Ardian KACUPAJ, Aferdita Kacupaj, a.k.a. Alfadida Kacupaj, Eugert Kacupaj a.k.a. Uber Kacupaj, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 396 F. App'x 756

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioners, natives and citizens of Albania, seek review of an October 7, 2009, order of the BIA, affirming the July 25, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Michael W. Straus, which denied their application for asylum and withholding of removal. In re Kacupaj, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ], [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/783 (B.I.A. Oct. 7, 2009), aff'g Nos. Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ], [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/783 (Immig. Ct. Hartford July 25, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

As an initial matter, we review the denial of relief in “asylum-only” proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), because the denial of relief in these circumstances is the functional equivalent of a removal order. See Kanacevic v. INS, 448 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2006). Under the circumstances of this case, we consider both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008); Manzur v. U.S.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 289 (2d Cir.2007). We find no error in the agency’s determination that, although he experienced past persecution, Kacupaj no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in Albania due to changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The agency supported its finding of a fundamental change in circumstances in Albania, stating that the Democratic Party had returned to power in 2005, a fact we have noted as well, see Latifi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 103, 106 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005).

The agency also reasonably relied on Department of State reports, noting that according to the U.S. Department of State’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Albania for 2007, the Albanian government “generally respected the human rights of its citizens.” See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341-42 (holding that the agency did not err in its reliance on State Department reports because they are “usually the best source of information on country conditions”) (internal citations omitted). The IJ also considered the testimony of Petitioners’ expert, Dr. Bernd J.

Fischer, acknowledging that there was ongoing political turmoil in Albania, but noting Dr. Fischer’s testimony that Shkoder, the area of Albania in which Kacupaj lived, was a stronghold of the Democratic Party. Moreover, Dr. Fischer testified that violence in Albania decreased since 2000, when Kacupaj suffered persecution for his activities on behalf of the Democratic Party. Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that a fundamental change in circumstances in Albania rebutted Kacupaj’s presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. See Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir.2006); Niang v.

Mukasey, 511 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir.2007). Likewise, the agency did not err in denying withholding of removal, insofar as that claim was based on the same alleged facts as Petitioners’ asylum claim. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006). Absent a well-founded fear of future persecution, the agency may grant humanitarian asylum based on the severity of past persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(l)(iii)(A). Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the agency’s conclusion that Kacupaj did not endure the type of atrocious persecution for which humanitarian asylum is reserved. See Mirzoyan v.

Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir.2006) (stating that humanitarian asylum is reserved for “certain rare cases”). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). .

Because Ardían Kacupaj was the lead applicant, we refer to him as “Kacupaj.”