SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Lynette Robinson, who is proceeding pro se on appeal, appeals the judgment of the district court granting the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, and dismissing her claims for retaliation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (“ERISA”); race discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”); and various claims under New York State and New York City law. We review orders granting
summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003); Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. Delta Air Lines, 263 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir.2001); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mazzola, 175 F.3d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1999). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Following an exhaustive review of the record, we conclude that the district court correctly granted
summary judgment to the Defendants on all of Robinson’s claims, based on substantially the same reasons as articulated by that court in its detailed memorandum and order. Furthermore, we have considered all of Robinson’s claims of error on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to overturn the underlying judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.