Mina Makram MORKOS, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 358 F. App'x 278

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Mina Makram Morkos, a native and citizen of Egypt, seeks review of a February 13, 2009 order of the BIA affirming the April 26, 2007 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Noel A. Brennan denying Morkos’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mina Makram Morkos, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 13, 2009), rev’g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City, Apr. 26, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

When the BIA reverses the IJ’s decision in whole, this Court reviews only the decision of the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). We review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2008). We review de novo questions of law and the application of law to undisputed fact. See, e.g., Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008). We find no error in the BIA’s denial of Morkos’s application for asylum.

As the BIA found, he failed to establish that the harm he fears bears a nexus to one of the protected grounds enumerated in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). For applications governed by the amendments to the INA made by the REAL ID Act of 2005, “the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or -will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii); see also Matter of JB-N-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 212 (BIA 2007).

Here, Morkos, a Coptic Christian, was threatened and beaten by the family of a Muslim woman with whom he allegedly had an affair. Although Morkos argues that the woman’s family was motivated by his religious beliefs, as reflected by the family’s desire for him to convert to Islam, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that religion was not a central reason for the alleged persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii); Matter ofJ-BN-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 216.

In particular, Morkos testified that his assailants were angry because “they say there was an affair between me and their daughter” and that they pressured him to convert to Islam to marry the Muslim woman under Egyptian law. Given such testimony, we are not compelled to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the agency. See Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 286 F.Bd 611, 612 (2d Cir.2002) (“To reverse under the substantial evidence standard, we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

Even if Morkos had demonstrated the requisite nexus, the BIA found that he failed to show that the Egyptian government is unwilling or unable to control his attackers. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987); Aliyev v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir.2008). Morkos does not challenge this finding, which was, alone, a proper basis for the denial of his application for asylum. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b). .

Although the BIA remanded to the IJ to allow her to consider Morkos’s request for voluntary departure, "a BIA order denying relief from removal and remanding for the sole purpose of considering voluntary departure is a final order of removal that this Court has jurisdiction to review.” Alibasic v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 78, 83-84 (2d Cir.2008).