Theodore F. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHAIRMAN NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee, 377 F. App'x 46

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Theodore F. Johnson, pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint alleging various claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117; and the Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Johnson brought this action against the New York City Transit Authority (“NYC-TA”), where he used to be employed, alleging discrimination in connection with his termination and calculation of pension benefits in 1984. The suit challenges actions taken long before any conceivable applicable limitation period, and in any event the events in question were the subject of suits brought as early as 1983 and 1985, which were decided against him on the merits and became final in 1986. Johnson v.

New York City Transit Auth., 116 F.R.D. 394 (E.D.N.Y.) (May 8,1986 Memorandum and Order dismissing both complaints for failing to state a claim). Although these suits were dismissed for legal defects and never reached the stage of a jury trial, they nevertheless were properly terminated. His claims are thus also barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See generally Pike v. Freeman, 266 F.3d 78, 91 (2d Cir.2001).

Since that time, appellant has filed numerous duplicative actions; as long ago as 1990, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York entered an order prohibiting him from filing further actions. This Court affirmed that order, Johnson v. New York City Transit Auth., 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.1990), and contrary to claims Johnson has made at times in the past, this Court has never “rescinded” or vacated it. See Johnson v. Chairman New York City Transit Auth., 198 Fed.Appx. 53 (2d Cir.2006) (affirming that 1990 order was still valid).

The district court, in reliance on that order, correctly dismissed this action, and its order is accordingly affirmed. This order constitutes the third time since the entry of the 1990 injunction that we have affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s repetitive claims. In light of his long history of meritless and vexatious litigation arising from his termination by the NYCTA, it is to be earnestly hoped that appellant will not continue to waste his own, the appellees’, and the courts’ resources with further filings.

In any event, Johnson is reminded that the 1990 order prohibiting such filings remains in full force, and that he should not expect to continue to violate it without facing sanctions. He is hereby advised that any future frivolous appeals, motions, or other filings concerning these matters could result in the imposition of sanctions, including an order barring any future filings without approval by this Court. See Hong Mai Sa v.

Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir.2005) (“If a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 228 (2d Cir.1993) (“[Cjourts may resort to restrictive measures that except from normally available procedures litigants who have abused their litigation opportunities.”); Sassower v.

Sansverie, 885 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1989) (warning appellant who “abused the judicial process to harass defendants with vexations and frivolous suits” and who then filed a “frivolous” appeal “that if he continues to abuse the judicial process by the instigation of frivolous appeals, an injunction will issue directing the Clerk of this Court to refuse to accept for filing any submissions from him, unless he has first obtained leave of the Court to file such papers.”). For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.