WEI YE, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 391 F. App'x 104

SUMMARY ORDER Wei Ye, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 12, 2009, order of the BIA, affirming the August 27, 2007, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sandy K. Horn, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Wei Ye, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 12, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 27, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

In the circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008); Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 289 (2d Cir.2007). I. Falun Gong The agency did not err in finding that Ye failed to meet his burden of establishing his eligibility for relief because he did not provide reasonably available corroboration of his claims. See Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 568 (2d Cir.2006), Diallo v.

INS, 232 F.3d 279, 290 (2d Cir.2000);. Ye does not challenge the agency’s dispositive finding that he failed to adequately corroborate his Falun Gong claim, but instead argues that the agency failed to consider the U.S. Department of State’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China for 2006.

The agency did not explicitly indicate that it had analyzed the information in the record concerning the treatment of Falun Gong practitioners in China: However, because the agency’s decision was based on the lack of corroboration of Ye’s assertion that he practiced Falun Gong, rather than the treatment of Falun Gong practitioners in general, his argument is inapposite. II.

Family Planning Ye argues that he suffered past persecution because his wife’s forced abortion prevented him from “being allowed to enjoy the basic human right of procreating with his wife.” However, an alien is not per se eligible for relief based on a spouse’s forced abortion. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 309 (2d Cir.2007).

Moreover, contrary to Ye’s contention that the agency failed to consider his fear of persecution under China’s family planning policy based on his wife’s pregnancy, the BIA reasonably found that Ye “failed to provide reasonably available corroboration to support his claim ... that he would face persecution based on China’s coercive population control policies.” See Kyaw Zwar Tun, 445 F.3d at 568; see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 161 (2d Cir.2008).

Because Ye’s withholding of removal claim was predicated on the same basis as his asylum claim, the agency’s reasonable finding that he had not met his burden of proof with respect to asylum was a sufficient basis to deny both forms of relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).