MU LIN CHEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent, 361 F. App'x 294

SUMMARY ORDER Mu Lin Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 17, 2009 order of the BIA, affirming the November 9, 2007 decision of Immigration Judge (“U”) Joanna M. Bukszpan, which denied his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mu Lin Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 17, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 9, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision. See Mei Chai Ye v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 523 (2d Cir.2007). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2008). The IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. We have held that an adverse credibility finding may reasonably be based on the applicant’s submission of false evidence in an asylum proceeding. See Rui Ying Lin v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir.2006) (discussing the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus).

Here, it is undisputed that Chen filed an asylum application that contained material misrepresentations regarding the date and manner of his entry into the United States. In addition, he offered both his own testimony and that of a witness supporting these false claims. The knowing filing of a false asylum application casts a serious shadow on an applicant’s overall credibility. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir.2007).

While applicants should be encouraged to recant false statements and withdraw false applications, as Chen did here, the agency is not required to overlook such falsities in making its ultimate determination. Thus, the IJ properly relied on the maxim of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus in denying Chen’s CAT claim. See Siewe, 480 F.3d at 170 (relying on the maxim to find that once an IJ concludes that a document is false, he or she is “free to deem suspect other documents (and to disbelieve other testimony) that depend for probative weight upon [the applicant’s] veracity”); Rui Ying Lin, 445 F.3d at 133.

We are unpersuaded by Chen’s argument that his misrepresentations regarding his entry to this country are ancillary to his CAT claim and thus an impermissible basis for the denial of that relief. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184-85 (2d Cir.2004). To the contrary, falsehoods regarding Chen’s entry to this country surely relate to his claims concerning his exit from China. Even if the two bore no relation, the IJ was still permitted to deem the balance of Chen’s uncorroborated testimony false.

See Siewe, 480 F.3d at 170-71 (finding that even ancillary falsehoods may support the application of falsus in uno). Having found no error in the IJ’s credibility determination, we need not reach her alternative burden of proof finding. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).