Willie SUMPTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D. SKIFF, Counselor, Gouverneur Correctional Facility, Glenn S. Goord, Commissioner, Defendants-Appellees, Lucien LeClaire, Jr., Deputy Commissioner, Defendant, 366 F. App'x 284

SUMMARY ORDER The appellant Willie Sumpter, pro se, appeals from a judgment of the district court dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. The district court adopted the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, to which Sumpter filed no objections after the district court denied his motion for an extension of time to file objections. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

This Court has adopted the rule that failure to timely object to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation “may operate as a waiver of any further judicial review of the decision, as long as the parties receive clear notice of the consequences of their failure to object.” Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 155, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (holding that a Court of Appeals may adopt such a rule); United States v. Male Juvenile (95-CR-107k), 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1997); see also Wesolek v. Canadair Limited, 838 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir.1988).

While this rule, which applies to pro se litigants, is “a nonjurisdictional waiver provision whose violation we may excuse in the interests of justice,” Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.1993), we find no basis for doing so here, where none of Appellant’s arguments on appeal have substantial merit, see Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Coir. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 174 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

We note that insofar as the appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for an extension of time to file objections to the report and recommendation, we review such decisions for abuse of discretion, see Wesolek, 838 F.2d at 58, and we have determined that, here, the district court acted within its discretion by denying the motion because the appellant failed to assert good cause for the requested extension, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6.

We also note that while the district court declined to grant the appellant leave to amend his complaint, even a liberal reading of the complaint gives no indication that he could have stated a valid claim in a second amended complaint. See Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir.2009) (citing Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir.1999)). For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.