ZHENHAI YU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, JR., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 383 F. App'x 65

SUMMARY ORDER Zhenhai Yu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April' 23, 2009 order of the BIA affirming the November 20, 2007 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Paul A. De-fonzo, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhenhai Yu, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 23, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 20, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA’s decision. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir.2008). I. Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Relief Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. Yu argues generally that the IJ’s findings went to matters too minor to support an adverse credibility determination.

For asylum applications governed by the REAL ID Act, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his or her account, and inconsistencies in his or her statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Moreover, the IJ’s individual findings were not erroneous.

The IJ reasonably identified an inconsistency between Yu’s asylum application, which stated that Chinese authorities came to his house and threatened to arrest him after he fled China, and Yu’s merits hearing testimony, which failed to mention these events, despite inquiry as to why Yu feared arrest upon return to China. The IJ further noted that this information was also omitted from Yu’s mother’s letter.

The IJ also reasonably relied on the inconsistency between Yu’s testimony that he used to practice Falun Gong with his friend only in the park and a letter from his friend stating that she went to Yu’s house to practice Falun Gong. To the extent that Yu offered explanations for these discrepancies, the IJ was not compelled to credit them. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Nor was he compelled to credit Yu’s contention that proffered medical records related to an alleged incident of mistreatment. See id.

Finally, the record plainly belies Yu’s contention that the agency failed to consider his claim to have been beaten twice by Chinese authorities. Yu does not challenge the agency’s denial of his withholding of removal or CAT claims before this Court. Even assuming that Yu’s challenge to the IJ’s adverse credibility determination suffices to challenge the agency’s denial of each of his applications for relief, that determination undermines these claims to the extent each was based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005). II. Motion to Remand Contrary to Yu’s argument, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand his proceedings to the IJ based on the affidavits he submitted on appeal. See Li Yong Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir.2005). As the BIA found, the information in these affidavits was not previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).