives, instructions, or requests of Justice Administration, including [Quiroga], to perform the duties of Justice Administration. 5. Appointing or employing any person other than [Quiroga] to perform the duties of [DJA] as directed by [Cox]. 6. Reassigning or relocating any employee who was an employee of Justice Administration on July 23, 2014, including but not limited to [Quiro-ga], Monica Gracia, and Deputy Clint Purcell. 7.

Taking any action to prevent or impede access by Justice Administration personnel, including [Quiroga], Monica Gracia, and Deputy Clint Purcell, to the offices occupied by Justice Administration on July 23, 2014.

The district court also ordered that Henry “his agents, servants, and representatives, and all those acting in concert with him,” restore Justice Administration under the same terms, judicial administrative organization, and salary scale of employment as existed on July 23, 2014, so that Justice Administration may perform all administrative duties serving the courts of Galveston County as performed on July 23, 2014, which duties shall be supervised by the Galveston County Administrative Judge. . (Emphasis added.) And it ordered that Henry “immediately provide written notice” of the court’s order to each of the commissioners and all County “Department Heads” and employees under the supervision of the commissioner’s court.

The district court further noted that its temporary injunction did not include Qui-roga “performing any duties relating to the law library,- pretrial, or -recovering costs.” And it set the case for trial and set a bond. , . Standard of Review The sole issue in a temporary injunction proceeding.is whether the applicant may preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex.2002).

The “status quo” is defined as “the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex.2004). To obtain a temporary injunction, an applicant is not required to establish that he will prevail upon a final trial on the merits, but must plead and prove (1) a cause of action against the defendant, (2) a probable right to the relief sought, and (3) a probable, imminent, and .irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Occidental Chem. Corp. v.

ETC NGL Transp., LLC, 425 S.W.3d 354, 363 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism’d). An irreparable injury is shown if there is no adequate remedy at law, i.e., the applicant cannot be adequately compensated in damages or damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary ' standard. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. We review the district court’s order granting the temporary injunction for a clear abuse of discretion. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1993); Occidental Chem. Corp., 425 S.W.3d at 363.

Accordingly, we will not reverse the 'district court’s order unless it is “so arbitrary as to exceed the bounds of reasonable discretion.” Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211; Occidental Chem. Corp., 425 S.W.3d at 363. The scope of our review is limited to the validity of the temporary injunction order; we do not review the merits of the underlying case. Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 58; INEOS Grp. Ltd. v. Chevron Phillips Chem.

Co., 312 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no. pet.). -We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling, drawing all legitimate inferences from the evidence, and deferring to the district court’s resolution of conflicting evidence. INEOS Grp. Ltd., 312 S.W.3d at 848. A court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law to established facts. Id. An abuse of discretion -does not occur as long as there is some evidence thát reasonably supports the court’s decision. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211.

The Inherent Powers of the Texas Judiciary At the outset, it must be noted that at the core of Judge Cox and the judges’ complaints against Judge Henry, and, thus, the resolution of most of the issues presented by Henry in his appeal of the district court’s temporary injunction, is the fundamental constitutional principle that the Texas Judiciary, as a separate, equal, and independent branch of government, has certain well-established, inherent powers. Texas courts “derive” their existence and “judicial power directly” from the Texas Constitution. Mays v.

Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex.1988) (Spears, J., concurring) (citing Tex. Const, art. V, § 1); see also Vondy v. Comm’rs Court of Uvalde Cty., 620 S.W.2d 104, 109-10 (Tex.1981); Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex.1979). Indeed, the ■ “judicial power” of Texas is “vested” in our constitutionally established courts, which constitute and operate as a separate and equal branch of government. Tex. Const, art. II, § 1; id. art. Y, § 1.

Moreover, the Texas Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, contains á specific, strongly-worded provision, entitled “The Powers of Government,” which mandates a strict separation of powers among the state’s Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments. See Tex Const, art. II, § 1. And the drafters of the Texas- Constitution thought the provision so important that they placed it in

article II, ahead of the separate articles establishing the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments of the state’s government. See id. .arts. Ill, IV, V. Only-the Texas Bill of Rights, contained in

article I of the Constitution, precedes the Separation of Powers Provision in prominence of place. See id. art. I, §§ 1-34.

The provision expressly states: The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another[;] and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted. Id. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added).

The judicial power of the state is divided among the various constitutionally established courts- “by means of express grants of jurisdiction contained in the constitution and statutes.” " Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398. In addition to these express grants of judicial power, courts have “inherent” and “implied” powers “not expressly authorized or described by the constitution or statute.” Id. (emphasis added). These powers are “woven into the fabric of the constitution by virtue of their origin in the common law” and “the mandate-of ... the separation of powers between three co-equal branches.” Id. (citing Tex.

Const, art. II, § 1). As explained by the Texas Supreme Court: The inherent judicial power of a-court is not derived from legislative grant or specific constitutional provision, but from the very fact that the court has been created and charged by the constitution with certain duties and responsibilities. Thé inherent powers of a court are those which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, ‘in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and integrity.

Inherent power of the courts has existed since the days of the Inns of Court in common law- English jurisprudence — It also springs from the doctrine of separation- of powers between the three governmental branches.... This power exists to enable our courts to effectively perform their judicial functions and to protect their dignity, independence and integrity. Id. at 388-89 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

In Vondy, the Texas Supreme Court further explained that Texas courts have the inherent powér to compel payment of sums of money if they are reasonable and necessary in order to carry out the court’s mandated responsibilities. 620 S.W.2d at 109. This inherent power is “necessary for the judiciary to carry out its functions, independently of the other branches of government,” and “protect and preserve the judicial powers from impairment or destruction.” Id.

The court noted that courts across the nation have employed their inherent powers to hire staff and require that salaries be paid for secretaries, probation officers, and assistants. Id. at, 110 (citations omitted). It also noted that in 1867, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania required a county to compensate a constable for his services because of the benefit derived by the county for such services in the preservation of 'order and administration of justice. Id. (citing Lancaster Cty. v. Brinthall, 29 Pa. 38, 40 (1857)).

Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court held that “the county commissioners of Uvalde County must compensate the county’s constables” because “[t]he judicial system of this state cannot function properly if those officials who are responsible for carrying out certain duties in that process áre not properly compensated” and “[i]t is the duty of the commissioners court to provide process servers as a necessary part of the proper administration of justice in this state, and to compensate them adequately.” Id. (citations omitted).

The court noted the fact that the commissioners court “is also part of the judicial branch of this state.” Id. - (citing Tex. Const, art V, § 1).- But it concluded “this fact does not alter oftr powers to protect and preserve the judiciary by compelling payment for process servers.” Id, In fact, when making fiscal and budgetary decisions, a commissioners court exercises its legislative function. ' See Comm’rs Court of Titus Cty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex.1997).

And, as emphasized by the court, The legislative branch- of this state has the duty tb' provide the judiciary with the funds necessary for the judicial branch to function adequately. If this were not so, a legislative body could destroy the judiciary by refusing to adequately fund the courts. The judiciary must have the authority to prevent any interference with or impairment of the administration of justice in this state. Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 110 (emphasis added).

Again emphasizing that Texas courts derive their, judicial power, directly from the constitution and it “expressly mandates , a separation of governmental powers,” the Texas Supreme Court, in Mays, expressly stated that “even .in the absence of a statutory provision, a court has the inherent power to compel the expenditure of those public funds which are reasonably necessary for the court, to efficiently fulfill its-,constitutional function.” 755 S.W.2d at 80 (citing Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109-10; Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398-99).

Thus, “[o]n this basis alone, a district judge may set a reasonable salary” for court staff. Mays, 755 S.W.2d at 80. Writing for the majority of the court in Mays, Justice Franklin Spears further elaborated: Like the power to punish for contempt, a court’s inherent power to compel funding flows from the law of self-preservation. No legislative authority, state or local, can so tighten the purse strings of the judiciary’s budget that it fails to provide the funds reasonably necessary for the court’s efficient and effective operation.

To adhere to any contrary view would effectively concede to the legislature the power to render inoperative the judicial branch of government. It could force the judiciary into the role of a subordinate and supplicant governmental service — in effect, a mere agency. The judiciary is not an agency, but is a constitutionally established separate, equal and independent branch of government. Id. (citing LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex.1986)) (emphasis added).

Thus, the “inherent power of the courts is necessary not only to preserve the judicial branch of government, but also to preserve for the people their security and freedom.” Id. Indeed, The judicial power provides a check on the abuse of authority by other governmental branches. If the courts are to provide that check, they cannot be subservient to the other branches of government but must ferociously shield their ability to judge independently and fairly. This is the essence of our very existence; we owe the people of Texas no less than our unflinching insistence on a true tripartite government.

It is the responsibility of this court to preserve this constitutional framework. The inherent power of the courts to compel funding thus arises out of principles and doctrines that are so thoroughly embedded as to form the very foundation of our governmental structure. The judiciary may often be denominated as the “third” branch of government, but that does not mean it is third in importance; it is in reality one of three equal branches. As such, the judiciary is an integral part of our government and cannot be impeded in its function by legislative intransigence in funding. Id. at 80-81 (emphasis added).

Again, the court in Mays noted that courts across the nation have used their inherent powers to compel funding for a wide variety of essentials, including janitorial services, chairs and carpeting, tape recording equipment, telephone services, and air conditioning equipment. Id. at 80-82 (citations omitted). And “[njumerous courts have held that the hiring of court personnel and the designation of staff salaries are matters over which courts may properly exercise their inherent powers.” Id. at 82 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

With this in mind, the court noted that the Supreme Court of Indiana had expressly recognized that the “power of the courts to employ necessary personnel and fix their salaries” is “grounded on the most fundamental of constitutional principles.” Id. (citing Noble Cty. Council v. State ex. rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709, 714 (1955)). And it quoted the Indiana court’s reasoning: These [constitutional] mandates necessarily carry with them the right to quarters appropriate to the office and personnel adequate to perform the functions thereof.

The right to appoint a necessary staff of personnel necessarily carries with it the right to have such appointees paid a salary commensurate with their responsibilities. The right cannot be made amenable to and/or denied by a county council or-the legislature itself. Our courts are the bulwark, the final authority which guarantees to every individual his right to breathe free, to prosper and be secure within the framework of a constitutional government. The arm which ■ holds the scales of justice cannot be shackled or made impotent by either restraint, circumvention or denial by another branch of that government.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Noble Cty. Council, 125 N.E.2d at 714). The court in Mays also noted that many courts have “expressly concluded that, as a matter of constitutional law, the judiciary must directly control court personnel.”. Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the court further explained that “courts may even compel payment of those expenses which are reasonably necessary for the court to exercise its inherent powers.

Thus, if it becomes necessary for a court to retain counsel in order to litigate an exercise' of inherent powers, then payment of attorney fees may also be compelled.” Id. (citation omitted). With these ■ important constitutional principles in mind, we turn to the issues presented in this appeal.

Mootness In his first issue, Judge Henry argues that the district court’s temporal^ injunction has become moot on appeal because the Texas Legislature recently amended the Texas Government Code to, “fflor the first time,” provide “specific authority for the creation of a county-funded court administrative system for the district courts collectively in counties like Galveston County” and the amendment became effective on September 1, 2015. (Emphasis added.) See Act of May 27, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., S.B.1913, ch. 966,'§ 1-2 (codified as an amendment to Tex Gov’t.

Code Ann. § 75.4Q1) (referred to hereafter as Tex Gov’t Code Ann., § 75.401. (Vernon Supp.2015)). He further argues that because the “new amendments to

section 75.401” “now give authority to the judges in Galveston County” “to appoint Ms. Qui-roga to the new Court Administrator position,” “where she would, be supervised by those judges and serve at their pleasure,” and “now clearly, gives” the commissioners court “the authority to set the salary for that position,” the temporary injunction “does not have any practical effect oh an existing controversy.” (Emphasis added.) “[Cjourts have an obligation to take into account intervening events that may render a lawsuit moot.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 166-67 (Tex.2012).

Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to' decide moot controversies and render advisory opinions. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex.1999). A justiciable controversy between the parties must exist at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal, or the case is moot. Williams v.

Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex.2001). “If a controversy ceases to exist — the issues presented are no longer' ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome — the case becomes moot.” Id The same is true if an' appellate court’s judgment cannot have any practical legal effect upon á then existing controversy. Zipp v. Wuemling, 218 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Tex.2007). A case may' btecome moot by reason of new legislation or acts that supersede existing legislation. In re Gruebel, 163 S.W.3d 686, 689 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding).

However, a case is not moot if some issue is still in controversy. Id.

Section 76.401, as amended, provides: (

a) In a county that has more than one district court or statutory county •‘court, those courts may establish and maintain,' on approval of the commissioners court, a court administrator system. . (

b) The judges of the district courts or the statutory county courts may by local rule designate, local court divisions and the duties of - the court administrator for each division, if applicable. The eourt administrator shall cooperate with regional, presiding, and local administrative judges and state agencies having duties re- . lating to the operation of the courts to promote uniform and efficient administration of justice. (

c) The court administrator is appointed by the judges of the district courts or the statutory county courts served by the court administrator. The court administrator serves at the pleasure of those judges. (

d) A court administrator is entitled to reasonable compensation, as- determined by the judges served and in the salary range for the position, as set by the commissioners court. (

e) The judges of the courts served by the court administrator, with the approval of the commissioners court, shall appoint appropriate staff and support personnel according to the needs of the local jurisdiction. (

f) On order and directive of the judges, the commissioners court shall fund the court administrator system from fines collected by the courts served by the court administrator. If the fines collected are insufficient to provide the -total funding for the program, the county shall provide the . additional funds needed. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 75.401 (emphasis added). The legislature explained that it amended

section 76.401 because “interested parties” had “contend[ed] that there [was] a need to clarify the statutory authority of judges to hire a county court administrator in a county served by multiple district courts and statutory county courts.” House Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B.1913, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015) (emphasis added). The previous version of

section 75.401 discussed the authority of courts in counties with “more than one” “county criminal court or more than one county court at law” “to establish a court administrator system.” Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, §■ 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2015 (amended 2009). The amended version discusses the establishment and maintenance of a court administrator system by courts in counties that have “more than one district court or statutory county court.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 75.401(a). The current version of

section 75.401, as did the previous version, recognizes that the court administrator “is appointed by the judges” of the courts served by the administrator and “serves at” their “pleasure.” Compare Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 75.401(b), (c), with Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2015 (amended 2009). Moreover, the current version of

section 75.401, as did the previous version, recognizes that a court administrator “is entitled to reasonable compensation.” Compare Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §' 75.401(d), with Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2015 (amended 2009). Judge Cox argues that the district court’s temporary injunction is not moot because, regardless of the recent changes made to

section 75.401, this case “directly involves the constitutional prerogative of the trial judges, who have a wellestabl-ished right to select judicial personnel and to have them reasonably compensated by the commissioners.” See Mays, 755 S.W.2d at 80-82; Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109-10. He asserts that these rights are “recognized” in

section 75.401 and Judge Henry and the commissioners court, relying on the fact that the legislature has recently amended the statute, are merely attempting “to rig” the compensation of the court administrator “so as to” illegally “control [the] selection process.” Cox further asserts that Henry illegally “fire[d] Ms.

Quiroga,” “arrogate[d] to himself and his staff the selection of a successor,” and “compounded the harm by attempting to cut the.judges out of the selection pro-, cess,” “flimflam[ing] the system by a stacked salary review.” Judge Cox notes that at the time Judge Henry purportedly terminated Quiroga’s employment in July 2014, her compensation was set and approved by the commissioners court at $113,000. Henry then, based on Drummond’s unfounded “research,” recommended, and the commissioners court approved, a salary range of $57,705. to $63,695 for the “new” court administrator position.

And Cox asserts that the judges cannot hire a qualified court administrator at a salary within that range, nor can they set any level of compensation within that range that would be “reasonable.” See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 75.401(d). We first note that Judge Henry’s argument that the district court’s temporary injunction is moot is based entirely on the false premise that the “new amendments to

section 75.401,” “[fjor the first time,” gavé the Galveston County Judiciary the authority “to 'appoint Ms. Quiroga to the new position of Court Administrator.” Henry, in making this assertion, ignores the fact, as found by the district court, that the judges had “[flourteen years ago” “selected” Quiroga as the second DJA. And he ignores the well-established constitutional, .principle that Texas judges have the “inherent power to act to protect and preserve the proper administration of the judicial system.” Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109.

As noted above, this includes the inherent power to hire staff and “eompel the payment of sums of money if they are reasonable and necessary in order to carry out the court’s responsibilities.” Id. at 109-10. The legislature, in amending

section 75.401, did not, as Henry asserts, “[f]or the first time” give the Galveston County Judiciary the authority to appoint Quiroga to her position. ' It merely, in its own words, at the request of “interested parties,” “clarified ” the judges’ “statutory authority to do. so.” House Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B.1913, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015) (emphasis added). More important, the fact that the legislature amended

section 75.401 does not in any way “moot” the district court’s findings that . : • [Judge Cóx] has the’probable right ■ to. recover relief- in his suit that ' [Judge Henry] may not eliminate and attempt to control the replacement of the administrator for the courts 'in Galveston County and, then, manipulate employment terms and applicants to replace the administrator position to eliminate suitable applicants; • [Cox] and the courts of Galveston County are. irreparably injured by the acts committed by [Henry], and will be irreparably injured by further acts, to interfere with the administrative ability of the courts to perform their judicial functions; • the last peaceable status quo should be restored pending final trial in the case; and, • if not enjoined, [Henry] will continue to deny' administrative support for the Galveston County courts, further interfering with the independence of the Gcdveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its ‘judicial functions. (Emphasis added.) Specifically, in regard to Quiroga’s position and salary as Galveston County DJA, the district court found: • [Judge Henry] intentionally interfered with the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial functions. ... •' Fourteen years ago, the judges selected Bonnie Quiroga as the second director of Judicial Administration, and such selection was approved by the Commissioner’s Court.... • The director of th[e] hybrid judicial-governmental administrative department, called Justice Administration, reported to the County Judge for the county government related duties and to the local Administrative Judge for the■ judicial administrative d/uties.

The principal duties of Justice Administration are judicial administration.— The Director reported daily to the local Administrative Judge.

The Director also reported to the County Judge for the government related projects. • On July 24, 2014, [Henry] terminated the employment of the Director of Judicial Administration from both her governmental related responsibilities as well as her duties to the Galveston County judiciary. [Henry] did not, consult with the judiciary, nor did he advise the judiciary that he intended to terminate the Director of Judicial Administration’s duties performed for the Galveston County Courts.... • [Henry’s] qualification and interview process was designed to orchestrate the selection of the replacement administrator for the courts without ... the advice or consent of the judiciary .... • [Henry] abandoned ■his plan to force a hand-picked candidate as the judiciary’s chief administrative officer, yet, used the ability to set the salary for the new position at a sufficiently low salary to continue to control the hiring process. • [Henry’s] staff member Tyler Drummond was assigned to determine the salary for the new judicial administrator.... • [Drum-mond’s] salary survey process was arbitrary and designed to orchestrate the salary of the replacement administrator for the courts at the lowest possible level, improperly undermining the independence of the judiciary. • [And Henry] attempted to stymie the effort of the judges to restore a judicial administrator by holding an emergency Commissioner’s Court meeting on June 13, 2015, to create a new judicial administrator position at the salary level [Henry] knew was at a salary level the judiciary considered arbitrarily low to attract a suitable candidate. (Emphasis added.) The evidence presented at the injunction hearing supports the district court’s findings, which Henry does not challenge.

Commissioner Dennard admitted that “[t]he judges were the primary customer of the Department of Justice Administration.” Regardless, Henry, himself, testified that on July 24, 2014, he terminated Quiroga’s employment solely on his own initiative as county judge. Although he had discussed terminating Quiroga’s employment with one of the county commissioners, he did not raise the matter at a commissioners court meeting, nor did he confer with the judges before terminating her employment.

Henry also conceded that neither he nor the commissioners court tad given Quiroga any prior job-performance reviews, nor had there been any documented dissatisfaction with her job performance. He simply opined that it was “in the public’s best interest” to amend the 2015 fiscal-year budget and restructure and reorganize certain County departments. Henry noted that after he had terminated Quiroga’s employment, “it was important to have that role filled,” and he then assigned, again without consulting Judge Cox and the judges, his own staff to “spearhead[ ]” the effort and set a salary range for the new position.

And although the commissioners, in the June 9, 2015 order, set the salary range for the new DCA position at $57,705 to $63,695, Drum-mond admitted that, in determining salary ranges for County'positions, he does not apply any methodology that is generally accepted by counties in setting such salary ranges. As noted above, Judge Cox testified’ at length about Quiroga’s many duties to the Galveston County Judiciary. And the district court admitted into evidence Quiro-ga’s 2005 “Job Description Certification,” the “Position

Summary” of which states that she “manages, coordinates, directs, arid plans the operations "and activities of all courts” and lists her numerous “Essential Functions.” Cox explained that'he was not warned prior to the termination of Quiroga’s employment, and he chronicled the subsequent events, including Judge Henry’s lock-out of Quiroga from her office, removal of her personal computer and telephone, “filing [of] criminal trespass warnings or notices” against her, and attempts to conduct interviews for her replacement.

Cox further testified that, based on his experience, Drummond’s proposed salary range" is “not an adequate salary for this position.” And the judges, in their May 12, 2015 application to the commissioners court to approve the hiring of a DCA at an annual salary of $85,000 to $120,000, included a job description and a “Salary Survey.” The Salary Survey includes the salary ranges, which vary from a low of $45,894 to a high of $149,488, for court administrators in . Bexar, Collin, Dallas, Denton, Tarrant, and Williamson counties and indicates the 'number of courts to which each administrator reports.

Cox also testified that Lubbock and, Montgomery counties reported court administrator annual salaries of $110,000 and $100,000, respectively. Judge Cox further explained that despite this evidence, Judge Henry, at the end of one of the May 2015 “workshops,” stated that “he would never pay” the director in the judges’ requested salary range of $85,000 to ■ $120,000.

And Cox noted that although the revised job description for the position of court administrator eliminates duties in regard.to the law library,, building facilities, pre-trial release, and collections and has fewer reporting employees, Henry’s proposed salary range is, based on Cox’s experience, “ridiculously low.” Moreover, the judges have not had a court administrator since Henry purportedly terminated Quiroga’s employment on July 24, 20Í4. .

Judge Henry did testify that he and the commissioners court reduced the salary range for the “new” DCA because “all” of the commissioners court “functions” had been removed from the duties of the position. And he asserted that the “new” DCA position has “approximately 25 percent of the responsibility that the old DJA position had,”, based on the number of people reporting to the director. However, he conceded that he, in proposing the new salary range, did not consider the number of elected officials to whom the director reports, nor did he consider the importance of one duty over another.

Although Henry asserts that Judge Cox has not attempted to hire a court administrátor in the proposed salary range, this assertion wrongly presumes that Henry had the legal authority to terminate Quiroga’s employment, in regard to her duties to Cox and the judges, in the first place. This' issue is yet to be decided by the district court. Moreover, the evidence reveals that Henry himself was unable to fill the position with a qualified candidate.

Bluemer testified that after she had publicly posted the position, she selected the “10 to 15” candidates who “fit the role,” conducted telephone' interviews, narrowed the field to “four,” and set up interviews with Henry and Dennard. Ultimately, Henry and Dennard -chose three “final” candidates, none of whom, according to Bluemer, had any experience in court administration. ■ ■ We defer to the district court’s resolution of conflicting evidence. See INEOS Grp. Ltd., 312 S.W.3d at 848.

The district court was free. to believe Judge Cox, and credit evidence in his favor, and to disbelieve Judge Henry, and discredit evidence in his favor. Based on the evidence, the district court could have reasonably concluded, as it did, that Henry, by purporting to unilaterally terminate Quiroga’s employment, had intentionally denied administrative support for Cox and the. judges and interfered with the independence of the Galveston County Judiciary and its ability to perform its judicial functions.

And, based on the evidence, the district court could have reasonably concluded, as it did, that Henry would continue to do so. Thus, the district court’s issuance of the temporary injunction was in accord with the valid exercise of its inherent power to act to protect and preserve the proper administration of justice. And the recént amendments to

section 75.401, which became effective on September 1, 2015, do not vitiate the district court’s findings and conclusions. Although

section 75.401 recognizes that the commissioners court has the discretion to set a salary range for Quiroga’s position, this power cannot be used arbitrarily or unreasonably or in a manner that interferes with - Judge Cox and the judges’ inherent powers and abilities' to perform their judicial functions, effectively. See Mays, 755 S.W.2d at 83; Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109-10; Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398-99. The ultimate resolution of the salary dispute is yet to be decided by the district court and is outside, the scope of our review, which is limited to the validity of the temporary injunction. See INEOS Grp.

Ltd., 312 S.W.3d at 848. We conclude that there remains a justi-ciable controversy regarding Judge Henry’s purported termination of Quiroga’s employment and his attempts, as found by the district court, ⅛> influence the judges’ decision to keep Quiroga as their administrator and interfere with the independence and ability of the judges to perform their duties by setting an “arbitrarily low” salary range for her position. See Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109-10; Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 399; Griffin v. Birkman, 266 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. denied); Hooten v.

Enriquez, 863 S.W.2d 522, 528-29 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, no pet.). Accordingly, we hold that the district court’s temporary- injunction order is not moot. We overrule Judge Henry’s first issue.

Jurisdiction 'In his second issue, Judge Henry argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the temporary injunction because Judge Cox “lack[s] standing to seek an injunction reinstating [Quiroga] to her old job at her old salary”; “[legislative immunity bars this suit ... as a matter of law"; and “the other county commissioners are indispensable partiés and their absence is jurisdictional.”' Whether a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of -law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex.2004).

Standing Judge Henry first argues that Judge Cox “lacked standing to seek an injunction” because “[t]he injury alleged in this case was suffered only by Bonita Quiro-ga — being terminated from- her job”-’as -DJA. He asserts that Cox “did not demonstrate that he had standing ‘in his official capacity-;.as Judge:of the 56th District Court of Galveston County to seek an injunction reinstating Ms.

Quiroga to her old job ” In' response, Judge Cox asserts that “Quiroga'was not the only party injured”; rather, “[a]nother distinct casualty was the constitutionally’ grounded ability of judges to select competent personnel and to have them adequately compensated.” Standing is implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a ease. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.1993). Thus, standing is never presumed, cannot be waived, and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 443-44.

The test for standing requires that there be a real controversy between the parties that will actually be determined by the judicial declaration sought. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex.1996). Without a breach of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff, no cause of action can accrue to his benefit. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex.1976). A plaintiff has standing when he is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether he is acting with legal authority. Nootsie, Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 661.

He has standing if: (1) he has sustained, or is immediately in' danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the wrongful act of which he complains; (2) he has a direct relationship between the alleged injury and claim sought to be adjudicated; (3) he has an individual stake in the controversy; (4) the challenged action has caused him some injury in fact; or (5) he is an appropriate party to assert the public’s interest in the matter as well as his own interest. Lake Medina Conservation Soc., Inc./Bexar-Medina Atascosa Counties WCID No. 1 v. Tex. Nat. Res.

Conservation Comm’n, 980 S.W.2d 511, 515-16 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied); Billy B., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ). A plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively demonstrate a court’s jurisdiction to hear a cause. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. And we construe the allegations in the pleadings in favor of the pleader. Id. A court deciding an issue of standing is not required to look solely to the pleadings, but may consider evidence, and must do so when necessary, to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Bland Indep.

Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex.2000); In re Shifflet, 462 S.W.3d 528, 537 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding). A challenge to standing cannot be used to require the party to prove his entire case but should be limited to facts that might be characterized as primarily jurisdictional. See Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554; In re Shifflet, 462 S.W.3d at 537.

Judge Henry’s argument that Judge Cox lacks standing to seek injunc-tive relief from the district court is based on the false premise that “[t]he injury alleged in this case was suffered only by Bonita Quiroga — being terminated from her job” as DJA. (Emphasis added.) In fact, Cox alleges that he suffers “imminent, “ongoing,” and “irreparable” harm because Henry has interfered with the ability of Cox’s court to properly perform its judicial functions.

And Cox seeks “enforcement of constitutional rights and powers under the inherent power of the courts to demand and receive adequate funding, personnel and facilities.” As noted above, the district court expressly found that Judge Henry “intentionally interfered with the independence of the Galveston County [Jjudiciary” and its ability to “perform its judicial functions.” It further found that Henry “will continue to deny administrative support for the Galveston County courts, further interfering with the independence of the Galveston County [Jjudiciary” and its ability to “perform its judicial functions.” In support of that finding, Judge Cox testified that Judge Henry, without notice to Cox and the judges, had dismantled the Department of Justice Administration, unilaterally terminated the employment" of Quiroga, and begun reassigning court staff.

And since September 24, 2014, Cox and his colleagues have been without a DJA, and, thus, without an executive to perform numerous “essential- functions,” including assisting with and managing caseloads and -implementing efficient docket control; training court staff; arranging for personal bonds (pretrial); arranging for interpreters; determining the eligibility for and appointing indigent defense counsel;, and .providing for the comfort, convenience, and security of jurors.

Cox further testified that the new salary range proposed by Drummond and Henry is so unreasonably low that the judges cannot fill it with a qualified candidate. Accordingly, we hold that Judge Cox has sufficiently alleged facts and presented evidence affirmatively demonstrating his standing to bring the instant suit against Judge Henry. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443-44; see generally Cty. Comm’rs Court of Dall. Cty. v.

Williams, 638 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (practicing attorney, “due to the special interest attorneys have in their profession,” had standing to enjoin commissioners court from enforcing order allocating courtroom and library space).

Legislative Immunity Judge Henry next argues that “legislative immunity bars Judge Cox’s suit against” him “as a matter of law” because Cox’s claims involve Henry’s “performance,” as a member of the commissioners court, of “legislative functions and duties.” in “passing and ^effectuating [commissioners court] orders” terminating Quiroga’s employment as DJA, creating the “new administrator position,” and setting the salary range for the new position.” Legislative immunity protects -individuals from “personal liability” for actions performed in their legislative capacity.

In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857, 859 (Tex.2001). “ ‘When officials are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant to their official duties, they may well be induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide'their conduct.’ ” Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)); see also Hays Cty. v. Hays Cty. Water Planning P’ship, 106 S.W.3d 349, 359 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).

Here, Judge Cox does not sue Judge Henry in his personal capacity; rather, Cox sues Henry in his official capacity as county judge. Moreover, .although Henry filed, in the district court, a plea to the jurisdiction, Re did not raise an immunity defense, but instead advanced other grounds. Immunity from liability does not affect a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). Like other affirmative defenses to liability, it must be pleaded or it is waived,- Id.; see Tex.R. Civ.

P. 94. ' Accordingly, we hold that Judge Cox’s suit is not barred by legislative immunity. Indispensable Parties Judge Henry next argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction against him because Judge Cox did not join the county commissioners, or the commissioners court as a whole, as parties to the suit. Henry asserts that the commissioners are “indispensable parties and their absence is a fatal jurisdictional defect.” Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (

a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims, an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (

i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to jprotect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.... (

b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.

The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-joinder. Tex.R.

Civ, P. 39(a) — (b). “Although [rule 39] provides for joinder in mandatory terms, ‘there is no arbitrary standard or precise formula for determining whether a particular person falls within its provision.’ ” Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 255 S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Cooper v. Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex.1974)); see also Kodiak Res., Inc. v. Smith, 361 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2012, no pet.). If a district court determines that an absent. person falls within the provisions of the rule, it has á duty to effect that person’s joinder.

Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 184; see Tex.R. Civ. P. 39(a). If a person required -to, be joined under subsection (

a) cannot be joined, the district eóurt must deéide “whether in equity and in good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed” by considering the factors listed in subsection (b). . Id. ; see Tex.R. Civ. P. 39(b); State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Herrera, 288 S.W.3d 543, 549 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.). “At one time, it was at least theoretically possible that the joinder of a person could be so essential to a case that proceeding in the person’s absence would constitute fundamental error, which could be raised for the first time on appeal.” Onwudiegwu v.

Dominguez, No. 14-14-00249-CV, 2015 WL 4366213, at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 106).

However, the Texas Supreme .Court has held that since rule 39 was amended, a party complaining of a nonjoined person’s absence waives that complaint by failing to raise it in.the district court, explaining that [h]enceforth, it will be rare indeed when an áppellate court properly determines that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute when the nonjoining person’s absence is raised for the first time on appeal by one of the parties in the trial court, at least insofar as the judgment affects parties who participated in the trial, directly or indirectly, or who purposely bypassed the proceedings.

The doctrine of fundamental error should. no longer protect, persons from the binding force of,judgments when they have had an opportunity to raise the absence of the nonjoined person and waived it. Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 162-63 (Tex.2004) (issue of suit dismissal because zoning board not joined as defendant constituted “prudential rather than jurisdictional quéstion”); see also Trust Fund for Haynes v. Walden on Lake Conroe Cmty. Imp.

Ass’n, Inc., No. 09-04-374 CV, 2006 WL 137434, at *3 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Jan. 19, 2006, no pet.) (mem.op.) (issue of whether party indispensable waived by failure to raise it in trial court); Wilchester W. Concerned Homeowners LDEF, Inc. v. Wilchester W. Fund, Inc., 177 S.W.3d 552, 558-60 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (non-joinder not jurisdictional and waived because not raised in trial court). Courts have held that 'there are “rare cases in which failure to name an indispensable party will deprive a court of jurisdiction,” i.e., “where a party responsible fo

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