NEN MEI LIN, a.k.a. Nen-Mei Lin, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 358 F. App'x 272

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Nen Mei Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the January 30, 2009 order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Nen Mei Lin, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 30, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006), mindful of “the Supreme Court’s admonition that motions to reopen are disfavored,” Maghradze v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.2006) (citing INS v.

Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (“There is a strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the interest in giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective cases.”)); see also INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992). When the BIA evaluates country conditions evidence submitted with a motion to reopen, we review its findings for substantial evidence. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen based on her failure to establish prima facie eligibility for relief. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104, 108 S.Ct. 904. The BIA reasonably concluded that, notwithstanding her membership in the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) in the United States, Lin failed to show that the Chinese government would single her out for persecution upon her return to China, or that the Chinese government has a pattern or practice of persecuting overseas members of the CDP who return to China. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008).

The BIA also reasonably concluded that the evidence in the record did not describe the persecution or torture of individuals similarly situated to Lin. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir.2005). Contrary to Lin’s argument, the BIA analyzed the most significant pieces of evidence in the record, and adequately indicated the basis for its decision. See Wei Guang Wang v.

BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that where the BIA “has given reasoned consideration to the petition, and made adequate findings,” it need not “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To the extent Lin urges the Court to remand her case to the BIA to address her July 2007 motion to remand, that argument is not properly before us. The proper mechanism for such an argument would have been a petition for review of the BIA’s July 2008 order, a step Lin failed to take. See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 89, 90 (2d Cir.2001) (providing that where an alien timely petitions for review from the denial of a motion to reopen, but not from the underlying affirmance of another decision, this Court may review only the denial of the motion). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).