UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Frederick MARCH, also known as Frederick Morris Gordon, also known as Winston March, Defendant-Appellant, 382 F. App'x 76

SUMMARY ORDER Defendant-appellant Frederick March (“defendant” or “March”) appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on July 7, 2009, after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846(a)(1) and 841(b)(l)(A)(ii)(II), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(l)(A)(ii)(II) and bail jumping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1), (b)(l)(A)(I), and (b)(2).

The District Court sentenced March principally to a 135-month term of imprisonment and five years of supervised release on the cocaine charges, and a thirty-six month term of imprisonment on the bail jumping charge, to run concurrently. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. On appeal, defendant makes two arguments. First, he argues that the District Court “abused its discretion” in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the cocaine charges.

Specifically, March contends that the District Court’s conclusion that his plea was knowing and voluntary based on its determination that his former counsel’s testimony was credible was clearly erroneous. Second, March argues that the District Court erred in rejecting his claim that his former counsel’s ineffective assistance invalidated his guilty plea. Both claims are without merit. We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea for “abuse of discretion.” United States v.

Doe, 537 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir.2008). “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on a mistaken application of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” United States v. Arteca, 411 F.3d 315, 320 (2d Cir.2005) (quotation marks omitted). “A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.

Iodice, 525 F.3d 179, 185 (2d Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted). “Where a motion to withdraw a plea is premised on involuntariness, the defendant must raise a significant question about the voluntariness of the original plea.” Doe, 537 F.3d at 211 (quotation marks omitted). On May 4, 2009, the District Court conducted a hearing as to the voluntariness of March’s plea at which March’s former counsel was the sole witness. The District Court concluded that the counsel’s testimony was credible and that March had therefore failed to offer “a fair and just reason” to withdraw his plea.

See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B) (“A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty ... after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”). A district court’s credibility determination is entitled to “particularly strong deference.” Iodice, 525 F.3d at 185 (citation omitted). After an independent review of the record, we cannot say that the District Court, which benefit-ted from the direct testimony of the former counsel, “abused its discretion” in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea.

We review a district court’s determination of a claim of ineffective assistance de novo. See Arteca, 411 F.3d at 320. To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel elaim a defendant must show that “1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness according to prevailing professional norms, and 2) ... that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

Defendant must therefore show that there is a “reasonable probability” that but for counsel’s errors, “he would not have [pleaded] guilty.” Id. (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)).

March affirmed under oath the adequacy of his former counsel’s representation, and stated that he was satisfied and had sufficient time to discuss the charges and his decision to plead guilty. “The fact that a defendant has a change of heart prompted by his reevaluation of either the Government’s case against him or the penalty that might be imposed is not a sufficient reason to permit withdrawal of a plea.” Doe, 537 F.3d at 212 (quotation marks omitted). We therefore conclude, for substantially the same reasons stated by the District Court, J.A. at 174-81 (Hr’g.

Tr., May 8, 2009), that inadequate representation did not invalidate defendant’s plea or provide a basis for which it might be withdrawn. CONCLUSION We have considered each of defendant’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.