Roy Den HOLLANDER and William A. Nosal, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN & GENDER AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, School of Continuing Education at Columbia University, Trustees Of Columbia University In The City Of New York, also known as Columbia University, U.S. Department of Education, Richard P. Mills, in his individual capacity, Commissioner Richard P. Mills, New York State Commissioner of the Department of Education, in his official capacity, Margaret Spellings, U.S. Secretary of Education, in her official capacity, President James C. Ross, President of the New York State Higher Education Services Corp., in his official capacity, James C. Ross, in his individual capacity, Chancellor Robert M. Bennett, Chancellor of the Board of Regents, in his official capacity, Robert M. Bennett, in his individual capacity, Board of Regents of the University of the State, in his or her individual or official capacity, Defendants-Appellees, 372 F. App'x 140

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Roy Den Hollander appeals from the judgment of the district court dated April 30, 2009 (Kaplan, J.), adopting the Report and Recommendation dated April 15, 2009 by United States Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox, and granting defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of standing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and specification of issues on appeal. “The party seeking judicial review bears the burden of alleging facts that demonstrate its standing.” Green Island Power Auth. v. Fed.

Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 577 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Plaintiff alleges that the existence of Columbia University’s Women’s Studies Program and the corresponding lack of an equivalent “Men’s Studies Program” inflicts harm on certain men as a class by, inter alia, promoting “misandry-femi-nism,” promoting feminism as a religion, and robbing men of an equivalent educational experience.

As to the plaintiffs discrimination-based claims, the district court properly dismissed the action for lack of standing as to all defendants because the plaintiffs claims of harm amount to the kind of speculative harm for which courts cannot confer standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (stating that “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (

a) concrete and particularized, and (

b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted); Gully v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 341 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir.2003) (same). Nor has plaintiff made out the requirements for taxpayer standing for his Establishment Clause claim. See DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 405 (2d Cir.2001).

Thus, with no occasion to reach any of plaintiffs’ further arguments on appeal — about which we share, in any event, the district court’s grave doubts — we AFFIRM the dismissal of the action for substantially the reasons stated in Judge Fox’s thorough Report and Recommendation as adopted by the district court. . William A. Nosal was a Class Representative when the case was before the district court and as of the filing of the appeal at bar, but has since withdrawn.