GUO MAN WANG, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, Respondent, 367 F. App'x 278

SUMMARY ORDER Guo Man Wang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 9, 2009, order of the BIA affirming the December 6, 2007, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Helen J. Si-chel, which denied Wang’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Gtio Man Wang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA Apr. 9, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 6, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision including the portions not explicitly discussed by the BIA. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

The IJ found that Wang was not credible based on: (1) his inconsistent testimony about his wife’s affidavit; (2) his inconsistent testimony regarding his knowledge of the Democratic Party in China; (3) his lack of knowledge about the pro-democracy group he claimed to be involved with in China; (4) his failure to mention his alleged beating in his initial asylum application; (5) his inconsistent testimony about the nature of his injuries; and (6) his inconsistent testimony about the hospital he claimed he went to after the beating he allegedly endured.

In his brief, Wang argues that the IJ’s credibility finding was erroneous because she relied on minor inconsistencies that did not go to the heart of his claim. Contrary to Wang’s argument, under the REAL ID Act, which applied to Wang’s application for relief, “an IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (emphasis in original); see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); see also Matter of JY-C-, 24 I. & N.

Dec. 260, 265 (BIA 2007) (finding that “the REAL ID Act no longer requires the trier of fact to find a nexus between inconsistencies and the ‘heart of the claim’ ”). Moreover, no reasonable fact finder would have been compelled to credit Wang’s explanations for the discrepancies the IJ identified. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Accordingly, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii), 1252(b)(4)(B).

Because Wang’s claims were all based on the same factual predicate, the agency’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief was proper. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).