Betty BEHLING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee, 369 F. App'x 292

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Betty Behling appeals from the February 9, 2009 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Bianco, /.), granting appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Appellee, the Commissioner of Social Security, determined that appellant was not entitled to disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (the “Act”).

This determination was made in light of the fact that appellant failed to demonstrate that she was disabled within the meaning of the Act prior to December 31, 2003, the date on which appellant was last insured. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. In conducting our review of “a disability benefits determination, our focus is not so much on the district court’s ruling as it is on the administrative ruling.” Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We engage in “a plenary review of the administrative record to determine if there is substantial evidence, considering the record as a whole, to support the Commissioner’s decision” and to determine “if the correct legal standards have been applied.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the district court’s decision to grant judgment on the pleadings de novo but defer to the Commissioner’s resolution of any conflicting evidence in the record. See Clark v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir.1998).

The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential analysis for evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see Carroll v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir.1983). In this case, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that appellant retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work and that she could return to her past relevant type of work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); see also Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir.2004) (per curiam).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s deter-' ruination that appellant did not suffer from a disability, as that term is defined in the Social Security Act, prior to the date on which she was last insured. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). While it is true that “subjective evidence of pain or disability testified to by the claimant” is relevant in evaluating a claim for disability insurance, Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir.1999), appellant’s subjective complaints alone are not a basis for an award of disability insurance benefits in the absence of corroborating objective medical evidence.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 307 (2d Cir.2009) (per curiam). Appellant asks this Court to consider her current condition, which she alleges is deteriorating. However, appellant was required to demonstrate that she was disabled as of the date on which she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A); see Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.1989). Any new impairments are not relevant to our disposition of appellant’s present appeal. We have considered appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.