The ESTATE OF Theodore LIPIN, Robert G. Lipin, and Ann Susan Markatos, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Joan C. LIPIN, Defendant-Appellant, 369 F. App'x 236

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Joan C. Lipin, pro se, appeals from a judgment of the district court “dismissing” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the state court action she removed to federal court. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

As an initial matter, upon consideration of the arguments raised therein, Lipin’s pending motion to file her reply brief is hereby GRANTED, and her pending motion for reconsideration of a March 2009 order of this Court regarding subpoenas served on Lipin is hereby DENIED, because it has no basis in law. Generally, with respect to a removed case, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded” back to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added). This Court lacks jurisdiction to review such “remand” orders.

See id. § 1447(d). However, the district court here “dismissed” the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the dismissal, and we review district court rulings on subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See SEC v. Berger, 822 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir.2003). There is no federal question jurisdiction over the removed action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). However, we cannot determine on the present record whether diversity jurisdiction exists. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(b).

Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND the matter with instructions for the district court to conduct further proceedings to determine whether remand to state court is appropriate. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v. CenterMark Props., 30 F.3d 298, 305-06 (2d Cir.1994); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 and 1447(c). . Although no separate judgment was entered in this matter, the dismissal order was entered in July 2008.

Under the 2002 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7), if a required separate judgment is not entered, it is deemed to have been entered 150 days after entry of the dispositive order.