Frederick TARANTINO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF HORNELL, Timothy Aiken, Shawn Hogan, Joe Pelych, Defendants-Appellees, 378 F. App'x 68

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Frederick Tarantino appeals pro se from a May 19, 2009, 615 F.Supp.2d 102, order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Larimer, J.) granting

summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appel-lees and dismissing Tarantino’s complaint asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law claims. See Tarantino v. City of Hornell, 615 F.Supp.2d 102 (W.D.N.Y.2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case and with the issues presented for review. We review an order granting

summary judgment de novo, and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom

summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Stuart v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 626 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a[n adequately supported]

summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002). Appellant Tarantino’s principal contentions on appeal relate to his facial challenge to various provisions of the City of Hornell’s Municipal Code § 120-1, which sets forth the requirements, inter alia, that all residential dwelling and commercial rental units in the City of Hornell be inspected and certified for occupancy by the City. Hornell, N.Y., Municipal Code § 120-1. When construed generously, see Wright v.

Comm’r, 571 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir.2009), Tarantino’s appellate brief also challenges the district court’s dismissal of his Fourth Amendment, First Amendmént retaliation, malicious prosecution, Equal Protection, and Contract Clause claims. Any challenge to the district court’s decision not sufficiently raised in Tarantino’s brief is deemed waived. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995). We find no error in the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to defendants on Tarantino’s constitutional claims, and therefore affirm the judgment for substantially the same reasons set forth in the District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See Tarantino, 615 F.Supp.2d 102.

To the extent Tarantino presses a facial challenge to the provision of § 120-1 that prohibits the collection of rents on properties that lack the required Certificate of Occupancy, Hornell, N.Y., Municipal Code § 120-l(C)(l)(c), we conclude that this provision is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of enforcing the substantive requirements of Hornell’s municipal code relating to the inspection and certification of buildings within the City. See Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 608 (2d Cir.2009).

We have carefully considered all of Appellant’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.