Mansoor ALAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A., formerly known as Republic National Bank of New York, Defendant-Appellee, 382 F. App'x 74

SUMMARY ORDER Pro se plaintiff Mansoor Alam, a 65-year old Muslim male, brought this action against defendant, HSBC Bank USA., N.A. (“HSBC”), alleging retaliation and discrimination based on his age and religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. during his employment with and as a result of his termination by HSBC on August 4, 2005. The District Court granted

summary judgment for HSBC on September 28, 2009. Alam filed a timely appeal of that order. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history and issues raised on appeal. We review orders granting

summary judgment de novo, and we will affirm only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 535-36 (2d Cir.2010). We analyze these discrimination claims using the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Gorzynski v.

JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 105-06 (2d Cir.2010) (holding that the burden-shifting framework for ADEA cases remains binding after Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009)). Having conducted an independent and de novo review, we hold, for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court in its well-reasoned opinion, see Alam v. HSBC Bank U.S.A., N.A., No. 07 Civ. 3450, 2009 WL 3096293 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 28, 2009), that Alam failed to demonstrate that HSBC’s non-discriminatory, legitimate business reasons for the alleged discriminatory employment actions were a pretext for discrimination. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817; see also Fisher v.

Vassar, 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir.1995) (“[T]he plaintiff must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s stated reason is ‘a pretext for discrimination’ ... [by] establishing] ‘both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’ ”). We also conclude, for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, that Alam was unable to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v.

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (holding that the two events must be “very close,” and that a proximity of three months or more was insufficient); Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 113 (2d Cir.1999) (four-month delay insufficient); Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir.1990) (three-month delay insufficient). Even if Alam were able to establish a prima facie case, we hold that Alam failed to proffer any material evidence, from which a rational fact-finder could conclude that HSBC’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions were pretextual.

CONCLUSION We have considered each of Alam’s arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.