James F. BOYLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF HAMMOND, New York State Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees, 375 F. App'x 85

SUMMARY ORDER Pro se plaintiff James F. Boyle appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint alleging a qui tam claim under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., and an involuntary servitude claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. In addition, Boyle moves for this court to award him “just compensation” on these claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review de novo a district court’s s^la sponte dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Giano v.

Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.2001). “Notwithstanding any filing fee ... that may have been paid,” a district court “shall dismiss [a] case at any time if the court determines that ... the action or appeal ... is frivolous or malicious ... [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)®, (ii); see Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d at 149; see also Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir.2007) (observing that § 1915(e)(2) provides “an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims”).

An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact — ie., if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or presents “factual contentions [that] are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827,104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Upon independent review of the record, we conclude for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its well-reasoned opinion that plaintiffs claims lack an arguable basis in law or fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs complaint.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. Because we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint, plaintiffs motion for “just compensation” based on the claims raised therein is hereby DENIED.