Robert L. KRUG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard McNALLY, Jr., Bartle, McGrane, Duffy, and Jones, Peter B. Jones, Defendants-Appellees, 368 F. App'x 269

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-appellant Robert L. Krug appeals pro se from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Kahn, J.) dated February 8, 2007, 488 F.Supp.2d 198, granting

summary judgment to the Defendants-Appellees and dismissing Krug’s complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Krug alleged that his privately-retained attorneys deprived him of his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by interfering with and depriving him of effective assistance of counsel in relation to state criminal charges brought against him. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. We review orders granting

summary judgment de novo and determine whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202-03 (2d Cir.1995). The district court did not err in determining that Krug failed to state a claim under § 1983 because the Defendants are not state actors. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-51, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981).

Krug’s vague allegations of conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights are also insufficient to sustain a claim under § 1983. “[C]omplaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights are properly dismissed; diffuse and expansive allegations are insufficient, unless amplified by specific instances of misconduct.” Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 325 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As to Krug’s state law claims, a district court has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over Krug’s state law claims, in light of the fact that it had dismissed all of Krug’s federal claims. We have considered all of Krug’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.