Theodore F. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Judge Debra A. JAMES, Natalia Swan, also known as Natalia Wolan, Alterman and Boop, LLP, William Schaap, Robert S. Sikorski, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, Yolanda Chang, Broker, H.P.D. New York City Department of Finance, et al., Defendants-Appellees, 364 F. App'x 704

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff Theodore F. Johnson, pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his complaint, which alleged various claims under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. We review a judgment of dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo, construing the pro se complaint liberally, accepting its factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002); see also Miller v.

Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). To the extent the challenged judgment against two of the nine defendants was entered by the court sua sponte, we are mindful that, notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) authorizes a district court to dismiss a case at any time if the court determines that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir.2000).

In applying these principles, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. Our independent review of the record confirms that the district court properly ordered dismissal.

As the district court observed, all of Johnson’s claims against the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development and the Department of Finance are barred by res judicata, as they arose out of the same transaction upon which Johnson had previously brought suit on more than one occasion, and at least one of those actions resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Cieszkowska v.

Gray Line N.Y., 295 F.3d 204, 205 (2d Cir.2002) (“[0]nce a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a case, that judgment will bar any subsequent litigation by the parties or those in privity with them concerning the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the [first] action arose.” (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original)).

Further, Johnson’s remaining claims do not satisfy the pleading standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) because he has not “plead[ed] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —, —, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir.1995) (“When a complaint fails to comply with [Fed.R.Civ.P. 8], the district court has the power, on motion or sua sponte, to dismiss the complaint....”).

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the reasons articulated in its thorough and well-reasoned decision. We have considered Johnson’s other arguments on appeal and conclude that they lack merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.