Ra'Shaun MULLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alton HOLMES and Catherine Duncan, Defendants-Appellees, 353 F. App'x 664

SUMMARY ORDER Ra’Shaun Muller, an inmate, sued two employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they reduced his pay and discharged him from his prison job, in retaliation for filing inmate grievances. Muller appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J. and Kahn, J.), dismissing the complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. Muller’s appellate brief challenges (

i) the denial of his request for the issuance of four writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, (ii) the grant of partial

summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to the job removal basis of his retaliation claim, and (iii) the denial of his request that the district court ask particular questions during the voir dire. However, our appellate jurisdiction is limited to the district court’s March 13, 2008 denial of Muller’s request for the issuance of four writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum. Muller’s notice of appeal provides: “NOTICE is hereby given that Mr.

RA’SHAUN MULLER, Plaintiff in the above named case, hereby Appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from an Order denying the testimony of inmate and non-inmate witnesses and impeding plaintiffs opportunity to be heard, entered on the 13th 2008, and received by plaintiff on the 17th 2008.” We liberally construe notices of appeal, especially notices filed pro se. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (“[W]e construe notices of appeal liberally, taking the parties’ intentions into account.”); Marvin v.

Goord, 255 F.3d 40, 42 n. 1 (2d Cir.2001) (per curiam) (pro se notices of appeal are construed liberally); Phelps v. Kapnolas, 123 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir.1997) (same). Nevertheless, appellate “jurisdiction is limited by the wording of the notice.” The New Phone Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 498 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam); see also Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1) (“The notice of appeal must ... designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.”).

The express language of Muller’s notice of appeal thus limits our jurisdiction to review of the denial of Muller’s request for the issuance of four writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum.

The district court denied Muller’s request based on the following reasoning: [The] requested inmate witnesses would purportedly testify only to their own circumstances of being removed and then returned to their employment within the Medical Unit following their release from “keeplock.” Inasmuch as the Court has already decided that “plaintiffs removal from his job cannot form the basis for any part of plaintiffs retaliation claim,” the purported testimony of these witnesses] would be irrelevant to the issue to be tried.

The district court determined that the testimony that might be obtained via issuance of the writs would focus on the job discharge claim, which had been dismissed pursuant to an earlier grant of partial

summary judgment, and that the testimony would not be relevant to the remaining pay reduction basis of Muller’s retaliation claim. Muller’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. Accordingly, we detect no error in the district court’s denial of Muller’s request for the issuance of four writs of habeas corpus ad, testificandum. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.