Ingrid Jno CHARLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daisy CHAPLIN, Defendant-Appellee, A Choice Nanny, Defendant, 356 F. App'x 540

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-appellant Ingrid Jno Charles, ;pro se, appeals from a judgment of the District Court entered after the District Court granted

summary judgment to defendant-appellee Daisy Chaplin on Charles’s Title VII claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues raised on appeal. We review orders granting

summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmovant. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, Inc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999). Chaplin claims that she employs fewer than fifteen employees and, as a result, is not an “employer” covered by Title VII.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining “employer” as any person “engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year”). Charles has been unable to submit evidence in opposition to that claim. Accordingly, the District Court correctly found that no genuine issue of fact existed as to whether Chaplin was an “employer” for purposes of Title VII, and the District Court properly granted

summary judgment in Chaplin’s favor. We have considered Charles’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the August 22, 2008 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. . Defendant-appellant Daisy Chaplin was originally identified by Charles as “Daisy Prince.’’