Lolita BRONZINI, Plaintiff-Appellant, Eimont Bronzini, Consolidated-Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLASSIC SECURITY L.L.C., Defendant-Appellee, 371 F. App'x 196

SUMMARY ORDER Pro se plaintiffs Lolita and Eimont Bronzini appeal from the January 15, 2009, 2009 WL 102140, order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Harold Baer, Judge) granting

summary judgment in favor of defendant Classic Security L.L.C. on plaintiffs’ discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq.; the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.; and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin.

Code § 8-101 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history. We review de novo orders granting

summary judgment, focusing on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We analyze discrimination claims under the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96-97 (2d Cir.2009) (ADA); Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 167-68 (2d Cir.2004) (FMLA); Tomassi v.

Insignia Fin. Group, Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 114-15 (2d Cir.2007) (ADEA). We independently conclude, for substantially the reasons stated by the district court, that plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence that would permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that defendant’s nondiscriminatory, legitimate business reasons for the challenged employment actions were a pretext for discrimination. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817; see also Fisher v.

Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir.1995). Insofar as plaintiffs argue that the district court failed specifically to address Lolita Bronzini’s FMLA claim, we conclude that any oversight was harmless. The district court referenced the factual predicate of the underlying FMLA claim twice in its order and, properly reviewing Lolita Bronzini’s claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, concluded there was no evidence to support a showing of pretext.

Upon independent review of the record, we likewise conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support an inference that defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions were in fact in retaliation for Lolita Bronzini’s taking FMLA-protected leave. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 156 (2d Cir.2003) (observing that this court is “free to affirm an appealed decision on any ground which finds support in the record” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.