Terrence FINNAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin K. RYAN, Marsha Kameron Finnan, Ara Asadourian, Essex County, Darla Breckenridge, J. Does, Vito Caruso, Defendants-Appellees. Ann Kennedy, Defendant, 357 F. App'x 331

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-appellant Terrence Finnan (“plaintiff’), pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,1985(2) & (3), and 1986, in a civil rights action arising out of a series of judicial proceedings to which plaintiff was a party. The District Court ordered that (1) plaintiffs claims against defendant Darla Breckenridge be dismissed under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, (2) plaintiffs claims against Justice Kevin K.

Ryan (“Ryan”) and Judge Vito Caruso (“Caruso”) be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to the Rooker-Feld-man doctrine, and (3) plaintiffs remaining claims against defendants Ann Kennedy, Marsha Kameron Finnan, Ara Asadourian, and Essex County be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. All of the defendants except for Ann Kennedy are appellees in the present action. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

We review de novo the District Court’s decision dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), see Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006), and Rule 12(b)(6), see Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). “To survive dismissal, [a] plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ ” ATSI Comms., Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, as here, we are “obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations.” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.2004). We also review de novo the District Court’s decision to grant

summary judgment and, in the course of that review, we resolve ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.2008); Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999). We will affirm the grant of

summary judgment by the District Court if the record indicates “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Pilgrim v. Luther, 571 F.3d 201, 204 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantially for the reasons stated in the District Court’s thorough order of November 7, 2008 we affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(2) & (3), and 1986. See Finnan v. Ryan, No. 08-cv-259, 2008 WL 4891162 (N.D.N.Y.2008).

Plaintiffs § 1983 claims were also properly dismissed against Marsha Finnan, Ara Asadourian, and Darla Breckenridge because they are not state actors and plaintiff made only conclusory allegations that these appellees acted in concert with state officials, which “does not suffice to state a § 1983 claim against [a] private entity.” Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir.2002).

As to Essex County, plaintiff has not made allegations of a governmental custom or policy that would make the County liable under § 1983 and we therefore conclude that the District Court properly dismissed plaintiffs claims against the County. See Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir.2002). The District Court dismissed plaintiffs claims against defendants-appellees Ryan and Caruso under Rule 12(b)(1) pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine after being advised mistakenly that plaintiffs divorce proceedings had ended and a final judgment had been entered.

On appeal, Ryan and Caruso correct this mistake and on this basis we conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar plaintiffs claims against Ryan and Caruso. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced ” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs claims against Ryan and Caruso nonetheless must be dismissed pursuant to Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), which requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question state proceedings. The requirements of Younger abstention have been met in this case because (1) state proceedings are pending;

(2) New York state has an important interest in administering family law; and (3) plaintiff is able to raise his claims in those state court proceedings. Because we are “free to affirm an appealed decision on any ground which finds support in the record,” In re Certain Underwriter, 294 F.3d 297, 302 (2d Cir.2002), on the basis of Younger abstention we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against Ryan and Caruso. We have considered plaintiffs other arguments and find them to be without merit. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.