Michael J. WANG, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Julia N. MILLER, Toni E. Logue, Defendants-Appellees, 356 F. App'x 516

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-appellant Michael Wang (‘Wang”), pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing sua sponte his claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as state law, against defendants-appellees Julia Miller, a private attorney (“Miller”), and Toni Logue, an Assistant Attorney General for the State of New York (“Logue”). The present appeal is one of multiple suits initiated by Wang since 2004, when Wang’s medical certification and residency position were revoked and he was prevented from obtaining medical employment based on a finding that he had fraudulently practiced medicine.

Defendants Logue and Miller each represented entities against which Wang brought lawsuits regarding the revocation of his medical certification and residency position. In 2008, Wang filed a complaint against defendant Logue, alleging that she made false statements regarding Wang’s qualifications to practice medicine during the course of that earlier litigation. The District Court dismissed Wang’s claims against Logue with prejudice for failure to state a claim and on grounds of Logue’s absolute immunity. See Wang v. Logue, 08-cv-383 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 10, 2008).

On January 16, 2009, Wang initiated the present suit against Logue and also against defendant Miller, a private attorney who defended another private entity in Wang’s earlier lawsuits. The District Court dismissed Wang’s complaint sua sponte on grounds of res judicata, immunity, and failure to state a claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint. See e.g., Giano v.

Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir.2001). “To survive dismissal, [a] plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, as here, we are “obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations.” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.2004). I.

Claims Against Defendant Logue We recently affirmed the dismissal of Wang’s claims against Logue for her actions in representing a New York State agency as Assistant Attorney General of New York State as barred by absolute immunity. See Wang v. Logue, 351 Fed.Appx. 510, 510-11 (2d Cir.2009). In addition, the claims Wang raises against Logue in the instant litigation are virtually identical to the claims Wang raised against her in a prior action. Accordingly, Wang’s claims against Logue are barred by res judiciata, see Cieszkowska v.

Gray Line N.Y., 295 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.2002), and by the doctrine of absolute immunity, see Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1148 (2d Cir.1995); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571-73 (2d Cir.1986). II. Claims Against Defendant Miller The District Court did not err in determining that Wang failed to state a claim under § 1983 because Miller is not a state actor. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-51, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999).

Wang’s vague allegations of conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights are also insufficient to sustain a claim under §§ 1983 and 1985. See Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir.1992); Sommer v. Dixon, 709 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that § 1985 claims must be dismissed where they contain “only conclu-sory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights”). Because § 1986 claims are contingent upon a valid § 1985 claim, the Distinct Court was also correct in dismissing Wang’s § 1986 claim.

As to Wang’s State law claims, a district court has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over Wang’s state law claims in the instant case. III. Warning of Injunction Against New Actions Finally, we reinforce the District Court’s warning to Wang regarding his duplicative lawsuits.

When “a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system.” Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). Wang has filed at least five prior pro se federal actions relating to the loss of his medical license and his discharge from a medical residency program.

As the District Court noted in its memorandum and order of February 11, 2009, No. 09-cv-183, “[i]n each of Plaintiffs filings, Plaintiff reasserted the same issues against the same parties, and offered no additional facts that would alter [the District Court’s] finding in its earlier orders....

Plaintiff has been given every conceivable benefit of the doubt.” We join the District Court in cautioning Wang that since his repeated filings relate to similar facts and issues, some of which have already been dismissed with prejudice, further filings of any complaint or any appeal based on the same facts and issues may result in the issuance of an order prohibiting Wang from filing any future lawsuits in this Court without first obtaining leave of the Court. Failure to abide by the terms of this Order, or that of the District Court, could result in the imposition of sanctions.

CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.