Pamela CARVEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew CUOMO, Attorney General of the State of New York, on behalf of the People of the State of New York and the Ultimate Charitable Beneficiaries of the Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation, Defendant-Appellee, 357 F. App'x 382

SUMMARY ORDER Pro se plaintiff Pamela Carvel, the niece of the ice cream franchiser, sued defendant Andrew Cuomo, the Attorney General of the State of New York (the “Attorney General”), to compel him to bring an action to dissolve the Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation (the “Foundation”). She now appeals from the dismissal of her complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and from the denial of leave to amend. We review the dismissal of a complaint under either subsection de novo. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002); Makarova v.

United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. Plaintiffs claims against the Attorney General reduce to his alleged failure (1) to bring an action to dissolve the Foundation under N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 1101 or (2) “to enforce the rights of [charitable] beneficiaries by appropriate proceedings in the courts” under N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 8 — 1.1(f).

It is well-established that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against state officials on the basis of state law.” Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 260 (2d Cir.1996); see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (“[I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.”); Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir.1988) (“The federal courts have no general power to compel action by state officials.”).

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs complaint for lack of jurisdiction. While plaintiffs complaint recites violations of the federal Constitution and federal statutes, including the Internal Revenue Code and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., plaintiff has not alleged that the Attorney General himself violated any federal law or that he had any “personal involvement” in the alleged deprivation of her constitutional rights. Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, construing the pro se complaint liberally, as we must, see Boykin v. Key-Corp., 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir.2008), we also conclude that, to the extent we have jurisdiction, plaintiff has failed to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend, see McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir.2007) (reviewing denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion); Van Buskirk v. N.Y.

Times Co., 325 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir.2003) (noting that leave to amend is appropriate “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have considered plaintiffs other arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.