BAO MI CHEN, a.k.a. Baomi Chen, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 395 F. App'x 764

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Bao Mi Chen (“Chen”), a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the November 17, 2009 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Bao Mi Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 17, 2009). The BIA denied Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely filed and number barred, and the BIA found inapplicable the exception for alleged changed country conditions in Chen’s native People’s Republic of China. We “review the denial of motions to reopen immigration proceedings for abuse of discretion, mindful that motions to reopen are disfavored.... ” See Ali v.

Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). As in this case, when the BIA evaluates evidence of “changed country conditions” submitted with a motion to reopen, we review its findings for whether substantial evidence supports the BIA’s findings. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. See Ali, 448 F.3d at 517.

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened and only one such motion may be filed. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Chen’s second motion to reopen, filed in February 2009, was numerically barred and untimely. See id.

The time and number limitations do not apply to a petitioner’s motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(S)(ii).

In denying Chen’s motion to reopen, the BIA reasonably concluded that his adoption of Christianity in the United States— well over a decade after an immigration judge originally denied Chen’s application for asylum — did not excuse the time or number limit barring his motion because it constituted a change in his personal circumstances rather than a change in circumstances “arising in the country of nationality.” See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006).

Furthermore, the BIA did not err in finding that Chen failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions with respect to the treatment of underground churches in China. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169. The record supports the BIA’s finding that the treatment of unregistered religious groups varies widely within China, with some areas allowing such groups to practice openly. Moreover, the religious persecution recounted in the State Department Reports in the record is identified as occurring in provinces other than Chen’s native Fujian Province.

Although Chen proffered a letter written to him from his native province, which discussed the suppression of underground churches, this letter failed to indicate if this activity has changed in any material way since 1995, when Chen was originally excluded from the United States.

Therefore, the BIA reasonably found that the conclusory assertions contained in this letter regarding changed circumstances in the Fujian Province were insufficient to establish changed circumstances that would materially alter the outcome of Chen’s case, particularly absent any comparative evidence of the treatment of underground churches in Chen’s home province at the time of his hearing before the immigration judge. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N.

Dec. 247, 257 (B.I.A.2007) (finding that “a new report or a new law is not evidence of changed conditions without convincing evidence that the prior version of the law was different, or was differently enforced, in some relevant and material way”). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).