DE SHENG TIAN, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, Respondent, 386 F. App'x 9

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner De Sheng Tian, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the May 18, 2009, order of the BIA, which denied his motion to reopen. In re De Sheng Tian, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 18, 2009). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Because the BIA issued its final order of removal in May 1996, it is undisputed that Tian’s November 2008 motion to reopen was untimely.

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). While there is no time limitation for motions to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h), the BIA reasonably found that Tian did not qualify for such an exception. As the BIA noted, Tian’s recent practice of Christianity and the birth of his U.S. citizen children constitute changed personal circumstances, not changed country conditions.

See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir.2006). The BIA also reasonably found that Tian failed to demonstrate that the Chinese government’s treatment of Christians in China had “changed for the worse in recent years.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Although Tian submitted a State Department 2005 Country Report to support his claim of changed country conditions, that report stated simply that the Chinese government’s “respect for religious freedom remained poor.” Certified Admin. Record at 121 (emphasis added).

Finally, we identify no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Tian failed to demonstrate his eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture based on his illegal departure from China. See Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir.2005). The BIA’s denial of Tian’s untimely motion to reopen was therefore not an abuse of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Wei Guang Wang, 437 F.3d at 273-74. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). . We do not reach Tian's argument that he established changed country conditions relating to China's treatment of "political dissidents.” That argument was not raised before the BIA and is therefore unexhausted. See Lin Zhong v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007).