Lloyd RAJCOOMAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., Defendant-Appellee, 361 F. App'x 234

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-appellant Lloyd Rajcoomar (“Rajcoomar”), who was represented by counsel in the District Court proceedings, appeals pro se from an order of the District Court granting

summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. (“Wal-Mart”), in Rajcoo-mar’s action alleging that Wal-Mart discriminated against him because of his national origin, race, and color, and then retaliated against him for making related complaints, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law § 290 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal. On appeal, Rajcoomar argues that the District Court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of defendant because (1) material questions of fact existed that require a jury to weigh the evidence, and (2) the District Court did not consider the totality of the circumstances in making its determination. We review de novo the District Court’s decision to grant

summary judgment and, in the course of that review, we resolve ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.2008); Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, Inc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999). No genuine issue of fact exists when the moving party demonstrates, by pleadings and submitted evidence, that no rational juror could find in the non-mov-ant’s favor. See Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.1996).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, plaintiff must show that: (1) they engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse employment action against him; and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity. Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir.2006). If a plaintiff meets this burden, then the defendant must point to evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged employment decision.

The burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to offer evidence sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that the defendant-employer’s explanation is merely a pretext for impermissible retaliation. Cifra v. G.E. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir.2001).

In the instant case we assume, as the District Court did, that Rajcoomar established a prima facie case of retaliation, see SPA at 11 (Memorandum and Order, Apr. 15, 2008), and we agree with the District Court that Rajcoomar did not put forth sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Wal-Mart’s legitimate reasons for its “disciplinary” actions were a pretext for unlawful retaliation. See Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 130-31 (2d Cir.1996) (affirming grant of

summary judgment on claim for retaliatory discharge where “[defendant came forward with several legitimate reasons for the decision to fire plaintiff,” including complaints about her performance and her inability to take direction from supervisors, and plaintiff “put forth no evidence to show that defendant’s asserted reasons for the [decision] were pretextual”). We therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in awarding

summary judgment to defendant. We have considered each of plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.