JING YUN JIANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Respondent, 353 F. App'x 634

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Jing Yun Jiang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the September 8, 2008 order of the BIA affirming the November 30, 2006 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Steven R. Abrams denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jing Yun Jiang, No. [ A XXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 8, 2008), aff'g No. [ A XXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 30, 2006). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

When the BIA agrees with the IJ’s conclusion that a petitioner is not credible and, without rejecting any of the IJ’s grounds for decision, emphasizes particular aspects of that decision, we review both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions. See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005). We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2008). We review de novo questions of law and the application of law to undisputed fact. See Salimatou Bah v.

Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008).

Jiang does not challenge the IJ’s findings that: (1) her testimony was internally inconsistent regarding why she failed to tell U.S. border patrol agents that she was persecuted on account of her Falun Gong activities in China; (2) her testimony regarding the date when she distributed Fa-lun Gong flyers was inconsistent with the documentary evidence that she submitted in support of her asylum application; (3) her testimony was internally inconsistent regarding her Falun Gong activity in the United States; (4) her testimony was internally inconsistent regarding whether she distributed Falun Gong flyers; and (5) there were discrepancies between her testimony and the documentary evidence she submitted.

Thus, she has waived any challenge to those findings, Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005), which constitute substantial evidence for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, see Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146-147 (2d Cir.2008). With respect to the findings that Jiang does challenge, each was proper. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s findings that:

(1) Jiang’s testimony that she was beaten by the police was implausible; (2) there was a discrepancy within Jiang’s testimony and between her testimony and the documentary evidence she submitted regarding her ability to practice Falun Gong;

(3) Jiang provided inconsistent testimony regarding when she allegedly received Fa-lun Gong materials in China;

(4) Jiang provided evasive and implausible testimony regarding the location where she allegedly distributed Falun Gong flyers. While Jiang offered explanations before the agency that were responsive to each of these findings, the agency did not err in rejecting them. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Having called Jiang’s testimony into question, the IJ properly noted the absence of corroborative evidence that could have rehabilitated her testimony. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341 (2d Cir.2006).

Ultimately, substantial evidence supported the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Thus, the IJ properly denied Jiang’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because the only evidence that she would be persecuted or tortured depended on her credibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Muhasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008); Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).